Nowhere else to go

CSGnet Archive CSG1998
1

[From Tim Carey (980509.0750)]

Hi Bill, and Rick, and Bruce,

I've been following this conversation with interest and I think I'm
following it. The thing I'm not getting fully, is the higher level
reference idea. I understand that the reference for one control system is
set by the output of a higher system and I understand the idea of conflict
that is crucial to MOL (that conflict can't be solved at the level it's
experienced), for me though this doesn't answer how we _choose_ one
reference over another.

What if I have to choose between references at a high level? Let's say I
have a great career opportunity by accepting a promotion by moving to
another state but my wife and kids won't go. Effectively, then I have to
choose between my career and my family. Does the higher level reference
argument still hold? Is choosing just the name given to a higher level
control system setting different references at a lower level?

Cheers,

Tim

2

[From Bill Powers (980608.20548 MDT)]

Tim Carey (980509.0750)--

What if I have to choose between references at a high level? Let's say I
have a great career opportunity by accepting a promotion by moving to
another state but my wife and kids won't go. Effectively, then I have to
choose between my career and my family. Does the higher level reference
argument still hold?

Either you're talking about the highest level of control in your brain, or
there's still another level which could reset the conflicting reference
signals. If it's the highest level, all you can do is reorganize, right?
"Agonize, then reorganize." If it's not the highest level, you may still
need to reorganize if you don't have a ready-made solution at the higher
level.

Is choosing just the name given to a higher level
control system setting different references at a lower level?

That meaning seems to cover a very large percentage of the cases, doesn't it?
Remember that there are many systems at each level.

Best,

Bill P.

3

[From Tim Carey (980509.1400)]

[From Bill Powers (980608.20548 MDT)]

That meaning seems to cover a very large percentage of the cases, doesn't

it?

Remember that there are many systems at each level.

Yep, thanks,

Tim

4

[From Bruce Gregory (980509.1003 EDT)]

Bill Powers (980608.20548 MDT)

Tim Carey (980509.0750)--

>What if I have to choose between references at a high level? Let's say I
>have a great career opportunity by accepting a promotion by moving to
>another state but my wife and kids won't go. Effectively, then I have to
>choose between my career and my family. Does the higher level reference
>argument still hold?

Either you're talking about the highest level of control in your brain, or
there's still another level which could reset the conflicting reference
signals. If it's the highest level, all you can do is reorganize, right?
"Agonize, then reorganize." If it's not the highest level, you may still
need to reorganize if you don't have a ready-made solution at the higher
level.

I'm beginning to appreciate Isaac's concerns about "I" and "you". What
reorganizes is the system rather than the awareness we usually associate
with "I". I know that you know this, but I sometimes get mentally sloppy.
"If it's the highest level, all the system can do is reorganize" for me
conveys the important message that all awareness can do is watch.

It seems to me that Tim's conflict only exists in his imagined future. _If_
he accepts the promotion _then_ he will have to act in ways that will
generate conflict. So he must be able to imagine the consequences of
accepting the promotion and to imagine the potential errors. Further he must
be able to compare the errors associated with accepting the promotion and
with declining the promotion. A control system for minimizing total system
error must then be able to set the reference level for "the promotion" in
such a way that he is either rejects or accepts the offer. The more equal
the imagined total system error associated with the two branches, the more
likely it would seem to be for the controller to oscillate.

Or is there a simpler model that covers this situation?

5

[From Bill Powers (980509.0824 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (980509.1003 EDT)--

Bill Powers (980608.20548 MDT)

Tim Carey (980509.0750)--

>What if I have to choose between references at a high level? Let's say I
>have a great career opportunity by accepting a promotion by moving to
>another state but my wife and kids won't go. Effectively, then I have to
>choose between my career and my family. Does the higher level reference
>argument still hold?

...

I'm beginning to appreciate Isaac's concerns about "I" and "you". What
reorganizes is the system rather than the awareness we usually associate
with "I". I know that you know this, but I sometimes get mentally sloppy.
"If it's the highest level, all the system can do is reorganize" for me
conveys the important message that all awareness can do is watch.

Right. But by watching, it seems to me that one ("one") does focus
reorganization on what is watched. As well as having other effects -- we
really do need some heavy research to find out the effects of conscious
attention on control processes.

It seems to me that Tim's conflict only exists in his imagined future. _If_
he accepts the promotion _then_ he will have to act in ways that will
generate conflict. So he must be able to imagine the consequences of
accepting the promotion and to imagine the potential errors. Further he must
be able to compare the errors associated with accepting the promotion and
with declining the promotion. A control system for minimizing total system
error must then be able to set the reference level for "the promotion" in
such a way that he is either rejects or accepts the offer. The more equal
the imagined total system error associated with the two branches, the more
likely it would seem to be for the controller to oscillate.

Or freeze. Yes, you're right, all this is taking place in the imagination
mode, because obviously you don't have to leave your wife or travel to
another city before you realize there's a conflict.

