Natural language search

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.09 21.00)]

  Anyone know to what extent natural language processing is used in

google searches? They certainly don’t respond in natural language,
but just present a list. I would have thought by now that the
technology would be more like a chatbot. Here 's a partially
relevant article,

···

https://www.wired.com/2016/02/ai-is-changing-the-technology-behind-google-searches/

Regards,
Rupert

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.10.12:27 ET)]

Rupert Young (2017.12.09 21.00)–

There are two main approaches, statistical learning and formal linguistic analysis. They are related somewhat in the way that neural networks and control theory are related.

To the extent that a neural network reorganizes itself so as to generate realistic behavior we may assume (and verify by the Test for controlled variables) that it is controlling, and therefore that the structures resulting from its reorganization process must include negative-feedback control loops. But can those structures be examined and refined directly? Is it even possible to determine what they are?

Likewise, when a statistical ‘big data’ approach to natural-language processing is successful, the associations that it registers between words and constructions evidently correlate with those established by painstaking linguistic analysis, but are not disclosed for examination.

Fernando Pereira talks about the relationship between these two approaches to language in an important paper, “Formal grammar and information theory: together again?”, first published in 2000 in the Proceedings of the Royal Society. (A revised version was published in volume 2 of a collection that I edited, published by John Benjamins Publishing in 2002.)

https://www.princeton.edu/~wbialek/rome/refs/pereira_00.pdf

Pereira begins as follows:

In the last forty years, research on models of spoken and written language has been split between two seemingly irreconcilable points of view: formal linguistics in the Chomsky tradition, and information theory in the Shannon tradition. Chomsky (1957)’s famous quote signals the beginning of the split:

(1) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.

(2) Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.

. . . It is fair to assume that neither sentence (1) nor (2) (nor indeed any part of these sentences) has ever occurred in an English discourse. Hence, in any statistical model for grammaticalness, these sentences will be ruled out on identical grounds as equally ‘remote’ from English. Yet (1), though nonsensical, is grammatical, while (2) is not.

Before and after the split, Zellig Harris had advocated a close alliance between grammatical and information-theoretic principles in the analysis of natural language (Harris, 1951, 1991).

He is contrasting the logical symbolic rule-processing systems of Chomsky with the empirical linguistics of Chomsky’s teacher (and mine), whose linguistic methodology I have written about in connection with PCT. This methodology is grounded in tests for controlled variables (though of course they are not called that), and identifies the controlled perceptions that constitute language.

Pereira now works for Google:

https://sites.google.com/site/fernandopereira/

How much this informs one or another of Google’s diverse products and in what ways, is not likely to be public knowledge.

···

On Sat, Dec 9, 2017 at 3:59 PM, Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.09 21.00)]

  Anyone know to what extent natural language processing is used in

google searches? They certainly don’t respond in natural language,
but just present a list. I would have thought by now that the
technology would be more like a chatbot. Here 's a partially
relevant article,
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/ai-is-changing-the-technology-behind-google-searches/


Regards,
Rupert

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.10.18:00 ET)]

BTW, pace Chomsky’s influential (1957) claim, “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously is at least 200,000 times as probable a sentence as Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.”

http://fistfulofeuros.net/pedantry/archives/000533.html

···

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:11 PM, Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.10.12:27 ET)]

Rupert Young (2017.12.09 21.00)–

There are two main approaches, statistical learning and formal linguistic analysis. They are related somewhat in the way that neural networks and control theory are related.

To the extent that a neural network reorganizes itself so as to generate realistic behavior we may assume (and verify by the Test for controlled variables) that it is controlling, and therefore that the structures resulting from its reorganization process must include negative-feedback control loops. But can those structures be examined and refined directly? Is it even possible to determine what they are?

Likewise, when a statistical ‘big data’ approach to natural-language processing is successful, the associations that it registers between words and constructions evidently correlate with those established by painstaking linguistic analysis, but are not disclosed for examination.

Fernando Pereira talks about the relationship between these two approaches to language in an important paper, “Formal grammar and information theory: together again?”, first published in 2000 in the Proceedings of the Royal Society. (A revised version was published in volume 2 of a collection that I edited, published by John Benjamins Publishing in 2002.)

https://www.princeton.edu/~wbialek/rome/refs/pereira_00.pdf

Pereira begins as follows:

In the last forty years, research on models of spoken and written language has been split between two seemingly irreconcilable points of view: formal linguistics in the Chomsky tradition, and information theory in the Shannon tradition. Chomsky (1957)’s famous quote signals the beginning of the split:

(1) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.

(2) Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.

. . . It is fair to assume that neither sentence (1) nor (2) (nor indeed any part of these sentences) has ever occurred in an English discourse. Hence, in any statistical model for grammaticalness, these sentences will be ruled out on identical grounds as equally ‘remote’ from English. Yet (1), though nonsensical, is grammatical, while (2) is not.

Before and after the split, Zellig Harris had advocated a close alliance between grammatical and information-theoretic principles in the analysis of natural language (Harris, 1951, 1991).

He is contrasting the logical symbolic rule-processing systems of Chomsky with the empirical linguistics of Chomsky’s teacher (and mine), whose linguistic methodology I have written about in connection with PCT. This methodology is grounded in tests for controlled variables (though of course they are not called that), and identifies the controlled perceptions that constitute language.

Pereira now works for Google:

https://sites.google.com/site/fernandopereira/

How much this informs one or another of Google’s diverse products and in what ways, is not likely to be public knowledge.

/Bruce

On Sat, Dec 9, 2017 at 3:59 PM, Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.09 21.00)]

  Anyone know to what extent natural language processing is used in

google searches? They certainly don’t respond in natural language,
but just present a list. I would have thought by now that the
technology would be more like a chatbot. Here 's a partially
relevant article,
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/ai-is-changing-the-technology-behind-google-searches/


Regards,
Rupert

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.11
14.25)]

Thanks. Fyi, I didn't get the post below, though see it did appear

on the archive.
Rupert

···

On 10/12/2017 23:01, Bruce Nevin wrote:

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.10.18:00 ET)]

BTW, pace Chomsky’s influential (1957) claim, “* Colorless
green ideas sleep furiously* is
at least 200,000 times as probable a sentence as * Furiously
sleep ideas green colorless*.”

http://fistfulofeuros.net/pedantry/archives/000533.html

      On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:11 PM, Bruce

Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com
wrote:

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.10.12:27 ET)]

              Rupert Young

(2017.12.09 21.00)–

              There are two main

approaches, statistical learning and formal linguistic
analysis. They are related somewhat in the way that
neural networks and control theory are related.

              To the extent that a

neural network reorganizes itself so as to generate
realistic behavior we may assume (and verify by the
Test for controlled variables) that it is controlling,
and therefore that the structures resulting from its
reorganization process must include negative-feedback
control loops. But can those structures be examined
and refined directly? Is it even possible to determine
what they are?

