One of Bill Powers' (many) great insights (I think) was the realization
that complex "behaviors" (control of complex perceptions like
events and sequences) could be handled by control theory if
control systems could be designed to _perceive_ these kinds of
variables.
I think one reason why control theory was dismissed early in the
game and/or reformulated as an "output generation" model (as in
"modern control theory") is because life scientists couldn't see
how control systems, the familiar examples of which controlled
only scalar variables like temperature, could produce complex
behaviors, like a "golf swing" (event) or a "sentence" (sequence).
I agree with these two points. I think, also, that it was/is difficult to see
what it _means_ to control some things. Some things are fairly
straightforward to comprehend such as your speed or position say, but it is
not so clear what is meant by controlling something like a sensation or
configuration.
It certainly seems alien to me to think of controlling a sensation, say, when
these perceptions are presented, in conventional Cognitive Science as being
_features_ "out there". I would certainly welcome some discussion along the
lines of what it is we are actually controlling, how the perceptual functions
are "constructed", what behaviours we use to control and what the effects of
those behaviours are on the environmental/controlled variables.
I don't have any strong opinion about a PCT dictionary but have always thought
we could do with an FAQ briefly introducing some of the main issues and
concepts associated with PCT.
It certainly seems alien to me to think of controlling a sensation, say,
when these perceptions are presented, in conventional Cognitive Science as
being _features_ "out there".
Sensations seem a particularly good example. Consider the sensation we know
as the taste of chocolate. Suppose I said that chocolate has no taste. How
could you prove me wrong?
I agree with these two points. I think, also, that it was/is difficult to see
what it _means_ to control some things. Some things are fairly
straightforward to comprehend such as your speed or position say, but it is
not so clear what is meant by controlling something like a sensation or
configuration.
It certainly seems alien to me to think of controlling a sensation, say, when
these perceptions are presented, in conventional Cognitive Science as being
_features_ "out there". I would certainly welcome some discussion along the
lines of what it is we are actually controlling, how the perceptual functions
are "constructed", what behaviours we use to control and what the effects of
those behaviours are on the environmental/controlled variables.
A simple example of sensation control is control of an aperture where
both of the surfaces constituting the aperture has a variable position.
Such as for example the distance between the lips in speaking, or between
the thumb- and a finger- tip in a precision grasp. If the system can
compute the position (some point on the surface) of these surfaces, it
can compute the separation by subtraction, and control that, by using the
error signal to drive actuators affecting the position of both surfaces.
Now if the reference for the aperture is reduced, normally both surfaces
will move some, but if one of them is restrained, the other will move
further to make up for it.
There has been some literature about such effects concerning lip-rounding
in phonetic performance, and precision grips, I could probably dig them up,
& they'd be in the archives c. 92-94. There's a review of some of this
stuff in `Attention and Performance 13' (can't remember the editor's name)
in which some of this material is discussed in a section entitled
`Beyond the Closed-Loop Model', which suggest some serious misunderstanding ...
But the volume contains a lot of interesting stuff, including a review of
why feedback is a lot faster than motor-control people tend to say it is.
Bill Powers and I also have various versions of some arm models that
control for various `sensations' (computed functions of joint positions);
I think we need somebody to teach us how to calculate the forward
dynamics in order to push that project further. I'd be happy to
forward the code to anyone who wants to have a look at it, but it's
in C.
It certainly seems alien to me to think of controlling a sensation, say,
when these perceptions are presented, in conventional Cognitive Science as
being _features_ "out there".
There is still the "Represention Mind". This is THE cornerstone to modern
Cognitive Magic; most recently justified by Fodor but a consideration dating
back to Plato's "copies". Its worst manifestation is the modern "information
processing" where we have a ghost called "information" that is neither mental
nor physical, but somehow transends the two. This is in _every_ psych, cog. ,
and neuroscience book I have ever seen: people process information.
Sensations seem a particularly good example. Consider the sensation we know
as the taste of chocolate. Suppose I said that chocolate has no taste. How
could you prove me wrong?
Ask you if you would rather eat a chocolate bar or a poo-sandwich.
i.
Bill, i think the leap from the 3rd person characterization by system
Sensations seem a particularly good example. Consider the sensation we know
as the taste of chocolate. Suppose I said that chocolate has no taste. How
could you prove me wrong?
Ask you if you would rather eat a chocolate bar or a poo-sandwich.
That would probe that I would rather eat the chocolate bar. It wouldn't
prove that there's any such thing as the taste of chocolate.
Bill, i think the leap from the 3rd person characterization by system
Sensations seem a particularly good example. Consider the sensation we know
as the taste of chocolate. Suppose I said that chocolate has no taste. How
could you prove me wrong?
Ask you if you would rather eat a chocolate bar or a poo-sandwich.
That would probe that I would rather eat the chocolate bar. It wouldn't
prove that there's any such thing as the taste of chocolate.
We do agree that there is a common identifiable--though ultimately private--for
at least one circumstnace we call chocolate.
So at least on one occassion you and another individual have held common one
moment--the chocolate moment. You have bought chocolate at the store, and for
that something was common..enough. And what would be different about its
taste..where taste is another moment that can be held common..enough.
I only entered as I get very ansy when persons switch from systems analysis to
their referents as identical---as in x*y=area (as a psychological state).
