Manipulation

[William_T_Powers2]

[From Bill Powers (920829.2130)]

RE: various posts on the subject of manipulation.

The context of Greg Williams' discussion of manipulation requires a
particular interpretation of the term. What is meant is one person
controlling another person's actions surreptitiously, leading to that
other person doing something one could not get the person to do simply
by asking. The implication is that the other is made to behave in some
way independent of his or her interests or wishes, without arousing a
direct conflict or direct resistance by the other person. The means of
manipulation are not the application of direct force, or a request for
the other to perform the act, but deceit, indirection,
misrepresentation of facts, false promises, ambiguous communications,
and (using the Test) disturbance of variables the victim is known to
be controlling in order to elicit an opposing response with
consequences unknown to or unpredicted by the victim. While
manipulation in this sense might be used for the benefit of the
manipulee, that is a judgement of the manipulator, not the manipulee;
it is the goals of the manipulator that are satisfied, while those of
the manipulee are ignored or bypassed.

Greg's thesis is that there are ways of controlling the behavior of
other people against their will or without their awareness other than
by the use of overwhelming physical force.

My thesis is that such apparent control (a) is an illusion, or (b) is
of no importance to the "victim", or (c) is carried out only with the
aid of the "victim," or (d) rests on a threat of force in the
background. I contend that a properly functioning control system
cannot be controlled from outside, so that any apparent success by a
manipulator results from some defect of organization in the control
system.

···

----------------------------------------
Martin Taylor (920829.1315) --

One should never say that one "controls" the location of the car

within >its lane on the road. One should say that one controls the
percept of >the location of the car....

The stages of Satori. Before I understood, I said that I controlled
the car within its lane. While I was understanding, I said that I
controlled the percept of the car within its lane. After I understood,
I said that I controlled the car within its lane (for I know only the
percept in any case).

We need a different word for what happens to the CEV corresponding to

a >controlled percept. For lack of a better word, I propose here to
use >X-control (externalized control). One can X-control passive CEV's
in >the real outer world. One cannot control (P-control?) them.

I resist this terminology. If the (hypothetical) external CEV (complex
environmental variable) does not behave as the percept does, then the
CEV has been misdefined; it must entail aspects that are not matched
in the perceptual function of the controlling system. While I don't
object to speaking of a model of the physical reality as if it really
exists (practical considerations require this), I want to minimize
reification of that hypothetical reality. To speak of a CEV apart from
the perceptual system that defines it for a controlling system is to
give the CEV an independent existence of its own, to objectify it, and
to imply a third-party observer who can know the true form of the CEV
which may be partly misrepresented in the controlling system. There
may be many variables in the external world. But they are not
organized into CEVs.

It is the perceptual function that defines the true relationship
between the percept and that which is externally controlled. The
percept can't be incorrect. Only our understanding of its external
counterpart can be in error. That is, our assertion that we are
perceiving the world in the same way that the control system is
perceiving it is fallible. There are no CEVs independent of the
controlling system (or the observer). A correctly-defined CEV always
corresponds exactly to the percept.

There is only one form of control: control of the percept.

RE: manipulation of uncontrolled perceptions

Wait a minute here...This is one of the things I was talking about

when >I said that the dynamics are important. You are dealing with
steady >states, whereas the effect the attempting controller would
have is >transient.

A disturbance that has a transient effect only will not materially
affect the behavior (output) of the control system. If the control
system could react within the interval we classify as "transient," the
disturbance would be successfully resisted and there would be no
transient effect on the perception. Remember that the main means of
producing predictable outputs from a control system is to apply a
disturbance THAT IS CANCELED BY THE ENSUING ACTION. If the disturbance
is brief enough to qualify as a true transient that the control system
cannot counteract before it is over, then there will be no action that
is equal and opposite to the disturbance.

Control systems evolve and reorganize until they can react adequately
on the time-scale typical of normal disturbances. Don't think of
disturbances as transient "events." They are simply independent
variables that influence the controlled variable. They may be brief,
or like gravity they may be present permanently.

Even in the steady state, when there is conflict, two controllers
attempting to move a single CEV to different levels, each will show
some persistent error, so even in the steady state one can influence
the other's controlled percepts. How much the "controller" influences
the "controlee"s percept will depend on who has the higher insistence
(gain), and that could be interpreted as who applies the more
overwhelming physical force.

I repeat that an influence (or disturbance) is neither control nor
determination. It is simply an influence, which may or may not have
any effect, depending on other influences that may be present at the
same time (such as the output of a control system).

With two systems balanced in conflict as you describe above, each
system is producing some amount of output that is canceling an equal
amount of the output of the other system. Varying either reference
signal will result in moving the balance point, but only until the
effort of the active system reaches its limit. Beyond that point,
neither system will have any control over the common variable. In
control systems with integrating outputs (which seem to be common in
real systems), both outputs will quickly reach saturation, and there
will be no effect from varying either reference signal.

As I pointed out at the start of this post, "manipulation" in the
sense that Greg Williams means does not include direct conflict, which
can't be brought about surreptitiously.

Besides, does planting a fence constitute "overwhelming physical

force?"

If no matter how hard the control system tries it can't get past the
fence, yes. The overwhelming physical force is automatically applied,
to whatever extent is necessary, as soon as the control system sets
the reference level for its position to the other side of the fence
and attempts to correct the error. The fence totally overrides the
organism's efforts at control. Control systems can be prevented from
functioningd by overwhelming physical force, whatever the source of
that force. Of course we would not say it is "controlled" unless the
source of the force is intentional. It is not really the fence that
controls the child's behavior, but the person who put the fence there.

Because the child can't control its position relative to a place
outside the fence, it will reorganize so that it no longer desires to
be outside the fence. It will then continue to live, to greater or
lesser extent, as if it is inside a fence even when the fence is
removed. One of the great difficulties in growing up is that of
understanding which fences have been or should be removed, so there is
no longer any need to restrict one's desires to the region within
their confines.

Adolescents often rail against the constraints of "the system" (oh
rueful memories), not yet realizing that the constraints are in
themselves and that "the system" is largely a memory of the
restrictions, punishments, and fears of childhood -- to which they
adapted themselves all too expertly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Best to all,

Bill P. (Turned 66 today: happy birthday to me).

[_Martin_Taylor]

[Martin Taylor 920831 1330]
(Bill Powers 920829.2130) and (Greg Williams 920830)

I hope this is short. Time presses.

Bill. I think this is another occasion in which the language we use points
in opposite directions while the thoughts are close. But I'm not sure.

···

----------------------------------------

Martin Taylor (920829.1315) --

One should never say that one "controls" the location of the car

within >its lane on the road. One should say that one controls the
percept of >the location of the car....

The stages of Satori. Before I understood, I said that I controlled
the car within its lane. While I was understanding, I said that I
controlled the percept of the car within its lane. After I understood,
I said that I controlled the car within its lane (for I know only the
percept in any case).

Well, yes. That's the normal way of looking at it. But when we are trying
to be precise, and communicate exactly, then we have to go back to separating
the controlled percept from the CEV, which is what I was trying to do. We do,
easily but sloppily, use third-stage language most of the time.

We need a different word for what happens to the CEV corresponding to

a >controlled percept. For lack of a better word, I propose here to
use >X-control (externalized control). One can X-control passive CEV's
in >the real outer world. One cannot control (P-control?) them.

I resist this terminology. If the (hypothetical) external CEV (complex
environmental variable) does not behave as the percept does, then the
CEV has been misdefined; it must entail aspects that are not matched
in the perceptual function of the controlling system.

As you put it here, ALL CEVs are and always will remain misdefined, inasmuch
as there probably exists no construct whatever in the outer world that behaves
precisely as the perceptual input function that defines the CEV does. All we
can know is those aspects of the outer world that correspond to some perceptual
function, but our actions affect the real world as it is, not as we perceive it.
We perceive the effects our actions have on the real world as filtered through
our perceptual input functions, and that filtering is both noisy (intrinsically)
and subject to error (contextual effects). The CEV we think we are controlling
corresponds only by fluke with any CEV controlled by anyone else, and even
then we cannot know that this correspondence has occurred.

What we can know is that we can perceive someone else acting on the CEV we
are trying to X-xontrol--i.e. we perceive that our percept corresponding to the
CEV is changing in coordination with some perception of action by someone else.
We might even, applying the Test, perceive that the other is X-controlling a
CEV highly correlated with one we are controlling (or disturbing). We cannot
perceive or determine by any finite procedure what the other is P-controlling.

I want to minimize
reification of that hypothetical reality. To speak of a CEV apart from
the perceptual system that defines it for a controlling system is to
give the CEV an independent existence of its own, to objectify it, and
to imply a third-party observer who can know the true form of the CEV
which may be partly misrepresented in the controlling system. There
may be many variables in the external world. But they are not
organized into CEVs.

It is this paragraph that makes me think we are trying to say the same thing.
It is what I was trying to get across in making the P-control versus X-control
distinction. X-control is X both for X-ternal and for "hypothesized variable."
X-control is based on the notion that what you perceive has some identity in
the outer world. Maybe it does, and maybe it doesn't. You can't know.

There is only one form of control: control of the percept.

