[From Rick Marken (2017.02.24.1255)]
···
Bruce Abbott (2017.02.23.2135 EST)
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BA: The angle of the line is the controlled variable, Qi. This variable is being converted within the person’s visual system to an internal representation, p, which according to perceptual control theory is a neural current whose frequency represents the perceived angle of the external physical variable, Qi.
RM: This is not quite correct. It’s not Qi that is converted within the person’s visual system to an internal representation, p. The visual system – the receptive field in my diagram – converts the sensory effects of the physical variables that are the basis of the computation of Qi into p. Remember, Qi is a function of physical variables; in my diagram, Qi is defined by the function sin-1(x/y), where x and y are the physical variables. So p is also presumed to be a function of physical variables, a function computed by a neural network called the perceptual or input function in PCT, with the arguments of the function being the sensory effects of the physical variables rather than the physical variables themselves.
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BA: Bear in mind that the variable directly under control is p. Qi is also controlled to the extent that the functional relation between p and Qi is maintained. Â
RM: As you can see from the above, there is no functional relationship between p and Qi; they are same function of the same physical variables. That is Qi =Â sin-1(x/y) and p =Â sin-1(x/y). I think youwould see the problem of treating p as a function of Qi by writing a model of the control of angle in the “Control of Perception” demo.Â
 BA: If the person decided to control the rectangle’s area rather than its angle, Qi would not necessarily be observable as a single environmental variable;
RM: Qi is a function of environmental (physical) variables; it is a perceptual variable, specifically a perception in the observer of a variable that someone is controlling. When the subject in the “Control of Perception” demo is controlling the angle, an observer can see that sin-1(x/y) is being controlled; so Qi, the observer’s perception of the controlled variable, is sin-1(x/y). An observer who understands PCT could then model this behavior by assuming that the subject is controlling a perception, p, proportional to sin-1(x/y).  When the subject switches to controlling area rather than angle, the observer can see that x * y is now being controlled; so Qi is now x * y and this behavior can be modeled by assuming that the subject is now controlling a perception, p, proportional to x * y. Â
RM: It’s our perceptual systems that organize this “booming, buzzing confusion” into things like computers, mice and so on.
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BA:Â I was surprised to see you borrowing this phrase from John Watson, the founder of behaviorism!
RM: The phrase is borrowed from William James, the first psychologist to see  (back in the 1890s) that purposeful behavior is a control process. Unfortunately, he didn’t have control theory available so he couldn’t do what Bill Powers was able to do some 60 years later.Â
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 RM: Why that train of impulses looks like a varying angle rather than something else is, I believe, what is called the “hard problem” of consciousness. It is actually a problem of understanding perception and I solve it to my own satisfaction by assuming that that’s the way it looks when you are the neuron carrying the varying rates of neural impulses.
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BA: I guess, then,  that to a lot of neurons, the signals they carry don’t look like anything at all – since thosee signals give rise to no conscious perceptions.
RM: My “solution” has nothing to do with consciousness. I’m just saying that I’m comfortable understanding the world to look (and sound and feel and smell) the way it does (when we are conscious of it) because we are the neurons that carry the neural impulses.Â
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BA: You may find your explanation satisfying, but it doesn’t explain why the qualia of experience depend on where in the cortex the signal is analyzed rather than on what neurons carried the signal there.Â
RM: No, it sure doesn’t.Â
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BA: Of course, this still does not explain how conscious experience arises from activity in these areas. There is a reason they call it a hard problem!
RM: I think philosophers conflate perception with conscious perception. My comments pertain only to perception, which we know from control theory doesn’t go away when we are not conscious of it (since we are still able to control perceptions of which we are not conscious). For me, both the problem of “why perception looks the way it does” and " what does it mean to be conscious of those perceptions" are hard problems.Â
BestÂ
Rick
–
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery