[Martin Taylor 2014.01.02.14.37]
On 2014/01/2 1:33 PM, Ted Cloak wrote:
TC: Maybe this is philosophical hair-splitting, but since behavior *is* the
control of perception, PCT actually explains observed actions of animals.
Otherwise, it seems that one is saying that behavior explains behavior.
Although I took it from the other angle, that is indeed what I intended to point out to Rick when I thought he had made a "mental typo".
Martin
[From Fred Nickols (2014.01.02.1556 EST)]
Uh-oh. I think I'm about to commit heresy here.
I agree that PCT explains "observed actions of animals" (and other life
forms as well). Where I might be a wee bit heretical is with regard to the
PCT canon that "behavior is the control of perception." I appreciate the
sentiment behind that statement but I would argue that it isn't technically
correct or particularly useful. I do agree that behavior serves to control
perception. No quarrel there. However, I also happen to believe (along
with millions of others) that behavior is a term that, in general, refers to
the activity of organisms (or, as Ted says, the "observed actions of
animals").
So, PCT is a theory. That theory explains behavior. PCT is not behavior.
The control of perception is not behavior, although behavior does indeed
serve to control perception.
Go ahead! Burn me at the stake.
Fred Nickols
From: Martin Taylor [mailto:mmt-csg@MMTAYLOR.NET]
Sent: Thursday, January 02, 2014 2:39 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: "mental typo"[Martin Taylor 2014.01.02.14.37]
>
> TC: Maybe this is philosophical hair-splitting, but since behavior
> *is* the control of perception, PCT actually explains observed actions
of
-----Original Message-----
On 2014/01/2 1:33 PM, Ted Cloak wrote:
animals.
> Otherwise, it seems that one is saying that behavior explains behavior.
>
>
Although I took it from the other angle, that is indeed what I intended to
point out to Rick when I thought he had made a "mental typo".Martin
[From Rick Marken (2014.01.02.1840)]
Fred Nickols (2014.01.02.1556 EST)–
FN: Uh-oh. I think I’m about to commit heresy here.
RM: No such thing as heresy here.
FN: I agree that PCT explains “observed actions of animals” (and other life
forms as well). Where I might be a wee bit heretical is with regard to the
PCT canon that “behavior is the control of perception.” I appreciate the
sentiment behind that statement but I would argue that it isn’t technically
correct or particularly useful. I do agree that behavior serves to control
perception. No quarrel there. However, I also happen to believe (along
with millions of others) that behavior is a term that, in general, refers to
the activity of organisms (or, as Ted says, the "observed actions of
animals").
So, PCT is a theory. That theory explains behavior. PCT is not behavior.
The control of perception is not behavior, although behavior does indeed
serve to control perception.
RM: The problem here turns on the word “behavior”; it’s not a technical term. I agree that most people would say that “behavior”: refers to the activity of organisms: what we see them doing. But this is actually very vague. One way in which it is vague – a way that is pertinent to the present discussion – can be illustrated by the behavior of a glass being knocked over. Is the knocking over behavior intentional or accidental? We might be able to guess which it is from context. But if we have no context – if all we see is the behavior; the activity that we call “glass being knocked over” – then it could be either intentional or accidental; you can’t tell just by looking.
The distinction between the intentional and accidental instances of the glass being knocked over is precisely the distinction PCT makes between control and non-control behavior. Control is intentional behavior; the glass was knocked down on purpose. Non-control is simple cause-effect behavior; the glass was caused to go down because it was hit by the arm (for example). This distinction between control (intentional) and cause-effect (accidental) behavior is a primary consideration when applying PCT, which is an explanation of intentional (control) behavior. The test for the controlled variable (TCV) is a formal method – based on an understanding of what control is – of determining whether any particular behavior is intentional (control) or unintentional (cause-effect).
The use of the TCV to determine whether some observed behavior is an example of control or simply an effect of some cause is demonstrated in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html). In that demo you see a person (in this case it’s best to get someone other than yourself to do it while you watch) moving three avatars around the screen with the mouse. The person is asked to move only one of the avatars intentionally; the other avatars will move as a side effect of the mouse movements that are producing the intentional movements of the avatar.
