I would appreciate it if someone out there could write up a critical
evaluation of the relationship between Dennett's "intentional stance"
approach to behavior and Powers' "control of perception" approach to
behavior. I don't know much about Dennett but people seem to think he
has some useful things to say about purposeful behavior. Dennett's point
of view seems to be _far_ more influential than Powers's. So I would
like to know what's up.
I would appreciate it if someone out there could write up a critical
evaluation of the relationship between Dennett's "intentional stance"
approach to behavior and Powers' "control of perception" approach to
behavior. I don't know much about Dennett but people seem to think he
has some useful things to say about purposeful behavior. Dennett's point
of view seems to be _far_ more influential than Powers's. So I would
like to know what's up.
I've read some of Dennett's work but I can't claim to understand him.
Here's what the University of Alberta's _Cognitive Science Dictionary_ says:
"An intentional stance refers to the treating of a system as if it has
intentions, irrespective of whether it does. By treating a system as if it
is a rational agent one is able to predict the system's behaviour. First,
one ascribes beliefs to the system as those the system ought to have given
its abilities, history and context. Then one attributes desires to the
system as those the system ought to have given its survival needs and means
of fulfilling them. One can then predict the systems behaviour as that a
rational system would undertake to further its goals given its beliefs.
Dennett argues for three main reasons for taking an intentional stance.
First, it fits well with our understandings of the processes of natural
selection and evolution in complex environments. Second, it has been shown
to be an accurate method of predicting behaviour. Third, it is consistent
with our folk psychology of behaviour."
I would hardly call this a model of behavior. It is not obvious to me that
it is inconsistent with Powers' approach, but it has so much wiggle room in
it, that that doesn't say much. I think any model that treats human beings
as rational agents faces insurmountable problems from the outset. The body
of research in behavioral economics (cf. Thaler, _The Winners Curse:
Paradoxes & Anomalies of Economic Life_ New York, Free Press) demonstrates
this pretty convincingly.
Sounds like it might be a pretty convincing argument for identifying controlled variables, without a real methodology for doing so. Just as in the coin game the CV is not obvious, it shouldn't be hard to come up with examples where the "obvious" survival needs, beliefs, desires, intentions, and means turn out not to be the actual ones, e.g. by a PCT account of those economic paradoxes and anomalies. "It has been shown to be an accurate method of predicting behavior" I wonder how often and under what conditions.
"Rational" probably means only that outcomes follow from the needs, beliefs, desires, intentions, and means in a systemic ("logical") way, substituting in place of the organism's functioning the reasoning of the person who imputed this reasonable system to it.
Bruce Gregory (2001.1005.1741), responding to Rick's request for info about
Dennett's "intentional stance" includes this remark:
> I think any model that treats human beings as rational agents faces
insurmountable
> problems from the outset. The body of research in behavioral economics
(cf. Thaler,
> _The Winners Curse: Paradoxes & Anomalies of Economic Life_ New York,
Free Press)
> demonstrates this pretty convincingly.
Are you using "rational" in a commonplace sense (i.e., as thinking,
reasoning entities) or are you using in a more restricted and technical
sense the way economists seem to use it (i.e., as calculating) or in some
even more technical way (e.g., behaves in accordance with xxxx)? I think
people behave rationally -- at times -- I also think they behave
irrationally at times (to an observer at least). Could you say more about
why viewing human beings as rational agents is faced with insurmountable
problems?
Are you using "rational" in a commonplace sense (i.e., as thinking,
reasoning entities) or are you using in a more restricted and technical
sense the way economists seem to use it (i.e., as calculating)
Human beings certainly think. How often and how well they reason is subject
to debate!
or in some
even more technical way (e.g., behaves in accordance with xxxx)? I think
people behave rationally -- at times -- I also think they behave
irrationally at times (to an observer at least).
I agree. Problems arise if we assume they will act rationally in any
particular situation.
Could you say more about
why viewing human beings as rational agents is faced with insurmountable
problems?
Basically for the reason I just gave. If you assume rational action, your
models will quickly depart from reality. Most economic models need
"adjustments". Economists, for example, have no idea why they, or anyone
else, bothers to vote. One person's impact on the outcome of an election is
extremely small when compared with the effort needed to vote. Rational
people, apparently, do not vote.
Bruce Gregory is an ex-patriot.
He lives with the American
poet and painter Gray Jacobik
and their canine and feline familiars in
Pomfret, Connecticut.
The HPCT hierarchy as proposed places reason and logic at the program
level. This level serves the principle level and beyond that, the system
concept level. If you think someone's principles and systems concepts are
out of kilter, then that person's reasoning, however orderly and logical,
will seem irrational. Arrangements for the Holocaust, or more recently
destroying the WTC, were rational - carefully planned and carried out - but
their _rationale_ , the beliefs and moral principles on which they were
based, are what we see as irrational.
