Presumably, PCT is only value neutral to the extent to which it refers to the hierarchical mechanism as abstracted from the controlled variables which populate it. If the mechanism must at a minimum be populated with controlled variables which sustain continued perception, then PCT at a minimum, has the equivalent of a will for the individual instantiation to live, and starts out with a bias toward individualism.
-- Martin L
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.18.1815)]
Presumably, PCT is only value neutral to the extent to which it refers to
the hierarchical mechanism as abstracted from the controlled variables which
populate it. �If the mechanism must at a minimum be populated with
controlled variables which sustain continued perception, then PCT at a
minimum, has the equivalent of a will for the individual instantiation to
live, and starts out with a bias toward individualism.
PCT is completely value neutral. Control systems presumably have
values (in PCT they are references for principle perceptions) but PCT,
as a theory of human nature, can't say what those values should be.
PCT says that humans are controllers, controlling a hierarchy of
different types of perceptual variables. The theory doesn't say what
perceptions _should_ be controlled but it does help us understand what
will happen if certain perceptions are controlled, such as perceptions
of other people's behavior.
The theory doesn't say whether people should be individualist,
pursuing their own goals while ignoring the possible effects doing so
may have on others, or community oriented; it doesn't say whether
coercion is good or bad; it doesn't say whether one economic system is
better than another. All PCT can do is show -- after an appropriate
model has been built -- what will happen if people control in these
ways. Then one can judge whether the model produces results that are
good or bad relative to the references of the one judging those
results. The values are in the people evaluating the performance of
the model, or so says PCT.
So PCT is truly values free. It can never be used as a basis for
evaluating whether, say, my values are better than yours or vice
versa. But it can explain _why_ my values are different than yours.
According to PCT it's because we are controlling for different system
concept perceptions and maintaining those different system concepts
requires that we set out references for the lower level principles
perceptions (values) somewhat differently.
Vive la diff�rence.
Best
Rick
On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 3:25 PM, Martin Lewitt <mlewitt@comcast.net> wrote:
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
(Gavin Ritz 2011.04.19NZT)
[From Rick Marken
(2011.04.18.1815)]
I actually agree with the
rest of your statements.
According to PCT it’s because we are controlling for
different system
concept perceptions and maintaining those different
system concepts.
So explain to us how
these systems concepts are arranged. Or what exactly are these system concepts.
What type of logic can we expect in the systems concepts?
Would that be what Smuts
or Leibniz would call “Holism, Monadism?
Or mathematical category
theory regards as associativity?
So what exactly do we
really control here?
Sounds a little godlike
or Matrixy.
Is this Systems Concept not
a value couched in other words?
requires that we set out references for the lower
level principles
perceptions (values) somewhat differently.
[Martin Lewitt 18 Apr 2011 2033 MDT]
(Gavin Ritz 2011.04.19NZT)
[From Rick Marken
(2011.04.18.1815)]
I actually agree with therest of your statements.
According to PCTit’s because we are controlling for
different system
concept perceptionsand maintaining those different
system concepts.
So explain to us howthese systems concepts are arranged. Or what exactly are
these system concepts.
What type of logic can we expect in the systems concepts?
Would that be what Smutsor Leibniz would call “Holism, Monadism?
Or mathematical categorytheory regards as associativity?
So what exactly do wereally control here?
Sounds a little godlikeor Matrixy.
Is this Systems Concept nota value couched in other words?
requires that we setout references for the lower
level principles
perceptions (values)somewhat differently.
I don't think a system concept controlled variable has to exist. A
sociopath for instance could just view other humans as food or
potential dupes. Does that mean there are few PCT levels in his
hierarchy? I suspect the brain is flexible enough to have a
variable number of levels based upon environmental needs (including
the social and intellectual environment) from the same genotype.
Just as far more people can probably achieve an Arnold
Schwarzenegger body phenotype than ever bother to do so.
Martin L
On 4/18/2011 8:17 PM, Gavin Ritz wrote:
(gavin Ritz
[ Martin Lewitt
18 Apr 2011 2033 MDT]
On 4/18/2011 8:17 PM, Gavin Ritz wrote:
(Gavin Ritz
2011.04.19NZT)
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.18.1815)]
I actually agree with the rest of your statements.
According to PCT it’s
because we are controlling for different system
concept
perceptions and maintaining those different system concepts.
So explain to us how these systems concepts are arranged. Or what
exactly are these system concepts. What type of logic can we expect in the
systems concepts?
Would that be what Smuts or Leibniz would call “Holism,
Monadism?
Or mathematical category theory regards as associativity?
So what exactly do we really control here?
Sounds a little godlike or Matrixy.
Is this Systems Concept not a value couched in other words?
requires that we
set out references for the lower level principles
perceptions
(values) somewhat differently.
I don’t think a system concept controlled variable has to exist.
Does it or doesn’t it?
A sociopath for instance
could just view other humans as food
Is this referral to Jeffery Dahmer or Armin Meiwes ?
or potential dupes.
Like the victims on American Greed, or the
victims of Bernie Madoff.
Does that mean there are
few PCT levels in his hierarchy? I suspect the brain is flexible enough
to have a variable number of levels based upon environmental needs
How do you know if the brain has any
levels?
MRI’s
on test subjects don’t seem to show any specific levels in the brain. Seems
to show more like a synthesis of different parts of the brain.
Where is the test for the levels?
(including the social and
intellectual environment) from the same genotype. Just as far more people can
probably achieve an Arnold Schwarzenegger body phenotype than ever bother to do
so.
Martin L
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.18.2130)]
Martin Lewitt (18 Apr 2011 2033 MDT)--
I don't think a system concept controlled variable has to exist.
Of course not. First, because it is a theoretical (made up) construct
so it may be wrong. Second, even if it is right and there are system
concept perceptions controlled at the top of a control hierarchy, it
may be that some people never end up developing that level of control.
A sociopath for instance could just view other humans as food or potential
dupes.� Does that mean there are few PCT levels in his hierarchy?
Yes. The current theory is that the PCT levels develop over the course
of childhood. It's certainly possible that some people never actually
develop a system concept level, in which case they wouldn't even be
able to perceive the world in terms of system concepts.
I suspect
the brain is flexible enough to have a variable number of levels based upon
environmental needs (including the social and intellectual environment) from
the same genotype.
It certainly might be; it would be a somewhat different theory than
HPCT but it's certainly possible. There has not been that much
research on the hierarchical aspects of PCT, especially on what the
levels are (if they exist) had how many there are. But there is some
research and it strongly suggests that there _is_ a hierarchy; and the
developmental research (by the Plooijs) suggests that primates
(including humans) seem to have the same levels that develop in the
same developmental sequence.
And just from the fact that we are arguing about our preferences for
what I would call different system concepts (economy, society,
government) suggests that we can perceive system concepts and that we
control for different reference states of these system concepts.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
(Gavin Ritz 2011.04.19.17.27NZT)
[From Rick Marken
(2011.04.18.2130)]
Martin Lewitt (18 Apr 2011 2033 MDT)–
There has not been that much
research on the hierarchical aspects of PCT,
especially on what the
levels are (if they exist) had how many there are.
The entire key to human communication,
spontaneity, society building, and industry lies here.
That is why this is the
area I’m interested in.
The model building in PCT
has shown categorically that the control system is at the heart of the matter, so
why is no-one interested so called hierarchical area of PCT?
I have put forward ideas
of non-equilibrium thermodynamical approach; this type of thinking has been put
at the forefront for years by Prigogine
and the Santa Fe Institute plus an entire cadre of complexity, chaos folk. Why
is there so little uptake on this type of thinking?
There have even been huge
breakthroughs in how the human mind works from both biomedical and sociological
(Jaques) view points.
And just from the fact that we are arguing about our
preferences for
what I would call different system concepts (economy,
society,
government) suggests that we can perceive system
concepts and that we
control for different reference states of these system
concepts.
So what is it specifically
that we control at the systems concept?
Regards
Gavin
[From Richard Kennaway (2011.04.19.0836 BST)]
Bill used to think that PCT had some rather strong implications for human values, to judge by these words of wisdom I've seen from him over the years:
--------
"If you happen to believe that people ought to live all bunched up together, be nice and refrain from violence, keep their promises and commitments to each other, take care of the helpless, do their share by helping with the unpleasant or boring jobs, teach the young, love truth, and be respectful of the environment, that's fine. What you should do is go around talking to people, trying to persuade them that they will be better off if they act like this, explaining to them the advantages of this kind of behavior toward others and the disadvantages of other ways of behaving, so so forth. The more of them you can persuade, the more people there will be in the world who want the same things you want, and who will help get them in situations where one person alone would be ineffective. Nothing the matter with that.
"But if you tell them they should do all these things because there are social forces that make them necessary or right, then you're lying. The truth is that these are things you want to happen. You may have lots of good reasons for wanting them to happen, and there's certainly nothing wrong with telling people what convinced you and seeing whether the same things will convince others. But trying to convince people that there are forces other than you that demand the behavior you want in some objective way is just an empty threat; anyone who disagrees with you can nullify your argument by claiming knowledge of other forces that demand a different kind of behavior. Since you're both making up these external forces in your imaginations, nobody wins."
--------
"Social systems don't define "responsible." People do. You are behaving responsibly if you're doing everything I think you ought to be doing, and not doing anything I think you shouldn't be doing. That's all there is to responsibility. There's no point in telling people that they have objective responsibilities; either they already accept them and are carrying them out as their own ideas of what's right to do, or they disagree with you. If you insist that they carry them out, you will eventually have to threaten them with force, or actually apply physical force (and if you never apply physical force, there's not much point in threatening its use). That doesn't prove you were right; it just proves you were stronger."
--------
"One person negotiating agreements with another: that's society. You and me, talking and working together."
--------
It's hard to imagine that the writer of those words also wrote a few days ago in favour of central planning. Ah, but it will all be done on PCT principles, with validated models of how society works! *Then* central planning will finally work!
Bill, just who is it who will get to make these plans? Are they going to tell people that they have objective responsibilities to do as the planners tell them? Are people to be merely nodes in a societal PCT hierarchy, their reference levels set for them by their superiors? How many people will have to be executed before the proles learn to stay in line and do as they're told?
Meanwhile, I heard today that in Cuba, people are to be allowed to buy and sell their own houses for the first time since the revolution.
Sorry Bill, I still think you're one of the wisest people I've ever known, but I can't go along with you on this. Martin Lewitt is fighting the good fight here.
--
Richard Kennaway, jrk@cmp.uea.ac.uk, http://www.cmp.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/
School of Computing Sciences,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.
