Inconsistent theories (was Re: Chasing the Wind)

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.25.14.29]

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.25.1115)]

Bill Powers (2009.089.25.1106 MDT) to Kenny Kitzke (2009.09.25.1100EDT)

It’s hard for me to see how you could
claim to admire both the theories of economics that you have learned
about AND the theory that people are living hierarchies of control
systems who try to make their inputs match internally set reference
levels. PCT is entirely incompatible with the way economists think
people
work. You can’t believe in both approaches unless you have a different
brain to use in thinking about each of them. If economic theories are
right, Bill Powers’ theory is wrong. And vice versa. You can’t make
them
both be right at the same time. You have to choose.

This is called a conflict, Kenny. You know, those things you help
other people to resolve?

I have a strong suspicion that this type of conflict is the reason why
many people have left CSGNet and blamed their leaving on me. The
conflict is always between admiring Bill Powers’ theory (PCT) and
admiring some other theory which is wrong if Bill Powers’ theory is
right.

I don’t see it quite that way. What I see as a problem is that the
“other theory” is so often asserted to be wrong if Bill Powers’
theory is right, when in fact there is no necessary inconsistency
between the theories. The perception that is so strongly defended
against disturbances is that any theory that isn’t by Bill Powers is
ipso facto incompatible with PCT, whereas in reality some other
theories are truly incompatible (e.g. S-R behaviourism), some are not
incompatible but address some other issue (e.g. complexity theory), and
some are supportive and potentially useful in extending the reach of
PCT (e.g. informational analysis). Insisting that other theories must
necessarily be incompatible with PCT, in the absence of rational
explanations of what the particular inconsistency might be, can be
extremely frustrating to the person introducing those ideas into the
discussion.

I have no personal doubts as to the correctness of PCT, but I do have
(as does Bill, by his own statements), and hope always to retain,
questions about the correctness of “classical” HPCT. Even so, there
have been occasions on which I have contemplated leaving CSGnet because
I introduce concepts that are, to my mind, supportive of PCT, not
incompatible with HPCT, I have argued their value for PCT, but my
arguments have been summarily and arbitrarily dismissed as “old
thinking that must be destroyed before one can truly know PCT” (in
other words, heretical).

The words “admiring”, used twice by Rick in the sentence quoted above,
is quite telling, don’t you think?

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.25.1650)]

Martin Taylor (2009.09.25.14.29)–

Rick Marken (2009.09.25.1115)–

I have a strong suspicion that this type of conflict is the reason why
many people have left CSGNet and blamed their leaving on me. The
conflict is always between admiring Bill Powers’ theory (PCT) and
admiring some other theory which is wrong if Bill Powers’ theory is
right.
I don’t see it quite that way. What I see as a problem is that the
“other theory” is so often asserted to be wrong if Bill Powers’
theory is right, when in fact there is no necessary inconsistency
between the theories.

Yes, that’s another approach to dealing with the conflict.

The perception that is so strongly defended
against disturbances is that any theory that isn’t by Bill Powers is
ipso facto incompatible with PCT

That’s not true. If the other theory were the same as PCT then it wouldn’t matter whether Bill came up with it or not. It’s the theory that matters, not who developed it.

The words “admiring”, used twice by Rick in the sentence quoted above,
is quite telling, don’t you think?

Yes, I think it made the conflict clear. What do you think was telling about it?

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD

rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.25.20.39]

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.25.1650)]

Martin Taylor
(2009.09.25.14.29)–

Rick Marken (2009.09.25.1115)–

I have a strong suspicion that this type of conflict is the reason why
many people have left CSGNet and blamed their leaving on me. The
conflict is always between admiring Bill Powers’ theory (PCT) and
admiring some other theory which is wrong if Bill Powers’ theory is
right.
I don’t see it quite that way. What I see as a problem is that the
“other theory” is so often asserted to be wrong if Bill Powers’
theory is right, when in fact there is no necessary inconsistency
between the theories.

Yes, that’s another approach to dealing with the conflict.

The perception that is so
strongly defended
against disturbances is that any theory that isn’t by Bill Powers is
ipso facto incompatible with PCT

That’s not true. If the other theory were the same as PCT then it
wouldn’t matter whether Bill came up with it or not. It’s the theory
that matters, not who developed it.

Yes, I accept that. But my point is that PCT covers a whole range of
possible structures and concepts, not all of which are simply
descriptions of the connectivity, whether it be of one elementary
control system, of a “classic” hierarchy, or of conflicts among control
systems. What I should have said is that anything that doesn’t simply
accept the classic HPCT hierarchy and isn’t about testing for “the”
controlled variable (as if there is always only one) is considered a
disturbance that must be strongly resisted. HPCT is Bill Powers’
theory, which is what led me to the inappropriate wording I used.

The words “admiring”, used
twice by Rick in the sentence quoted above,
is quite telling, don’t you think?

Yes, I think it made the conflict clear. What do you think was telling
about it?

I really do think that your use of “admire” in the context you used it
is a significant clue to why so many competent and interested people
have left CSGnet. You said: “I have a strong suspicion that this
type of conflict is the reason why
many people have left CSGNet and blamed their leaving on me. The
conflict is always between admiring Bill Powers’ theory (PCT) and
admiring some other theory which is wrong if Bill Powers’ theory is
right.

It isn’t. The conflict occurs when someone has a reference to be
understood as contributing some ideas to PCT and their ideas are
treated as a disturbance to some high-gain controlled perception for
which the output is that the contributor is forcefully told that any
such ideas are “old thinking” because
they aren’t in the canon, and are to be expunged before one can be
credited with understanding PCT. That’s a brick wall against which only
people really committed to PCT can butt their heads for long without
feeling that the pain just isn’t worthwhile. It’s a surprise, really
that there are so many left (half a dozen?).