Notice, by the way, that what you imagine is a reference condition, and
thus a perception. The "world model" involved does not represent HOW you
will go about accepting the job or leaving your family; it's not a model of
"the plant" as Hans Blom would describe it, or the environmental feedback
function as we call it in PCT. It's really a model of perceptual
consequences of acting, without any specification of what acts would be
required to produce those perceptions. So you imagine, "All right, here I
am in Darwin, and oops, I'm a long way from my family in Perth and that
doesn't feel right." Or you imagine, "Here I am in my cozy house with my
nice family in Perth, but oops, there goes that great job in Darwin, to
somebody else." When you imagine, you imagine that the perceptions have
happened or are happening, but you don't have to bother with HOW you got
those perceptions to happen (how much is a plane ticket from Perth to
Darwin? Is my travel agent in his office today? What time do I have to be
at the airport? What should I pack? How does Ayers Rock look today?).

Best,

Bill P.

6

[From Tim Carey (980510.0655)]

[From Bill Powers (980509.0824 MDT)]

Or freeze. Yes, you're right, all this is taking place in the imagination
mode, because obviously you don't have to leave your wife or travel to
another city before you realize there's a conflict.

This is a great point, thanks Bruce and Bill. Is this the case for most
conflict do you think? That's it's the result of perceptual consequences
generated in imagination mode or can some conflict be "played out" in
actual experience? Does this change the model at all?

Would this apply to addictive kinds of behaviours like smoking or heavy
drinking? Do people experience conflict from say wanting to stop _at the
time_ they are engaging in the smoking or drinking?

Cheers,

Tim

7

i.kurtzer (980510.0300)

there has followed some prime samples of what this forum can reach towards with
the current interchange on the RTP/PCT contrast. There seems to me an
ever-awakening realization of such contrasts, as even with PCT and MOL ,
choosing another anacronism. I would suggest now to stick empirical sureites
as far as "da word of PCT", which is a _very_ small word cast by less than 100
pages, and not rely on what might stand in for this Type of knowledge by
"suggestions" ala individuals. Referring to book chapters is only the most
obvious corrallary of this amalgamistic tendancy. Too often I "hear"
suggestions that _all_ the problems that the life sciences face were due to an
ignorance of PCT, as with that esoterica about partial deriviatives and PCT
being the only honest epstimology. There are so many _unknowns_ that to cast a
book chapter as fact, simply since it is cooincident with an insight, is a
grave mistake. This is not to condone certain individuals' willingness to
revert to their Familiar, but a CALL TO TEST YOUR IDEAS, in the most
straightfoward, simple, and humble manner without restriction. If you call
yourself a scientist and do not proceed likewise, expect no ears from me at
least, though maybe a beer.

sloppliy as ever
i.

8

[From Bill Powers (980510.0426 MDT)]

Tim Carey (980510.0655)--

Is this the case for most
conflict do you think? That's it's the result of perceptual consequences
generated in imagination mode or can some conflict be "played out" in
actual experience? Does this change the model at all?

If all conflict were played out in the imagination mode, it wouldn't
interfere with acting, would it? And there'd be no such thing as conflict
between people.

What would this change about the model? Conflict theory is an _application_
of the PCT model.

Best,

Bill P.

9

[From Bruce Gregory (980510.1121 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980510.0750)

Conflict is _never_ the result of perceptual consequences -- real
or imagined. Conflict is the _existence of_ goals that require,
for their achievement, that one perceptual variable to be in two
different states at the same time, which is an impossibility.

Lacking perceptual consequences, how would we become aware of the existence
of these reference levels?

In
the example case, the goal of teaching at another school "conflicts
with" staying with the family because simultaneous achievement of
these two goals require that you be in (perceive yourself in) two
different places at the same time.

Isn't this a perceptual consequence?

The impossibility of achieving
both goals at the same time -- and, hence, the realization that you
have a conflict -- becomes obvious when you _imagine_ yourself
teaching at, say, Harvard and notice that your family is not there
or you imagine yourself with your family and notice that you are
not at Harvard.

I think this is the point we have been making.

Conflict is there, whether you imagine (or actually try) achieving
the incompatible goals or not. Imagination (which is surely what
people use in therapeutic situations) just lets you see that you
_do_ have goals that are in conflict (goals that require, for their
achievement, that the same perception be in two different states
at the same time).

Incompatible goals do not lead to conflict. Trying to realize incompatible
goals leads to conflict. You seem to blur the distinction between the world
and the way we model it.

Best Offer

10

[From Rick Marken (980510.0750)]

Bill Powers (980509.0824 MDT) --

Or freeze. Yes, you're right, all this is taking place in the
imagination mode, because obviously you don't have to leave your
wife or travel to another city before you realize there's a conflict.

Tim Carey (980510.0655) --

This is a great point, thanks Bruce and Bill. Is this the case
for most conflict do you think? That's it's the result of perceptual
consequences generated in imagination mode or can some conflict be
"played out" in actual experience?

