From Greg Williams (920920)
Bill Powers (920920.0900)
What's really going on would be much plainer if you'd say that she serves
food that she believes ought to be good for the kids.
What I said is that she controls for her perception of the kids eating
"healthy" (her definition) food. She isn't just controlling for seeing the
"healthy" (her definition) food SERVED, which depends ONLY on HER actions, but
also for seeing the kids EAT the "healthy" (her definition) food, which
depends BOTH on (some of) her actions AND (some) actions of the kids. In order
to control her seeing the kids eating the "healthy" (her definition) food, she
must serve food which is both "healthy" (her definition) and wanted (on SOME
basis) by the kids. So she makes a model of what the kids want with respect to
food, and serves them food which is "healthy" (her definition) and which she
believes also has the property of being wanted (currently) by the kids. The
belief is developed via her using the Test. She might be wrong in her belief,
and will then see an error; to correct and regain good control of her desired
perception, she will try the Test again. It is possible that she will never be
able to come up with a property of food which the kids want and which can be
combined (in the same food) with "healthiness" (her definition), in which case
she is not able to control her desired perception. So far (in real life) Pat
has been able to repeatedly see both the kids and me eat the "healthy" (to
her) and "tasty" (to me and the kids) food she serves us, with a few
exceptions where her belief about the "tastiness" of the food she served was
(I can attest!) quite incorrect. She never served that stuff again, and
regained good control of her perception that we are eating "healthy" (her
definition) food.
I call this sort of control, where one's desired outcome depends on outputs of
others, "purposive influence," because it is being done purposefully (it is
control of one's perception) and because, to succeed, it requires influencing
the way others control. It does not involve overwhelming physical force or
threat thereof. Generation of conflict in the others' control systems is
minimized if the influencer can sufficiently ascertain (via The Test) what the
prospective influencee wants in order to provide the opportunity for those
wants to be satisfied in a manner which allows the influencee to see what
he/she wants to see. Empirically, I find that purposive influence is
extremely common, and often successful in the sense that the influencer
retains good control of his/her desired perceptions, which depend on the
influencees' controlling, over long periods of time. Rubber-banding is a
special case of purposive influence, which is a special case of controlling
(namely controlling where the desired outcome depends on other organisms'
controlling).
If she [Pat] can actually see how varying the kind of food changes the kids'
state of health, then she can control the state of health. Unless, of course,
they're already controlling it themselves.
To avoid generating conflict in an influencee's control system, the influencer
must not attempt to control a perception (of the influencer, of course) which
is incompatible with possible actions which could be taken by the influencee
to enable control by the influencee of the influencee's desired perceptions.
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that (1) often there are SEVERAL
possible actions which can enable control by the influencee of the
influencee's desired perceptions, (2) often there is at least ONE possible
action which ALSO is compatible with the influencer's desired perception, and
often the "compatible" action/s is/are "don't-care" for or actually embraced
(because of perceived "convenience," lack of perceived "drawbacks," or other
reasons) by the influencee, and so there is no conflict generated in the
influencee's control system. The Test (in some form, and applied repeatedly
if necessary, perhaps in different forms) is useful to predict whether
conflict generation is likely to be a problem in any given case.
I see no fundamental difference in control which involves other
persons (of whatever developmental stages) and control which involves
non->living entities, EXCEPT that in the former kind of control,
(some of) the other persons' wants must be taken into account for the
control to succeed without generating conflict in the others' control
systems.
I agree that control is control, whatever is being controlled. But that
little difference, I claim, makes all the difference.
No argument here. It makes all the difference. I was trying to make the point
that needing to take (some of) the other persons' wants into account IS INDEED
the crux of the difference.
I'm interested in how control of people differs from control of inanimate
things.
I'm interested in how (successful) control of one's perceptions must differ
(according to PCT science) when (a) the perceptions depend on other peoples'
actions and (b) when the perceptions do not depend on other peoples' actions.
Is that the same interest as yours?
Anyway, it isn't sufficient to know SOME of the variables under active
control by the other person. You must know ALL of them.
You must know ALL of them to do what? I claim that, for successful purposive
influence, SOME -- but by no means ALL -- variables under active control by
the influencee must be correctly determined by the influencer, so that the
influencer can provide the opportunity for the influencee to control in such a
way that the influencer will see what he/she wants to see. Pat need only
correctly figure out that the kids want "tasty" (to them) food, serve them the
food, and then watch them gobble it up. If they don't gobble it up, she has
incorrectly figured out ONE of their reference signals (or maybe the laws of
physics changed, or the dining table blew up -- but even control SOLELY
involving inanimate entities relies on a faith in certain constancies, like
the continued existence of the universe). Sure, sometimes there are details
unforeseen by the influencer (suddenly one of the kid's friends bursts in with
a box of popsicles -- cherry, even!!), but that's possible (Murphy's law says
likely!) with inanimate entities, too. Pat isn't trying to see the kids eat
the food JUST SO; JUST EATING it will suffice. And if they fall out of their
chairs and can't eat the food for some strange reason, Pat will work to
correct that problem.
Of course you may be unaware of the extent to which you're disturbing
another's hierarchy by trying to control some innocent-seeming aspect
of that person's behavior.
Yes, you might. But I look around and see that this doesn't appear to be a big
problem in the real world, where successful purposive influence is common.
To appreciate the full extent of the effects, you'd have to use the Test
systematically, with a far more organized and extensive effort than anyone
knows how to mount now.
I claim there's no need to appreciate it.
Robbers and con-men often seem puzzled at what seems to them an overreaction
to what they did, when they're caught. They know a little, but not enough,
about what the victim wants. It's their ignorance of human nature that gets
them into such professions in the first place.
Is this just opining, or do you have some evidence to back up what you say
here?
I have a problem with terms like "linkable wants." What good are such
terms? They just make us try to interpret them in PCT terms. Why not
simply express what you mean in PCT terms in the first place? Is
"linking" a new phenomenon that requires a new explanation?
I've tried at the start of this post to eliminate all but PCT jargon from my
explanation of what I'm talking about.
Advertising writers appeal to consumers' patriotism to sell them
dinnerware at gas stations; who is controlling the higher-level
perception?
The consumers.
In your last post, you seemed to be claiming that a requirement for successful
purposive influencing is that the influencer control for (his/her) perceptions
at a HIGHER level than the perceptions being controlled for by the influencee.
Have you dropped that claim, or perhaps never actually made it?
Providing an opportunity is like serving healthy food.
Yes.
What I can provide on purpose is a physical situation under my direct control
that I think of as an opportunity to drink. But it doesn't matter to the cat
how I think of it. What matters is whether the cat uses this situation as a
means of drinking. I have no control over whether my physical manipulation
amounts to an opportunity or not.
No control if you have a poor model of your cats' controlling.
Half of the time the cat switches its tail at me, ignores the sink, and
drinks out of his cup.
So you DO have a poor model. Models of non-human animals' controlling is made
difficult by the fact that they don't speak, so don't feel too bad.
It's not as if I can control what the cat's going to do.
That's right. (You and I mean without overwhelming physical force. Maybe even
WITH overwhelming physical force, for a cat!) But I claim you MIGHT be able to
apply The Test and figure out what your cat wants sufficiently to improve the
repeatability of your amusement.
I can't control for my amusement, because I can't make the cat "take
advantage of the opportunity."
Providing the RIGHT SORT of opportunity would require a better model of your
cat's controlling than you now have. But I can't speak about the likelihood of
being able to find the right sort of opportunity, because I don't have the
opportunity to observe a lot of successful purposive influencing with cats.
With people, however, I observe that "good-enough" models don't seem very
difficult to construct -- even by influencers who know nothing about PCT and
apply The Test intuitively.
There's a critical part of the process that's under the cat's control, not
mine. The relationship between me and the cat is not one of control.
Yes, yes, yes! You can only control YOUR perceptions; your cat can only
control HIS perceptions. But BOTH of you can (not necessarily WILL) control
(some of) your OWN perceptions by purposive influence.
Show me, in PCT terms. How are the two people carrying the bed
upstairs making each others' actions be in a desired state? What are
the controlled variables? The reference levels? The actions taken to
affect the controlled variables?
I want to see this bed upstairs. (reference level: bed upstairs; controlled
variable: bed position)
I ask you, "Would you like to help me move this bed upstairs?" (action:
applying The Test to attempt to determine whether I can purposively influence
you so I can control for the bed being upstairs (it's a big, heavy bed, and I
can't move it alone; you just happen to be here)
You say, "Sure!" (PUTATIVE reference level EXPRESSED by you: bed upstairs
(note shared reference level); controlled variable: bed position)
I think you get the gist. Now I'd tell you how I want the movement of the bed
to go in some -- BUT NOT MICROSCOPIC -- detail: "I'll go first; you keep it
level; etc., etc." I'd want to hear either "OK" from you ("asymmetric
successful purposive influence") or better ideas about how it should be done
(to which I would no doubt agree -- you're on the bottom -- "symmetric
successful purposive influence"). Our purposive influencing would continue
throughout the moving, as you and I each deem necessary.
At a higher level, I'm helping her with the suitcase because she let
me know she wanted help, and I decided, for numerous reasons, to
comply. I've got my mitzvah; she has the suitcase where she wanted it.
I lent her some lower-level systems to use in controlling the variable
she wanted to control -- not me, but the suitcase's position.
Now you've got it! You've been successfully purposively influenced. Didn't
really hurt, did it?
It was I who rearranged my momentary wants to allow her to use my muscles in
her control action. I could have said no.
You didn't. That LOL sure psyched out some (enough!) of your wants, didn't
she?
···
-----
IBMers could probably build systems with identical blocks (amps,
integrators, delays, etc.) as those used in STELLA, so what could be
passed from IBMers to MACers and back could be lists of the blocks
and their connections and parameters.
Stella would have to be modified to accept a setup language. And
I think the language should be both generated by and interpreted by
the programs, to avoid errors and for the sake of people just starting
to learn.
All we'd need is the format for setup files for STELLA; then we could write a
pre-processor (translator) to convert from TUTsim's ASCII setup files to
STELLA setup files and vice-versa. The program could be entirely separate
from STELLA and TUTsim, and wouldn't be very complex or hard to write --
unless the STELLA folks are proprietary about their file formatting, and we
have to figure it out for ourselves! A MACer could send a STELLA setup file to
an IBMer who would run it through the translator and end up with a regular
TUTsim setup file, and vice versa.
ADVERTORIAL: Maybe if PCTers are serious about having a common programming
language (i.e., block diagrams), they are willing to pay a little something
for the translator program, as well as for TUTsim or STELLA?
Best wishes,
Greg