What was telling about your quote was that you talked about “admiring”
PCT theory and about your so called opponents as “admiring” a theory
that, simply because it was not HPCT, was necessarily in conflict with
HPCT.

I would never consider theories as being subjects of admiration. I can
and do admire the creators of ingenious theories, and the beauty of the
theories themselves, whether the theories are right or wrong (my own
often-expressed belief is that ALL theories are wrong to some degree).
I can admire the creativity of the authors of theories that are in such
direct conflict with each other that both could not simultaneously be
correct – but to me theories themselves are subjects of criticism,
things to be torn apart and tested, never to be admired. I admire the
beauty of the Ptolemaic spheres of the heavens, the ingeniousness of
their construction, and their success in predicting astronomical
events, even though I don’t admire the Ptolemaic theory. I admire
Einstein’s genius, and the beauty of general relativity as well as that
of quantum chromodynamics, but that doesn’t stop me from considering
that there seems to be something fundamentally wrong with the situation
when two theories that so wonderfully predict observations in their own
domains are in clear conflict at their foundations.

No, I think your comment was indeed telling – and disturbing.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.26.0945)]

Martin Taylor (2009.09.25.20.39)–

What I should have said is that anything that doesn’t simply
accept the classic HPCT hierarchy and isn’t about testing for “the”
controlled variable (as if there is always only one) is considered a
disturbance that must be strongly resisted.

The resistance is not mindless opposition. It looks to me more like healthy scientific debate. For example, you’ve been pushing information theory as being a useful adjunct to control theory for years. Over those years we have gone through several exercises that have involved both modeling and data. These exercises have not convinced me that information theory has anything useful to contribute to control theory. I’m not resisting information theory because it is not part of “classic HPCT”; I’m not really even resisting it. I just have not seen any use for it, though God knows you’ve tried your best to convince me of its value. I’m open to any idea that will help me with my work on PCT. By I don’t feel compelled to accept an idea as useful just because a fan of PCT says it is.

I really do think that your use of “admire” in the context you used it
is a significant clue to why so many competent and interested people
have left CSGnet.

Actually, I used the term “admire” because I was quoting what Bill Powers had said in his post to Kenny: “It’s hard for me to see how you could
claim to admire both the theories of economics that you have learned
about AND the theory that people are living hierarchies of control
systems who try to make their inputs match internally set reference
levels”. Nothing deeper than that.

The conflict occurs when someone has a reference to be
understood as contributing some ideas to PCT and their ideas are
treated as a disturbance to some high-gain controlled perception for
which the output is that the contributor is forcefully told that any
such ideas are “old thinking” because
they aren’t in the canon, and are to be expunged before one can be
credited with understanding PCT.

As I said above, I believe that a lot more than “forceful telling” has been
involved, on both sides. There has been a lot of modeling, mathematics
and data. If this is what you call “forceful telling” then at least you
have to admit that this “forceful telling”, and the resistance to it, has come from both
sides. That’s what makes it a conflict. You have been forcefully telling me that information theory “contributes” to PCT and I have been
resisting; and I have been forcefully telling you that information
theory does not contribute to PCT and you have been resisting. That’s
the way conflicts work; both sides are controlling for what they think
is right.

That’s a brick wall against which only
people really committed to PCT can butt their heads for long without
feeling that the pain just isn’t worthwhile. It’s a surprise, really
that there are so many left (half a dozen?).

I agree completely. I think people deal with this conflict in many ways: leaving is one way; staying and thinking that PCT is great except that people like Marken are too blind to recognize the importance to PCT of {take your pick: information theory, libertarianism, god, free market capitalism, chaos theory, postmodernism, …} is another; staying and working on PCT is a third. Unfortunately, there are very few people who take that third route. C’est la vie.

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.26.17.07]

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.26.0945)]

Martin Taylor
(2009.09.25.20.39)–

What I should have said is
that anything that doesn’t simply
accept the classic HPCT hierarchy and isn’t about testing for “the”
controlled variable (as if there is always only one) is considered a
disturbance that must be strongly resisted.

The resistance is not mindless opposition. It looks to me more like
healthy scientific debate.

Yes, and I remember a debate from a year or two ago about whether
different people perceive the same data similarly.

In this case, we don’t.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.26.1720)]

Martin Taylor (2009.09.26.17.07)–

Rick Marken (2009.09.26.0945)–

Martin Taylor
(2009.09.25.20.39)–

What I should have said is
that anything that doesn’t simply
accept the classic HPCT hierarchy and isn’t about testing for “the”
controlled variable (as if there is always only one) is considered a
disturbance that must be strongly resisted.

The resistance is not mindless opposition. It looks to me more like
healthy scientific debate.

Yes, and I remember a debate from a year or two ago about whether
different people perceive the same data similarly.

In this case, we don’t.

I guess not. What data, by the way?

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com

www.mindreadings.com

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.27.09.50]

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.26.1720)]

Martin Taylor
(2009.09.26.17.07)–

Rick Marken (2009.09.26.0945)–

Martin Taylor
(2009.09.25.20.39)–

What I should have said
is
that anything that doesn’t simply
accept the classic HPCT hierarchy and isn’t about testing for “the”
controlled variable (as if there is always only one) is considered a
disturbance that must be strongly resisted.

The resistance is not mindless opposition. It looks to me more like
healthy scientific debate.

Yes, and I remember a debate from a year or two ago about whether
different people perceive the same data similarly.

In this case, we don’t.

I guess not. What data, by the way?

The content of the messages in this thread, and of the threads
referenced therein.

Abstracted: the perceptions that are perceived differently revolve
around the referents of “It looks to me more like
healthy scientific debate.”

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.27.1940)]

Martin Taylor (2009.09.27.09.50)–

Abstracted: the perceptions that are perceived differently revolve
around the referents of “It looks to me more like
healthy scientific debate.”

