[David Goldstein (2015.10.20.2335)]
CSG friends,
I would appreciate comments/corrections of my understanding of these terms:
At each level of the hierarchy, its “environment” consists of all of the perceptual signals entering the input functions from the immediately lower level in the hierarchy.
At each level of the hierarchy, the “behavior” consists of all of results of the output functions which feed into the reference functions of the immediately lower level. .
Thank you.
[Martin Taylor 2010.10.30.23.42]
[David Goldstein (2015.10.20.2335)]
CSG friends,
I would appreciate comments/corrections of my understandingof these terms:
1. At each level of the hierarchy, its "environment"consists of all of the perceptual signals entering the input
functions from the immediately lower level in the hierarchy.
Different viewpoints offer different answers. From the Controller's
View, the environment of an ECU is what you say. The Analyst’s view
is the most comprehensive, and from that view, the environment of an
Elementary Control Unit (the complex consisting of Perceptual Input
Function, Reference Input Function, Comparator, and Output Function)
is everything in the Universe that contributes to or might
contribute to the inputs to the Perceptual Input Function as well as
everything in the Universe that might be influenced by its output.
In a restricted Analyst’s view, the ECU’s environment consists of
everything in the Universe that both is influenced by the output of
the ECU and influences any input to its Perceptual Input Function.
From an Observer’s view, its environment consists of those parts of
the Universe perceptible by the Observer that are influenced by the
output of the ECU.
2. At each level of the hierarchy, the "behavior" consistsof all of results of the output functions which feed into the
reference functions of the immediately lower level. .
That's the bone of contention at the moment, and I had thought I had
already said all I planned to say on the subject, not expecting any
resolution to occur, but you introduce a third possibility, so I do
comment again.
I don't think your definition agrees with either camp, because it
includes too little for the Marken-Nevin definition, and too much
for me. Maybe it might serve as a compromise position.
The problem for me, if we take Bill's Table on p172 of LCS 1 as a
reference, is that for any of the listed “Behaviours” it would
include the “Means” column, which I would call the behaviours of
supporting control systems, not of the system controlling a
perception of the state of (in the first row) the door. To me, when
one is controlling a perception of the state of a door, with a
reference to perceive it to be open, the behaviour is what an
external observer sees as “opening the door”. In order to do that,
one grasps the handle, but no external observer would see that as
the behaviour “opening the door”. It’s the behaviour “grasping the
handle”, which one does when “opening the door”.
I suspect that Rick and Bruce would have the opposite problem with
your definition, because although it includes the “Means” column of
the table, it omits the other two columns “Variable” and “Reference
State”.
When I read Bill's text around this table, my primary impression is
that he gets all wound up in the idea of single causes. If many
different things influence a variable, any could be called a “cause”
if the others are fixed. But Bill seems to say that a behaviour
casually (not causally) called “opening the door” cannot be the
cause of the door opening because of the other things that influence
the door state, and therefore cannot be “a behaviour”. I think his
argument is illogical, but I also think it is what has led to this
unfortunate argument.
Rick says [From Rick Marken (2015.10.30.1645)] "RM: This is what is
important – knowing that PCT explains the reference states of
controlled variables (the purpose of behavior) and other theories
don’t – more important than getting wrapped around the axle trying
to find the “correct” definition of a word (behavior) that is an
informal term that refers to the “doings” of living and non-living
things."
I would like to agree with this, but PCT says that I shouldn't,
because what is more important depends on the purpose – what
perception one is trying to control at what reference value. If the
purpose is to understand how organisms function, then I agree with
Rick, but if the purpose is to communicate PCT to others who might
want to learn, then I do not, because “behaviour” is being used as a
technical term in a way bound to confuse someone who knows quite
well its obvious everyday meaning, a meaning that is important in
clarifying the hierarchic nature of perceptual control, and that
needs a clear technical term (which is not conveyed by “behavioural
output” or “action”, both of which seem to imply all of the “Means”
in Bill’s table). For communication, “opening the door” must be
different from “Grasping the handle” or “pulling”, both of which are
“actions” in “opening the door”.
Thank you.
You are welcome. I expect this contribution makes muddy waters even
muddier.