(Gavin Ritz 2011.04.19.10.53NZT)
[From Richard Kennaway
(2011.04.19.0836 BST)]
Bill used to think
that PCT had some rather strong implications for human values, to judge by
these words of wisdom I’ve seen from him over the years:
"If you happen to believe that people ought to
live all bunched up together, be nice and refrain from violence, keep their
promises and commitments to each other, take care of the helpless, do their
share by helping with the unpleasant or boring jobs, teach the young, love
truth, and be respectful of the environment, that’s fine. What you should do is
go around talking to people, trying to persuade them that they will be better
off if they act like this, explaining to them the advantages of this kind of behavior
toward others and the disadvantages of other ways of behaving, so so forth. The
more of them you can persuade, the more people there will be in the world who
want the same things you want, and who will help get them in situations where
one person alone would be ineffective. Nothing the matter with that.
“But if you tell them they should do all these
things because there are social forces that make them necessary or right, then
you’re lying. The truth is that these are things you want to happen. You may
have lots of good reasons for wanting them to happen, and there’s certainly
nothing wrong with telling people what convinced you and seeing whether the
same things will convince others. But trying to convince people that there are
forces other than you that demand the behavior you want in some objective way
is just an empty threat; anyone who disagrees with you can nullify your
argument by claiming knowledge of other forces that demand a different kind of
behavior. Since you’re both making up these external forces in your
imaginations, nobody wins.”
“Social systems don’t define
“responsible.” People do. You are behaving responsibly if you’re
doing everything I think you ought to be doing, and not doing anything I think
you shouldn’t be doing. That’s all there is to responsibility. There’s no point
in telling people that they have objective responsibilities; either they
already accept them and are carrying them out as their own ideas of what’s
right to do, or they disagree with you. If you insist that they carry them out,
you will eventually have to threaten them with force, or actually apply
physical force (and if you never apply physical force, there’s not much point
in threatening its use). That doesn’t prove you were right; it just proves you were
stronger.”
“One person negotiating agreements with another:
that’s society. You and me, talking and working together.”
Seems like pretty well structured
arguments these above.
It’s hard to imagine that the writer of those words
also wrote a few days ago in favour of central planning. Ah, but it will
all be done on PCT principles, with validated models of how society
works! Then central planning will finally work!
What central planning, you’ve
got to be joking? I haven’t seen any PCT models of social organisations
yet, where are they I want to get my hands on those plans.
Bill, just who is it
who will get to make these plans?
We’ve got a good
team here.
Are they going to tell people that they have objective
responsibilities to do as the planners tell them? Are people to be merely
nodes in a societal PCT hierarchy, their reference levels set for them by their
superiors? How many people will have to be executed before the proles
learn to stay in line and do as they’re told?
Stalin had
some good guidelines, we can copy those.
Meanwhile, I heard today that in Cuba, people are to be allowed to buy and
sell their own houses for the first time since the revolution.
Looks like the fundamentals
of human exchange is finally being accepted in Cuba.
Sorry Bill, I still think you’re one of the wisest people I’ve ever known, but
I can’t go along with you on this. Martin Lewitt is fighting
the good fight here.
What fight was that?
[From Bill Powers (2011.04.19.-730 MDT)]
Richard Kennaway (2011.04.19.0836 BST) --
BP: "One person negotiating agreements with another: that's society. You and me, talking and working together."
--------
JRK: It's hard to imagine that the writer of those words also wrote a few days ago in favour of central planning. Ah, but it will all be done on PCT principles, with validated models of how society works! *Then* central planning will finally work!
Bill, just who is it who will get to make these plans? Are they going to tell people that they have objective responsibilities to do as the planners tell them? Are people to be merely nodes in a societal PCT hierarchy, their reference levels set for them by their superiors? How many people will have to be executed before the proles learn to stay in line and do as they're told?
BP: Perhaps I can regain your shattered trust in me.
When I say "central planning," I don't mean what you and others seem to mean. I don't mean telling people what to buy or not buy, what to produce or not produce (or what prices to set), what work to do or how to do it, or in general how to live. One person can't prescribe such things for another person without creating violence (at least that's what I take PCT to predict), which I assume the majority of us don't enjoy. I'm not talking about a coercive (or benign) totalitarian regime, which I also assume isn't generally wanted.
My concept of a central plan is a model that all can agree predicts accurately. The model tells us what will happen to some variables if others are changed in certain ways. We validate the model using historical data, pretending to predict events at and after a certain past date using only information from prior to that date. When the model has been refined enough for all those pseudo-predictions to succeed with sufficient accuracy, we can begin to make real predictions of things that haven't happened yet. When those real predictions have proven reliable for long enough to satisfy us, we can begin relying on them in our attempts to control what will happen to us.
The model will tell us things such as "If the consensus is that having another Great Depression is what everyone wants, keep doing all the things you are doing right now. To get a different outcome, it will be necessary to change some parameters in the system, such as p,q, and r, or x, y, and z. You may now enter changes in those or other parameters to obtain predictions of what the result will be." Of course the model will be incapable of sarcasm.
That is my central planning. The planners are those who want to know the most probable consequences of their actions, particularly actions based on policies that may be adopted by many people. The plan is central in that it is based on a model accepted by all as correct, and all have equal access to its use. Furthermore, the model is developed by competent people using publicly available resources, whose reasoning is open to inspection and debate in the normal manner of any scientific development. Where special knowledge or skill is required, such as knowledge of mathematics, skill at developing and debugging large programs, or a facility for gathering data from diverse sources, those who provide it are adequately compensated in return for making their resources available to all.
