p vs q.i.

MartinT · July 12, 2017, 8:10pm

[Martin Taylor 2017.07.12.16.03]

The following was an inadvertently private interchange between Bruce

Nevin and me. It was my fault. I updated my Mac from Snow Leopard to
El Capitan, which involved updating my Thunderbird mail client.
Turns out that the new version handles “reply” differently.
Previously, if I wanted to reply to a CSGnet message, I would click
on “reply”, whereas now that replies to the person who sent the
original message to CSGnet. I have to remember to click “reply list”
instead. So expect more inadvertent private replies until I get used
to the change.

Bruce has suggested I copy the whole interchange to CSGnet, which is

where I will try to make any further comment, if any.

Martin

(Attachment BasicControlDiagram2.jpg is missing)

···

On 2017/07/12 3:44 PM, Bruce Nevin
wrote:

      I had to look to see why my reply went only to

you. That was unexpected. Turns out, it was because the email
I replied to went only to me.

            Why do we need an
experimenter to also perceive the chair and its
location? Can we not sit because the chair is as there
as our sensors can allow us to perceive it, without
assistance?

          If you put the chair in

the diagram, you call it the CEV I think, which is not the
same as q.i., but all we can know of this CEV is my p and
your p, which latter (if you are the experimenter) = q.i.
These perceptual variables, p and q.i, or transforms of
them, are the only appropriate labels for that which is
really in the real environment. Labeling is an act of
perceptual control. This is not solipsism or denial of
reality, it is recognition of an essential limitation. A
difficult thing to carry through rigorously, but there it
is.

          It might be useful to

review Billʽs objections to Gibson saying the information
is in the environment.

          Unexpected house guests,

friends of Sarahʽs, and Sarah had seizures last night, so
I’m away for a bit. If you want to put this inadvertently
private exchange in the CSGnet public, feel free.

/Bruce

        On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 2:07 PM,

Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

Bruce,

              You sent this to me personally, so I am answering

personally.

              Question: When we are only discussing the variables
in a generic control loop, how does the concept of
“Experimenter” get involved?

              Observation: Since we do not assume solipsism, "it's
all perception" is false. That statement presupposes
solipsism and the absence of a “real world” out there.
No matter how little of the “Real World” (RW) we know
or can know, it is the RW that determines what we
could possible perceive using only our sensory inputs.
We may incorporate imagination into what we perceive,
but it is the effectiveness of control through the RW
that determines whether we live or die. The less
imagination enters into our perceptions, the more
precisely we are potentially able to control by acting
on the RW. A better version of “it’s all perception”
might be “All we can know is what we perceive.” That’s
the way Bill P put it, and I like that way of thinking
about it.

              I have an aphorism "The Perceptual Function proposes;
the Real World disposes." The inputs to the sensors
limit what the perceptual functions (PFs) can propose
to exist in the RW, and the PFs can be any function at
all. But if the perceptual signal produced by a PF is
not controllable by actions on the RW that our
effectors are capable of, to create that perceptual
signal is actively detrimental to our overall
wellbeing, as it is a waste of energy and neural
real-estate. The same is true if controlling that
perception does nothing to improve our wellbeing in
the longer term. If we believe that part of PCT,
reorganization will eliminate such PFs over time,
leaving those that produce perceptions that correspond
to aspects of the RW through which we can control
those perceptions to survive.

              For example, by controlling a perception of the
location of a chair, using our muscles, we can create
a situation in which the unknowable RW will allow us
to perceive ourselves sitting where we want to sit.
The property “location” of the perceive entity “chair”
may not exist as such in the RW, but the RW allows us
to act as though it does, which is all we can ask of
it. We perceive something of the RW as “a chair” and
we perceive something of the RW as “the location of
the chair”. If the RW is different, we don’t perceive
the chair, and must go to look for it. The RW
disposes, no matter what we want to perceive.

              Why do we need an experimenter to also perceive the
chair and its location? Can we not sit because the
chair is as there as our sensors can allow us to
perceive it, without assistance?

