Memory in perceptual input

[From Rick Marken (2005.08.31.0830)]

Martin Taylor (2005.08.30.20.54)

Rick Marken (2005.08.30.1655)--

... you can
convince me otherwise if you can give me an example of a lower level
perception -- like a configuration, sequence or event -- that changes based
on memory.

The nearest example I can think of is the shift of category
boundaries dependent on recent past experience (a sound that seems
like an "a" in one context can sound like an "eh" in another, and
this effect can be memory dependent).

Again, this seems all perceptual. There is no memory involved unless I can
change what I am hearing by just remembering something different.

I wonder if the McGurk effect could work in memory? You can certainly
change the sound of "bank" by a simultaneous visual input, but that
doesn't answer your request.

I don't know what the McGurk effect is but, as you note, it sounds like a
purely perceptual input based phenomenon.

It should be possible to think up a suitable experiment, but not off
the top of my head. Maybe it's been done, but I don't know of it.

I'll look forward to hearing about it.

Best

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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[From Jeff Vancouver (2005.08.31.1150 EST)]

Rick,

What about the ambiguous figures case? Individuals "see" the old lady or
the young lady with the hat.

Also, if you acknowledge that perceptions can arise from memory and
through input functions in the imagination mode, you must be saying that
NONE of the lower-level control systems can be in imagination mode while
a higher level system that uses input from those systems is in control
mode.

Another assumption here is that a control system is all or none in modes
(independent of the modes of systems below the focal system). I have
always been leery of that assumption given the strong case for analog
processing.

However, there is no question that empirically testing these issues is
tricky. It probably requires accepting statistical results of
potentially small effects. I have such a paper that you have seen
(Vancouver, Thompson, & Williams, 2001) and found unimpressive (the
statistical results are meager). I also realize that the model I was
talking about a couple posts back (that is not quite done) was one in
imagination mode (so it will not help in this discussion).

Finally, I remember hearing a talk about how we are able to distinguish
perceptions arising from imagination and those not, but that we are not
necessarily as good at it as we think (particularly when trying to
remember if something was imagined or experienced in the past). There
might be some interesting empirical work there that could address this
question. But the bottom line is that it takes collecting and
interpreting evidence that is indirectly related to the question at
hand. Welcome back to the psychology you rejected (sorry, could not help
myself).

Jeff

[From Rick Marken (2005.08.31.1000)]

Jeff Vancouver (2005.08.31.1150 EST)]

Rick,

What about the ambiguous figures case? Individuals "see" the old lady or
the young lady with the hat.

Yes, I thought that one might be an example. I guess I ended up being able
to see how memory might be involved on the input side. I can see memory
involved on the reference side; you can change what you see in the figure by
setting a reference for the old lady pattern and then changing to a
reference for the young lady pattern.

Also, if you acknowledge that perceptions can arise from memory and
through input functions in the imagination mode, you must be saying that
NONE of the lower-level control systems can be in imagination mode while
a higher level system that uses input from those systems is in control
mode.

Actually, I realized that that was where my thoughts were going, which would
contradict how my own spreadsheet hierarchy model, which includes
imagination, works. I think imagined perception does enter into higher
level control and now, based on Bill's (2005.08.31.0823 MDT) post, I can
_imagine_ situations where this might occur. But I still find it hard to
believe that this happens anywhere but at the highest levels of perception
-- at the levels of perception that are usually described as cognitive.

But the bottom line is that it takes collecting and
interpreting evidence that is indirectly related to the question at
hand. Welcome back to the psychology you rejected (sorry, could not help
myself).

I agree that it will take a lot of research to answer these questions about
perception and imagination. If there is pertinent data in the psychology
literature then that would be great. The psychology I rejected was the model
that is used to collect and interpret the data; I didn't reject the idea,
also prevalent in psychology, of of doing experimental research! It's true
that much of the data collected in psychology is difficult to interpret from
a control theory perspective. But data is data and I think there is some
suggestive data, particularly in the field of perception, that may be
helpful.

Best

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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