For example, I think a good model might tell us that if one American company outsources its manufacturing, it will prosper, but if this becomes a general policy and a majority outsources, the American people will not make enough money to be able to buy all that can be manufactured elsewhere, that foreign prices will rise, and the net result will be that in America everyone's standard of living will go down. That might be argued to be a good thing; perhaps the world will be better off with less disparity of incomes and standards of living. The model does not offer a judgment in that regard. But the model does not decide whether any outcome is to be preferred over any other; it simply shows what the outcomes will most probably be. It's still up to us to decide whether any given outcome is wanted or not wanted.
I don't know if that example is realistic, since we don't have any competent economic model based on a realistic understanding of human behavior. I reveal my concealed (?) prejudices by guessing what a good model will predict. The example is meant only to show how the model would be used in a non-coercive way. No sane person, even a criminal, will adopt a course which can be predicted reliably to thwart the very goals which it was supposed to achieve. We all want to know if our longer-term efforts to make our life experiences come closer to what we want them to be are most likely to fail or to succeed. Finding out the hard way is not generally a good idea. Bernie Madoff, if he had been able to forsee with some confidence the outcome of his actions, would have behaved differently if his most important goals could not be achieved while in prison.
I encounter so much resistance to the idea of developing this model that I can't help wondering what's behind it. What is disturbed by the idea of actually knowing how the economy works well enough to control how it behaves? Is it just that most ideas now being offered will prove to be wrong? Is it that certain objectives now being sought will become public knowledge? Is it that access to full information will make the acquisition of power over others more difficult? Or is it simply the belief that no really workable model is possible? Is that it? Simple fear of failure?
Actually, Richard, your reaction suggests to me that one important reason is that the objective of my proposal is misunderstood as being a concentration of power instead of the acquisition of knowledge. Perhaps that point is clearer now.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bill Powers (2011.04.19.0928 MDT)]
ML: Presumably, PCT is only value neutral to the extent to which it refers to the hierarchical mechanism as abstracted from the controlled variables which populate it. If the mechanism must at a minimum be populated with controlled variables which sustain continued perception, then PCT at a minimum, has the equivalent of a will for the individual instantiation to live, and starts out with a bias toward individualism.
BP: That is a very strained way of describing the basic control system. It does not get "populated with controlled variables" separately from the perception of controlled variables. The controlled variable is defined by the input function that generates the perceptual signal. Given the same set of environmental variables at the inputs to sensors, any number of different perceptions can be generated at the same time by using different forms of input functions, each receiving a copy of all the sensor signals. The perceptual signal from any of them can be controlled if there is an action that can affect the environment in the required way.
The rest of your statement represents an interpretation you make, not something in the control system. Your objective is apparently to support the idea of a will to live and a bias toward individualism as being inherent in a control system, but neither of those things is needed to make a control system work. They are strictly in the eye of the beholder.
Best,
Bill P.
At 04:25 PM 4/18/2011 -0600, Martin Lewitt wrote:
[From Richard Kennaway (2011.04.19.1755)]
[From Bill Powers (2011.04.19.-730 MDT)]
My concept of a central plan is a model that all can agree predicts
accurately. The model tells us what will happen to some variables if
others are changed in certain ways. We validate the model using
historical data, pretending to predict events at and after a certain
past date using only information from prior to that date. When the
model has been refined enough for all those pseudo-predictions to
succeed with sufficient accuracy, we can begin to make real
predictions of things that haven't happened yet. When those real
predictions have proven reliable for long enough to satisfy us, we
can begin relying on them in our attempts to control what will happen to us.
I don't have any problem with that, except that I don't think that this is what anyone else calls central planning.
For that matter, the UK Treasury already uses a model of the British economy, differing from the above of course in not being based on PCT, and I don't know to what extent, if any, the accuracy of its predictions has been measured. There is even a publicly available version, although I don't know the details.
--
Richard Kennaway, jrk@cmp.uea.ac.uk, Richard Kennaway
Tel. 01603 593212
School of Computing Sciences,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.19.1210)]
Bill Powers (2011.04.19.-730 MDT)--
Richard Kennaway (2011.04.19.0836 BST) --
JRK: It's hard to imagine that the writer of those words also wrote a few
days ago in favour of central planning.
BP: When I say "central planning," I don't mean what you and others seem to
mean. I don't mean telling people what to buy or not buy, what to produce or
not produce...I'm not talking about a coercive (or benign) totalitarian regime,
which I also assume isn't generally wanted.
Yes, I think the term "central planning" has been used as though it is
synonymous with "coercive control". Perhaps that's because when a
group of people agree to participate in a plan the people who don't go
along with it -- because they are inconvenienced by or disagree with
the plan -- they have to be coerced in some way to prevent them from
disrupting those who are cooperating.
I think the ability to do "central planning" -- to control for the
perception of a plan -- is a uniquely human control skill that
probably accounts for much of the reason we are here (rather than
extinct). The first "central plans" were probably those that allowed
bands of weak, slow little people to hunt and kill quick, strong
beasts. Individual control skills are certainly important -- to
through the spear accurately and wind through the forest stealthily --
but many of our greatest accomplishments -- skyscrapers, orchestras,
brain surgery, etc -- result form people following central plans that
coordinate their often superb individual control skills.