              Likewise, when a

statistical ‘big data’ approach to natural-language
processing is successful, the associations that it
registers between words and constructions evidently
correlate with those established by painstaking
linguistic analysis, but are not disclosed for
examination.

Fernando Pereira talks about the relationship
between these two approaches to language in an
important paper, “Formal grammar and information
theory: together again?”, first published in 2000 in
the Proceedings of the Royal Society. (A revised
version was published in volume 2 of a collection that
I edited, published by John Benjamins Publishing in
2002.)

https://www.princeton.edu/~wbialek/rome/refs/pereira_00.pdf

              Pereira begins as

follows:

                In the last forty years, research on models of

spoken and written language has been split between
two seemingly irreconcilable points of view: formal
linguistics in the Chomsky tradition, and
information theory in the Shannon tradition. Chomsky
(1957)’s famous quote signals the beginning of the
split:

(1) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.

(2) Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.

                  . . . It is fair to assume that neither

sentence (1) nor (2) (nor indeed any part of these
sentences) has ever occurred in an English
discourse. Hence, in any statistical model for
grammaticalness, these sentences will be ruled out
on identical grounds as equally ‘remote’ from
English. Yet (1), though nonsensical, is
grammatical, while (2) is not.

                Before and after the split, Zellig Harris had

advocated a close alliance between grammatical and
information-theoretic principles in the analysis of
natural language (Harris, 1951, 1991).

              He is contrasting the logical symbolic

rule-processing systems of Chomsky with the empirical
linguistics of Chomsky’s teacher (and mine), whose linguistic methodology I
have written about in connection with PCT. This
methodology is grounded in tests for controlled
variables (though of course they are not called
that), and identifies the controlled
perceptions that constitute language.

Pereira now works
for Google:

https://sites.google.com/site/fernandopereira/

            How much this informs one or another of Google's

diverse products and in what ways, is not likely to be
public knowledge.

/Bruce

                On Sat, Dec 9, 2017 at 3:59

PM, Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.09 21.00)]

                      Anyone know to what extent natural language

processing is used in google searches? They
certainly don’t respond in natural language,
but just present a list. I would have thought
by now that the technology would be more like
a chatbot. Here 's a partially relevant
article,
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/ai-is-changing-the-technology-behind-google-searches/

                          --

Regards,
Rupert

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

  I'll read the paper. Do we have anything that puts language

(textual) in the PCT framework? That is, in the context of
separating (parsing) it into perceptual types at the different
levels in the hierarchy.

Regards,

Rupert

(Bruce Nevin (2017.12.10.12:27 ET)]

···
              Rupert Young

(2017.12.09 21.00)–

              There are two main

approaches, statistical learning and formal linguistic
analysis. They are related somewhat in the way that
neural networks and control theory are related.

              To the extent that a

neural network reorganizes itself so as to generate
realistic behavior we may assume (and verify by the
Test for controlled variables) that it is controlling,
and therefore that the structures resulting from its
reorganization process must include negative-feedback
control loops. But can those structures be examined
and refined directly? Is it even possible to determine
what they are?

              Likewise, when a

statistical ‘big data’ approach to natural-language
processing is successful, the associations that it
registers between words and constructions evidently
correlate with those established by painstaking
linguistic analysis, but are not disclosed for
examination.

Fernando Pereira talks about the relationship
between these two approaches to language in an
important paper, “Formal grammar and information
theory: together again?”, first published in 2000 in
the Proceedings of the Royal Society. (A revised
version was published in volume 2 of a collection that
I edited, published by John Benjamins Publishing in
2002.)

https://www.princeton.edu/~wbialek/rome/refs/pereira_00.pdf

              Pereira begins as

follows:

                In the last forty years, research on models of

spoken and written language has been split between
two seemingly irreconcilable points of view: formal
linguistics in the Chomsky tradition, and
information theory in the Shannon tradition. Chomsky
(1957)’s famous quote signals the beginning of the
split:

(1) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.

(2) Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.

                  . . . It is fair to assume that neither

sentence (1) nor (2) (nor indeed any part of these
sentences) has ever occurred in an English
discourse. Hence, in any statistical model for
grammaticalness, these sentences will be ruled out
on identical grounds as equally ‘remote’ from
English. Yet (1), though nonsensical, is
grammatical, while (2) is not.

                Before and after the split, Zellig Harris had

advocated a close alliance between grammatical and
information-theoretic principles in the analysis of
natural language (Harris, 1951, 1991).

              He is contrasting the logical symbolic

rule-processing systems of Chomsky with the empirical
linguistics of Chomsky’s teacher (and mine), whose linguistic methodology I
have written about in connection with PCT. This
methodology is grounded in tests for controlled
variables (though of course they are not called
that), and identifies the controlled
perceptions that constitute language.

Pereira now works
for Google:

https://sites.google.com/site/fernandopereira/

            How much this informs one or another of Google's

diverse products and in what ways, is not likely to be
public knowledge.

/Bruce

                On Sat, Dec 9, 2017 at 3:59

PM, Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.09 21.00)]

                      Anyone know to what extent natural language

processing is used in google searches? They
certainly don’t respond in natural language,
but just present a list. I would have thought
by now that the technology would be more like
a chatbot. Here 's a partially relevant
article,
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/ai-is-changing-the-technology-behind-google-searches/

                          --

Regards,
Rupert

[From Bruce Nevin (2012.12.15.12:00 ET)]

Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)–

RY: Do we have anything that puts language (textual) in the PCT framework? That is, in the context of separating (parsing) it into perceptual types at the different levels in the hierarchy.

I have three things that address this. My chapter in LCS IV I am forbidden to distribute until after publication. The following derive from a conference in Duino sponsored by the University of Paris.

http://zelligharris.org/Embodied.grammar.pdf

http://zelligharris.org/Nevin20160521.pdf

The presentation that I gave at Stanford in February 2012:

http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/SPLaT/SPLaT_Nevin.html

This concerns meanings only at the most primitive level of phonemic contrast: speakers and hearers control the distinctness of different words from one another. Kinesthetic and tactile perceptions of pronunciation are controlled in real time; their acoustic effects can only be controlled over time as contrasting words and syllables are repeated, and they are controlled by ‘tuning’ the references for the real-time kinesthetic and tactile perceptions. A proposed PCT model indicates a solution to the puzzle. A working simulation has not yet been built. It would presumably involve some kind of numerical surrogate for human speech apparatus. This engages only the lowest levels of language structure and of the perceptual hierarchy. (My host introducing me was Ivan Sag, since deceased.) I just noticed that the copy that I had uploaded to youtube is gone (only a snip of discussion at the end was there), so I put it up again.

