[Avery Andrews 940914.1237]
(Bill Powers (940913.0930 MDT))
>Philosophers, trying to remain scientific, accepted that such a thing is
>impossible, so they looked around for some other meanings to satisfy
>their sense that "intentions" really do exist. What they came up with is
>a vague mish-mash in which words like "aboutness" and "indication" and
>"reference" show up, no better defined than "intention." PCT shows this
>to be a pseudoproblem: intentions exist and have exactly the effect that
>the original meaning suggested. They exist in the physical form of
>reference signals; they are no longer in the province of philosophy.
I'm not sure about the historical connections, but the philosophers
distinguish between 'intentions' (purposes) and 'intensions' (an aspect
of meaning). The treatment of both is certainly a mishmash, however!
Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au