Brain surgery requires a surgeon with great individual control
skills, but those skills must be coordinated by a central plan that
tells who will be involved in the surgery (nurses, anesthesiologist,
etc) and what each should do when. Same with an orchestra; you need
individuals with excellent musicians but these skills must be
coordinated by a central plan (the score) to produce a symphony rather
than a cacophony.
My concept of a central plan is a model that all can agree predicts accurately.
My concept of a central plan is a central plan: a musical score, a
plan for an operation, a business plan, a blueprint for a skyscraper,
an economic plan, etc. These plans are very high level perceptions so
it's probably only humans that can perceive and control them. Problems
arise when these plans are implemented without the agreement of those
participating in the plan. This is what happens at the governmental
level when plans are implemented by force (dictatorships). But even
when the plans are agreed to by a majority or even super majority
there will still be many people who don't go along with the plan.
These people are likely to be the ones who feel "coerced" by the plan
(even if they go along with it) or who are actually coerced if they
don't.
But the idea that you can have a civilized society simply as a side
effect of everyone doing whatever they want, "freely", is about as
plausible to me as the idea that a skyscraper will get built if all
the architects, engineers and construction workers just do whatever
they want whenever they want. Ain't gonna happen.
In PCT there are demos (such as the CROWD demo) that show interesting
group results emerging for the controlling done by individuals who are
not trying to achieve the group result. For example, the "guru" demo
shows that a group of agents controlling just for their own distance
from the guru and from each other will arrange themselves into a
perfect circle around the guru. The circle looks like a planned result
but it's not. It's probably this kind of phenomenon that "free
marketers" have in mind for the economy; that people controlling for
just their own "self interest" (like their distance from the guru and
each other) will be a nice result for the group as a whole (like the
perfect circle around the guru). I think that's why we need modeling;
to see if this really happens. But I think there is pretty good
empirical evidence that it doesn't happen but we don't need to get
into that. There are certainly group level results what occur when
people pursue their individual self interest, untrammeled by rules
(that are components of plans), but I don't think those results are
particularly good for the whole group, though that's a value judgment,
of course.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[Martin Lewitt 19 Apr 2011 1319 MDT]
*** much snipped ***
I encounter so much resistance to the idea of developing this model that I can't help wondering what's behind it. What is disturbed by the idea of actually knowing how the economy works well enough to control how it behaves? Is it just that most ideas now being offered will prove to be wrong? Is it that certain objectives now being sought will become public knowledge? Is it that access to full information will make the acquisition of power over others more difficult? Or is it simply the belief that no really workable model is possible? Is that it? Simple fear of failure?
As I understand it, the value added from PCT is the more realistic representation of the individuality and diversity of the actors, so a simple two controlled variable, money and food, model where all control for both the exactly the same is not PCT. The daunting thing about representing individuality and diversity is the need for a significant sampling of the real world controlled variables, and whether mass sampling technologies relying upon self reports are accurate enough for there to be a real differentiation between PCT models and subjective value rational actor models, when we look at aggregate behavior.
Actually, Richard, your reaction suggests to me that one important reason is that the objective of my proposal is misunderstood as being a concentration of power instead of the acquisition of knowledge. Perhaps that point is clearer now.
Yes that is clearer, thanx
-- Martin L
On 4/19/2011 8:59 AM, Bill Powers wrote:
Best,
Bill P.
(Gavin Ritz 2011.04.20.10.10NZT)
[From Bill Powers
(2011.04.19.-730 MDT)]
Richard Kennaway (2011.04.19.0836 BST)
Sounds like Safford Beer’s
Cybersyn System he put together in Chile in
the 1970’s.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Cybersyn
Is not the acquisition of
knowledge akin to the concentration of power?
According to my
proposition this is a concentration of energies.
–
BP: "One person negotiating agreements with
another: that’s society.
You and me, talking and working together."
JRK: It’s hard to imagine that the writer of those
words also wrote
a few days ago in favour of central
planning. Ah, but it will all
be done on PCT principles, with validated models
of how society
works! Then central planning will finally
work!
Bill, just who is it who will get to make these
plans? Are they
going to tell people that they have objective
responsibilities to do
as the planners tell them? Are people to be
merely nodes in a
societal PCT hierarchy, their reference levels set
for them by their
superiors? How many people will have to be
executed before the
proles learn to stay in line and do as they’re
told?
BP: Perhaps I can regain your shattered trust in me.
When I say “central planning,” I don’t mean
what you and others seem
to mean. I don’t mean telling people what to buy or
not buy, what to
produce or not produce (or what prices to set), what
work to do or
how to do it, or in general how to live. One person
can’t prescribe
such things for another person without creating
violence (at least
that’s what I take PCT to predict), which I assume the
majority of us
don’t enjoy. I’m not talking about a coercive (or
benign)
totalitarian regime, which I also assume isn’t
generally wanted.
My concept of a central plan is a model that all can
agree predicts
accurately. The model tells us what will happen to
some variables if
others are changed in certain ways. We validate the
model using
historical data, pretending to predict events at and
after a certain
past date using only information from prior to that
date. When the
model has been refined enough for all those
pseudo-predictions to
succeed with sufficient accuracy, we can begin to make
real
predictions of things that haven’t happened yet. When
those real
predictions have proven reliable for long enough to
satisfy us, we
can begin relying on them in our attempts to control
what will happen to us.