Martin
[David Goldstein (2015.11.1.12:53)]
[Martin Taylor 2010.10.30.23.42]
I don’t quite understand your terms "controller’s view, analyst view, observers view). I like Bill’s way of relating his theory to biology. On page 94 of BCP, Bill states: “Hence the set of all first-order perceptual signals emitted by the first-order input functions is the only environment that higher systems can respond to; higher systems do not and cannot respond directly to physical stimuli.” This is the reason for my first statement.
"I identify the output functions of second-order control systems with concentrated masses of neural inter
connnections in the brain stem called motor nuclei. These nuclei are similar in location, size, and appearance to the sensory nuclei which I am suggesting embody second-order input functions. they differ, however, in the sources of signals that reach them and the destinatinos of signals that leave them.
…The output signals produced in these motor nuclei follow pathways that terminate in the motor cells of the spinal cord: these output signals, clearly, are the reference signals for the first-order systems. "
This is the reason for my first statement.
I do appreciate your point of view. I am not sure if it is the same or different than that of Bill Powers.
<
[Martin Taylor 2010.10.30.23.42]
[David Goldstein (2015.10.20.2335)]
CSG friends,
I would appreciate comments/corrections of my understanding of these terms:
1. At each level of the hierarchy, its "environment" consists of all of the perceptual signals entering the input functions from the immediately lower level in the hierarchy.
Different viewpoints offer different answers. From the Controller's View, the environment of an ECU is what you say. The Analyst's view is the most comprehensive, and from that view, the environment of an Elementary Control Unit (the complex consisting of Perceptual Input Function, Reference Input Function, Comparator, and Output Function) is everything in the Universe that contributes to or might contribute to the inputs to the Perceptual Input Function as well as everything in the Universe that might be influenced by its output. In a restricted Analyst's view, the ECU's environment consists of everything in the Universe that both is influenced by the output of the ECU and influences any input to its Perceptual Input Function. From an Observer's view, its environment consists of those parts of the Universe perce
ptible by the Observer that are influenced by the output of the ECU.
- At each level of the hierarchy, the “behavior” consists of all of results of the output functions which feed into the reference functions of the immediately lower level. .
That's the bone of contention at the moment, and I had thought I had already said all I planned to say on the subject, not expecting any resolution to occur, but you introduce a third possibility, so I do comment again.
I don't think your definition agrees with either camp, because it includes too little for the Marken-Nevin definition, and too much for me. Maybe it might serve as a comp
romise position.
The problem for me, if we take Bill's Table on p172 of LCS 1 as a reference, is that for any of the listed "Behaviours" it would include the "Means" column, which I would call the behaviours of supporting control systems, not of the system controlling a perception of the state of (in the first row) the door. To me, when one is controlling a perception of the state of a door, with a reference to perceive it to be open, the behaviour is what an external observer sees as "opening the door". In order to do that, one grasps the handle, but no external observer would see that as the behaviour "opening the door". It's the behaviour "grasping the handle", which one does when "opening the door".
I suspect that Rick and Bruce would have the opposite problem with your definition, because although it includes the "Means" column of the table, it omits the other two columns "Variable" and "Reference State".
When I read Bill's text around this table, my primary impression is that he gets all wound up in the idea of single causes. If many different things influence a variable, any could be called a "cause" if the others are fixed. But Bill seems to say that a behaviour casually (not causally) called "opening the door" cannot be the cause of the door opening because of the other things that influence the door state, and therefore cannot be "a behaviour". I think his argument is illogical, but I also think it is what has led to this unfortunate argument.
Rick says [From Rick Marken (2015.10.30.1645)] "RM: This is what is important -- knowing that PCT explains the reference states of controlled variables (the purpose of behavior) and other theories don't -- more important than g
etting wrapped around the axle trying to find the “correct” definition of a word (behavior) that is an informal term that refers to the “doings” of living and non-living things."
I would like to agree with this, but PCT says that I shouldn't, because what is more important depends on the purpose -- what perception one is trying to control at what reference value. If the purpose is to understand how organisms function, then I agree with Rick, but if the purpose is to communicate PCT to others who might want to learn, then I do not, because "behaviour" is being used as a technical term in a way bound to confuse someone who knows quite well its obvious everyday meaning, a meaning that is important in clarifying the hierarchic nature of perceptual control, and that needs a clear technical term (which is not conveyed by "behavioural output" or "action", both of which s
eem to imply all of the “Means” in Bill’s table). For communication, “opening the door” must be different from “Grasping the handle” or “pulling”, both of which are “actions” in “opening the door”.