There are also two papers in the 2003 Festschrift for Bill:

http://iapct.org/festschrift/judd.html

http://iapct.org/festschrift/nevin.html

···

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 4:32 AM, Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

  I'll read the paper. Do we have anything that puts language

(textual) in the PCT framework? That is, in the context of
separating (parsing) it into perceptual types at the different
levels in the hierarchy.

Regards,

Rupert

(Bruce Nevin (2017.12.10.12:27 ET)]
              Rupert Young

(2017.12.09 21.00)–

              There are two main

approaches, statistical learning and formal linguistic
analysis. They are related somewhat in the way that
neural networks and control theory are related.

              To the extent that a

neural network reorganizes itself so as to generate
realistic behavior we may assume (and verify by the
Test for controlled variables) that it is controlling,
and therefore that the structures resulting from its
reorganization process must include negative-feedback
control loops. But can those structures be examined
and refined directly? Is it even possible to determine
what they are?

              Likewise, when a

statistical ‘big data’ approach to natural-language
processing is successful, the associations that it
registers between words and constructions evidently
correlate with those established by painstaking
linguistic analysis, but are not disclosed for
examination.

Fernando Pereira talks about the relationship
between these two approaches to language in an
important paper, “Formal grammar and information
theory: together again?”, first published in 2000 in
the Proceedings of the Royal Society. (A revised
version was published in volume 2 of a collection that
I edited, published by John Benjamins Publishing in
2002.)

https://www.princeton.edu/~wbialek/rome/refs/pereira_00.pdf

              Pereira begins as

follows:

                In the last forty years, research on models of

spoken and written language has been split between
two seemingly irreconcilable points of view: formal
linguistics in the Chomsky tradition, and
information theory in the Shannon tradition. Chomsky
(1957)’s famous quote signals the beginning of the
split:

(1) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.

(2) Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.

                  . . . It is fair to assume that neither

sentence (1) nor (2) (nor indeed any part of these
sentences) has ever occurred in an English
discourse. Hence, in any statistical model for
grammaticalness, these sentences will be ruled out
on identical grounds as equally ‘remote’ from
English. Yet (1), though nonsensical, is
grammatical, while (2) is not.

                Before and after the split, Zellig Harris had

advocated a close alliance between grammatical and
information-theoretic principles in the analysis of
natural language (Harris, 1951, 1991).

              He is contrasting the logical symbolic

rule-processing systems of Chomsky with the empirical
linguistics of Chomsky’s teacher (and mine), whose linguistic methodology I
have written about in connection with PCT. This
methodology is grounded in tests for controlled
variables (though of course they are not called
that), and identifies the controlled
perceptions that constitute language.

Pereira now works
for Google:

https://sites.google.com/site/fernandopereira/

            How much this informs one or another of Google's

diverse products and in what ways, is not likely to be
public knowledge.

/Bruce

                On Sat, Dec 9, 2017 at 3:59

PM, Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.09 21.00)]

                      Anyone know to what extent natural language

processing is used in google searches? They
certainly don’t respond in natural language,
but just present a list. I would have thought
by now that the technology would be more like
a chatbot. Here 's a partially relevant
article,
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/ai-is-changing-the-technology-behind-google-searches/

                          --

Regards,
Rupert

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14]

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

    ...Do we have anything that puts language (textual) in the PCT

framework? …

I do, but since it is a substantial part (roughly 100 single-spaced

pages out of 600 at the moment) of the book I am writing, I don’t
think I can post it, though I might possibly be able to provide
drafts to individuals who have the background and who would be
prepared to offer helpful comments. All the same, I think it not
unreasonable to post a small section that is a sort of introduction
to the language part. Here is a PCT “just So Story” about how a baby
produces and mother learns a first word.

The working title of the book is "*      Powers of Perceptual Control: a

PCT enquiry into Language, Culture, Power, and Politics* ", pun
intended. My LCS IV chapter is more on the mechanism of protocols,
and not really relevant to the question. However, some of my old
Layered Protocol papers and chapters might be relevant, since LPT is
just a special case of PCT invented before I knew of PCT. A few are
on researchgate.

Martin

12.1CoraAndIvan.pdf (177 KB)

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.16.18:00 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14 –

It might be useful to have your definition of ‘protocol’, Martin.

In the usual definitions, a protocol is (or specifies) constraints to which a communicative interaction must conform in order to be perceived as such. Presupposed metacommunication, if you will. Here are two definitions (for diplomacy and for computer intercommunication, respectively) from the Random House Dictionary:

1. the customs and regulations dealing with diplomatic formality, precedence, and etiquette.

[...]

7. Computers. a set of rules governing the format of messages that are exchanged between computers.

Thus, the Internet Protocol specifies a number of things (such as IP addresses) to which communications from one computer across the Internet to another must comply.

You refer to the baby’s initiating protocol and the mother’s continuation protocol. The word here seems to refer to parts of an instance of communication rather than to the whole. Maybe this is analogous to the definitions 2-5 elided above. They are:

2. an original draft, minute, or record from which a document, esp. a treaty, is prepared.

3. a supplementary international agreement.

4. an agreement between states.

5. an annex to a treaty giving data relating to it.

In these cases, it’s not synecdoche–the part taken to represent the whole–but rather the word for the whole (‘protocol’) is used to refer to a part. The analogy breaks down because these are parts of a particular instance of protocol-compliant communication (negotiation of a treaty, etc.), and your terms initiating protocol and continuation protocol are at a higher level of generalization. An initiating protocol is any observed behavior by party A that is [intended to be] perceived by party B as initiating an an exchange compliant with a known protocol; and so on.

There are two other dictionary definitions which I believe are a bit too divergent to be relevant:

6. Med. the plan for carrying out a scientific study or a patient's treatment regimen.

8. Also called protocol statement, protocol sentence, protocol proposition. Philos. a statement reporting an observation or experience in the most fundamental terms without interpretation: sometimes taken as the basis of empirical verification, as of scientific laws.
···

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 1:49 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14]

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

    ...Do we have anything that puts language (textual) in the PCT

framework? …

I do, but since it is a substantial part (roughly 100 single-spaced

pages out of 600 at the moment) of the book I am writing, I don’t
think I can post it, though I might possibly be able to provide
drafts to individuals who have the background and who would be
prepared to offer helpful comments. All the same, I think it not
unreasonable to post a small section that is a sort of introduction
to the language part. Here is a PCT “just So Story” about how a baby
produces and mother learns a first word.

The working title of the book is "*      Powers of Perceptual Control: a

PCT enquiry into Language, Culture, Power, and Politics* ", pun
intended. My LCS IV chapter is more on the mechanism of protocols,
and not really relevant to the question. However, some of my old
Layered Protocol papers and chapters might be relevant, since LPT is
just a special case of PCT invented before I knew of PCT. A few are
on researchgate.

