[Lars Christian Smith (960314 16:00 CET)]
···
To: Tom Bourbon, Bill Powers
Subject: Models of reorganization
How can we learn more about your models? Are you writing them up?
Any plans for a CSG meeting in Europe this summer?
Lars
[from Gary Cziko 970619.1430 GMT]
A few years ago at a CSG meeting in Durango, Bill Powers showed me and some
others a computer simulation of reorganization.
I wonder if Bill still has this or another version of it and if it would be
possible for me to play with it. I would also be interested if anyone else
has developed computer simulations of the reorganization process.
My motivation for this request comes from a review of my 1995 book
(_Without Miracles_) in _Biology and Philosophy_ where I am faulted for not
providing an explicit model for a cognitive variation-and-selection
process. I also would like to make such a simulation available to readers
of the current book I am working on (_The Things We Do_) which emphasizes
both the power of PCT and selectionism for making sense of animal and human
behavior.
--Gary
[From Rick Marken (970620.0800 PDT)]
Gary Cziko (970619.1430 GMT) --
in _Biology and Philosophy_ ...I am faulted for not providing an
explicit model for a cognitive variation-and-selection process.
That's odd. I think there are a number of examples of cognitive
variation-and-selection models in the cognition/AI literature. For
example, in an old article (1978?) in "Cognitive Psychology" there
was a model of water jar problem solving that used a "means-ends
analysis" strategy. I think this strategy was an example of a
cognitive variation-and-selection process. The strategy involved
making random "moves" -- the "variation" part of the model. After a
move the model computed the similarity of the resulting problem
state to the solution state. If the move made things better
(the resulting problem state was closer to the solution state) the
probability of making that move again (when it was pssible) was
increased -- the "selection" part of the model.
I think it's rather quaint that a journal called _Biology and
Philosophy_ would fault you for not providing an explicit model
for a cognitive variation-and-selection process. Do they fault
Darwin for not providing an explicit model of the natural selection
process or Gould and Ethridge for not providing an explicit model
of the punctuated equilibrium process?
I also would like to make such a simulation available to readers
of the current book I am working on (_The Things We Do_) which
emphasizes both the power of PCT and selectionism for making
sense of animal and human behavior.
Why don't we write it in Java and make it available to your readers via
the net?
By the way, I hate to be troublesome (well, maybe I don't really _hate_
it;-)) but I think it's better to say that PCT _explains_
(rather precisely) various aspects of animal and human behavior.
It's easy to "make sense" of animal and human behavior with any
theory. Freudians can make sense of it with ids and egos;
behaviorists can make sense of it with stimuli and reinforcers;
evolutionary psychologists can make sense of it with natural selection;
cyberneticists can make sense of it with model-based control theory.
They can all make sense of it; they just can't
explain it -- that is, they can't precisely predict the data.
Can "selectionism" explain (predict the data of) animal and human
behavior? If not -- if it only "makes sense" of it -- then why not
just stick to PCT?
Best
Rick
PS. Don't forget to change the pointers to my java demos.
···
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/
[Hans Blom, 970624b]
(Rick Marken (970620.0800 PDT))
I was struck by your distinction between "making sense" of versus
"explaining" data:
It's easy to "make sense" of animal and human behavior with any
theory. Freudians can make sense of it with ids and egos;
behaviorists can make sense of it with stimuli and reinforcers;
evolutionary psychologists can make sense of it with natural
selection; cyberneticists can make sense of it with model-based
control theory.
They can all make sense of it; they just can't explain it -- that
is, they can't precisely predict the data.
I'm trying to comprehend your distinction. Maybe you can help me by
answering this question: Do Newton's laws -- which Einstein
demonstrated to be incorrect -- "make sense of" or do they "explain"
the motion of the heavenly bodies? Inquiring minds etc.
Greetings,
Hans
[From Bruce Gregory (970624.0935 EDT)]
Hans Blom, 970624b
(Rick Marken (970620.0800 PDT))
>It's easy to "make sense" of animal and human behavior with any
>theory. Freudians can make sense of it with ids and egos;
>behaviorists can make sense of it with stimuli and reinforcers;
>evolutionary psychologists can make sense of it with natural
>selection; cyberneticists can make sense of it with model-based
>control theory.
>They can all make sense of it; they just can't explain it -- that
>is, they can't precisely predict the data.I'm trying to comprehend your distinction. Maybe you can help me by
answering this question: Do Newton's laws -- which Einstein
demonstrated to be incorrect -- "make sense of" or do they "explain"
the motion of the heavenly bodies? Inquiring minds etc.
Newton's laws are explanatory in Rick's sense. They predict the
data very well. Einstein showed that Newton's laws have a
limited range of applicability. But that range includes almost
all phenomena that we encounter. In this domain, Newton's laws
are perfectly valid and explanatory.
Bruce
[Hans Blom, 970701d]
(Bruce Gregory (970624.0935 EDT))
Catching up. Rick Marken (970620.0800 PDT) contrasted "making sense"
with "explaining":
It's easy to "make sense" of animal and human behavior with any
theory. Freudians can make sense of it with ids and egos;
behaviorists can make sense of it with stimuli and reinforcers;
evolutionary psychologists can make sense of it with natural
selection; cyberneticists can make sense of it with model-based
control theory.
They can all make sense of it; they just can't explain it -- that
is, they can't precisely predict the data.
I did not understand the difference. You, Bruce, select the accuracy
of prediction as the differentiation criterium:
Newton's laws are explanatory in Rick's sense. They predict the data
very well. Einstein showed that Newton's laws have a limited range
of applicability. But that range includes almost all phenomena that
we encounter. In this domain, Newton's laws are perfectly valid and
explanatory.
Long before Newton, the movement of the heavenly bodies could be
predicted very accurately using a theory of co-centered "heavenly
spheres". Moreover, the laws of this ancient theory had a fairly wide
range of applicability, not much less than Newton's laws.
If laws are valid _because they are explanatory_, we must logically
-- it appears to me -- also accept the "heavenly spheres theory" as
explanatory. My logical conclusion: a theory's correctness is not
demonstrated by its predictive power. In other words, I still don't
understand Rick. Or you...
What I do accept is that a theory is _useful_ if it produces correct
predictions. But then even Freud's psychoanalysis might be a _useful_
theory...
Greetings,
Hans
[From Bruce Gregory (970701.1035 EDT)]
Hans Blom, 970701d
Long before Newton, the movement of the heavenly bodies could be
predicted very accurately using a theory of co-centered "heavenly
spheres". Moreover, the laws of this ancient theory had a fairly wide
range of applicability, not much less than Newton's laws.
Quite untrue. The earth centered model was purely
empirical and applied only to the heavens. Given the
discovery of new planet, it had nothing whatsoever to
say about its path. (Ptolemy was quite aware of this and made
no explanatory claims.)
If laws are valid _because they are explanatory_, we must logically
-- it appears to me -- also accept the "heavenly spheres theory" as
explanatory. My logical conclusion: a theory's correctness is not
demonstrated by its predictive power. In other words, I still don't
understand Rick. Or you...
I don't know what a correct theory is. (God presumably knows,
but She isn't talking.) One way to describe an explanatory
theory is to say that if you accept these rules and these
starting conditions, then you must accept this conclusion. If
you accept Newton's laws and some initial configuration of the
planets then you can predict the position of the planets at some
future date. If the predicted configuration does not match the
observed configuration there is something wrong either with the
rules or with the initial configuration.
What I do accept is that a theory is _useful_ if it produces correct
predictions.
Agreed.
But then even Freud's psychoanalysis might be a _useful_
theory...
Less clear. If Freud's theory makes definite predictions (and
can therefore fail) that is quite another situation. I have
never encountered a situation for which a Freudian is not able
to develop a post hoc "explanation". The theory seems to have
little if any predictive power. (It may be useful if it allows a
psycholoanalyst to make a living. But by this criterion Voodo is
equally useful.)
Bruce