The model will tell us things such as "If the
consensus is that
having another Great Depression is what everyone
wants, keep doing
all the things you are doing right now. To get a
different outcome,
it will be necessary to change some parameters
in the system, such
as p,q, and r, or x, y, and z. You may now enter
changes in those or
other parameters to obtain predictions of what the
result will be."
Of course the model will be incapable of sarcasm.
That is my central planning. The planners are those
who want to know
the most probable consequences of their actions,
particularly actions
based on policies that may be adopted by many people.
The plan is
central in that it is based on a model accepted by all
as correct,
and all have equal access to its use. Furthermore, the
model is
developed by competent people using publicly available
resources,
whose reasoning is open to inspection and debate in
the normal manner
of any scientific development. Where special knowledge
or skill is
required, such as knowledge of mathematics, skill at
developing and
debugging large programs, or a facility for gathering
data from
diverse sources, those who provide it are adequately
compensated in
return for making their resources available to all.
For example, I think a good model might tell us that
if one American
company outsources its manufacturing, it will prosper,
but if this
becomes a general policy and a majority outsources,
the American
people will not make enough money to be able to buy
all that can be
manufactured elsewhere, that foreign prices will rise,
and the net
result will be that in America everyone’s standard of
living will go
down. That might be argued to be a good thing; perhaps
the world will
be better off with less disparity of incomes and
standards of living.
The model does not offer a judgment in that regard.
But the model
does not decide whether any outcome is to be preferred
over any
other; it simply shows what the outcomes will most
probably be. It’s
still up to us to decide whether any given outcome is
wanted or not wanted.
I don’t know if that example is realistic, since we
don’t have any
competent economic model based on a realistic
understanding of human
behavior. I reveal my concealed (?) prejudices by
guessing what a
good model will predict. The example is meant only to
show how the
model would be used in a non-coercive way. No sane
person, even a
criminal, will adopt a course which can be predicted
reliably to
thwart the very goals which it was supposed to
achieve. We all want
to know if our longer-term efforts to make our life
experiences come
closer to what we want them to be are most likely to
fail or to
succeed. Finding out the hard way is not generally a
good idea.
Bernie Madoff, if he had been able to forsee with some
confidence the
outcome of his actions, would have behaved differently
if his most
important goals could not be achieved while in prison.
I encounter so much resistance to the idea of
developing this model
that I can’t help wondering what’s behind it. What is
disturbed by
the idea of actually knowing how the economy works
well enough to
control how it behaves? Is it just that most ideas now
being offered
will prove to be wrong? Is it that certain objectives
now being
sought will become public knowledge? Is it that access
to full
information will make the acquisition of power over
others more
difficult? Or is it simply the belief that no really
workable model
is possible? Is that it? Simple fear of failure?
Actually, Richard, your reaction suggests to me that
one important
reason is that the objective of my proposal is
misunderstood as being
a concentration of power instead of the acquisition of
knowledge.
Perhaps that point is clearer now.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.19.1620)]
Martin Lewitt (19 Apr 2011 1319 MDT)--
As I understand it, the value added from PCT is the more realistic
representation of the individuality and diversity of the actors,
No, the "value added" from PCT is that it provides a more accurate
account of the data.
so a simple
two controlled variable, money and food, model where all control for both
the exactly the same is not PCT.
Actually there were four controlled variables in the model of the
Giffen effect (which is what I presume you are dissing... er, alluding
to); two higher level variables, calories and budget are controlled by
manipulating the reference signals sent to two lower level variables,
amount of bread and meat consumed . The model is definitely a PCT
model; and it accounts for the behavior seen in the Giffen Effect demo
at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Economics.html.
The daunting thing about representing
individuality and diversity is the need for a significant sampling of the
real world controlled variables, and whether mass sampling technologies
relying upon self reports are accurate enough for there to be a real
differentiation between PCT models and subjective value rational actor
models, when we look at aggregate behavior.
This would be true if the goal of PCT were to represent individuality
and diversity. In fact, the goal of PCT (which is the same as the goal
of any scientific theory) is to account for the data. So it should be
very easy to differentiate between PCT and subject value rational
actor models: just design a test where the models make different
predictions about the outcome. And then run the test. I think a
Giffin type situation should do nicely. Wouldn't a subjective value,
rational actor model predict that demand should always go down as
price goes up. I mean what kind of rational actor increases their
consumption of a commodity as it's price goes up? It's got to be
either a groise mishuga or a two level control system;-)
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bill Powers
(2011.04.19.-730 MDT)]
Richard Kennaway (2011.04.19.0836 BST) –
I don’t know if that example is realistic, since we
don’t have any
competent economic model based on a realistic
understanding of human
behavior. I reveal my concealed (?) prejudices by
guessing what a
good model will predict.
That is because of the
issue of complexity.
I have provided so many opportunities
(also to resistance) to discuss energetic models because ultimately
it’s the energetic balancing equations that hold the high ground. We can’t
take more than the system has or the environment has to give. Its accounting is
the arbitrator.
There is a delicate balance
between scarcity and abundance. (In ecology it’s called Shelford’s
Law).
In agriculture Justus Liebig
also showed how this balance works with his deficient factors, and of course
the famous Lotka’s law.
Revolutionary creations (like
a caterpillar to a butterfly) are far-from equilibrium and seems to exhibit
positive feedback, while near equilibrium (like use) also non linear seem to exhibit
negative feedback. (As your experiments and models have shown). So predication
with growth is not that simple. The so called chaos theory constructs.
Further cross inductions
of new energy sources for any system is prone to Onsager Reciprocity which is extremely
difficult to predict.