What you see on the screen are three behaviors that are clearly activities of the person moving the mouse. One behavior is the movement of Homer, another is the movement of Bart and the third is the movement of Lisa. Because only one of the avatars is being moved intentionally, the behavior of only one of the avatars involves control; the movement of the other two avatars is unintentional (cause-effect); the mouse movements as well as the movements of the computer generated disturbances are causing the movements of these two unintentionally moved avatars; their movements are an effect of these two causal factors. The computer is doing the TCV to determine which avatar is being moved intentionally; it does this by looking for lack of effect of the disturbance to each avatar on the movement of that avatar.
If the person is skilled at carrying out their intention the test will pick out the avatar that is being moved intentionally; the behavior that involves control. This is the behavior that can be explained by control theory. The behavior of the other two avatars can be explained in terms of lineal cause and effect; the behavior of these unintentionally moved avatars is predicted perfectly as an effect of mouse movements and the disturbance to the avatar. So what you are seeing in this Mind Reading demo is three behaviors – three activities of an organism – and only one of these behaviors is intentional. What should be astonishing about the demo is that you can’t tell which behavior is intentional (control) and which are not by just looking at the behavior of the avatars. But the computer, doing the TCV, can!
Note that control theory is not involved in determining which behavior is control and which are not. The computer determines which behavior involves control based on the definition of control that I gave in an earlier post (and that is found on the first page of LCS III): “acting to bring something to a specified condition, and then maintaining
it close to that condition even if unpredictable external forces and changes in environmental properties tend to alter it”. The “acting” is moving the mouse. The “something” is the screen position of the intentionally moved avatar. The “specified condition” is the (ever changing) screen position of the intentionally moved avatar. And the “unpredictable external forces” is the computer-generated disturbance affecting the position of the intentionally moved avatar. There is nothing about perception, reference, comparison, or error signals in the method used to determine whether or not a particular behavior is an example of control. You don’t need control theory to know that control is going on.
Most of the behaviors (visible activities) of organisms that we name – walking, talking, downloading music, etc – are,indeed, intentional (control) behavior. That’s why I say “Behavior IS control”. What I mean is that the activities that we see as the behavior is organisms is typically done “on purpose”; behavior is purposeful. But that is an over-generalization, of course. Some (perhaps many) behaviors – often the same one’s that can be intentional (control) at other times – are unintentional (not purposeful), as, for example, when we unintentionally offend someone by something we say, or when we unintentionally bump a car while trying to avoid hitting another car.
Of course, it’s difficult to say all this to a lay person in order to clarify what “behavior” means in PCT. The way I handle it is to say that PCT is an model of purposeful or intentional behavior. That is probably no more successful than saying that PCT is about control, but you gotta say something, I suppose;-)
Best regards
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
-- Bertrand Russell
[From Fred Nickols (2014.01.03.0738 EST)]
Wow! That’s a long response and it will take me some time to digest it all but I do wish to focus on one aspect right now.
RM: The problem here turns on the word “behavior”; it’s not a technical term. I agree that most people would say that “behavior”: refers to the activity of organisms: what we see them doing. But this is actually very vague. One way in which it is vague – a way that is pertinent to the present discussion – can be illustrated by the behavior of a glass being knocked over. Is the knocking over behavior intentional or accidental? We might be able to guess which it is from context. But if we have no context – if all we see is the behavior; the activity that we call “glass being knocked over” – then it could be either intentional or accidental; you can’t tell just by looking.
FN: What you describe as “behavior” (i.e., knocking over a glass) is not what I would call behavior. Let’s say I was gesturing with my hands and that is how I knocked over the glass. It is the gesturing that qualifies as behavior. Knocking over the glass is an outcome or effect of behavior. That is why human performance technologists are so careful to distinguish between outcomes and actions. I also think that many behaviorists would disagree with your assertion that behavior is not a technical term nor is “activity of organisms” limited to what we can see.
Many years ago I had an exchange with Robert F. Mager, well known for his work in relation to behavioral learning objectives, about one of his examples. It was “Adjusting an audiometer.” I told Bob I didn’t think that was a behavioral objective at all. I said that “adjusting an audiometer” was a shorthand way of referring to a constellation of behaviors that ended up with the audiometer in a certain state but that the actual behaviors consisted of things like grasping a knob, turning it, reading dial values, etc. “Audiometer adjusted” was the desired outcome; the actions necessary to achieve that entailed numerous behaviors.