Martin

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.16.23.06]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.16.18:00 ET)]

        Martin Taylor

2017.12.15.13.14 –

          It might be useful to have

your definition of ‘protocol’, Martin.

Sorry. I take too much for granted. Since we had had a thread about

protocols and layered protocols some time ago, and since I’ve been
writing about them and discussing them for over 30 years, I forgot
that many people still won’t know much, if anything, about them.

Very simply, my definition of a protocol is that it is a procedure

whereby two people can discover what they can do to reduce error in
a perception being controlled by another, and in the process reduce
error in their own that is influenced by the actions of the other.
As an example. Jane disturbs some perception John controls (e.g.his
perception of Jane’s contentment) by saying “I’m cold. Could you
shut the window”. I call that statement a “display” by Jane. It
disturbs John’s perception of her contentment. He acts to bring that
perception nearer its reference level by closing the window. The
error in Jane’s temperature perception, and thus her comfort level
perception, is thus reduced. She feels warmer.

I know that's much to terse to be much help in describing the usual

form of protocols. The main process is the discovery by both parties
of what perception(s) each other is acting to control by influencing
(the initiator by disturbing) a perception controlled by the other.
Frequently the controlled perception is of the value(s) of
perception(s) held by the other, in a type of protocol I label
“Inform” or “Query”. I am the “continuer” in a “Query” protocol at
this moment. I am also an initiator in an “Inform”, because I am
doing more than just answering. I am acting to control a perception
of your understanding of “protocol” that was disturbed by your
query.

I don't know how many major types of protocol should be

distinguished. The process, however, is fairly well defined, at
least for dyadic (between two persons) protocols. You can get a lot
more detail in the two papers on the topic in the PCT Special Issue
of Int ,J, Human-Computer Studies (Farrell, Hollands, Taylor and
Gamble, 1998 and Taylor., Farrell, and Hollands, 1998). I thought I
had uploaded copies of those papers to Researchgate, but apparently
I didn’t.

Hope this helps, and is not too dense.

Martin
···

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 1:49 PM, Martin
Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14]

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

              ...Do we have anything that puts language (textual)

in the PCT framework? …

          I do, but since it is a substantial part (roughly 100

single-spaced pages out of 600 at the moment) of the book
I am writing, I don’t think I can post it, though I might
possibly be able to provide drafts to individuals who have
the background and who would be prepared to offer helpful
comments. All the same, I think it not unreasonable to
post a small section that is a sort of introduction to the
language part. Here is a PCT “just So Story” about how a
baby produces and mother learns a first word.

          The working title of the book is "*                Powers of Perceptual

Control: a PCT enquiry into Language, Culture, Power,
and Politics* ", pun intended. My LCS IV chapter is
more on the mechanism of protocols, and not really
relevant to the question. However, some of my old Layered
Protocol papers and chapters might be relevant, since LPT
is just a special case of PCT invented before I knew of
PCT. A few are on researchgate.

              Martin

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.17.09:40 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.12.16.23.06 –

So a protocol (in this sense) is a perception that is controlled collectively by all parties in the communication. It is a Sequence perception about the process of communication, and probably sometimes a Program perception. (The distinction between Sequence and Program is evident logically but perhaps not always so crisp in wetware.) As such, its inputs, in the canonical model, are Category perceptions. The mother-infant interaction in your just-so story posits the emergence of a collectively-controlled perception (the protocol) by ‘co-reorganization’ in the course of a social interaction.

···

On Sun, Dec 17, 2017 at 12:17 AM, Martin Taylor < mmt-csg@mmt
aylor.net> wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.16.23.06]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.16.18:00 ET)]

        Martin Taylor

2017.12.15.13.14 –

          It might be useful to have

your definition of ‘protocol’, Martin.

Sorry. I take too much for granted. Since we had had a thread about

protocols and layered protocols some time ago, and since I’ve been
writing about them and discussing them for over 30 years, I forgot
that many people still won’t know much, if anything, about them.

Very simply, my definition of a protocol is that it is a procedure

whereby two people can discover what they can do to reduce error in
a perception being controlled by another, and in the process reduce
error in their own that is influenced by the actions of the other.
As an example. Jane disturbs some perception John controls (e.g.his
perception of Jane’s contentment) by saying “I’m cold. Could you
shut the window”. I call that statement a “display” by Jane. It
disturbs John’s perception of her contentment. He acts to bring that
perception nearer its reference level by closing the window. The
error in Jane’s temperature perception, and thus her comfort level
perception, is thus reduced. She feels warmer.

I know that's much to terse to be much help in describing the usual

form of protocols. The main process is the discovery by both parties
of what perception(s) each other is acting to control by influencing
(the initiator by disturbing) a perception controlled by the other.
Frequently the controlled perception is of the value(s) of
perception(s) held by the other, in a type of protocol I label
“Inform” or “Query”. I am the “continuer” in a “Query” protocol at
this moment. I am also an initiator in an “Inform”, because I am
doing more than just answering. I am acting to control a perception
of your understanding of “protocol” that was disturbed by your
query.

I don't know how many major types of protocol should be

distinguished. The process, however, is fairly well defined, at
least for dyadic (between two persons) protocols. You can get a lot
more detail in the two papers on the topic in the PCT Special Issue
of Int ,J, Human-Computer Studies (Farrell, Hollands, Taylor and
Gamble, 1998 and Taylor., Farrell, and Hollands, 1998). I thought I
had uploaded copies of those papers to Researchgate, but apparently
I didn’t.

Hope this helps, and is not too dense.



Martin
          In the usual definitions,

a protocol is (or specifies) constraints to which a
communicative interaction must conform in order to be
perceived as such. Presupposed metacommunication, if you
will. Here are two definitions (for diplomacy and for
computer intercommunication, respectively) from the Random
House Dictionary:

            1.

the customs and regulations dealing with diplomatic
formality, precedence, and etiquette.

[...]
            7.

Computers. a set of rules governing the format of messages
that are exchanged between computers.

          Thus, the Internet

Protocol specifies a number of things (such as IP
addresses) to which communications from one computer
across the Internet to another must comply.

          You refer to the baby's

initiating protocol and the mother’s continuation
protocol. The word here seems to refer to parts of an
instance of communication rather than to the whole. Maybe
this is analogous to the definitions 2-5 elided above.
They are:

            2.

an original draft, minute, or record from which a
document, esp. a treaty, is prepared.

            3.

a supplementary international agreement.

            4.

an agreement between states.

            5.

an annex to a treaty giving data relating to it.

          In these cases, it's not

synecdoche–the part taken to represent the whole–but
rather the word for the whole (‘protocol’) is used to
refer to a part. The analogy breaks down because these are
parts of a particular instance of protocol-compliant
communication (negotiation of a treaty, etc.), and your
terms initiating protocol and continuation protocol are at
a higher level of generalization. An initiating protocol
is any observed behavior by party A that is [intended to
be] perceived by party B as initiating an an exchange
compliant with a known protocol; and so on.

          There are two other

dictionary definitions which I believe are a bit too
divergent to be relevant:

            6.

Med. the plan for carrying out a scientific study or a
patient’s treatment regimen.

            8.

Also called protocol statement, protocol sentence,
protocol proposition. Philos. a statement reporting an
observation or experience in the most fundamental terms
without interpretation: sometimes taken as the basis of
empirical verification, as of scientific laws.

/Bruce

      On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 1:49 PM, Martin

Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14]

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

              ...Do we have anything that puts language (textual)

in the PCT framework? …

          I do, but since it is a substantial part (roughly 100

single-spaced pages out of 600 at the moment) of the book
I am writing, I don’t think I can post it, though I might
possibly be able to provide drafts to individuals who have
the background and who would be prepared to offer helpful
comments. All the same, I think it not unreasonable to
post a small section that is a sort of introduction to the
language part. Here is a PCT “just So Story” about how a
baby produces and mother learns a first word.

          The working title of the book is "*                Powers of Perceptual

Control: a PCT enquiry into Language, Culture, Power,
and Politics* ", pun intended. My LCS IV chapter is
more on the mechanism of protocols, and not really
relevant to the question. However, some of my old Layered
Protocol papers and chapters might be relevant, since LPT
is just a special case of PCT invented before I knew of
PCT. A few are on researchgate.

              Martin

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.17.1040)]

···

Bruce Nevin (2017.12.17.09:40 ET)

BN: So a protocol (in this sense) is a perception that is controlled collectively by all parties in the communication.

RM: Right. A “protocol” is a theoretical concept (defined in terms of a hybrid of PCT and reinforcement theory) in search of a phenomenon! Â

Â

It is a Sequence perception about the process of communication, and probably sometimes a Program perception. (The distinction between Sequence and Program is evident logically but perhaps not always so crisp in wetware.) As such, its inputs, in the canonical model, are Category perceptions. The mother-infant interaction in your just-so story posits the emergence of a collectively-controlled perception (the protocol) by ‘co-reorganization’ in the course of a social interaction.

On Sun, Dec 17, 2017 at 12:17 AM, Martin Taylor < mmt-csg@mmt
aylor.net> wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.16.23.06]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.16.18:00 ET)]

        Martin Taylor

2017.12.15.13.14 –

          It might be useful to have

your definition of ‘protocol’, Martin.

Sorry. I take too much for granted. Since we had had a thread about

protocols and layered protocols some time ago, and since I’ve been
writing about them and discussing them for over 30 years, I forgot
that many people still won’t know much, if anything, about them.

Very simply, my definition of a protocol is that it is a procedure

whereby two people can discover what they can do to reduce error in
a perception being controlled by another, and in the process reduce
error in their own that is influenced by the actions of the other.
As an example. Jane disturbs some perception John controls (e.g.his
perception of Jane’s contentment) by saying “I’m cold. Could you
shut the window”. I call that statement a “display” by Jane. It
disturbs John’s perception of her contentment. He acts to bring that
perception nearer its reference level by closing the window. The
error in Jane’s temperature perception, and thus her comfort level
perception, is thus reduced. She feels warmer.

I know that's much to terse to be much help in describing the usual

form of protocols. The main process is the discovery by both parties
of what perception(s) each other is acting to control by influencing
(the initiator by disturbing) a perception controlled by the other.
Frequently the controlled perception is of the value(s) of
perception(s) held by the other, in a type of protocol I label
“Inform” or “Query”. I am the “continuer” in a “Query” protocol at
this moment. I am also an initiator in an “Inform”, because I am
doing more than just answering. I am acting to control a perception
of your understanding of “protocol” that was disturbed by your
query.

I don't know how many major types of protocol should be

distinguished. The process, however, is fairly well defined, at
least for dyadic (between two persons) protocols. You can get a lot
more detail in the two papers on the topic in the PCT Special Issue
of Int ,J, Human-Computer Studies (Farrell, Hollands, Taylor and
Gamble, 1998 and Taylor., Farrell, and Hollands, 1998). I thought I
had uploaded copies of those papers to Researchgate, but apparently
I didn’t.

Hope this helps, and is not too dense.



Martin
          In the usual definitions,

a protocol is (or specifies) constraints to which a
communicative interaction must conform in order to be
perceived as such. Presupposed metacommunication, if you
will. Here are two definitions (for diplomacy and for
computer intercommunication, respectively) from the Random
House Dictionary:

            1.

the customs and regulations dealing with diplomatic
formality, precedence, and etiquette.

[...]
            7.

Computers. a set of rules governing the format of messages
that are exchanged between computers.

          Thus, the Internet

Protocol specifies a number of things (such as IP
addresses) to which communications from one computer
across the Internet to another must comply.

          You refer to the baby's

initiating protocol and the mother’s continuation
protocol. The word here seems to refer to parts of an
instance of communication rather than to the whole. Maybe
this is analogous to the definitions 2-5 elided above.
They are:

            2.

an original draft, minute, or record from which a
document, esp. a treaty, is prepared.

            3.

a supplementary international agreement.

            4.

an agreement between states.

            5.

an annex to a treaty giving data relating to it.

          In these cases, it's not

synecdoche–the part taken to represent the whole–but
rather the word for the whole (‘protocol’) is used to
refer to a part. The analogy breaks down because these are
parts of a particular instance of protocol-compliant
communication (negotiation of a treaty, etc.), and your
terms initiating protocol and continuation protocol are at
a higher level of generalization. An initiating protocol
is any observed behavior by party A that is [intended to
be] perceived by party B as initiating an an exchange
compliant with a known protocol; and so on.

          There are two other

dictionary definitions which I believe are a bit too
divergent to be relevant:

            6.

Med. the plan for carrying out a scientific study or a
patient’s treatment regimen.

            8.

Also called protocol statement, protocol sentence,
protocol proposition. Philos. a statement reporting an
observation or experience in the most fundamental terms
without interpretation: sometimes taken as the basis of
empirical verification, as of scientific laws.

/Bruce

      On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 1:49 PM, Martin

Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14]

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

              ...Do we have anything that puts language (textual)

in the PCT framework? …

          I do, but since it is a substantial part (roughly 100

single-spaced pages out of 600 at the moment) of the book
I am writing, I don’t think I can post it, though I might
possibly be able to provide drafts to individuals who have
the background and who would be prepared to offer helpful
comments. All the same, I think it not unreasonable to
post a small section that is a sort of introduction to the
language part. Here is a PCT “just So Story” about how a
baby produces and mother learns a first word.