Would you like to try working on a specific example (like what exactly information theory contributes to PCT) or do we leave it at “you are right form your side and I am right form mine; we’re both just one too many mornin’s and a thousand miles behind”?

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.28.00.06]

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.27.1940)]

Martin Taylor
(2009.09.27.09.50)–

Abstracted: the perceptions that are perceived differently revolve
around the referents of “It looks to me more like
healthy scientific debate.”

Would you like to try working on a specific example (like what exactly
information theory contributes to PCT) or do we leave it at “you are
right form your side and I am right form mine; we’re both just one too
many mornin’s and a thousand miles behind”?

Why would I? I’ve done it often enough before. Whenever I do, all I
ever get is simple denials, starting way back in 92 or 93, when Allan
Randall and I demonstrated mathematically and conclusively that
information about the disturbance waveform was present in the
perceptual signal. The result was a simple “t’ain’t so”. Randall left
CSGnet because he couldn’t deal with that kind of anti-argumentation.

I do keep trying, but only when I’ve got lots of time to spare and a
current topic seems suited to reintroducing the idea. It always winds
up the same way, so I have no inclination to try when I’m busy and
there really isn’t a currently active topic the understanding of which
would be aided by using information-theoretic ideas.

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2009.09.28.1043 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2009.09.28.00.06]

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.27.1940)]
...
Would you like to try working on a specific example (like what exactly information theory contributes to PCT) ... ?

Why would I? I've done it often enough before. Whenever I do, all I ever get is simple denials, starting way back in 92 or 93, when Allan Randall and I demonstrated mathematically and conclusively that information about the disturbance waveform was present in the perceptual signal. The result was a simple "t'ain't so". Randall left CSGnet because he couldn't deal with that kind of anti-argumentation.

As I recall it now, I think my reaction wasn't "t'aint so," but "how do you know?" and "So what?" I didn't see that you had included the closed-loop properties of control systems in your analysis, which made me doubt your conclusions, but then I didn't understand your analysis anyway. You seemed to be saying that there was information in the perceptual signal from which it would be possible to reconstruct the waveform of the disturbance rather than just saying that some residual effects of the net disturbance would remain visible in the perceptual signal (have some small correlation with it). The latter, of course, I would have to agree with. But according to my understanding of the control model, there is simply no way to separate the net effect of a disturbance on the perception from the effect of the system's own output, and I don't recall that you ever answered my objections of that kind or showed how you had taken the feedback effects into account.

However, I have changed gears here, and no longer consider these issues to be of major concern to me. I don't want to minimize the importance of information theory and realize that there may be much more to it that I now comprehend. But I can't understand what I am not equipped to understand, when there is no attempt to present the case at a level that is accessible to me. And I am much closer to the end of my life than just about everyone else here is, and don't want to spend the remaining time on anything but what I'm calling the PCT Persuasion. If information theory can make a contribution to PCT, then contribute it. But first, let's see to it that PCT becomes part of mainstream thinking. That would just about wrap up my life's work.

Best,

Bill

[From Bill Powers (2009.09.28.1851 MDT)]

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.28.00.06]

all I ever get is simple denials, starting way back in 92 or 93, when Allan Randall and I demonstrated mathematically and conclusively that information about the disturbance waveform was present in the perceptual signal.

Without doing a comprehensive search, I found this in the archives:

···

=====================================================================

[Martin Taylor 960608 1221]

>Rick Marken (960608.0845)

MT: At the risk of propagating a discussion that has several times proved
to be a lettuce (i.e. fruitless)...

>RM: The second statement [that living organisms process information] is
>true (deductively) of imaginary organisms. But it is not true of
>real living organisms because it is rejected by evidence (remember
>that, in a control task, we could find no information to "process"
>where there should have been plenty).

MT: If you remember (and I might be able to find it in the archives as I have
done before) the initial and basic prediction from information theory is
that the better the control, the less information from the disturbance
will be found in the perceptual signal, and that's the result that
showed up.

BP now: Speaking in my own layman's terms, I can see that this could be translated the way I indicated in my earlier post today: The better the control, the lower the correlation between the disturbance and the perceptual signal will be. The correlation will be maximum when there is no control (for example, the gain of the output function is set to zero). All of the information about the disturbance will then be present in the perceptual signal, if the input function is a simple proportionality.

With this interpretation, "information loss" does not have its usual informal meaning, which is that a message about something at the transmitting end is sent, and some of the meaning of the message but not all of it gets to the receiving end intact. The perception evoked by the received message differs from the intended meaning. I say that formal information is different because of the custom of measuring information transfer in bits. Suppose the message I am sending is simply the first 25 bits of the value of pi. If there are any transmission errors, not all of the bits will be transmitted correctly (or at all); the information received will be less, in bits, than the information received. But there is no way to tell from that description which of the bits will be erroneous or missing. There is therefore no way to deduce the magnitude in the error of meaning.

In decimal notation, the value of pi to ten places transmitted as 3.141592654... could be received as 2.78281828 (the value of e to 10 places). How much information has been lost? Using information theory that number can be calculated as something like 20.5216 bits (an arbitrary number for the sake of illustration, I didn't calculate it), but using the more common meaning of information we would have to say that NONE of the information has been received. ALL of the information about the value of pi to the number of decimal places received has been lost: the error is qualitative. The same can be said about an ASCII message with only some of its bits lost during part of the transmission: "Meet me shvv... but leave your car at the station and walk to the corner of 3d0oos and West vvd23." Most of the transmitted bits are preserved but the entire message is useless for telling where and when to meet. Reasoning this way I conclude that the technical meaning of information is something quite different from the informal meaning. Technical information is to ordinary information as statistical significance is to importance.