Fred Nickols
From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, January 02, 2014 9:38 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: “mental typo”
[From Rick Marken (2014.01.02.1840)]
Fred Nickols (2014.01.02.1556 EST)–
FN: Uh-oh. I think I’m about to commit heresy here.
RM: No such thing as heresy here.
FN: I agree that PCT explains “observed actions of animals” (and other life
forms as well). Where I might be a wee bit heretical is with regard to the
PCT canon that “behavior is the control of perception.” I appreciate the
sentiment behind that statement but I would argue that it isn’t technically
correct or particularly useful. I do agree that behavior serves to control
perception. No quarrel there. However, I also happen to believe (along
with millions of others) that behavior is a term that, in general, refers to
the activity of organisms (or, as Ted says, the “observed actions of
animals”).So, PCT is a theory. That theory explains behavior. PCT is not behavior.
The control of perception is not behavior, although behavior does indeed
serve to control perception.
RM: The problem here turns on the word “behavior”; it’s not a technical term. I agree that most people would say that “behavior”: refers to the activity of organisms: what we see them doing. But this is actually very vague. One way in which it is vague – a way that is pertinent to the present discussion – can be illustrated by the behavior of a glass being knocked over. Is the knocking over behavior intentional or accidental? We might be able to guess which it is from context. But if we have no context – if all we see is the behavior; the activity that we call “glass being knocked over” – then it could be either intentional or accidental; you can’t tell just by looking.
The distinction between the intentional and accidental instances of the glass being knocked over is precisely the distinction PCT makes between control and non-control behavior. Control is intentional behavior; the glass was knocked down on purpose. Non-control is simple cause-effect behavior; the glass was caused to go down because it was hit by the arm (for example). This distinction between control (intentional) and cause-effect (accidental) behavior is a primary consideration when applying PCT, which is an explanation of intentional (control) behavior. The test for the controlled variable (TCV) is a formal method – based on an understanding of what control is – of determining whether any particular behavior is intentional (control) or unintentional (cause-effect).
The use of the TCV to determine whether some observed behavior is an example of control or simply an effect of some cause is demonstrated in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html). In that demo you see a person (in this case it’s best to get someone other than yourself to do it while you watch) moving three avatars around the screen with the mouse. The person is asked to move only one of the avatars intentionally; the other avatars will move as a side effect of the mouse movements that are producing the intentional movements of the avatar.
What you see on the screen are three behaviors that are clearly activities of the person moving the mouse. One behavior is the movement of Homer, another is the movement of Bart and the third is the movement of Lisa. Because only one of the avatars is being moved intentionally, the behavior of only one of the avatars involves control; the movement of the other two avatars is unintentional (cause-effect); the mouse movements as well as the movements of the computer generated disturbances are causing the movements of these two unintentionally moved avatars; their movements are an effect of these two causal factors. The computer is doing the TCV to determine which avatar is being moved intentionally; it does this by looking for lack of effect of the disturbance to each avatar on the movement of that avatar.
If the person is skilled at carrying out their intention the test will pick out the avatar that is being moved intentionally; the behavior that involves control. This is the behavior that can be explained by control theory. The behavior of the other two avatars can be explained in terms of lineal cause and effect; the behavior of these unintentionally moved avatars is predicted perfectly as an effect of mouse movements and the disturbance to the avatar. So what you are seeing in this Mind Reading demo is three behaviors – three activities of an organism – and only one of these behaviors is intentional. What should be astonishing about the demo is that you can’t tell which behavior is intentional (control) and which are not by just looking at the behavior of the avatars. But the computer, doing the TCV, can!
Note that control theory is not involved in determining which behavior is control and which are not. The computer determines which behavior involves control based on the definition of control that I gave in an earlier post (and that is found on the first page of LCS III): “acting to bring something to a specified condition, and then maintaining it close to that condition even if unpredictable external forces and changes in environmental properties tend to alter it”. The “acting” is moving the mouse. The “something” is the screen position of the intentionally moved avatar. The “specified condition” is the (ever changing) screen position of the intentionally moved avatar. And the “unpredictable external forces” is the computer-generated disturbance affecting the position of the intentionally moved avatar. There is nothing about perception, reference, comparison, or error signals in the method used to determine whether or not a particular behavior is an example of control. You don’t need control theory to know that control is going on.