A colleague of mine ( de
Lange) in 1980 showed that learning is actually
like an energetic spectrum, in his experiments. Almost like a chromatograph. So
it looks like the direction of energy and its transformations and balancing
equations are the key to understanding human behaviour.
Regards
Gavin
The example is meant only to show how the
model would be used in a non-coercive way. No sane
person, even a
criminal, will adopt a course which can be predicted
reliably to
thwart the very goals which it was supposed to
achieve. We all want
to know if our longer-term efforts to make our life
experiences come
closer to what we want them to be are most likely to
fail or to
succeed. Finding out the hard way is not generally a
good idea.
Bernie Madoff, if he had been able to forsee with
some confidence the
outcome of his actions, would have behaved differently
if his most
important goals could not be achieved while in prison.
I encounter so much resistance to the idea of
developing this model
that I can’t help wondering what’s behind it. What is
disturbed by
the idea of actually knowing how the economy works
well enough to
control how it behaves? Is it just that most ideas now
being offered
will prove to be wrong? Is it that certain objectives
now being
sought will become public knowledge? Is it that access
to full
information will make the acquisition of power over
others more
difficult? Or is it simply the belief that no really
workable model
is possible? Is that it? Simple fear of failure?
Actually, Richard, your reaction suggests to me that one important
reason is that the objective of my proposal is
misunderstood as being
a concentration of power instead of the acquisition of
knowledge.
Perhaps that point is clearer now.
Best,
Bill P.
[Martin Lewitt 19 Apr 2011 1802 MDT]
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.19.1620)]
Martin Lewitt (19 Apr 2011 1319 MDT)--
As I understand it, the value added from PCT is the more realistic
representation of the individuality and diversity of the actors,No, the "value added" from PCT is that it provides a more accurate
account of the data.
But shouldn't PCT have a different initial state, i.e., different data that is using to make predictions, other than say the the supply and demand curves of the actors?
so a simple
two controlled variable, money and food, model where all control for both
the exactly the same is not PCT.Actually there were four controlled variables in the model of the
Giffen effect (which is what I presume you are dissing... er, alluding
to); two higher level variables, calories and budget are controlled by
manipulating the reference signals sent to two lower level variables,
amount of bread and meat consumed . The model is definitely a PCT
model; and it accounts for the behavior seen in the Giffen Effect demo
at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Economics.html.The daunting thing about representing
individuality and diversity is the need for a significant sampling of the
real world controlled variables, and whether mass sampling technologies
relying upon self reports are accurate enough for there to be a real
differentiation between PCT models and subjective value rational actor
models, when we look at aggregate behavior.This would be true if the goal of PCT were to represent individuality
and diversity. In fact, the goal of PCT (which is the same as the goal
of any scientific theory) is to account for the data. So it should be
very easy to differentiate between PCT and subject value rational
actor models: just design a test where the models make different
predictions about the outcome. And then run the test. I think a
Giffin type situation should do nicely. Wouldn't a subjective value,
rational actor model predict that demand should always go down as
price goes up.
No, that is inelastic demand.
I mean what kind of rational actor increases their
consumption of a commodity as it's price goes up? It's got to be
either a groise mishuga or a two level control system;-)
This behavior is observed when higher prices are subjectively interpreted as luxury or exclusivity, or as a sign of increasing scarcity, such as runs on banks or decreases in the supply of commodities. Rising commodity prices can increase demand if there are concerns about prices and availability in the future. The rising price alone can sometimes be seen as a signal of this.
I don't think you appreciate how flexible rational actors with subjective values are. It is going to be hard to differentiate. I suspect most of what PCT can achieve, can be represented by some complicated subjective value implementation.
regards,
Martin L
On 4/19/2011 5:19 PM, Richard Marken wrote:
Best
Rick
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.19.1920)]
Martin Lewitt (19 Apr 2011 1802 MDT)--
Rick Marken (2011.04.19.1620)--
Martin Lewitt (19 Apr 2011 1319 MDT)--
ML: As I understand it, the value added from PCT is the more realistic
representation of the individuality and diversity of the actors,RM: No, the "value added" from PCT is that it provides a more accurate
account of the data.ML:But shouldn't PCT have a different initial state, i.e., different data that
is using to make predictions, other than say the the supply and demand
curves of the actors?
The data that is used to test PCT is usually data that has been
obtained in experimental situations explicitly designed to compare the
predictions of PCT to those of alternative theories. So the data that
is used to test PCT depends on what is being tested.
RM: �I think a
Giffin type situation should do nicely. Wouldn't a subjective value,
rational actor model predict that demand should always go down as
price goes up.ML: No, that is inelastic demand.
Whatever it is called, it seems to me that subjective value rational
actor theory predicts that demand (consumption) goes down as price
goes up. The opposite may be called "elastic demand" or "Herbert
Hoover" for all I know. But it seems to be a phenomenon that, if it
occurs, would contradict the predictions of subjective value rational
actor theory.
RM: I mean what kind of rational actor increases their
consumption of a commodity as it's price goes up? �It's got to be
either a groise mishuga or a two level control system;-)ML: This behavior is observed when higher prices are subjectively interpreted as
luxury or exclusivity, or as a sign of increasing scarcity, such as runs on
banks or decreases in the �supply of commodities.
So how does this subjective interpretation know when to kick in? In
most cases it is observed that increasing the price does lead to
decreased demand. How does subjective value rational actor theory
account for the change in the effect of price on demand in certain
circumstances?