Thank you.
You are welcome. I expect this contribution makes muddy waters even muddier.
Martin
On page 107, Under the heading of Second-Order Output Functions, Bill says:
On 10/31/15, Martin Taylormmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2015.11.01.14.08]
[David Goldstein (2015.11.1.12:53)]
[MartinTaylor 2010.10.30.23.42]
I don't quite understand your terms "controller's view,analyst view, observers view).
Sorry, I tend to fall into the rap I've been pointing out -- using
ingroup words when not necessarily talking to ingroup members. We’ve
been using these terms for years, but I guess not often enough for
them to become common currency.
"Controller's view" consists more or less exclusively of the
controlled perception(s). The Analyst has a God’s eye view of the
entire control loop and can see every variable as it changes. The
Observer’s view is that of an outsider who may or may not have tools
to look at the physiology. I usually assume no tools, so no
physiology. But the Observer can make inferences, such as figuring
out that there are controlled perceptions, and assuming that the
signals are carried by nerves because other kinds of researchers can
see these nerves and measure what they do. The Analyst knows all
that, and those inferences can often allow the Observer to
approximate or emulate an Analyst’s view. In truth, the Analyst’s
view can really apply properly only to a constructed (hardware or
software) control system, and when we say “Analyst’s view” in
respect of a living organism, we almost always mean an Observer’s
emulation of an Analyst’s view. When we say “Observer’s view” we
usually mean what an outside observer can see and maybe infer at a
particular moment.
In commenting on my writing, Bruce Nevin says I tend to mix
Observer’s and Analyst’s views without making the switch clear, a
fault I try unsuccessfully to avoid. The reason may be the
Observer’s ability to emulate the Analyst, which fudges the boundary
between them rather badly.
I like Bill's way of relating his theory to biology. Onpage 94 of BCP, Bill states: “Hence the set of all first-order
perceptual signals emitted by the first-order input functions
is the only environment that higher systems can respond to;
higher systems do not and cannot respond directly to physical
stimuli.” This is the reason for my first statement.
That's common ground. It is an analyst's view (as emulated,
obviously, by Bill, the Observer).
"I identify the output functions of second-order controlsystems with concentrated masses of neural inter connnections
in the brain stem called motor nuclei. These nuclei are
similar in location, size, and appearance to the sensory
nuclei which I am suggesting embody second-order input
functions. they differ, however, in the sources of signals
that reach them and the destinatinos of signals that leave
them.
...The output signals produced in these motor nuclei followpathways that terminate in the motor cells of the spinal cord:
these output signals, clearly, are the reference signals for
the first-order systems. "
This is the reason for my first statement.
I think you mean "second statement". I don't think any of the
participants in the discussion object to anything you quote. It’s a
plausible implementation of the functional model of Bill’s
hierarchy. But it’s irrelevant to the question of how best to use
the word “behaviour”. "
DMG (2015.10.20.2335)]"2. At each level of the hierarchy,
the “behavior” consists of all of results of the output
functions which feed into the reference functions of the
immediately lower level."*
This is quite close to being an implementation of my opinion of how
best to use the word, except that you include all the control units
at a level whereas I was restricting it to one (such as “Opening a
door”). There isn’t a right or wrong about that; there’s only
effectiveness when used with the target audience.
I do appreciate your point of view. I am not sure if it isthe same or different than that of Bill Powers.
It's in a different domain of discourse, but I think they are
compatible. I hope they are.
Martin
[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.01.2202 ET)]
DG: 2. At each level of the hierarchy, the “behavior” consists of all of results of the output functions which feed into the reference functions of the immediately lower level. .
BN: I would substitute “behavioral outputs”. That avoids the ambiguity and finesses the problem that outputs from any level other than the lowest (intensities, muscle tensions and the like) are not “observable actions”.
BN: There is an open question whether some perceptions may skip levels, but the general assumption is yes that inputs are from the immediately lower level, or via sensors at the lowest level.
BN: There is also the observation that when your awareness is located at level n the world looks like perceptions of level n-1. This has been postulated as the reason for time dilation in certain emergency situations (“time seemed to slow down”): you’re perceiving at the Event level. People have also been accused of being stuck in a world of category perceptions. So there’s another idea you can play with.