Most of the behaviors (visible activities) of organisms that we name – walking, talking, downloading music, etc – are,indeed, intentional (control) behavior. That’s why I say “Behavior IS control”. What I mean is that the activities that we see as the behavior is organisms is typically done “on purpose”; behavior is purposeful. But that is an over-generalization, of course. Some (perhaps many) behaviors – often the same one’s that can be intentional (control) at other times – are unintentional (not purposeful), as, for example, when we unintentionally offend someone by something we say, or when we unintentionally bump a car while trying to avoid hitting another car.
Of course, it’s difficult to say all this to a lay person in order to clarify what “behavior” means in PCT. The way I handle it is to say that PCT is an model of purposeful or intentional behavior. That is probably no more successful than saying that PCT is about control, but you gotta say something, I suppose;-)
Best regards
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell
[From Fred Nickols (2014.01.03.0906 EST)]
My comments are embedded below.
From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, January 02, 2014 9:38 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: “mental typo”
[From Rick Marken (2014.01.02.1840)]
Fred Nickols (2014.01.02.1556 EST)–
FN: Uh-oh. I think I’m about to commit heresy here.
RM: No such thing as heresy here.
FN: I agree that PCT explains “observed actions of animals” (and other life
forms as well). Where I might be a wee bit heretical is with regard to the
PCT canon that “behavior is the control of perception.” I appreciate the
sentiment behind that statement but I would argue that it isn’t technically
correct or particularly useful. I do agree that behavior serves to control
perception. No quarrel there. However, I also happen to believe (along
with millions of others) that behavior is a term that, in general, refers to
the activity of organisms (or, as Ted says, the “observed actions of
animals”).So, PCT is a theory. That theory explains behavior. PCT is not behavior.
The control of perception is not behavior, although behavior does indeed
serve to control perception.
RM: The problem here turns on the word “behavior”; it’s not a technical term. I agree that most people would say that “behavior”: refers to the activity of organisms: what we see them doing. But this is actually very vague. One way in which it is vague – a way that is pertinent to the present discussion – can be illustrated by the behavior of a glass being knocked over. Is the knocking over behavior intentional or accidental? We might be able to guess which it is from context. But if we have no context – if all we see is the behavior; the activity that we call “glass being knocked over” – then it could be either intentional or accidental; you can’t tell just by looking.
[Fred Nickols] See my earlier email for a response about “behavior.”
The distinction between the intentional and accidental instances of the glass being knocked over is precisely the distinction PCT makes between control and non-control behavior. Control is intentional behavior; the glass was knocked down on purpose. Non-control is simple cause-effect behavior; the glass was caused to go down because it was hit by the arm (for example). This distinction between control (intentional) and cause-effect (accidental) behavior is a primary consideration when applying PCT, which is an explanation of intentional (control) behavior. The test for the controlled variable (TCV) is a formal method – based on an understanding of what control is – of determining whether any particular behavior is intentional (control) or unintentional (cause-effect).
[Fred Nickols] Hmm. Intentional vs non-intentional. I’m pretty sure there are behaviors on my part that aren’t “intentional” – at least not in the consciously aware, deliberate sense of that word. My heart beats and I breathe but I don’t think of those as intentional. I think the term is “autonomic” but I’ll wager Bruce Abbott can nail that for me. In any case, I also think PCT explains those non-intentional behaviors as well or at least that’s what I think the hierarchy does.
The use of the TCV to determine whether some observed behavior is an example of control or simply an effect of some cause is demonstrated in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html). In that demo you see a person (in this case it’s best to get someone other than yourself to do it while you watch) moving three avatars around the screen with the mouse. The person is asked to move only one of the avatars intentionally; the other avatars will move as a side effect of the mouse movements that are producing the intentional movements of the avatar.
What you see on the screen are three behaviors that are clearly activities of the person moving the mouse. One behavior is the movement of Homer, another is the movement of Bart and the third is the movement of Lisa. Because only one of the avatars is being moved intentionally, the behavior of only one of the avatars involves control; the movement of the other two avatars is unintentional (cause-effect); the mouse movements as well as the movements of the computer generated disturbances are causing the movements of these two unintentionally moved avatars; their movements are an effect of these two causal factors. The computer is doing the TCV to determine which avatar is being moved intentionally; it does this by looking for lack of effect of the disturbance to each avatar on the movement of that avatar
[Fred Nickols] I would not class what you see on the screen as “behaviors” – instead, I would call them movements. The avatars aren’t “behaving” – at least not in the sense of behavior being an “activity of an organism.”
If the person is skilled at carrying out their intention the test will pick out the avatar that is being moved intentionally; the behavior that involves control. This is the behavior that can be explained by control theory. The behavior of the other two avatars can be explained in terms of lineal cause and effect; the behavior of these unintentionally moved avatars is predicted perfectly as an effect of mouse movements and the disturbance to the avatar. So what you are seeing in this Mind Reading demo is three behaviors – three activities of an organism – and only one of these behaviors is intentional. What should be astonishing about the demo is that you can’t tell which behavior is intentional (control) and which are not by just looking at the behavior of the avatars. But the computer, doing the TCV, can
[Fred Nickols] I think the TCV can tell you which avatar is being controlled and thus its movements reflecting the intent of the person using the mouse but, like I said, I don’t think of the movement of the avatar as “behavior.”
Note that control theory is not involved in determining which behavior is control and which are not. The computer determines which behavior involves control based on the definition of control that I gave in an earlier post (and that is found on the first page of LCS III): “acting to bring something to a specified condition, and then maintaining it close to that condition even if unpredictable external forces and changes in environmental properties tend to alter it”. The “acting” is moving the mouse. The “something” is the screen position of the intentionally moved avatar. The “specified condition” is the (ever changing) screen position of the intentionally moved avatar. And the “unpredictable external forces” is the computer-generated disturbance affecting the position of the intentionally moved avatar. There is nothing about perception, reference, comparison, or error signals in the method used to determine whether or not a particular behavior is an example of control. You don’t need control theory to know that control is going on.
[Fred Nickols] I would agree that you don’t need control theory to know that control is going on but I do think you need control theory to explain what is going on.
Most of the behaviors (visible activities) of organisms that we name – walking, talking, downloading music, etc – are,indeed, intentional (control) behavior. That’s why I say “Behavior IS control”. What I mean is that the activities that we see as the behavior is organisms is typically done “on purpose”; behavior is purposeful. But that is an over-generalization, of course. Some (perhaps many) behaviors – often the same one’s that can be intentional (control) at other times – are unintentional (not purposeful), as, for example, when we unintentionally offend someone by something we say, or when we unintentionally bump a car while trying to avoid hitting another car.
[Fred Nickols] Again, I think you’re talking about the effects or outcomes of behaviors, not the behaviors themselves.
Of course, it’s difficult to say all this to a lay person in order to clarify what “behavior” means in PCT. The way I handle it is to say that PCT is an model of purposeful or intentional behavior. That is probably no more successful than saying that PCT is about control, but you gotta say something, I suppose;-)
[Fred Nickols] I generally say the same thing.
Best regards
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell
[From Rick Marken (2014.01.03.0900)]
FN: What you describe as behavior (i.e., knocking over a glass) is not what I would call behavior.
RM: Yes, my point exactly; the word “behavior” is not a technical term. Everyone has their own idea of what it is. “Control”, on the other had, does have a formal definition.
Best
Rick
Lets say I was gesturing with my hands and that is how I knocked over the glass. It is the gesturing that qualifies as behavior. Knocking over the glass is an outcome or effect of behavior. That is why human performance technologists are so careful to distinguish between outcomes and actions. I also think that many behaviorists would disagree with your assertion that behavior is not a technical term nor is activity of organisms limited to what we can see.
Many years ago I had an exchange with Robert F. Mager, well known for his work in relation to behavioral learning objectives, about one of his examples. It was Adjusting an audiometer. I told Bob I didnt think that was a behavioral objective at all. I said that adjusting an audiometer was a shorthand way of referring to a constellation of behaviors that ended up with the audiometer in a certain state but that the actual behaviors consisted of things like grasping a knob, turning it, reading dial values, etc. Audiometer adjusted was the desired outcome; the actions necessary to achieve that entailed numerous behaviors.