I think that the view that humans are rational agents is indeed faced with
problems. Appeals to reason do not cut it with strongly held beliefs.
Mary P.
···
At 08:41 AM 10/7/2001 -0400, you wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2001.10.06.0852)] --
Are you using "rational" in a commonplace sense (i.e., as thinking,
reasoning entities) or are you using in a more restricted and technical
sense the way economists seem to use it (i.e., as calculating) or in some
even more technical way (e.g., behaves in accordance with xxxx)? I think
people behave rationally -- at times -- I also think they behave
irrationally at times (to an observer at least). Could you say more about
why viewing human beings as rational agents is faced with insurmountable
problems?
The HPCT hierarchy as proposed places reason and logic at the program
level. This level serves the principle level and beyond that, the system
concept level. If you think someone's principles and systems concepts are
out of kilter, then that person's reasoning, however orderly and logical,
will seem irrational. Arrangements for the Holocaust, or more recently
destroying the WTC, were rational - carefully planned and carried out -
but
their _rationale_ , the beliefs and moral principles on which they were
based, are what we see as irrational.
I think that the view that humans are rational agents is indeed faced with
problems. Appeals to reason do not cut it with strongly held beliefs.
The last issue of "Science" journal had an article on the use of brain scans
while subjects were asked how they would handle moral choices. Apparantly,
the conclusion is that subject's first activity took place in the emotional
areas and then in frontal cortex. The conclusion, according to a newspaper
report, is that the choice is made on an emotional basis and then reasons
are attached to it.
I've tried to read the article but someone had it at the university library.
Has anyone else seen it?
David Wolsk
···
----- Original Message -----
From: "Mary Powers" <powers_w@FRONTIER.NET>
To: <CSGNET@LISTSERV.UIUC.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, October 10, 2001 6:09 AM
Subject: Re: Intentional stance
The last issue of "Science" journal had an article on the use of brain scans
while subjects were asked how they would handle moral choices. Apparantly,
the conclusion is that subject's first activity took place in the emotional
areas and then in frontal cortex. The conclusion, according to a newspaper
report, is that the choice is made on an emotional basis and then reasons
are attached to it.
I've tried to read the article but someone had it at the university library.
Has anyone else seen it?
David Wolsk
I haven't seen the article but I'll bet no salesman will be surprised by
the finding. It is also consistent with evolutionary models that lead to
the conclusion that emotional responses must be very if we are to survive
and flourish. It even helps to explain the behavior of some people who
regularly post to CSGnet
Bruce Gregory is an ex-patriot.
He lives with the American
poet and painter Gray Jacobik
and their canine and feline familiars in
Pomfret, Connecticut.
>The last issue of "Science" journal had an article on the use of brain scans
while subjects were asked how they would handle moral choices. Apparantly,
the conclusion is that subject's first activity took place in the emotional
areas and then in frontal cortex.
In a hierarchical system, disturbances are felt and resisted first at the
lowest levels. But it is the higher levels that set the reference signals
for the lower levels and thus determine what they will experience as
errors. Higher levels experience effects from disturbances only to the
extend that lower levels fail to resist them, either because the
disturbances are too large or because the lower levels are not equipped to
perceive the variables being disturbed.
I saw the Science article, too. It seemed to me like just the same old
fumbling around.
The last issue of "Science" journal had an article on the use of brain scans
while subjects were asked how they would handle moral choices. Apparantly,
the conclusion is that subject's first activity took place in the emotional
areas and then in frontal cortex. The conclusion, according to a newspaper
report, is that the choice is made on an emotional basis and then reasons
are attached to it.
I've tried to read the article but someone had it at the university library.
Has anyone else seen it?
David Wolsk
The article in the "last" issue of Science is in the Sept 14, 2001 issue.
It is "An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment" by
J.D. Greene, et al. My impression is that it does not say that emotions
come first and are the basis for action or decision. It says that emotions
are stronger and deciding takes longer when either choice in an ethical
dilemma is morally repugnant. But I don't think that emotions are shown to
precede or cause the process of deciding the conflict one way or the other.
The article in the "last" issue of Science is in the Sept 14, 2001 issue.
It is "An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment" by
J.D. Greene, et al. My impression is that it does not say that emotions
come first and are the basis for action or decision. It says that emotions
are stronger and deciding takes longer when either choice in an ethical
dilemma is morally repugnant. But I don't think that emotions are shown to
precede or cause the process of deciding the conflict one way or the
other.
Mary P.
Thanks, Mary, for the clarification. It's a good reminder of the quality of
newspaper science reports.
David
···
----- Original Message -----
From: "Mary Powers" <powers_w@FRONTIER.NET>
To: <CSGNET@LISTSERV.UIUC.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2001 7:36 AM
Subject: Re: Intentional stance