Martin

                  On
2017/07/12 9:03 AM, Bruce Nevin wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.07.12.9:00 ET)]

                      Martin Taylor

2017.07.11.22.52 –

MMT> But if a function
of environmental variables is not an
environmental variable, it takes an awful
lot of fancy verbal footwork to explain
how that can be.

                        All it takes
is the understanding that “it’s all
perception”. Really understanding that and
staying with it does indeed take some fancy
footwork with our customary language uses
embodying our customary assumption that our
perceptions are the realities that we
perceive. That’s where much of the argument
on CSG-net arises, quarreling as to whether
we got the footwork right or missed a step.

                          MMT>
Now you interpret Rick as saying that
there are two different perceptual
variables. Where do these two variables
appear in the canonical control loop
diagram?

                        The
perceptual variable p appears where
expected. The perceptual variable q.i cannot
be represented as a perceptual variable in
the experimenter unless the experimenter is
included in the diagram. In the canonical
diagram, the maker of the diagram
(identifying with the experimenter) projects
q.i into the environment, just as we all
project our perceptions and experience them
as being really the realities in the
environment.

/Bruce

                      On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at
11:11 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.07.11.22.52]

                                [Bruce Nevin

(2017.07.11.21:57 ET)]

                                    Martin

Taylor 2017.07.11.13.00 –

                                    Rick
not say say that q.i is not a
variable. He said it is not an
environmental variable.
Elsewhere, he said that p and
q.i are both perceptual
variables.

                          I guess that you are formally
correct. But if a function of
environmental variables is not an
environmental variable, it takes an awful
lot of fancy verbal footwork to explain
how that can be. I guess it’s true of a
perception that depends only on
environmental variables, but in that case
the processing involved is
straightforwardly depicted in the standard
control diagram. Now you interpret Rick as
saying that there are two different
perceptual variables. Where do these two
variables appear in the canonical control
loop diagram?
                          As I read Rick, his "difficult concept" is
that qi is determined by the same
Perceptual Function as p, and therefore is
p. That being the case, why use two labels
for the same variable? And that being the
case, what label should we use in place of
the “qi” that has over quite a long
history until very recently been used for
the result of adding the disturbance to
the output to produce the input to the
perceptual function in the canonical
control loop (“s” in the labelling of this
diagram)?
                              Martin
/Bruce

                                  On Tue, Jul

11, 2017 at 1:19 PM, Martin Taylor
mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

                                        [Martin Taylor

2017.07.11.13.00]

                                          [From Rick
Marken (2017.07.11.0930)]
RM: The
problem, I
believe, is that
in diagrams such
as the one below,
it is not made
clear that q.i (or
Q.i) is actually a
                                                   function of
environmental
variables*
and not an
environmental
variable itself.
That is, p is not
a function of q.i;
both p and q.i are
the same function
of environmental
variables; * q.i
is p from the
observer’s
perspective*.

...

                                      I guess this is another of
Rick’s New Math principles,
like the principle that the
shape of a curve depends on
how fast points on it move
about when you look at it. Or
the logic principle presented
in the “Perceptual Cartoon”
thread that if a mother has
two sons, neither son has a
mother.
                                      Today's New Math principle
(not new today, though) is
that if x = f(v1, v2, …)
where v1, v2,… are
variables, then by definition
of “variable” x is NOT a
variable. I don’t know what x
is in this New Math, but Rick
has been very clear, today and
in the past, that whatever it
is, it is not a variable.

…

                                                  RM: I know this
is a tough concept
to get. It’s
probably important
only for
researchers to get
it. But it can’t
hurt for
non-researchers to
get it as well.

                                      Why don't you publish your new
“Elements of New Math” book,
because New Math certainly
incorporates a lot of “tough
concepts to get.” An
exposition, like Euclid’s
“Elements” from first
principles, might make life
easier for those of use who
were brought up with the
old-fashioned maths used by
the rest of the world.
                                          Martin