Fred Nickols
From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, January 02, 2014 9:38 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: “mental typo”
[From Rick Marken (2014.01.02.1840)]
Fred Nickols (2014.01.02.1556 EST)–
FN: Uh-oh. I think I’m about to commit heresy here.
RM: No such thing as heresy here.
FN: I agree that PCT explains “observed actions of animals” (and other life
forms as well). Where I might be a wee bit heretical is with regard to the
PCT canon that “behavior is the control of perception.” I appreciate the
sentiment behind that statement but I would argue that it isn’t technically
correct or particularly useful. I do agree that behavior serves to control
perception. No quarrel there. However, I also happen to believe (along
with millions of others) that behavior is a term that, in general, refers to
the activity of organisms (or, as Ted says, the “observed actions of
animals”).So, PCT is a theory. That theory explains behavior. PCT is not behavior.
The control of perception is not behavior, although behavior does indeed
serve to control perception.
RM: The problem here turns on the word “behavior”; it’s not a technical term. I agree that most people would say that “behavior”: refers to the activity of organisms: what we see them doing. But this is actually very vague. One way in which it is vague – a way that is pertinent to the present discussion – can be illustrated by the behavior of a glass being knocked over. Is the knocking over behavior intentional or accidental? We might be able to guess which it is from context. But if we have no context – if all we see is the behavior; the activity that we call “glass being knocked over” – then it could be either intentional or accidental; you can’t tell just by looking.
The distinction between the intentional and accidental instances of the glass being knocked over is precisely the distinction PCT makes between control and non-control behavior. Control is intentional behavior; the glass was knocked down on purpose. Non-control is simple cause-effect behavior; the glass was caused to go down because it was hit by the arm (for example). This distinction between control (intentional) and cause-effect (accidental) behavior is a primary consideration when applying PCT, which is an explanation of intentional (control) behavior. The test for the controlled variable (TCV) is a formal method – based on an understanding of what control is – of determining whether any particular behavior is intentional (control) or unintentional (cause-effect).
The use of the TCV to determine whether some observed behavior is an example of control or simply an effect of some cause is demonstrated in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html). In that demo you see a person (in this case it’s best to get someone other than yourself to do it while you watch) moving three avatars around the screen with the mouse. The person is asked to move only one of the avatars intentionally; the other avatars will move as a side effect of the mouse movements that are producing the intentional movements of the avatar.
What you see on the screen are three behaviors that are clearly activities of the person moving the mouse. One behavior is the movement of Homer, another is the movement of Bart and the third is the movement of Lisa. Because only one of the avatars is being moved intentionally, the behavior of only one of the avatars involves control; the movement of the other two avatars is unintentional (cause-effect); the mouse movements as well as the movements of the computer generated disturbances are causing the movements of these two unintentionally moved avatars; their movements are an effect of these two causal factors. The computer is doing the TCV to determine which avatar is being moved intentionally; it does this by looking for lack of effect of the disturbance to each avatar on the movement of that avatar.
If the person is skilled at carrying out their intention the test will pick out the avatar that is being moved intentionally; the behavior that involves control. This is the behavior that can be explained by control theory. The behavior of the other two avatars can be explained in terms of lineal cause and effect; the behavior of these unintentionally moved avatars is predicted perfectly as an effect of mouse movements and the disturbance to the avatar. So what you are seeing in this Mind Reading demo is three behaviors – three activities of an organism – and only one of these behaviors is intentional. What should be astonishing about the demo is that you can’t tell which behavior is intentional (control) and which are not by just looking at the behavior of the avatars. But the computer, doing the TCV, can!
Note that control theory is not involved in determining which behavior is control and which are not. The computer determines which behavior involves control based on the definition of control that I gave in an earlier post (and that is found on the first page of LCS III): “acting to bring something to a specified condition, and then maintaining it close to that condition even if unpredictable external forces and changes in environmental properties tend to alter it”. The “acting” is moving the mouse. The “something” is the screen position of the intentionally moved avatar. The “specified condition” is the (ever changing) screen position of the intentionally moved avatar. And the “unpredictable external forces” is the computer-generated disturbance affecting the position of the intentionally moved avatar. There is nothing about perception, reference, comparison, or error signals in the method used to determine whether or not a particular behavior is an example of control. You don’t need control theory to know that control is going on.