          The working title of the book is "*                Powers of Perceptual

Control: a PCT enquiry into Language, Culture, Power,
and Politics* ", pun intended. My LCS IV chapter is
more on the mechanism of protocols, and not really
relevant to the question. However, some of my old Layered
Protocol papers and chapters might be relevant, since LPT
is just a special case of PCT invented before I knew of
PCT. A few are on researchgate.

              Martin

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.17.11.17]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.17.09:40 ET)]

        Martin Taylor

2017.12.16.23.06 –

      So a protocol (in this sense) is a perception that is

controlled collectively by all parties in the communication.

I was afraid that I was much too terse in my description. The full

description of the possible progress of a protocol involves as many
as nineteen different controlled perceptions. Of these nineteen,
there are nine that are common to all protocols in each participant
in a dialogue, though in most instances several, even as many as
eight, are undisturbed and therefore produce no overt action. The
nineteenth is the perception by the “sender of a message” (a.k.a the
“initiator of a protocol”) of what the “sender of the message” wants
the recipient (a.k.a “the continuer of a protocol”) to perceive.
That perception is controlled by the sender; the others are all in
support of the sender’s ability to control that one. The “meaning”
of the message (Ivan’s “hungry-word”, for example) probably is
collectively controlled, not just by the dialogue partners, though
that is possible, but by the larger linguistic community into which
the child emerges. The “meaning” may be different between the sender
and the recipient, but usually the difference is slight or
non-existent.

Different reference values for the various members of the supporting

group of perceptions controlled in the course of a protocol
determine whether the intentions of the initiator and the recipient
are cooperative, collaborative, deceitful, and so forth. In actual
dialogue, protocols have multiple levels of support, just as do
control units in the hierarchy. A dialogue can be cooperative at one
level and deceitful by one or both of the parties at another level.

Nineteen controlled perceptions may sound like unnecessary bells and

whistles, not to mention bows and ribbons. But every one of them
seems to be required to account for the general case. When we were
working on that aspect of protocols, we anticipated the possibility
of an infinite recursion, which would have resulted in 2*3n +1
possible controlled perceptions, but when we examined both real and
hypothetical dialogues, we could find no instances for n>2,
whereas we could find instances where n=2. And if you want to go
further, we could find only about 45 plausible different kinds of
actions for controlling these 18 perceptions. All of which doesn’t
mean that we (Taylor Farrell and Hollands 1998) were correct, but it
does mean that unless someone finds a simpler way to describe
dialogue interactions, the progress of a protocol is determined to a
large extent by the ever-changing values of what each partner
perceives the other to perceive while the main message is being
passed.

Apart from all the papers and chapters I and my colleagues wrote on

Layered Protocols before I learned of PCT, the book “Powers of
Perceptual Control” has a full chapter describing protocols as such,
and another chapter mostly devoted to how protocols develop and are
collectively controlled as perceptions in a community or culture.
That chapter also discusses how they differ from a PCT viewpoint
from rituals, morals, and laws. I can make these chapters (all
drafts possibly subject to much revision) available to you – as
someone much concerned with the use of language – for comment, but
I won’t post them more widely.

I think a protocol is an emergent property in the same way as is

control, stiffness, or tensegrity. Each has a minimum structure that
is needed before a protocol can exist, just as there is for control.
Stiffness requires at least two control units, tensegrity probably
nine, and protocol possibly nineteen. What is not needed, though it
may exist and may be collectively controlled, is a perception in
either party of the form of the protocol (I use a specific example
of collective control of a protocol form for various purposes in
Chapters 17-19).

      It is a Sequence perception about the process of

communication, and probably sometimes a Program perception.
(The distinction between Sequence and Program is evident
logically but perhaps not always so crisp in wetware.) As
such, its inputs, in the canonical model, are Category
perceptions. The mother-infant interaction in your just-so
story posits the emergence of a collectively-controlled
perception (the protocol) by ‘co-reorganization’ in the course
of a social interaction.

I don't think there's necessarily a collectively controlled

perception other than that an arbitrary pattern of sound and
movement begins to have a “meaning” (another emergent property that
requires a minimum supporting structure). Baby Ivan controls only
one of the nine that an adult might (“that mother has correctly
interpreted the message”, the message being “feed me” or “I’m
hungry” or something similar for which Cora’s action in feeding him
reduces the error).

That said, I also argue that many specific forms of protocol are

collectively controlled, just as are the meanings of some
sound-gesture patterns that in the distant pre-history of a language
were arbitrary. In the extreme, these collectively controlled forms
of protocols can sometimes merge into the forms of rituals. The
difference with rituals is that in rituals the defining property is
that the actions of the ritual may be publicly perceived and
controlled. An improperly executed ritual does not serve its
purpose. For example, a marriage service performed by a
non-authorized person or in which the potential spouses say “No I
won’t” rather than “I do” will not result in the partners being
perceived by most people as married. The marriage service is a
ritual, though it may look like a triadic protocol because of the
three-way interaction among the partners and the officiating
person…

Martin
···

On Sun, Dec 17, 2017 at 12:17 AM,
Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmt aylor.net>
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.16.23.06]

                [From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.16.18:00

ET)]

                    Martin Taylor

2017.12.15.13.14 –

                      It might be

useful to have your definition of ‘protocol’,
Martin.

           Sorry. I take too much for granted. Since we had

had a thread about protocols and layered protocols some
time ago, and since I’ve been writing about them and
discussing them for over 30 years, I forgot that many
people still won’t know much, if anything, about them.

          Very simply, my definition of a protocol is that it is a

procedure whereby two people can discover what they can do
to reduce error in a perception being controlled by
another, and in the process reduce error in their own that
is influenced by the actions of the other. As an example.
Jane disturbs some perception John controls (e.g.his
perception of Jane’s contentment) by saying “I’m cold.
Could you shut the window”. I call that statement a
“display” by Jane. It disturbs John’s perception of her
contentment. He acts to bring that perception nearer its
reference level by closing the window. The error in Jane’s
temperature perception, and thus her comfort level
perception, is thus reduced. She feels warmer.

          I know that's much to terse to be much help in describing

the usual form of protocols. The main process is the
discovery by both parties of what perception(s) each other
is acting to control by influencing (the initiator by
disturbing) a perception controlled by the other.
Frequently the controlled perception is of the value(s) of
perception(s) held by the other, in a type of protocol I
label “Inform” or “Query”. I am the “continuer” in a
“Query” protocol at this moment. I am also an initiator in
an “Inform”, because I am doing more than just answering.
I am acting to control a perception of your understanding
of “protocol” that was disturbed by your query.

          I don't know how many major types of protocol should be

distinguished. The process, however, is fairly well
defined, at least for dyadic (between two persons)
protocols. You can get a lot more detail in the two papers
on the topic in the PCT Special Issue of Int ,J,
Human-Computer Studies (Farrell, Hollands, Taylor and
Gamble, 1998 and Taylor., Farrell, and Hollands, 1998). I
thought I had uploaded copies of those papers to
Researchgate, but apparently I didn’t.