There are correspondances but there is no identity no more than a wavelength is
blue or that I set reference levels. I presume you agree with this as you have
in the past, so why my fuss?
Well, chocolate is an experience such that its occurance in our mouths is
typically more pleasurable than poo. Now for Boss Reality--what remains
_without_ Mind--i agree that what remains of the chocolate is without
taste--taste being an experience and necessarily goes bye-bye. But since all
we can deal with is with is our experiential world I would say that your
refusing to eat poo sandwiches is proof enough.
Ask you if you would rather eat a chocolate bar or a poo-sandwich.
That would pro[v]e that I would rather eat the chocolate bar. It wouldn't
prove that there's any such thing as the taste of chocolate.
We do agree that there is a common identifiable--though ultimately
private-->for at least one circumstnace we call chocolate.
I prefer the model-based approach to the philosophical one. I think there
is sufficient evidence to show that the existence of a perceptual signal is
a prerequisite to tasting chocolate or anything else. My expectation is
that one day it will be possible to measure neural signals that represent
to the occupant of a brain what we refer to as the taste of chocolate. Even
now it seems fairly clear that the law is, "No perceptual signal, no
perception." I have speculated even further that another law is, "To
experience is to experience neural perceptual signals."
All that is theory. Theory is what we use to plug holes in experience --
things that happen for no apparent reason. I know from experience that to
close my hand into a fist, all I have to do is will that this experience
occur. But my experience does not provide any information about how the
willing results in the change in appearance and feel of my hand. Theory
plugs the hole: it says that there is a control system in here that
automatically compares the present sensations from my hand to the
sensations I am willing, and by the use of muscles makes the hand change so
the sensations match what I will them to be. I don't sense that control
system, save for the perceptual signals. The signals hypothetically
travelling outward to my muscles and the hypothetical shortening of the
muscle fibers are insensible to me. I experience only the outcome.
I think that a purely experience-based account of human functioning is
necessarily incomplete. There are aspects of brain operation at which we
can only guess. Of course as we explore the nervous system and the
physiology of behavior, we learn that some of the hypothetical signals and
physical processes in the model do seem to have discoverable counterparts,
at least in preparations and cadavers (we can never verify these things in
ourselves). There is considerable circumstantial evidence to support one
family of models and rule out others.
The important thing about models is that they complete a picture of which
experience gives us only some of the parts. Models always go beyond
experience, which is why we worry about whether they're right or wrong. It
is not possible to experience incorrectly, but it is possible to model what
is missing from experience incorrectly. Yet unless we take the chance and
propose a model, we will be limited to pure empiricism, with all its risks
and limitations.
My answer to the question about proving that the taste of chocolate exists
is that we would have to demonstrate that a specific neural signal arises
in each brain under the circumstances in which each person would say that
the taste of chocolate is being experienced. It need not be the same signal
in the same place in every brain; I would be surprised if it were.
I prefer the model-based approach to the philosophical one.
The continuum is so weirdo. So i am at odds to say whether they are different
or identical. To which again I think the continuum answers nicely..they are
different along some same criteria.
Just an aside as to whether the two are even about the same questions.
I think there
is sufficient evidence to show that the existence of a perceptual signal is
a prerequisite to tasting chocolate or anything else.
I have never denied this. But this still leaves a range of philosophical
options, not discluding Dualism.
I have speculated even further that another law is, "To
experience is to experience neural perceptual signals."
That is one, and it can be carved up even more.
I think that a purely experience-based account of human functioning is
necessarily incomplete
but not worthless, right?
The important thing about models is that they complete a picture of which
experience gives us only some of the parts. Models always go beyond
experience, which is why we worry about whether they're right or wrong. It
is not possible to experience incorrectly, but it is possible to model what
is missing from experience incorrectly. Yet unless we take the chance and
propose a model, we will be limited to pure empiricism, with all its risks
and limitations.
i totally agree.
My answer to the question about proving that the taste of chocolate exists
is that we would have to demonstrate that a specific neural signal arises
in each brain under the circumstances in which each person would say that
the taste of chocolate is being experienced. It need not be the same signal
in the same place in every brain; I would be surprised if it were.
My contention is currently ill-formed. Roughly, science is about 3rd person
characterizations, and should not be confused with an 1st person
characterization. This is a long-standing argument beginning with the first
experimental psychologists; roughly, modern psychology is the legacy of German
experimentalists who used a method for their metaphysic. Its been successfull
in some areas (Bruce A., please note that i said there has been some value in
psychology; heck you did'nt ask but i do consider myself a psychologist, albeit
a disgruntled prematurely ruined one) but there are some areas to which it has
proved worthless since the problem lay before the method.
There has been some literature about such effects concerning lip-rounding
in phonetic performance, and precision grips, I could probably dig them up,
& they'd be in the archives c. 92-94. There's a review of some of this
stuff in `Attention and Performance 13' (can't remember the editor's name)
in which some of this material is discussed in a section entitled
`Beyond the Closed-Loop Model', which suggest some serious misunderstanding ...
But the volume contains a lot of interesting stuff, including a review of
why feedback is a lot faster than motor-control people tend to say it is.
Sounds interesting, do you have a full reference for this.