Most of the behaviors (visible activities) of organisms that we name – walking, talking, downloading music, etc – are,indeed, intentional (control) behavior. That’s why I say “Behavior IS control”. What I mean is that the activities that we see as the behavior is organisms is typically done “on purpose”; behavior is purposeful. But that is an over-generalization, of course. Some (perhaps many) behaviors – often the same one’s that can be intentional (control) at other times – are unintentional (not purposeful), as, for example, when we unintentionally offend someone by something we say, or when we unintentionally bump a car while trying to avoid hitting another car.
Of course, it’s difficult to say all this to a lay person in order to clarify what “behavior” means in PCT. The way I handle it is to say that PCT is an model of purposeful or intentional behavior. That is probably no more successful than saying that PCT is about control, but you gotta say something, I suppose;-)
Best regards
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell
–
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell
[From Rick Marken (2014.01.03.1740)]
Fred Nickols (2014.01.03.0906 EST)–
***[Fred Nickols] Hmm. Intentional vs non-intentional. Im pretty sure there are behaviors on my part that arent intentional at least not in the consciously aware, deliberate sense of that word. ***
RM: I use “intentional” to describe behavior that is “deliberate” or “purposeful” but not necessarily conscious. I know that it is very common to think that “intention” implies consciousness. But again the problem is that “intentional”, like “behavior”, is not a technical term: “control” is. I think all behavior that is referred to as “intentional” (conscious or not) is control. I also think a lot of behavior that is considered unintentional because it is done unconsciously (like the heart beats and breathing that you mention) is also control. When you deal with “behavior” in terms of the formal concept of control you can see that consciousness and control are two different things; we do a lot of our controlling consciously but we actually do even more of it unconsciously.
** * FN: I think the term is autonomic but Ill wager Bruce Abbott can nail that for me. In any case, I also think PCT explains those non-intentional behaviors as well or at least thats what I think the hierarchy does.***
RM: Yes, unconscious behavior is called “automatic” behavior by conventional psychologists. But this kind of behavior is always intentional behavior (as I’m using the term “intentional”) because it always is control behavior. For example, driving is often done “automatically” (unconsciously), at least for short times, but driving is intentional (as I use the term), whether it’s being done consciously or not, because it involves control. So to the extent that unconscious control is considered “non-intentional” behavior it can certainly be accounted for by PCT.
[Fred Nickols] I would not class what you see on the screen as behaviors instead, I would call them movements. The avatars arent behaving at least not in the sense of behavior being an activity of an organism.
RM: As I said, “behavior” is not a technical term; it can mean whatever you’d like it to mean. But I think most people would consider the movements of the intentionally moved avatar to be a behavior in the same sense that driving a car is considered a behavior. The behavior of the unintentionally moved avatars would not necessarily be considered a behavior, though, just as accidentally knocking over a glass might not be considered a behavior, in the sense of something the person did. I think the notion of purpose or intention is always lurking in the background when we talk about “behavior”; PCT shows that that notion (or purpose or intention) is equivalent to control.
[Fred Nickols] I think the TCV can tell you which avatar is being controlled and thus its movements reflecting the intent of the person using the mouse but, like I said, I dont think of the movement of the avatar as behavior.
RM: I agree that what the TCV picks up is which avatar is being controlled and which are not. It identifies the phenomenon of control and makes it possible to discriminate control from non-control.
[Fred Nickols] I would agree that you dont need control theory to know that control is going on but I do think you need control theory to explain what is going on.
RM: Precisely!
[Fred Nickols] Again, I think youre talking about the effects or outcomes of behaviors, not the behaviors themselves.