Conflict is _never_ the result of perceptual consequences -- real
or imagined. Conflict is the _existence of_ goals that require,
for their achievement, that one perceptual variable to be in two
different states at the same time, which is an impossibility. In
the example case, the goal of teaching at another school "conflicts
with" staying with the family because simultaneous achievement of
these two goals require that you be in (perceive yourself in) two
different places at the same time. The impossibility of achieving
both goals at the same time -- and, hence, the realization that you
have a conflict -- becomse obvious when you _imagine_ yourself
teaching at, say, Harvard and notice that your family is not there
or you imagine yourself with your family and notice that you are
not at Harvard.

Conflict is there, whether you imagine (or actually try) achieving
the incompatible goals or not. Imagination (which is surely what
people use in theraputic situations) just lets you see that you
_do_ have goals that are in conflict (goals that require, for their
achievement, that the same perception be in two differnet states
at the same time).

Does this change the model at all?

Not at all. Conflict is always modeled in the same way; two (or
more) high level control systems trying to achieve their goals by
specifying different references for the same lower level perceptual
variable.

Would this apply to addictive kinds of behaviours like smoking
or heavy drinking? Do people experience conflict from say wanting
to stop _at the time_ they are engaging in the smoking or drinking?

Yes. You have this conflict when two control systems -- one
controlling for, say, the perception of feeling a certain level
of nicotine in the blood and the other controlling for the perception
of not coughing -- can achieve their goals only by specifying two
different references for the same percpetual variable (frequency of
inhaling, say).

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

11

[From Tim Carey (980511.0617)]

[From Rick Marken (980510.0750)]

Great post Rick. Thanks for the clarification.

Cheers,

Tim

12

[From Bruce Nevin (980510.2353 EDT)]

Bruce Gregory (980510.1121 EDT)

Incompatible goals do not lead to conflict. Trying to realize incompatible
goals leads to conflict. You seem to blur the distinction between the world
and the way we model it.

What is the status of goals that you are not trying to realize? How do you
model them?

  Bruce Nevin

13

[From Bruce Gregory (980511.0716 EDT)]

Bruce Nevin (980510.2353 EDT)

What is the status of goals that you are not trying to realize? How do you
model them?

With low loop gain.

Best Offer

14

[From Bruce Gregory (980511.1218 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980511.0820)

> You seem to blur the distinction between the world and the way
> we model it.

I don't understand this. Why does it seem that I am doing this?
I think I have a pretty good grasp of the distinction between my
world (which I know only as perceptions) and my model (which is
my imagined perception of the cause of my perceptions). What was
I blurring? I sure don't want to blur.

Since I find nothing to disagree with in your post, you are certainly not
blurring anything! I was clearly attributing views to you that you do not
hold.

Best Offer

15

[From Rick Marken (980511.0820)]

Me:

Conflict is _never_ the result of perceptual consequences -- real
or imagined. Conflict is the _existence of_ goals that require,
for their achievement, that one perceptual variable to be in two
different states at the same time, which is an impossibility.

Bruce Gregory (980510.1121 EDT)]

Lacking perceptual consequences, how would we become aware of the
existence of these reference levels?

We would not become _aware_ of the conflict without perceptual
consequences. So _awareness_ of a conflict does depend on perceptual
consequences. But the conflict _itself_ is not the result of
perceptual consequences.

Me:

In the example case, the goal of teaching at another school
"conflicts with" staying with the family because simultaneous
achievement of these two goals require that you be in (perceive
yourself in) two different places at the same time.

Ye:

Isn't this a perceptual consequence?

Yes. An imagined perceptual consequence. And by imagining these
consequences the person becomes _aware_ of the conflict. But this
conflict would exist even if the perceptual consequences were _not_
imagined. The conflict exists simply because the person has two
goals (teaching at location X and being with the family at location
Y) that are impossible to achieve simultaneously. These goals exist
as a potential conflict even if the person never imagines (or
experiences) incompatible perceptual consequences of achieving
these goals.

Incompatible goals do not lead to conflict. Trying to realize
incompatible goals leads to conflict.

I'll buy that. If one is not trying to achieve the incompatable
goals there is no possibility of conflict. But it's still the
_goals_ that determine the fact that there is a conflict, not
the perceptual consequences of acting to achieve the conflicted
goals. I say this because it is possible (and possibly _common_)
to have conflicting goals that don't "present" under most
circumstances. This is an "incipient" conflict; Freud's "unconscious"
conflict. It is incipient because circumstances have not required
that the conflicted systems set incompatible references for a lower
level perception. As long as there is no job offer from location X,
for example, there is no need to try to be in two places at the
same time. The conflicting goals (teaching at location X and being
with the family at location Y) still exists in the hierarchy, they
just are not causing any problems. And the conflict doesn't cause a
problem until the job offer comes in from location X. When the job
offer does come in, it will seem like this perception "caused" the
conflict; but the conflict was there all along.

You seem to blur the distinction between the world and the way
we model it.

I don't understand this. Why does it seem that I am doing this?
I think I have a pretty good grasp of the distinction between my
world (which I know only as perceptions) and my model (which is
my imagined perception of the cause of my perceptions). What was
I blurring? I sure don't want to blur.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken