Intensity-level

[From Bruce Abbott (2001.05.15.1745 EST)]

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.14.1035 EST) --

"Here's a (minor) brain-teaser to start off the week:
What are the names of all the current levels of control defined in HPCT,
beginning with the lowest?
First person to answer gets to be our PCT-person of the week, with all the
rights and privileges thereof..."

Mary Powers (2001.05.14) --

Comment from Bill: "I'm pretty sure the first level is intensity."

Hmmm -- I'm pretty sure it isn't!

Bill argued in B:CP for the first level being pure intensities devoid of any
quality. I think this was based on the fact that neural currents arising
from sensory receptors vary only in frequency, with frequency representing
the intensity of stimulation. Bill said something to the effect that the
kind of variable being represented by a given neural current depends on the
nature of the input function and not on any properties of the signal (neural
current) output by that function. The term "sensation" was then reserved
for the next higher level of perception, in which the input functions
combine intensity inputs. An example might be intensity signals from "red"
"green" and "blue" color receptors in the retina combining to produce a
range of qualitatively different perceived colors.

I would argue that there is _no_ perception of pure intensities under
ordinary circumstances, if by "perception" we mean conscious perception.
The qualitative nature of the perception depends not on the nature of the
input function (e.g., sensory receptor) but rather on the nature of the
"analyzer" whose activity gives rise (in some way nobody yet understands) to
conscious perception. A pure tone of 220 Hz is perceived as a _tone_
because its signal enters the auditory areas of the cerebral cortex, not
because it originated in the ears. (Route that same signal to the primary
visual area in the occipital lobes and the person would see flashes of light
rather than hearing a tone.) Moreover, it is perceived as a tone of 220 Hz
because the signal entered that region of the primary auditory cortex where
tones of 220 Hz are registered rather than some other region of the primary
auditory cortex. And the reason the signal enters the "right" portion of
cortex for 220 Hz sound is that it was carried by a separate pathway from a
sensory mechanism in the cochlea of the ear that was selectively stimulated
by tones of that frequency. (I recognize that the processing of sound
frequency is not this simple, but substituting the actual complex process
would make no difference to the argument.)

With respect to those "perceptual" signals that give rise to no conscious
perceptions, it makes no real difference how they are labeled;
"first-order," and "second-order" are probably just as good as "intensity"
and "sensation"; in fact they may be better as they do not connote something
belonging legitimately only to conscious perception. And even here, the
outputs of sensory receptors come already qualitatively "labeled" in the
nervous system by being carried in particular pathways that emerge from
sensory receptor mechanisms tuned to different values of some aspect of the
input energy (e.g., different frequencies). In other words, the outputs are
spacially "coded."

If anyone cares to present a different analysis or comment on this one (or
both), I'd like to hear it. (That includes you, Bill.)

Best wishes,

Bruce A.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0516.0526)]

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.15.1745 EST)]

With respect to those "perceptual" signals that give rise to no conscious
perceptions, it makes no real difference how they are labeled;
"first-order," and "second-order" are probably just as good as "intensity"
and "sensation"; in fact they may be better as they do not connote something
belonging legitimately only to conscious perception. And even here, the
outputs of sensory receptors come already qualitatively "labeled" in the
nervous system by being carried in particular pathways that emerge from
sensory receptor mechanisms tuned to different values of some aspect of the
input energy (e.g., different frequencies). In other words, the outputs are
spacially "coded."

I agree with this analysis. It is similar to the one I settled on.

BG

[From Richard Kennaway (2001.05.16.1320 BST)]

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.15.1745 EST):

I would argue that there is _no_ perception of pure intensities under
ordinary circumstances, if by "perception" we mean conscious perception.

By "perception", in the context of PCT, we mean the input to a control
system. Consciousness is irrelevant to this definition.

With respect to those "perceptual" signals that give rise to no conscious
perceptions, it makes no real difference how they are labeled;
"first-order," and "second-order" are probably just as good as "intensity"
and "sensation"; in fact they may be better as they do not connote something
belonging legitimately only to conscious perception.

Borrowing words from the vernacular to name new technical concepts is
standard practice everywhere. Are astronomers wrong to talk about the
intensity of the microwave background, which is also not a conscious
perception? Talking about first-order and second-order perceptions makes
sense in contexts where the physical nature of the perceptions is
immaterial to the discussion; calling them "intensity" and "sensation"
makes sense where these words relate to their physical nature.

What do you think of the words "purpose" and "goal", borrowed from the
vernacular to use in connection with inanimate control systems such as
line-walking robots or domestic thermostats? Or "window" to describe
certain things you see on computer screens?

-- Richard Kennaway, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk, http://www.sys.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/
   School of Information Systems, Univ. of East Anglia, Norwich, U.K.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0516.1005)]

Richard Kennaway (2001.05.16.1320 BST)

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.15.1745 EST):
>I would argue that there is _no_ perception of pure intensities under
>ordinary circumstances, if by "perception" we mean conscious perception.

By "perception", in the context of PCT, we mean the input to a control
system. Consciousness is irrelevant to this definition.

Perhaps you can explain what Mary meant when she said about the levels of
perception that "Bill ... derived them from his own introspection." Is
consciousness irrelevant to introspection?

BG

[From Richard Kennaway (2001.05.16.1517 BST)]

Bruce Gregory (2001.0516.1005):

Richard Kennaway (2001.05.16.1320 BST)
By "perception", in the context of PCT, we mean the input to a control
system. Consciousness is irrelevant to this definition.

Perhaps you can explain what Mary meant when she said about the levels of
perception that "Bill ... derived them from his own introspection." Is
consciousness irrelevant to introspection?

No more than it is irrelevant to any other sort of observation or thinking.
That does not imply that it is a necessary part of the thing observed.

To go back to the analogy I drew with talking about the microwave
background, that was discovered through observation, a conscious process,
but consciousness is not part of the thing that was discovered.

-- Richard Kennaway, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk, http://www.sys.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/
   School of Information Systems, Univ. of East Anglia, Norwich, U.K.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0516.1030)]

Richard Kennaway (2001.05.16.1517 BST)

To go back to the analogy I drew with talking about the microwave
background, that was discovered through observation, a conscious process,
but consciousness is not part of the thing that was discovered.

True, but it wasn't discovered by introspection, was it?

BG

[From Bruce Nevin (2001.0516.0758 PDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2001.0516.1030)--

···

At 10:30 05/16/2001 -0400, Bruce Gregory wrote:

Richard Kennaway (2001.05.16.1517 BST)

To go back to the analogy I drew with talking about the microwave
background, that was discovered through observation, a conscious process,
but consciousness is not part of the thing that was discovered.

True, but it wasn't discovered by introspection, was it?

Is there a problem with introspection?

         Bruce Nevin

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0516.1154)]

Bruce Nevin (2001.0516.0758 PDT)

Is there a problem with introspection?

Not at all. I do it all the time. It just doesn't tell us anything useful
about how the universe or our brains are organized.

BG

[From Bruce Abbott (2001.05.16.1535 EST)]

Richard Kennaway (2001.05.16.1320 BST) --

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.15.1745 EST):

I would argue that there is _no_ perception of pure intensities under
ordinary circumstances, if by "perception" we mean conscious perception.

By "perception", in the context of PCT, we mean the input to a control
system. Consciousness is irrelevant to this definition.

By "perception," in the context of PCT, we mean a particular neural signal
arising as the output of a perceptual function. A perceptual function has
as its inputs either (a) neural signal(s) or (b) environmental variables
that are transduced by a sensory mechanism into neural signals. A
perception is still a perception whether or not it is part of a control system.

But that is a definition from the objective point of view. Bill also
considered what perceptions are like to the person doing the perceiving (the
subjective point of view), apparently on the assumption of there being an
isomorphism between the neural currents he labels as perceptions and the
subjective phenomena of experience, the "perceptions" of the common
vernacular. In working out his proposed perceptual hierarchy, Bill assumed
that these conscious phenomena (the conscious perception of sensations such
as color or touch, of relationships, of configurations, transitions, events
-- all the types included in HPCT -- arise from neural signals whose
"meaning" inheres in the nature of the operations and inputs that gave rise
to them.

With respect to those "perceptual" signals that give rise to no conscious
perceptions, it makes no real difference how they are labeled;
"first-order," and "second-order" are probably just as good as "intensity"
and "sensation"; in fact they may be better as they do not connote something
belonging legitimately only to conscious perception.