RM: But what you call “behaviors” are often also outcomes, and vice versa. For example, you said that you would call a gesture a “behavior” because it could be attributed only to the person doing it and the knocked over glass an “outcome” because it is an effect on the environment. But the gesture is also an “outcome” that occurs in the environment of muscle tension behavior; and muscle tension behavior is an outcome that occurs in the environment of neural activity behavior. That’s as far back as we can go; as Bill said in his Byte article in which he deals with the problem of defining behavior ( http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/enclosures/byte_june_1979.pdf) “The only behavior that a person produces that can be attributed entirely to the person and not in part to his environment consists of the nerve signals that leave his nervous system and enter his muscles”. I think it might be worthwhile to re-read that article. PCT really begins with an understanding of the phenomenon that it purports to explain: the phenomenon of control, which is commonly known as “behavior”.
Best
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
-- Bertrand Russell
Thanks Rick, really important stuff.
Fred Nickols (2014.01.03.0906 EST)–
***[Fred Nickols] Hmm. Intentional vs non-intentional. I’m pretty sure there are behaviors on my part that aren’t “intentionalâ€? – at least not in the consciously aware, deliberate sense of tthat word. ***
RM: I use “intentional” to describe behavior that is “deliberate” or “purposeful” but not necessarily conscious. I know that it is very common to think that “intention” implies consciousness. But again the problem is that “intentional”, like “behavior”, is not a technical term: “control” is. I think all behavior that is referred to as “intentional” (conscious or not) is control. I also think a lot of behavior that is considered unintentional because it is done unconsciously (like the heart beats and breathing that you mention) is also control. When you deal with “behavior” in terms of the formal concept of control you can see that consciousness and control are two different things; we do a lot of our controlling consciously but we actually do even more of it unconsciously.
** * FN: I think the term is “autonomic� but I’ll wager Bruce Abbott can nail that for me. In any case, I also think PCT explains those non-intentional behaviors as well or at least that’s what I think the hierarchy does.***
RM: Yes, unconscious behavior is called “automatic” behavior by conventional psychologists. But this kind of behavior is always intentional behavior (as I’m using the term “intentional”) because it always is control behavior. For example, driving is often done “automatically” (unconsciously), at least for short times, but driving is intentional (as I use the term), whether it’s being done consciously or not, because it involves control. So to the extent that unconscious control is considered “non-intentional” behavior it can certainly be accounted for by PCT.
[Fred Nickols] I would not class what you see on the screen as “behaviorsâ€? – instead, I wwould call them movements. The avatars aren’t “behavingâ€? – at least not in the sense of behavior being an “œactivity of an organism.â€?
RM: As I said, “behavior” is not a technical term; it can mean whatever you’d like it to mean. But I think most people would consider the movements of the intentionally moved avatar to be a behavior in the same sense that driving a car is considered a behavior. The behavior of the unintentionally moved avatars would not necessarily be considered a behavior, though, just as accidentally knocking over a glass might not be considered a behavior, in the sense of something the person did. I think the notion of purpose or intention is always lurking in the background when we talk about “behavior”; PCT shows that that notion (or purpose or intention) is equivalent to control.
[Fred Nickols] I think the TCV can tell you which avatar is being controlled and thus its movements reflecting the intent of the person using the mouse but, like I said, I don’t think of the movement of the avatar as “behavior.�
RM: I agree that what the TCV picks up is which avatar is being controlled and which are not. It identifies the phenomenon of control and makes it possible to discriminate control from non-control.
[Fred Nickols] I would agree that you don’t need control theory to know that control is going on but I do think you need control theory to explain what is going on.
RM: Precisely!
[Fred Nickols] Again, I think you’re talking about the effects or outcomes of behaviors, not the behaviors themselves.
RM: But what you call “behaviors” are often also outcomes, and vice versa. For example, you said that you would call a gesture a “behavior” because it could be attributed only to the person doing it and the knocked over glass an “outcome” because it is an effect on the environment. But the gesture is also an “outcome” that occurs in the environment of muscle tension behavior; and muscle tension behavior is an outcome that occurs in the environment of neural activity behavior. That’s as far back as we can go; as Bill said in his Byte article in which he deals with the problem of defining behavior ( http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/enclosures/byte_june_1979.pdf) “The only behavior that a person produces that can be attributed entirely to the person and not in part to his environment consists of the nerve signals that leave his nervous system and enter his muscles”. I think it might be worthwhile to re-read that article. PCT really begins with an understanding of the phenomenon that it purports to explain: the phenomenon of control, which is commonly known as “behavior”.
Best
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
-- Bertrand Russell