On Sun, Nov 1, 2015 at 2:34 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2015.11.01.14.08]
[David Goldstein (2015.11.1.12:53)]
[MartinTaylor 2010.10.30.23.42]
I don't quite understand your terms "controller's view,analyst view, observers view).
Sorry, I tend to fall into the rap I've been pointing out -- usingingroup words when not necessarily talking to ingroup members. We’ve
been using these terms for years, but I guess not often enough for
them to become common currency."Controller's view" consists more or less exclusively of thecontrolled perception(s). The Analyst has a God’s eye view of the
entire control loop and can see every variable as it changes. The
Observer’s view is that of an outsider who may or may not have tools
to look at the physiology. I usually assume no tools, so no
physiology. But the Observer can make inferences, such as figuring
out that there are controlled perceptions, and assuming that the
signals are carried by nerves because other kinds of researchers can
see these nerves and measure what they do. The Analyst knows all
that, and those inferences can often allow the Observer to
approximate or emulate an Analyst’s view. In truth, the Analyst’s
view can really apply properly only to a constructed (hardware or
software) control system, and when we say “Analyst’s view” in
respect of a living organism, we almost always mean an Observer’s
emulation of an Analyst’s view. When we say “Observer’s view” we
usually mean what an outside observer can see and maybe infer at a
particular moment.In commenting on my writing, Bruce Nevin says I tend to mixObserver’s and Analyst’s views without making the switch clear, a
fault I try unsuccessfully to avoid. The reason may be the
Observer’s ability to emulate the Analyst, which fudges the boundary
between them rather badly.I like Bill's way of relating his theory to biology. Onpage 94 of BCP, Bill states: “Hence the set of all first-order
perceptual signals emitted by the first-order input functions
is the only environment that higher systems can respond to;
higher systems do not and cannot respond directly to physical
stimuli.” This is the reason for my first statement.
That's common ground. It is an analyst's view (as emulated,obviously, by Bill, the Observer).
On page 107, Under the heading of Second-Order OutputFunctions, Bill says:
"I identify the output functions of second-order controlsystems with concentrated masses of neural inter connnections
in the brain stem called motor nuclei. These nuclei are
similar in location, size, and appearance to the sensory
nuclei which I am suggesting embody second-order input
functions. they differ, however, in the sources of signals
that reach them and the destinatinos of signals that leave
them.
...The output signals produced in these motor nuclei followpathways that terminate in the motor cells of the spinal cord:
these output signals, clearly, are the reference signals for
the first-order systems. "
This is the reason for my first statement.
I think you mean "second statement". I don't think any of theparticipants in the discussion object to anything you quote. It’s a
plausible implementation of the functional model of Bill’s
hierarchy. But it’s irrelevant to the question of how best to use
the word “behaviour”. "
DMG (2015.10.20.2335)]"2. At each level of the hierarchy,the “behavior” consists of all of results of the output
functions which feed into the reference functions of the
immediately lower level."*
This is quite close to being an implementation of my opinion of howbest to use the word, except that you include all the control units
at a level whereas I was restricting it to one (such as “Opening a
door”). There isn’t a right or wrong about that; there’s only
effectiveness when used with the target audience.
I do appreciate your point of view. I am not sure if it isthe same or different than that of Bill Powers.
It's in a different domain of discourse, but I think they arecompatible. I hope they are.
Martin
< div>
On10/31/15, Martin Taylormmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2010.10.30.23.42]
[David Goldstein (2015.10.20.2335)]
CSG friends,
I would appreciate comments/corrections of myunderstanding of these terms:
1. At each level of the hierarchy, its "environment"consists of all of the perceptual signals entering the
input functions from the immediately lower level in the
hierarchy.
Different viewpoints offer different answers. From theController’s View, the environment of an ECU is what you say.
The Analyst’s view is the most comprehensive, and from that
view, the environment of an Elementary Control Unit (the complex
consisting of Perceptual Input Function, Reference Input
Function, Comparator, and Output Function) is everything in the
Universe that contributes to or might contribute to the inputs
to the Perceptual Input Function as well as everything in the
Universe that might be influenced by its output. In a restricted
Analyst’s view, the ECU’s environment consists of everything in
the Universe that both is influenced by the output of the ECU
and influences any input to its Perceptual Input Function. From
an Observer’s view, its environment consists of those parts of
the Universe perce ptible by the Observer that are influenced by
the output of the ECU.2. At each level of the hierarchy, the "behavior"consists of all of results of the output functions which
feed into the reference functions of the immediately lower
level. .