Borrowing words from the vernacular to name new technical concepts is
standard practice everywhere. Are astronomers wrong to talk about the
intensity of the microwave background, which is also not a conscious
perception? Talking about first-order and second-order perceptions makes
sense in contexts where the physical nature of the perceptions is
immaterial to the discussion; calling them "intensity" and "sensation"
makes sense where these words relate to their physical nature.

I am not so much quarrelling about the labels as about Bill's assumption
that there is such a thing in consciousness as a pure intensity perception
(devoid of any indication of its sensory quality) and that this perception
corresponds to the neural currents of first-order systems.

Of course, as you note, in (H)PCT consciousness plays no role (except to
suggest what layers of perception may exist, as noted above). A robot
constructed along the lines specified by HPCT would need no conscious
perceptions, only the perceptual function-mechanisms, pathways, and signals
consistent with the specifications of the HPCT model. It might be able to
recognize the form of a human being and behave "appropriately" toward it
(whatever that entails), while having no conscious perception of anything.
However, if one purpose of HPCT was to explain how the brain builds up our
(human) _conscious_ perceptions level by level (as I believe it was), and if
the label "intensity" is intended to convey the hypothesis that these
bottom-layer signals correspond to a conscious perception of dimensionless
intensity (as I believe it was), then one does have a right to question the
legitimacy of this hypothesis.

But I can also question the legitimacy of the labels applied to the
"intensity" and "sensation" levels on another ground. In HPCT, first-order
signals vary in frequency and this variation is supposed to represent the
intensity of the input quantity (e.g., loudness of a tone). At the second
level, second-order signals likewise vary in frequency but now this is
supposed to correspond to some property that differentiates one
sense-quality from another, or so it would seem from the label "sensation."
However, the first-order "intensity" signals do not merely convey
"intensity," they represent the intensity OF SOME PARTICULAR SENSATION. The
second-order functions might extract something useful about the distributed
properties of a collection of such signals, but these properties, but to
call the output signals "sensations" and the output signals of first-order
functions something else, seems misleading to me. A first-order signal
arising from the pressure receptors on the tip of my index finger is already
a sensation according to the accepted physiological definition of the word.
Is it good scientific practice to redefine terms already carrying specific
scientific definitions? Would you think it good practice if I wrote a
physics book in which I defined "work" in terms of energy expenditure rather
than force X distance? After all, I merely would be borrowing from the
common vernacular to name a technical concept.

Bruce A.

[From Bruce Nevin (2001.05.16 18:53 PDT)]

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.16.1535 EST)--

I am not so much quarrelling about the labels as about Bill's assumption
that there is such a thing in consciousness as a pure intensity perception
(devoid of any indication of its sensory quality) and that this perception
corresponds to the neural currents of first-order systems.

I understand the puzzle about associating the "qualia" of subjective awareness with the postulated mechanics of controlling neural signals. It's related to the old conundrum, whether the color green that you experience is the same as the subjective experience that I know as the color green.

Your phrase "devoid of any indication of its sensory quality" suggests something more to me. Is part of the problem also that we can't be aware of an intensity without concurrently being aware of the sensation (e.g. green) that has that level of intensity? That we get at an awareness of the lower-level perception, to the extent that we do, by almost an analytical process starting from the higher-level perception?

If so, then it seems to me also the case that we aren't aware of edges without being concurrently aware of configurations that the edges help to constitute. This is really no different, except that intensities are hardest to get to.

It seems to me that in general we are more familiar with the higher-level perceptions that we spend most time being aware of and that we turn our attention to perceptions on other levels from that familiar base.

I'm willing to speculate that when we attend to our physical environment we attend most of the time to objects -- configurations -- and that our awareness moves not only down to transitions, etc. but up to relationships etc. by a shift of attention from a kind of "home base" in configurations. When we don't pay so much attention to objects around us, it's commonly because we're attending to language constructs, another favorite attention base for most folks. Like the driver with the cell phone.

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 15:30 05/16/2001 -0500, Abbott_Bruce wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2001.05.16.2008 MDT)--

But I can also question the legitimacy of the labels applied to the
"intensity" and "sensation" levels on another ground. In HPCT, first-order
signals vary in frequency and this variation is supposed to represent the
intensity of the input quantity (e.g., loudness of a tone). At the second
level, second-order signals likewise vary in frequency but now this is
supposed to correspond to some property that differentiates one
sense-quality from another, or so it would seem from the label "sensation."
However, the first-order "intensity" signals do not merely convey
"intensity," they represent the intensity OF SOME PARTICULAR SENSATION.

You can also say that identification of the sensation is a further
elaboration on _what kind of intensity_ is present. I think there is quite
a lot of evidence that human beings can detect intensities at levels too
low for identification of what kind of sensation is occurring. Color
information, for example, drops out at low light levels. That is one of my
criteria for determining hierarchical order: the higher level depends on
the lower, but not vice versa. To perceive color sensations, we must be
perceiving at least some light intensity. But the reverse is not true.

There is undoubtedly a lot of work left to do in exploring all the possible
hierarchical relationships among perceptions, to see what regularities
really exist.

Best,

Bill P.

  The

···

second-order functions might extract something useful about the distributed
properties of a collection of such signals, but these properties, but to
call the output signals "sensations" and the output signals of first-order
functions something else, seems misleading to me. A first-order signal
arising from the pressure receptors on the tip of my index finger is already
a sensation according to the accepted physiological definition of the word.
Is it good scientific practice to redefine terms already carrying specific
scientific definitions? Would you think it good practice if I wrote a
physics book in which I defined "work" in terms of energy expenditure rather
than force X distance? After all, I merely would be borrowing from the
common vernacular to name a technical concept.

Bruce A.

[From Bill Powers (2001.05.15.2018 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2001.0516.0526)--

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.15.1745 EST)]

With respect to those "perceptual" signals that give rise to no conscious
perceptions, it makes no real difference how they are labeled;
"first-order," and "second-order" are probably just as good as "intensity"
and "sensation"; in fact they may be better as they do not connote something
belonging legitimately only to conscious perception. And even here, the
outputs of sensory receptors come already qualitatively "labeled" in the
nervous system by being carried in particular pathways that emerge from
sensory receptor mechanisms tuned to different values of some aspect of the
input energy (e.g., different frequencies). In other words, the outputs are
spacially "coded."

I agree with this analysis. It is similar to the one I settled on.

I agree, too. It's the analysis I have used from the beginning. All neural
signals are alike; their meaning is determined strictly by the functions
that give rise to them and the functions that receive them (and give rise
to further signals).

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Nevin (2001.05.16 18:53 PDT)]

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.16.1535 EST)--

>I am not so much quarrelling about the labels as about Bill's assumption
>that there is such a thing in consciousness as a pure intensity

perception

>(devoid of any indication of its sensory quality) and that this

perception

>corresponds to the neural currents of first-order systems.

I understand the puzzle about associating the "qualia" of subjective
awareness with the postulated mechanics of controlling neural signals.

It's

related to the old conundrum, whether the color green that you experience
is the same as the subjective experience that I know as the color green.

snipped

What this first level meant to me is that we may control for intensity as a
separate entity.
When I am suddenly in very bright sunlight or a heliocopter goes over my
house or I'm aware of a very faint sound but can't make out what it is .....
it's the intensity dimension that initiallydominates.
Obviously our response then becomes differentiated. Perhaps, "obviously"
is the wrong word as once we try to apply language to these phenomena, all
manner of arguable topics arise.
David

···

At 15:30 05/16/2001 -0500, Abbott_Bruce wrote:

[From Bruce Abbott (2001.05.17.1145 EST)]

Bill Powers (2001.05.16.2008 MDT) --

Hi Bill, nice to hear from you . . .

But I can also question the legitimacy of the labels applied to the
"intensity" and "sensation" levels on another ground. In HPCT, first-order
signals vary in frequency and this variation is supposed to represent the
intensity of the input quantity (e.g., loudness of a tone). At the second
level, second-order signals likewise vary in frequency but now this is
supposed to correspond to some property that differentiates one
sense-quality from another, or so it would seem from the label "sensation."
However, the first-order "intensity" signals do not merely convey
"intensity," they represent the intensity OF SOME PARTICULAR SENSATION.

You can also say that identification of the sensation is a further
elaboration on _what kind of intensity_ is present. I think there is quite
a lot of evidence that human beings can detect intensities at levels too
low for identification of what kind of sensation is occurring. Color
information, for example, drops out at low light levels. That is one of my
criteria for determining hierarchical order: the higher level depends on
the lower, but not vice versa. To perceive color sensations, we must be
perceiving at least some light intensity. But the reverse is not true.