I was using arguments like these (if not exactly this one) in the early discussions, so you can't really say that your proposals were simply dismissed without serious thought. I dismissed them because I didn't believe they addressed any real problems. But I didn't dismiss them without giving my reasons, and as far as I remember you never dealt with any of the reasons I gave. If there were any arbitrary dismissals, they were your dismissals of my objections. You just said I didn't know enough about information theory, which is true, but you didn't unbend far enough to explain what my error was -- if any such error existed.

In a control system that keeps the error at 1% of the reference signal (a static loop gain of 100), the information lost between disturbance and perceptual signal is nearly all of it. If the output function is a pure integrator, all the information about a steady-state disturbance would be lost because the final value of the perceptual signal will be exactly equal to the reference signal regardless of the magnitude of the disturbance (between the limits of control). Examples like this, and not a blind rejection of information theory, are what kept me from endorsing the information-theoretic approach. Remember that a one-bit error in transmitting the information from disturbance to perception could mean a 100% change in the transmitted value if that error happened to occur in the most significant position.

Best,

Bill P.

Bill Powers wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2009.09.29.00.29]

[From Bill Powers (2009.09.28.1043 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2009.09.28.00.06]

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.27.1940)]
...
Would you like to try working on a specific example (like what exactly information theory contributes to PCT) ... ?

Why would I? I've done it often enough before. Whenever I do, all I ever get is simple denials, starting way back in 92 or 93, when Allan Randall and I demonstrated mathematically and conclusively that information about the disturbance waveform was present in the perceptual signal. The result was a simple "t'ain't so". Randall left CSGnet because he couldn't deal with that kind of anti-argumentation.

As I recall it now, I think my reaction wasn't "t'aint so,"

No. Yours wasn't. Rick's was. Your's was much more inquisitive, and initially encouraging.

but "how do you know?" and "So what?" I didn't see that you had included the closed-loop properties of control systems in your analysis, which made me doubt your conclusions, but then I didn't understand your analysis anyway.

Funny how memory changes.

The argument provided by Randall and me was that internal to the control system there are (among others) two signals of interest. The question at issue was whether information about the disturbance waveform was available through the perceptual signal. The answer we gave at the time was in two stages:

1. p = o + d, and therefore d = p-o

Having the values of p and o permits the reconstruction of d, in the case in which the environmental feedback path is the unit transform.

2. Signal o is generated within the control system. The only input to the system from outside is through p.

p therefore carries information about the disturbance waveform.

When the environmental feedback path is not the unit transform, but is unchanging over time and is monotonic in the relation between the output value and the influence of the output on p, d cannot be reconstructed, but a signal can be generated that is informationally completely redundant with d.

If from that argument, you (at the time) didn't see that we had included the closed-loop properties of control systems, I am surprised.

I suspect that you did at the time, but that everybody's memory is fallible.

Martin

Bill Powers wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2009.09.29.00.45]

[From Bill Powers (2009.09.28.1851 MDT)]

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.28.00.06]

all I ever get is simple denials, starting way back in 92 or 93, when Allan Randall and I demonstrated mathematically and conclusively that information about the disturbance waveform was present in the perceptual signal.

Without doing a comprehensive search, I found this in the archives:

[Martin Taylor 960608 1221]

>Rick Marken (960608.0845)

MT: At the risk of propagating a discussion that has several times proved
to be a lettuce (i.e. fruitless)...

>RM: The second statement [that living organisms process information] is
>true (deductively) of imaginary organisms. But it is not true of
>real living organisms because it is rejected by evidence (remember
>that, in a control task, we could find no information to "process"
>where there should have been plenty).

MT: If you remember (and I might be able to find it in the archives as I have
done before) the initial and basic prediction from information theory is
that the better the control, the less information from the disturbance
will be found in the perceptual signal, and that's the result that
showed up.

BP now: Speaking in my own layman's terms, I can see that this could be translated the way I indicated in my earlier post today: The better the control, the lower the correlation between the disturbance and the perceptual signal will be. The correlation will be maximum when there is no control (for example, the gain of the output function is set to zero). All of the information about the disturbance will then be present in the perceptual signal, if the input function is a simple proportionality.

I guess I need also confess an error in what I said that you quoted. I should have said "the better the control, the less information from the disturbance will be found in the perceptual signal ALONE." Even though all the information about the disturbance is available from the perceptual signal, and can be extracted by combining it with the output signal, it is not accessible by analyzing the perceptual signal alone.

The rest of your comments need a longer discussion. The frame of that discussion would be the mantra: "information is reduction of uncertainty", not, as I suspect you believe from the tenor of your comment "information is a measure of uncertainty".

Consider your example: "Meet me shvv... but leave your car at the station and walk to the corner of 3d0oos and West vvd23." Before I received this message, I presumably expected to meet you, but was uncertain as to the time and place. This message did not reduce that uncertainty, and therefore conveyed (in the Shannon sense) no information. Only a communication engineer would consider the uncertainty of the character by character reception as being related to the information transmitted, and the reason for that is that the link for which the engineer is responsible must carry messages of arbitrary types. So the engineer must be concerned with the level at which all these different meanings can be represented. But that's not the case for the person who cares not a whit for the form of the message, but cares only about the reduction the message creates in his uncertainty about something meaningful to him. For that person, the information measure is based on the uncertainty of the person about what matters.

I was using arguments like these (if not exactly this one) in the early discussions, so you can't really say that your proposals were simply dismissed without serious thought. I dismissed them because I didn't believe they addressed any real problems. But I didn't dismiss them without giving my reasons, and as far as I remember you never dealt with any of the reasons I gave. If there were any arbitrary dismissals, they were your dismissals of my objections. You just said I didn't know enough about information theory, which is true, but you didn't unbend far enough to explain what my error was -- if any such error existed.

Well, memories do differ. I remember myself as trying quite hard, but abandoning the attempt. But you could be right. Rabbie Burns was quite correct when he offered the impossible prayer (which I can't properly quote in the Lallans, but I'll try): "Wud some Guid the giftie gie's, tae see oursens as ithers see's".