          Hope this helps, and is not too dense.



              Martin
                      In the usual

definitions, a protocol is (or specifies)
constraints to which a communicative
interaction must conform in order to be
perceived as such. Presupposed
metacommunication, if you will. Here are two
definitions (for diplomacy and for computer
intercommunication, respectively) from the
Random House Dictionary:

                        1.

the customs and regulations dealing with
diplomatic formality, precedence, and
etiquette.

[...]
                        7.

Computers. a set of rules governing the format
of messages that are exchanged between
computers.

                      Thus, the

Internet Protocol specifies a number of things
(such as IP addresses) to which communications
from one computer across the Internet to
another must comply.

                      You refer to

the baby’s initiating protocol and the
mother’s continuation protocol. The word here
seems to refer to parts of an instance of
communication rather than to the whole. Maybe
this is analogous to the definitions 2-5
elided above. They are:

                        2.

an original draft, minute, or record from
which a document, esp. a treaty, is prepared.

                        3.

a supplementary international agreement.

                        4.

an agreement between states.

                        5.

an annex to a treaty giving data relating to
it.

                      In these

cases, it’s not synecdoche–the part taken to
represent the whole–but rather the word for
the whole (‘protocol’) is used to refer to a
part. The analogy breaks down because these
are parts of a particular instance of
protocol-compliant communication (negotiation
of a treaty, etc.), and your terms initiating
protocol and continuation protocol are at a
higher level of generalization. An initiating
protocol is any observed behavior by party A
that is [intended to be] perceived by party B
as initiating an an exchange compliant with a
known protocol; and so on.

                      There are two

other dictionary definitions which I believe
are a bit too divergent to be relevant:

                        6.

Med. the plan for carrying out a scientific
study or a patient’s treatment regimen.

                        8.

Also called protocol statement, protocol
sentence, protocol proposition. Philos. a
statement reporting an observation or
experience in the most fundamental terms
without interpretation: sometimes taken as the
basis of empirical verification, as of
scientific laws.

/Bruce

                  On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at

1:49 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14]

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

                          ...Do we have anything that puts language

(textual) in the PCT framework? …

                      I do, but since it is a substantial part

(roughly 100 single-spaced pages out of 600 at
the moment) of the book I am writing, I don’t
think I can post it, though I might possibly
be able to provide drafts to individuals who
have the background and who would be prepared
to offer helpful comments. All the same, I
think it not unreasonable to post a small
section that is a sort of introduction to the
language part. Here is a PCT “just So Story”
about how a baby produces and mother learns a
first word.

                      The working title of the book is "*                            Powers of

Perceptual Control: a PCT enquiry into
Language, Culture, Power, and Politics* ",
pun intended. My LCS IV chapter is more on the
mechanism of protocols, and not really
relevant to the question. However, some of my
old Layered Protocol papers and chapters might
be relevant, since LPT is just a special case
of PCT invented before I knew of PCT. A few
are on researchgate.

                          Martin

Martin,

After a long time I’m glad to »hear« pure PCT. Superb explanation of PCT…

Boris

···

From: Martin Taylor [mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 17, 2017 6:18 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Natural language search

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.16.23.06]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.16.18:00 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14 –

It might be useful to have your definition of ‘protocol’, Martin.

Sorry. I take too much for granted. Since we had had a thread about protocols and layered protocols some time ago, and since I’ve been writing about them and discussing them for over 30 years, I forgot that many people still won’t know much, if anything, about them.

Very simply, my definition of a protocol is that it is a procedure whereby two people can discover what they can do to reduce error in a perception being controlled by another, and in the process reduce error in their own that is influenced by the actions of the other. As an example. Jane disturbs some perception John controls (e.g.his perception of Jane’s contentment) by saying “I’m cold. Could you shut the window”. I call that statement a “display” by Jane. It disturbs John’s perception of her contentment. He acts to bring that perception nearer its reference level by closing the window. The error in Jane’s temperature perception, and thus her comfort level perception, is thus reduced. She feels warmer.

I know that’s much to terse to be much help in describing the usual form of protocols. The main process is the discovery by both parties of what perception(s) each other is acting to control by influencing (the initiator by disturbing) a perception controlled by the other. Frequently the controlled perception is of the value(s) of perception(s) held by the other, in a type of protocol I label “Inform” or “Query”. I am the “continuer” in a “Query” protocol at this moment. I am also an initiator in an “Inform”, because I am doing more than just answering. I am acting to control a perception of your understanding of “protocol” that was disturbed by your query.

I don’t know how many major types of protocol should be distinguished. The process, however, is fairly well defined, at least for dyadic (between two persons) protocols. You can get a lot more detail in the two papers on the topic in the PCT Special Issue of Int ,J, Human-Computer Studies (Farrell, Hollands, Taylor and Gamble, 1998 and Taylor., Farrell, and Hollands, 1998). I thought I had uploaded copies of those papers to Researchgate, but apparently I didn’t.

Hope this helps, and is not too dense.

Martin

In the usual definitions, a protocol is (or specifies) constraints to which a communicative interaction must conform in order to be perceived as such. Presupposed metacommunication, if you will. Here are two definitions (for diplomacy and for computer intercommunication, respectively) from the Random House Dictionary:

            1. the customs and regulations dealing with diplomatic formality, precedence, and etiquette.

            [...]

            7. Computers. a set of rules governing the format of messages that are exchanged between computers.

Thus, the Internet Protocol specifies a number of things (such as IP addresses) to which communications from one computer across the Internet to another must comply.

You refer to the baby’s initiating protocol and the mother’s continuation protocol. The word here seems to refer to parts of an instance of communication rather than to the whole. Maybe this is analogous to the definitions 2-5 elided above. They are:

            2. an original draft, minute, or record from which a document, esp. a treaty, is prepared.

            3. a supplementary international agreement.

            4. an agreement between states.

            5. an annex to a treaty giving data relating to it.

In these cases, it’s not synecdoche–the part taken to represent the whole–but rather the word for the whole (‘protocol’) is used to refer to a part. The analogy breaks down because these are parts of a particular instance of protocol-compliant communication (negotiation of a treaty, etc.), and your terms initiating protocol and continuation protocol are at a higher level of generalization. An initiating protocol is any observed behavior by party A that is [intended to be] perceived by party B as initiating an an exchange compliant with a known protocol; and so on.

There are two other dictionary definitions which I believe are a bit too divergent to be relevant:

            6. Med. the plan for carrying out a scientific study or a patient's treatment regimen.

            8. Also called protocol statement, protocol sentence, protocol proposition. Philos. a statement reporting an observation or experience in the most fundamental terms without interpretation: sometimes taken as the basis of empirical verification, as of scientific laws.

/Bruce

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 1:49 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14]

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

…Do we have anything that puts language (textual) in the PCT framework? …

I do, but since it is a substantial part (roughly 100 single-spaced pages out of 600 at the moment) of the book I am writing, I don’t think I can post it, though I might possibly be able to provide drafts to individuals who have the background and who would be prepared to offer helpful comments. All the same, I think it not unreasonable to post a small section that is a sort of introduction to the language part. Here is a PCT “just So Story” about how a baby produces and mother learns a first word.
The working title of the book is “Powers of Perceptual Control: a PCT enquiry into Language, Culture, Power, and Politics”, pun intended. My LCS IV chapter is more on the mechanism of protocols, and not really relevant to the question. However, some of my old Layered Protocol papers and chapters might be relevant, since LPT is just a special case of PCT invented before I knew of PCT. A few are on researchgate.

Martin

Down

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, December 17, 2017 7:43 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Natural language search

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.17.1040)]

Bruce Nevin (2017.12.17.09:40 ET)

BN: So a protocol (in this sense) is a perception that is controlled collectively by all parties in the communication.

RM: Right. A “protocol” is a theoretical concept (defined in terms of a hybrid of PCT and reinforcement theory) in search of a phenomenon!

HB : Whenever you »open your mouth« you are outdoing yourself in stupidity.

RM earlier : In my rush to show that this is not the case I came up with what has to be the dumbest rebuttal of all time – outdoing even myself in stupidity;-)

HB : Martin gave a perfect description of PCT »protokol«, which I think is perfect match to Kents’ »collective control«.

And the best thing is that is not theoretical concept at all. You can try it anywhere in any life situation

RM earlier : But if one’s goal is to understand the behavior of living organisms, I would also recommend comparing the behavior of these working models to that of real organisms. This is something that has been sorely lacking in these discussions.

HB : So why you don’t start with real organisms and real life situations ???

Boris

It is a Sequence perception about the process of communication, and probably sometimes a Program perception. (The distinction between Sequence and Program is evident logically but perhaps not always so crisp in wetware.) As such, its inputs, in the canonical model, are Category perceptions. The mother-infant interaction in your just-so story posits the emergence of a collectively-controlled perception (the protocol) by ‘co-reorganization’ in the course of a social interaction.

On Sun, Dec 17, 2017 at 12:17 AM, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmt aylor.net> wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.16.23.06]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.16.18:00 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14 –

It might be useful to have your definition of ‘protocol’, Martin.

Sorry. I take too much for granted. Since we had had a thread about protocols and layered protocols some time ago, and since I’ve been writing about them and discussing them for over 30 years, I forgot that many people still won’t know much, if anything, about them.

Very simply, my definition of a protocol is that it is a procedure whereby two people can discover what they can do to reduce error in a perception being controlled by another, and in the process reduce error in their own that is influenced by the actions of the other. As an example. Jane disturbs some perception John controls (e.g.his perception of Jane’s contentment) by saying “I’m cold. Could you shut the window”. I call that statement a “display” by Jane. It disturbs John’s perception of her contentment. He acts to bring that perception nearer its reference level by closing the window. The error in Jane’s temperature perception, and thus her comfort level perception, is thus reduced. She feels warmer.

I know that’s much to terse to be much help in describing the usual form of protocols. The main process is the discovery by both parties of what perception(s) each other is acting to control by influencing (the initiator by disturbing) a perception controlled by the other. Frequently the controlled perception is of the value(s) of perception(s) held by the other, in a type of protocol I label “Inform” or “Query”. I am the “continuer” in a “Query” protocol at this moment. I am also an initiator in an “Inform”, because I am doing more than just answering. I am acting to control a perception of your understanding of “protocol” that was disturbed by your query.

I don’t know how many major types of protocol should be distinguished. The process, however, is fairly well defined, at least for dyadic (between two persons) protocols. You can get a lot more detail in the two papers on the topic in the PCT Special Issue of Int ,J, Human-Computer Studies (Farrell, Hollands, Taylor and Gamble, 1998 and Taylor., Farrell, and Hollands, 1998). I thought I had uploaded copies of those papers to Researchgate, but apparently I didn’t.

Hope this helps, and is not too dense.

Martin

In the usual definitions, a protocol is (or specifies) constraints to which a communicative interaction must conform in order to be perceived as such. Presupposed metacommunication, if you will. Here are two definitions (for diplomacy and for computer intercommunication, respectively) from the Random House Dictionary:

  1. the customs and regulations dealing with diplomatic formality, precedence, and etiquette.

[…]

  1. Computers. a set of rules governing the format of messages that are exchanged between computers.

Thus, the Internet Protocol specifies a number of things (such as IP addresses) to which communications from one computer across the Internet to another must comply.

You refer to the baby’s initiating protocol and the mother’s continuation protocol. The word here seems to refer to parts of an instance of communication rather than to the whole. Maybe this is analogous to the definitions 2-5 elided above. They are:

  1. an original draft, minute, or record from which a document, esp. a treaty, is prepared.
  1. a supplementary international agreement.
  1. an agreement between states.
  1. an annex to a treaty giving data relating to it.

In these cases, it’s not synecdoche–the part taken to represent the whole–but rather the word for the whole (‘protocol’) is used to refer to a part. The analogy breaks down because these are parts of a particular instance of protocol-compliant communication (negotiation of a treaty, etc.), and your terms initiating protocol and continuation protocol are at a higher level of generalization. An initiating protocol is any observed behavior by party A that is [intended to be] perceived by party B as initiating an an exchange compliant with a known protocol; and so on.

There are two other dictionary definitions which I believe are a bit too divergent to be relevant:

  1. Med. the plan for carrying out a scientific study or a patient’s treatment regimen.
  1. Also called protocol statement, protocol sentence, protocol proposition. Philos. a statement reporting an observation or experience in the most fundamental terms without interpretation: sometimes taken as the basis of empirical verification, as of scientific laws.

/Bruce

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 1:49 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.15.13.14]

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.12 09.30)]

…Do we have anything that puts language (textual) in the PCT framework? …

I do, but since it is a substantial part (roughly 100 single-spaced pages out of 600 at the moment) of the book I am writing, I don’t think I can post it, though I might possibly be able to provide drafts to individuals who have the background and who would be prepared to offer helpful comments. All the same, I think it not unreasonable to post a small section that is a sort of introduction to the language part. Here is a PCT “just So Story” about how a baby produces and mother learns a first word.
The working title of the book is “Powers of Perceptual Control: a PCT enquiry into Language, Culture, Power, and Politics”, pun intended. My LCS IV chapter is more on the mechanism of protocols, and not really relevant to the question. However, some of my old Layered Protocol papers and chapters might be relevant, since LPT is just a special case of PCT invented before I knew of PCT. A few are on researchgate.

Martin

Richard S. Marken

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