I don't find such evidence convincing. At low light levels, color
sensations drop out because the color receptor cells (cones) in the retina
fail to respond. That we continue to sense light at some intensity after
color has disappeared is due to the activity of the rod cells, which have
greater sensitivity to light than the cones.

As for the "synaesthesia" evidence, I suspect that here we are talking about
something happening very high up in the processing of sensory information,
where the perceptually distinct labeling of sensory experience is created
(yielding the conscious experience of qualitatively distinct sensations) and
where these experiences are assembled to produce the "cartesian theater" of
mind. As we know basically nothing about how this mental tapestry is woven,
it is problematic, to say the least, to state how sensory quality might be
stripped from experience, leaving only intensity behind, if indeed the
reports of this phenomenon are accurate.

Returning to the problem of identifying what is going on at the first two
levels of perception, I suspect that both levels are involved in what the
higher, conscious levels of the brain represent as distinct sensory qualia,
or in other words, as sensations. At the first level we have the sensory
nerve endings and their associated sensory mechanisms, which act to
transduce environmental inputs into neural signals. Such signals may go
directly to sensory analyzers at high levels in the brain, where they would
be represented in consciousness as distinct sensory qualities with
particular intensities (e.g., a feeling of a certain level of pressure on
the bottom surface of my right index finger).

Other such first-order signals might go no further than the second-order
layer, where they serve as inputs to "preprocessors" that serve to extract
sensory information from patterns of input distributed across different
types of sensory receptor. The example I have in mind is the extraction of
frequency information by the three types of cone cell in the retina. Here,
evolution has hit upon a much more efficient method for extracting such
information from the input electromagnetic wave than having a separate
extremely narrow-band receptor for each perceived color. The method
involves using three relatively broad-band detectors whose peak
sensitivities are centered at three different frequencies but whose
distributions overlap, so that frequencies lying between the peak values can
stimulate more than one type of receptor. The ratios of the the output
intensities (neural current levels) are used to generate the entire rainbow
of percievable colors. Thus, a frequency half-way between the peak of the
low-frequency and middle-frequency light detector will stimulate both about
equally and the high-frequency detector perhaps not at all; the result will
be the perception of yellow. Thus there needs to be no receptor in the
retina tuned to that intermediate frequency; the presence of that frequency
is "inferred" from the proportions of intensities of the three tuned
receptors. At some high level in the brain, this set of proportions
produces the conscious perception of yellow as a distinct quality of sensation.

The point I'm trying to get across here is that at the level of conscious
perception, both yellow and that sense of pressure on the finger tip may be
perceived as primary sensations qualitatively different from any other; the
brain at this level does not know the difference between these first- and
second-order sensations. Whether a sensation arises directly from
first-order outputs or indirectly through second-order processing is simply
a matter of practicality. If in the course of evolution the neural current
arising from some particular sensory transducer turned out to be usable "as
is," then further transmormations may not have evolved, there being no
incremental advantage to further refinement of the signal. On the other
hand, if further processing of these first-order signals extracted signals
more useful (read "adaptive") than the raw ones (as in the case of color
perception), then additional stages of processing may have evolved whose
outputs represent "inferred" sensory characteristics extracted from the
patterns of lower-level input intensities.

There is undoubtedly a lot of work left to do in exploring all the possible
hierarchical relationships among perceptions, to see what regularities
really exist.

I hope everyone understands that what I've said above in no way constitutes
a criticism of PCT, Bill. You've done a terrific job in formulating a
potentially workable model. However, it is my understanding that the model
was always intended as provisional -- a starting point for further
development, to be modified as necessary in the light of experimental
evidence, so long as the resulting system stays true to the basic precepts
of HPCT -- behavior as control of perception, the hierarchical, organization
of perception and control, reorganization as control (have I left anything
out?). It is in that spirit that I offer what is, after all, only some food
for further thought about the perceptual hierarchy.

Bruce A.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0517.1407)]

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.17.1145 EST)

I hope everyone understands that what I've said above in no way constitutes
a criticism of PCT, Bill. You've done a terrific job in formulating a
potentially workable model. However, it is my understanding that the model
was always intended as provisional -- a starting point for further
development, to be modified as necessary in the light of experimental
evidence, so long as the resulting system stays true to the basic precepts
of HPCT -- behavior as control of perception, the hierarchical, organization
of perception and control, reorganization as control (have I left anything
out?). It is in that spirit that I offer what is, after all, only some food
for further thought about the perceptual hierarchy.

The same goes for me. I fear that this is not always obvious. I agree with
the rest of the post, too.

BG

[From Richard Kennaway (2001.05.18.0916 BST)]

Bruce Abbott (2001.05.16.1535 EST):

By "perception," in the context of PCT, we mean a particular neural signal
arising as the output of a perceptual function. A perceptual function has
as its inputs either (a) neural signal(s) or (b) environmental variables
that are transduced by a sensory mechanism into neural signals. A
perception is still a perception whether or not it is part of a control
system.

Ok.

However, if one purpose of HPCT was to explain how the brain builds up our
(human) _conscious_ perceptions level by level (as I believe it was), and if
the label "intensity" is intended to convey the hypothesis that these
bottom-layer signals correspond to a conscious perception of dimensionless
intensity (as I believe it was),

Ah -- so it is (B:CP pp 96-97). For some reason I have been assuming that
the bottom few levels of the hierarchy were below the level of conscious
awareness.

then one does have a right to question the
legitimacy of this hypothesis.

Would you think it good practice if I wrote a
physics book in which I defined "work" in terms of energy expenditure rather
than force X distance? After all, I merely would be borrowing from the
common vernacular to name a technical concept.

Actually, this sort of thing happens all the time in mathematics (which is
what my background is in). As long as people remember to say specifically
what they mean when introducing technical terms whose use varies, saying
things like "Henceforth, by 'field' we mean any commutative field", it
doesn't cause confusion.

-- Richard Kennaway, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk, http://www.sys.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/
   School of Information Systems, Univ. of East Anglia, Norwich, U.K.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0518.0532)]

Richard Kennaway (2001.05.18.0916 BST)

>Would you think it good practice if I wrote a
>physics book in which I defined "work" in terms of energy expenditure rather
>than force X distance? After all, I merely would be borrowing from the
>common vernacular to name a technical concept.

Actually, this sort of thing happens all the time in mathematics (which is
what my background is in). As long as people remember to say specifically
what they mean when introducing technical terms whose use varies, saying
things like "Henceforth, by 'field' we mean any commutative field", it
doesn't cause confusion.

This works if you are simply specifying the kind of field you mean. If you
were to inconsistently use the term field to mean either a set or a ring,
you might find yourself ignored by other mathematicians who might decide it
simply wasn't worth the effort to try to figure out what you were trying to
say. Perception as the input signal to a comparator could perhaps be called
PCT-perception to distinguish it from the way nearly everybody else uses
the term.

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0518.1025)]

The use of the word "perception" in PCT is not as unambiguous as some
argue. Since there are both controlled and uncontrolled perceptions, it is
simply wrong to say, "By "perception", in the context of PCT, we mean the
input to a control system. Consciousness is irrelevant to this definition."

BG

[From Bill Powers (2001.05.18.1437 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2001.0518.1025)--

The use of the word "perception" in PCT is not as unambiguous as some
argue. Since there are both controlled and uncontrolled perceptions, it is
simply wrong to say, "By "perception", in the context of PCT, we mean the
input to a control system. Consciousness is irrelevant to this definition."

With whom are you arguing? There is no such definition of perception in
BCP, not have I ever offered that definition as far as I can recall. Look
up perception in the glossary of BCP: that's still how I use the term when
I mean to be precise.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.05.1725)]

Bill Powers (2001.05.18.1437 MDT)

Bruce Gregory (2001.0518.1025)--

>The use of the word "perception" in PCT is not as unambiguous as some
>argue. Since there are both controlled and uncontrolled perceptions, it is
>simply wrong to say, "By "perception", in the context of PCT, we mean the
>input to a control system. Consciousness is irrelevant to this definition."

With whom are you arguing? There is no such definition of perception in
BCP, not have I ever offered that definition as far as I can recall. Look
up perception in the glossary of BCP: that's still how I use the term when
I mean to be precise.

The quote is from Richard Kennaway. I notice that it didn't bother you when
he said it. We all need a vacation from time to time.

BG