Yes, that's my main point. And using that as the sense of "control", we CAN
control other people, as you demonstrated in a posting last week.

A disturbance that has a transient effect only will not materially
affect the behavior (output) of the control system. If the control
system could react within the interval we classify as "transient," the
disturbance would be successfully resisted and there would be no
transient effect on the perception. Remember that the main means of
producing predictable outputs from a control system is to apply a
disturbance THAT IS CANCELED BY THE ENSUING ACTION.

You can't have it both ways. Either there is an error signal that results
from the disturbance and generates an output signal that resists the
disturbance, or there isn't. If there is, it is an indication that the
disturbance did affect the percept. If there isn't, we don't know whether
any percept was affected, but if one was, it remains altered.

Control systems evolve and reorganize until they can react adequately
on the time-scale typical of normal disturbances. Don't think of
disturbances as transient "events." They are simply independent
variables that influence the controlled variable. They may be brief,
or like gravity they may be present permanently.

All feedback loops have transport delay. All linear feedback systems can
be characterized by their bandwidth and phase response. Non-linear ones
are harder to characterize, but among their characteristics are information
capacity measures. All of these apply to the dynamics. I think the word
"adequately" in your first line is key. It means that the organism will
survive, behaving this well, and that no excess resources will be applied
to ensure better behaviour than that.

I repeat that an influence (or disturbance) is neither control nor
determination. It is simply an influence, which may or may not have
any effect, depending on other influences that may be present at the
same time (such as the output of a control system).

Well, I refer again to your clarifying posting, which I had better look up...
Yep. Here it is (920828.0900)

People are not generally content merely to apply an influence to
someone else's behavior and accept the result. To do that would be to
accept the fact that the other's behavior is most likely to proceed as
before with no effect from the supposed "influence." What happens in
reality is that if the first attempt at influence fails, as it is most
likely to do, there will be continued attempts involving varieties of
influences and increasing force behind the influences. The influencer
reveals the fact that this is an attempt at control, not merely at
influence. The object is to have a particular effect on the other's
behavior that matches the influencer's goal for the effect.

The transition from mild and innocuous attempts at influence to
concerted attempts to control is inevitable, for the simple reason
that mere influence has almost no effect.

The same applies when we try to "influence" a ball to go up an incline by
blowing at it. If we just blow, it may go up and come down again, or it may
go sideways, or something else. If we really want it to go up, we modify the
direction and strength of blow according to our perception of what the ball
is doing. No difference when we "control" another person. We keep trying
different "influences" until the person does what we want or until we give up.

The original (confusing) claim against controlling another person was that
we could not, from outside, reliably set a reference level for any ECS within
the other person. This view is the one I was seeing as irrelevant, since
we control only our own percepts. Even internally, no ECS controls another.
An ECS controls only its own percept. It can not set the reference level for
another ECS, though it can influence that reference level in conjunction with
influences from possibly many other ECSs at its own level. And even if an
ECS was the only influence on the reference level of some lower-level ECS, it
would still not be controlling that ECS. If it could perceive directly the
reference level that it was setting, it could (X-)control that, but the lower
ECS might react in any number of ways, depending on the correctness of its
organization, its gain, the environment within which it was trying to control,
and so forth.

No, control of another has nothing whatever to do with setting reference levels
for another. Control of another may be achieved easily if it so happens that
the other's reference levels come to lead to actions that are perceived as
appropriate to the reference levels in the "controller." But the other's
reference levels are a red herring in the discussion of whether one person
can control another.

===============
Greg,

What is meant is one person controlling another person's actions
surreptitiously, leading to that other person doing something one could not
get the person to do simply by asking.

I thought we'd already reached an agreement that one person cannot control (in
the PCT sense) another.

Well, I haven't reached that agreement (see above).

In sum, I am exploring (with your aid) the PCT foundations of (c). There is
never any PCT-control "from the outside," is there? Success in manipulation
depends on proper functioning of the influencee's control system (note that
con men complain about the occasional mark "too stupid" to understand the
game); it depends most crucially on the influencer having a reasonably good
model of the influencee's control structure -- and this is one of the main
topics for investigation in a GTM based on PCT. More precision in our
definitions has great value, I think, for minimizing confusions due to this
or that word meaning one thing to one person and another to someone else, so
let's keep at it, OK? I'm learning a great deal from this.

I quite agree, and that is why I introduced X-control to contrast with real
(P-)control. And with P=control, one person most certainly CAN control
another, whether it be by force (i.e. in a conflict situation) or by taking
advantage of presumptions about the other's reference levels to set up
disturbances that lead to the desired actions. Each method fits exactly
within the normal PCT definition of control.

Martin