I don't mind if you don't care about it any more. At the moment, I find that the question of informational properties of networks and of people's perceptions of networks is tying in to this CSGnet topic, but in rather surprising ways that I had never considered. I'm hoping that the discussions within my NATO group will lead to some developments over the net year or two, and that those developments will feed back into PCT theory.

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2009.09.29.1020 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2009.09.29.00.45 –

MT: I guess I need also confess
an error in what I said that you quoted. I should have said “the
better the control, the less information from the disturbance will be
found in the perceptual signal ALONE.” Even though all the
information about the disturbance is available from the perceptual
signal, and can be extracted by combining it with the output signal, it
is not accessible by analyzing the perceptual signal
alone.

BP: I, too made a mistake in saying that if the output gain were set to
zero, the perceptual signal (alone) would contain perfect information
about the disturbance. It wouldn’t, because of system noise. And this is
why the information getting into the control system decreases as control
becomes tighter. The disturbance-caused variations in the perceptual
signal become smaller in comparison with the system’s irreducible input
noise, until at some point the system noise predominates. Your formula

  1. p = o + d, and therefore d = p-o

Must be written

p = o + d + N, and therefore d = p - o - N.

When p is nearly equal to o, N predominates.

Consider your example:
“Meet me shvv… but leave your car at the station and walk to the
corner of 3d0oos and West vvd23.” Before I received this message, I
presumably expected to meet you, but was uncertain as to the time and
place. This message did not reduce that uncertainty, and therefore
conveyed (in the Shannon sense) no information. Only a communication
engineer would consider the uncertainty of the character by character
reception as being related to the information transmitted, and the reason
for that is that the link for which the engineer is responsible must
carry messages of arbitrary types. So the engineer must be concerned with
the level at which all these different meanings can be represented. But
that’s not the case for the person who cares not a whit for the form of
the message, but cares only about the reduction the message creates in
his uncertainty about something meaningful to him. For that person, the
information measure is based on the uncertainty of the person about what
matters.

Then you’re not considering information as Shannon defined it. I
remembered a quote from Shannon explaining what he meant by information
and managed to find it again in a transcript of the 7th Macy Conference
on Cybernetics, 1950 (given to me by Heinz von Foerster).
“The communication engineer can visualize his job as the tranmission
of the particular messages chosen by the information source to be sent to
the receiving point. What the message means is of no importance to
him. The thing that does have importance is the set of statistics with
which it was chosen, the probabilities of various messages. In general,
we are usually interested in messages that consist of a sequence of
discrete symbols or symbols that at least can be reduced to that form by
suitable approximation.” (p. 123)
I think your definition of information as reduction of psychological
uncertainty in the receiver of the message is impractical, because to
calculate that you would have to know every possible meaning of
all possible messages and I believe that is impossible to know. The
message “I don’t know” has a meaning that’s entirely dependent
on what messages precede and follow it and that is practically an
infinite universe of possibilities. The preceding message might have been
“what’s the density of tungsten?” or “What was John’s
answer?” or “What’s a good crossword clue for
ignorance?” And the following message might be “Never mind, I
figured it out.” There doesn’t seem to be any way to quantify
information as reduction of psychological uncertainty about meaning. The
meaning of a message that was garbled in transmission might be “that
message was awfully garbled.”

I don’t mind if you don’t care
about it any more. At the moment, I find that the question of
informational properties of networks and of people’s perceptions of
networks is tying in to this CSGnet topic, but in rather surprising ways
that I had never considered. I’m hoping that the discussions within my
NATO group will lead to some developments over the net year or two, and
that those developments will feed back into PCT theory.

OK, let me know when they do. I might not understand the result,
though.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.29.1320)]

Martin Taylor (2009.09.29.00.29)–

When the environmental feedback path is not the unit transform, but is unchanging over time and is monotonic in the relation between the output value and the influence of the output on p, d cannot be reconstructed, but a signal can be generated that is informationally completely redundant with d.

If, however, the feedback function is continuously changing (for example, if the feedback function is i = k*o with the value of k slowly varying over time) then it is impossible to reconstruct d. Nevertheless, it is possible to control (vary output, o, in a way that compensate for the effects of d on the controlled variable, i) under these circumstances. Therefore, it is clear that the information about d that can be obtained by knowing o under certain circumstances (like when k is constant) is irrelevant to control.

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.30.10.35]

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.29.1320)]

Martin
Taylor (2009.09.29.00.29)–

When the environmental feedback path is not the unit transform, but is
unchanging over time and is monotonic in the relation between the
output value and the influence of the output on p, d cannot be
reconstructed, but a signal can be generated that is informationally
completely redundant with d.

If, however, the feedback function is continuously changing (for
example, if the feedback function is i = k*o with the value of k slowly
varying over time) then it is impossible to reconstruct d.
Nevertheless, it is possible to control (vary output, o, in a way that
compensate for the effects of d on the controlled variable, i) under
these circumstances. Therefore, it is clear that the information about
d that can be obtained by knowing o under certain circumstances (like
when k is constant) is irrelevant to control.

I believe I said more or less that, didn’t I?

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.29.00.29]
“When the environmental feedback path is not the unit transform, but is
unchanging over time and is monotonic in the relation between the
output value and the influence of the output on p, d cannot be
reconstructed, but a signal can be generated that is informationally
completely redundant with d.”

I said nothing, and implied nothing, about the relevance of the
information in p and its history to control. That’s a different topic
from the question of whether information about the disturbance waveform
is in the perception signal waveform.

It may be worth noting that if the variation of the feedback function
has a bandwidth on the same order as that of the disturbance, control
is likely to be severely compromised.