ML: Rising commodity prices
can increase demand if there are concerns about prices and availability in
the future. �The rising price alone can sometimes be seen as a signal of
this.
So why do rising prices sometimes signal decreased availability and
sometimes not? When I raise the price of eggs from $2 to $4 how does
this sometimes serve as a signal to increase demand and other times to
decrease it? How does this model work? Once I know, then I can develop
a test that will discriminate it from the PCT model that does explain
why raising prices sometimes increase demand and sometimes not (see
the demo at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Economics.html;
it's all in whether you are rich or poor).
ML: I don't think you appreciate how flexible rational actors with subjective
values are. �It is going to be hard to differentiate. � I suspect most of
what PCT can achieve, can be represented by some complicated subjective
value implementation.
It certainly will be hard to differentiate the theories if the
subjective value rational actor theory let's you bring in post hoc
assumptions deus ex machina to explain whatever you observe. What I
need is a description of the model. Then we can design a test to
discriminate it from PCT. But it's no fair to collect the data first
and then say that subjective value rational actor theory can explain
it.
So write out subjective value rational actor theory in a way that will
let us make some predictions from it and we'll see if we can test the
difference between it an PCT. From what you have said so far
subjective value rational actor theory looks a lot like cognitive
theory -- which is basically an S-R theory ( the idea the prices
signal availability is an S-R notion) -- and we've shown that
cognitive and S-R theories are wrong. So it looks like you start with
a very severe disadvantage.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bill Powers (2011.04.20.10455 MDT)]
Rick Marken (2011.04.19.1920) –
Martin Lewitt (19 Apr 2011
1802 MDT)–ML: I don’t think you appreciate how flexible rational actors with
subjective values are. It is going to be hard to
differentiate. Isuspect most of what PCT can achieve, can be represented by some
complicated subjective value implementation.
RM: It certainly will be hard to differentiate the theories if the
subjective value rational actor theory lets you bring in post hoc
assumptions deus ex machina to explain whatever you observe. What I
need is a description of the model. Then we can design a test to
discriminate it from PCT. But it’s no fair to collect the data first
and then say that subjective value rational actor theory can
explainit.
BP: Rick, I think you have put your finger on a basic problem with
conventional economic (and other) theories. They are almost always used
to explain what has already happened, not to predict what is going to
happen as a function of current and past variables. Thus if someone buys
a stock when its price has just gone up, Martin suggests that this might
be because of anticipation of further gains, whereas if that person buys
a stock when its price goes down, that is because the lower price signals
an excess of supply over demand. So as Martin says, “I don’t think
you appreciate how flexible rational actors with subjective values
are.” They are flexible enough so that under opposite changes in the
price of a stock, their behavior can be explained whether they buy, sell,
or hold. The theory of the flexible rational actor is therefore
unfalsifiable, as is almost any theory that is used only to explain what
has already happened without needing to verify that the assumed reasons
actually existed.
When our late friend and foe, and economist, Bill Williams developed the
ideas for explaining the Giffen Paradox, he began doing it much the same
way, but after we had worked through a long weekend together building a
model in Turbo Pascal, we had laid out the conditions that PCT suggested
would necessarily lead to buying more of a product when its price
went up. This was, as usual in PCT, a working model. You could specify
constants and reference levels for certain inputs to a person, then
manipulate the prices of goods and watch the predicted behavior take
place, whether the prediction was Giffen or normal behavior. To test the
model, of course, it would be necessary to observe individuals, find out
what variables they were controlling, ascertain their reference levels
for the relevant variables, and then predict their behavior in response
to rises or falls of prices. We didn’t get that far, but we did come up
with a model that could have been used that way. It would have been
possible, if anyone had been interested, to create a computer simulation
in which a person played some sort of economic game, and demonstrate the
Giffen Effect (it is no longer a Paradox) as a predicted behavior. I am
sure that qualitative predictions of individual behavior would almost
always be correct, and quantitative predictions quite impressively
accurate.
The post-hoc use of theories is so common that we pass over them without
realizing how they’re being used. Theories are used in the life sciences
mainly as explanations, and very seldom as methods of prediction. Such
theories are accepted mainly because of an ideology or belief that they
support, not because they have passed any experimental tests. Testing
theories, in the life sciences, is not done much. Stimulus-response
theory, as far as I know, has never been tested. Neither have any
cognitive theories.
This means that theories are being used backwards. Normally, say in
physics, we use a theory to predict what will happen under certain
conditions when some set of variables changes. In astronomy, the theory
known as “The Theory of the Moon” is used to predict where in
the sky the Moon will be found at a given moment, and exactly what part
of its surface will be visible to us. To do this, we use the properties
of a system previously determined and a set of equations relating the
dependent variables (like perceptions and outputs) to independent
variables (like disturbances and reference signals). We observe causes
and predict effects. Of course such theories can also be used as
explanations, but the explanations carry far more conviction simply
because they have also been tested by making predictions.
When theories are used as explanations, the effects are what are
observed, and we then imagine what the properties of the system and the
values of the independent variables – the causes – must have
been. If we observe a response, there must have been a stimulus. If a
person buys a stock when the price rises, that person must have taken the
rise as a sign of a rising market. If the same person buys a stock when
the price falls … you can’t lose when using theories this way because
nobody can ever prove you were wrong.
Best,
Bill P.