That's the bone of contention at the moment, and I had thought Ihad already said all I planned to say on the subject, not
expecting any resolution to occur, but you introduce a third
possibility, so I do comment again.I don't think your definition agrees with either camp, becauseit includes too little for the Marken-Nevin definition, and too
much for me. Maybe it might serve as a comp romise position.The problem for me, if we take Bill's Table on p172 of LCS 1 asa reference, is that for any of the listed “Behaviours” it would
include the “Means” column, which I would call the behaviours of
supporting control systems, not of the system controlling a
perception of the state of (in the first row) the door. To me,
when one is controlling a perception of the state of a door,
with a reference to perceive it to be open, the behaviour is
what an external observer sees as “opening the door”. In order
to do that, one grasps the handle, but no external observer
would see that as the behaviour “opening the door”. It’s the
behaviour “grasping the handle”, which one does when “opening
the door”.I suspect that Rick and Bruce would have the opposite problemwith your definition, because although it includes the “Means”
column of the table, it omits the other two columns “Variable”
and “Reference State”.When I read Bill's text around this table, my primary impressionis that he gets all wound up in the idea of single causes. If
many different things influence a variable, any could be called
a “cause” if the others are fixed. But Bill seems to say that a
behaviour casually (not causally) called “opening the door”
cannot be the cause of the door opening because of the other
things that influence the door state, and therefore cannot be “a
behaviour”. I think his argument is illogical, but I also think
it is what has led to this unfortunate argument.Rick says [From Rick Marken (2015.10.30.1645)] "RM: This is whatis important – knowing that PCT explains the reference states
of controlled variables (the purpose of behavior) and other
theories don’t – more important than g etting wrapped around
the axle trying to find the “correct” definition of a word
(behavior) that is an informal term that refers to the “doings”
of living and non-living things."I would like to agree with this, but PCT says that I shouldn't,because what is more important depends on the purpose – what
perception one is trying to control at what reference value. If
the purpose is to understand how organisms function, then I
agree with Rick, but if the purpose is to communicate PCT to
others who might want to learn, then I do not, because
“behaviour” is being used as a technical term in a way bound to
confuse someone who knows quite well its obvious everyday
meaning, a meaning that is important in clarifying the
hierarchic nature of perceptual control, and that needs a clear
technical term (which is not conveyed by “behavioural output” or
“action”, both of which s eem to imply all of the “Means” in
Bill’s table). For communication, “opening the door” must be
different from “Grasping the handle” or “pulling”, both of which
are “actions” in “opening the door”.
Thank you.
You are welcome. I expect this contribution makes muddy waterseven muddier.
Martin
[Blake Ashley (11/2/15 at 7:30 Arizona time)]
David Goldstein wrote on (2015.10.20.2335) DG: 2. At each level of the hierarchy, the "behavior" consists of all of results of the output functions which feed into the reference functions of the immediately lower level.
BA: Output from any given level (except the top) seems to go up and down. It goes down in the form of reference perceptions for lower levels. It goes up in the form of processed perceptions. For example, the output of levels that generate verbal and visual thinking and logic is perceived by higher levels.
[David Goldstein (2015.11.02.1013)]
[Blake Ashley (11/2/15 at 7:30 Arizona time)]
Thanks for your reply.
Notice that I said: “the results of the output functions.”
Yes, I know that the output of the input functions goes up.
David
&
nbsp;
On 11/02/15, Blake AshleyBlake.Ashley@tucsonaz.gov wrote:
[Blake Ashley (11/2/15 at 7:30 Arizona time)]
David Goldstein wrote on (2015.10.20.2335) DG: 2. At each level of the hierarchy, the “behavior” consists of all of results of the output functions which feed into the reference functions of the immediately lower level.
BA: Output from any given level (except the top) seems to go up and down. It goes down in the form of reference perceptions for lower levels. It goes up in the form of processed perceptions. For example, the output of levels that generate verbal and visual thinking and logic is perceived by higher levels.