Bill
[From Bill Powers (2009.09.29.1020 MDT)] managed to “refute” my
argument by altering the fundamental equation of the control system, in
that he introduced the noise that he usually strongly asserts to be
irrelevant to control. So as to conform to the normal CSGnet practice,
and to avoid complications, I had used the equations that are normally
taken to be central to the analysis of simple control in which most
signal paths are unit transforms, namely:

p = o + d

o = Ge

e = r - p

We can certainly include noise in the analysis, but that is a red
herring, as well. When the perceptual signal is so noisy that the
perceptual signal is uninformative about the right sign of e (compared
to the real-world status of “r - real(o+d)”), control isn’t likely to
be very good at all. Usually, as Bill so often asserts, the noise in a
controlled perception is not so great as to interfere with effective
control, so we tend to ignore it. Sometimes, as in the Schouten study
discussed in an earlier thread, it is possible to measure directly an
upper bound on the noise characteristics of the perceptual signal, but
usually we don’t worry about. I’m a little surprised that it was
brought up in this specific case when it is usually asserted to be
irrelevant.

One thing I had hoped that Rick or Bill would bring up, but they
didn’t, was that the signal “o” is a function of the history of the
perceptual signal, if the reference signal is constant over time. Even
if the output function G is a simple proportionality with no inherent
time-binding, the signal paths in the loop have transport lags that
ensure the output value added to the current disturbance is a function
of a past value of the perceptual signal, not of its present value.

I wonder if Bill’s original memory of the analysis by Allan Randall and
me as being “open loop” was engendered by memory of our statement that
one didn’t actually need to use the signal “o” to recover the
disturbance waveform from the perceptual signal. All one needs is a
replica of the output function – call it G’ with output o’ where G’ is
identical to G, but the output of G’, o’, is not connected outside the
control unit. If one then feeds r-p into G’ as well as into G, then the
disturbance waveform can be retrieved from the output of a filter
composed of p - o’. That is indeed an open loop process, but it doesn’t
work unless the control system itself is functioning. Maybe that’s
where Bill’s memory of our analysis as being “open-loop” comes from.

It might also be worth noting, though I apologise if it is too obvious
to make explicit, that even though the entire disturbance waveform can
be reconstructed from the entire perceptual waveform, there is almost
no information about the current value of the disturbance in the
current value of the perceptual waveform. As Richard and I have
mentioned many times over the years, if G is a pure integrator, o is
completely uncorrelated with p; informationally, the information from p
to o is distributed equally over all informationally independent
samples in its history, a notionally infinite number unless we start at
some time t0 with known values of p and o. Hence the information
available about the current value of o in the current value of p
approaches (using the usual mathematical sense of “approaches”) zero.

I mention this trivial fact because some might have seen an apparent
contradiction between (1) there being essentially no information about
the current value of d in the current value of p under conditions of
excellent control, and (2) the fact that the d waveform can be totally
reconstructed from the p waveform, and therefore that all the
information about d is available in p and its history.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.30.0910)]

Martin Taylor (2009.09.30.10.35)

Rick Marken (2009.09.29.1320)–

If, however, the feedback function is continuously changing (for
example, if the feedback function is i = k*o with the value of k slowly
varying over time) then it is impossible to reconstruct d.
Nevertheless, it is possible to control (vary output, o, in a way that
compensate for the effects of d on the controlled variable, i) under
these circumstances. Therefore, it is clear that the information about
d that can be obtained by knowing o under certain circumstances (like
when k is constant) is irrelevant to control.

I believe I said more or less that, didn’t I?

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.29.00.29]
“When the environmental feedback path is not the unit transform, but is
unchanging over time and is monotonic in the relation between the
output value and the influence of the output on p, d cannot be
reconstructed, but a signal can be generated that is informationally
completely redundant with d.”

No, this is not what I said. I said that when k is variable it is impossible to reconstruct d, which means that it is also impossible to general a signal that is informationally redundant with d. When k is variable, you cannot reconstruct d unless you know the detailed variations in k. If k is constant (as in your case) you could, knowing o, reconstruct a signal that would be perfectly correlated with d; in fact it would be = 1/kd.

I said nothing, and implied nothing, about the relevance of the
information in p and its history to control. That’s a different topic
from the question of whether information about the disturbance waveform
is in the perception signal waveform.

OK, so what you are saying is that given o you could solve for d in the equation d = ko. If you don’t know k you could assume k = 1, in which case you computed value of d would actually be 1/kd. I’ll even assume that of k were varying over time you could solve for d in the equation d = ko if you were given the time varying values of k and o. If this is what you mean by “there is information about the disturbance in the perceptual signal” then I would have to agree with you that, indeed, there is. But what this tells me is that algebra works, not that there is information in the perceptual signal. I really can’t see how this kind of “information” could be relevant to performance in a control task. There is simply no way for the actor to get the information needed to solve for the “information” about d that is presumably used as the basis of acting to prevent d from pushing the input from its reference state. I can see that it’s possible for the actor to get information about o but I don’t see how he would get information about the feedback function, and the disturbance function, for that matter (the function that relates d to i, i = g(d)).

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bill Powers (20089.09.30.0946 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2009.09.30.10.35] --

MT: Bill [From Bill Powers (2009.09.29.1020 MDT)] managed to "refute" my argument by altering the fundamental equation of the control system, in that he introduced the noise that he usually strongly asserts to be irrelevant to control.

BP: I do? I believe that presence of system noise was my very first explanation, many years ago, of why there is a low correlation between control actions and controlled quantities, which gets lower as control improves, and also between disturbances and controlled quantities. If you can remind me of when I said noise is irrelevant to control, I'll be glad to admit that I no longer believe it. It is irrelevant, usually, to how well the perceptual signal tracks the reference signal because we're comparing the noise to the dynamic range of the reference signal. It's certainly not irrelevant to the error signal or the effect of the error on the output.

MT: We can certainly include noise in the analysis, but that is a red herring, as well. When the perceptual signal is so noisy that the perceptual signal is uninformative about the right sign of e (compared to the real-world status of "r - real(o+d)"), control isn't likely to be very good at all.

BP: But that would occur only when control is very good. I believe I used an example of a control system with a loop gain of 100, which would result in very good control (error signal about 1% of value of reference signal). If the system noise is also 1% of the value of the reference signal, this would make the noise in the error signal equal to the error.

MT: Usually, as Bill so often asserts, the noise in a controlled perception is not so great as to interfere with effective control, so we tend to ignore it.

BP: Of course: if the range of variation of the reference signal is 100 times as large as the system noise, we can pretty much ignore the noise in calculating the size of the output relative to the disturbance, or of the perceptual signal relative to the reference signal. But with a high gain, such a control system would have an error signal of about the magnitude of the perceptual noise; indeed, the unsystematic variations in the perceptual signal, small as they are, set a lower limit on how small the error signal can be.

MT: Sometimes, as in the Schouten study discussed in an earlier thread, it is possible to measure directly an upper bound on the noise characteristics of the perceptual signal, but usually we don't worry about. I'm a little surprised that it was brought up in this specific case when it is usually asserted to be irrelevant.

BP: I hope you can see now that you are oversimplifying what I said.

MT: One thing I had hoped that Rick or Bill would bring up, but they didn't, was that the signal "o" is a function of the history of the perceptual signal, if the reference signal is constant over time. Even if the output function G is a simple proportionality with no inherent time-binding, the signal paths in the loop have transport lags that ensure the output value added to the current disturbance is a function of a past value of the perceptual signal, not of its present value.

BP: The lags in tracking behavior are measured at about 8 60ths of a second -- about 130 milliseconds. The bandwidth of these control systems is roughly 2.5 Hz, a number that's been known for around 60 years. This means that the lags are about 35% of the period of a sine-wave disturbance at the upper frequency limit of control. This is also indicated by the phase relationships in the Bode plots of such systems.

The result is that over most of the bandwidth range, the feedback effects are opposed to effects of any disturbances that the control system can resist, and are not independent of the disturbances that caused them. If the feedback effects always came too late to affect the input variations, we would have not a control system but an oscillator.

This is obvious when you think about what we observe of the effects of disturbances on controlled quantities. In fact the changes in the controlled quantity due to disturbances are very much less than what they would be if there were no feedback. This says that the feedback effects occur in time to cancel most of the effect of the disturbance. If the effects of lags were as you describe them, so that the feedback effects came only from "past values" of the disturbance, the effects on the controlled quantity would not be reduced. Only if you use disturbances with bandwidth greater than the bandwidth of good control do you see a significant effect from the lags -- and then the effect is to allow greater effects of the disturbance and to reduce the ability to control. The variations in the perceptual signal at the higher frequencies involved would then be much larger and we would start to see information in the perceptual signal about the higher frequencies in the disturbance -- but not the lower frequencies.

MT: I wonder if Bill's original memory of the analysis by Allan Randall and me as being "open loop" was engendered by memory of our statement that one didn't actually need to use the signal "o" to recover the disturbance waveform from the perceptual signal.

BP: Very likely, since that would be my present view, too. If you would do me the favor of restoring my comments about system noise to their intended meaning, as explained above, you can see that there is no way to work backward from the perception to the disturbance. In effect, you're trying to solve an equation that has two variable quantities of about equal size, the perceptual signal and the reference signal, being subtracted one from the other, leaving a very small difference, amplified to drive the output function. If the perceptual noise is comparable in magnitude to that difference, the output will have a large random component. Since you have to subtract the output from the perceptual signal (in your simplified set of equations) to calculate the size of the disturbance, your estimate of the size of the disturbance will be very uncertain -- and get more uncertain as the loop gain increases.

And now you drop the bombshell:

MT: It might also be worth noting, though I apologise if it is too obvious to make explicit, that even though the entire disturbance waveform can be reconstructed from the entire perceptual waveform, there is almost no information about the current value of the disturbance in the current value of the perceptual waveform.

BP: Martin, that's beneath you, or should be. "Apologize if it is too obvious to be made explicit!" The whole discussion was about whether the current value of the disturbance could be deduced from the current value of the perception. I said it couldn't, and all my arguments were aimed at showing why it couldn't. Now, in effect, you're saying I was right all along about the point I was trying to make, but that you were really making a different point which was "too obvious to be made explicit."

MT: As Richard and I have mentioned many times over the years, if G is a pure integrator, o is completely uncorrelated with p; informationally, the information from p to o is distributed equally over all informationally independent samples in its history, a notionally infinite number unless we start at some time t0 with known values of p and o. Hence the information available about the current value of o in the current value of p approaches (using the usual mathematical sense of "approaches") zero.

BP: Now you're really off into some never-never-land. This kind of gobbledegook smacks of desperation, not erudition. It's a smokescreen, a snow job. "Notionally infinite" -- Jesus Christ.

MT: I mention this trivial fact because some might have seen an apparent contradiction between (1) there being essentially no information about the current value of d in the current value of p under conditions of excellent control, and (2) the fact that the d waveform can be totally reconstructed from the p waveform, and therefore that all the information about d is available in p and its history.

"Trivial fact." Well, that does it for me. If you know what you're talking about, you're the only one here who does. I doubt that you will ever be able actually to perform the calculations you make these claims about, and the only way you'll ever convince me that you can do this is to do it. Call back when you have something to show me.

I've been annoyed at you before, Martin, and got over it. This time it's going to be hard.

Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2009.09.30.11.14]

[From Bill Powers (2009.09.29.1020 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2009.09.29.00.45 –

MT: I guess I need also
confess
an error in what I said that you quoted. I should have said “the
better the control, the less information from the disturbance will be
found in the perceptual signal ALONE.” Even though all the
information about the disturbance is available from the perceptual
signal, and can be extracted by combining it with the output signal, it
is not accessible by analyzing the perceptual signal
alone.

BP: I, too made a mistake in saying that if the output gain were set to
zero, the perceptual signal (alone) would contain perfect information
about the disturbance. It wouldn’t, because of system noise. And this
is
why the information getting into the control system decreases as
control
becomes tighter. The disturbance-caused variations in the perceptual
signal become smaller in comparison with the system’s irreducible input
noise, until at some point the system noise predominates. Your formula

  1. p = o + d, and therefore d = p-o

Must be written

p = o + d + N, and therefore d = p - o - N.

When p is nearly equal to o, N predominates.

I answered this in my response to Rick.

Consider your example:
“Meet me shvv… but leave your car at the station and walk to the
corner of 3d0oos and West vvd23.” Before I received this message, I
presumably expected to meet you, but was uncertain as to the time and
place. This message did not reduce that uncertainty, and therefore
conveyed (in the Shannon sense) no information. Only a communication
engineer would consider the uncertainty of the character by character
reception as being related to the information transmitted, and the
reason
for that is that the link for which the engineer is responsible must
carry messages of arbitrary types. So the engineer must be concerned
with
the level at which all these different meanings can be represented. But
that’s not the case for the person who cares not a whit for the form of
the message, but cares only about the reduction the message creates in
his uncertainty about something meaningful to him. For that person, the
information measure is based on the uncertainty of the person about
what
matters.

Then you’re not considering information as Shannon defined it. I
remembered a quote from Shannon explaining what he meant by information
and managed to find it again in a transcript of the 7th Macy Conference
on Cybernetics, 1950 (given to me by Heinz von Foerster).

“The communication engineer can visualize his job as the tranmission
of the particular messages chosen by the information source to be sent
to
the receiving point. What the message means is of no importance
to
him. The thing that does have importance is the set of statistics with
which it was chosen, the probabilities of various messages. In general,
we are usually interested in messages that consist of a sequence of
discrete symbols or symbols that at least can be reduced to that form
by
suitable approximation.” (p. 123)

May I requote from my paragraph you quoted above? “Only a communication
engineer would consider the uncertainty of the character by character
reception as being related to the information transmitted, and the
reason
for that is that the link for which the engineer is responsible must
carry messages of arbitrary types.” Isn’t that what Shannon says in
your quote (which I had not seen before)?

My reference to Shannon is to the book that popularized information
analysis (Shannon and Weaver, “The Mathematical Theory of
Communication” U of Illinois Press, 1949).

I think your definition of information as reduction of psychological
uncertainty in the receiver of the message is impractical

Shannon’s definition, not mine. You added the word “psychological”.
Shannon deals throughout the book with using observation of what was
received to reduce the receiver’s uncertainty as to what might have
been transmitted. That reduction is the information transmitted. I
think it’s made most explicit with the diagram on page 41 and the text
in that neighbourhood.

, because to
calculate that you would have to know every possible meaning of
all possible messages and I believe that is impossible to know.

Why do you make those two assertions? To me, they both come out of thin
air. As a receiver, you can’t ever know the meaning intended by the
sender, though you can use “The Test” to make a pretty good guess after
enough back-and-forth interactions. As a sender, you can’t ever know
whether the receiver has gathered the meaning you intended to convey,
although you can make a pretty good guess by applying “The Test” over a
series of interactions. But as a receiver you CAN know something about
what range of meanings you anticipate the sender might be wanting you
to perceive, and you usually do. In most circumstances, one has a
reasonably restricted range of messages one might expect.

Take your own example. You hypothesised that the listener quite clearly
heard and understood "Meet me " and later in the message “but leave
your car at the station and walk to the corner of” and “and West”. The
listener also can perceive roughly the length of the missing bits. Now
it’s extremely unlikely that the first gap contained a dissertation on
Hawking radiation from black holes, and quite likely that it contained
a time of day. Moreover, it is quite likely that the time of day in
question is on the same day, and at a time both parties are expected to
be free of other obligation. The probability distribution of messages
that the receiver might expect is quite a bit less wide than “the
meaning of all possible messages”. The same is true of the second gap,
where the receiver almost certainly have an uncertainty distribution
for the meaning that ranges only over a small number of street corners,
and does not have a high probability for issues concerning solar energy.

On the other hand, if the listener was in the middle of listening to a
discussion of Hawking radiation, the words “Meet me”, though clearly
spoken, might not have been immediately or easily understood, since
their meaning would not have been anywhere in the high-likelihood
region of meanings within the lecture.

The
message “I don’t know” has a meaning that’s entirely dependent
on what messages precede and follow it and that is practically an
infinite universe of possibilities. The preceding message might have
been
“what’s the density of tungsten?” or “What was John’s
answer?” or “What’s a good crossword clue for
ignorance?”

Yes, of course. I don’t know what point you are trying to make, here.
Everything that happened prior to the mesage constrains the
expectations for what might be in the garbled gaps, does it not? In
what I said above, I assumed the situation to be that the two people
had expected to meet, but had not arranged when and where. The
situation always constrains one’s expectation of what might be said.
I’m sure you have experienced occasions when someone has said something
that comes “out of left field”, and have not immediately understood it,
perhaps to the extent of asking “Could you say that again” or “What do
you mean”.

We verge on another discussion of what is meant by “meaning”. It’s not
a discussion in which I have either interest or time to contribute
much. But in this context, I take “meaning” to be “influence on a
perception, whether that perception be controlled or not”.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2009.09.30.1410)]

Martin Taylor (2009.09.30.11.14) –

“It is very very hard to change a system concept even when you’re trying to do that.” Bill Powers said that.

“It’s impossible to change them system concepts if you’re not trying to” I said that.

“I’ll let you be in my system concept if you’ll let me be in yours.” Bob Dylan said that, sort of.

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com

www.mindreadings.com