p vs q.i.

[_Boris_Hartman]

Down…

···

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2017 4:06 AM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: p vs q.i.

[Bruce Nevin (2017.07.11.22:00 ET)]

RM: Actually, I said that q.i is not an *environmental *variable. It is certainly a variable – a variable aspect of the environment that is controlled as a perceptual signal (also a variable) in a control system.

Saying “variable aspect of the environment” is what makes it sound like you are saying that q.i is in the environment.

More carefully yet, you might say “It is certainly a variable, a perceptual variable. It is a perception of that which perceptual evidence tells us is a variable aspect of the environment. It is controlled as a perceptual signal (also a variable) in two control systems: as the perceptual variable p in the subject and as the perceptual variable q.i in the experimenter.”

HB : You are contradicting yourself Bruce N. and to PCT model. There is no different perceptual signals in the sense that they are labeled differently (p, q.i.). You said it for yourself which are »lables« that make different perceptual signals (p₁ and p₂). In PCT Control works in all LCS the same so go and see where q.i. is in the PCT diagram (LCS III).

But if you are not talking about PCT and you are using your own model, then you could maybe suggest changes in PCT model. Â

HB : Well, well things are always complicating as usual when somebody is not listening to Powers couple. Why using your BNCT model if you have perfect PCT model ???

Boris

On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.1300)]

Martin Taylor (2017.07.11.13.00) –

RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is actually a function of environmental variables and not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of environmental variables; q.i is p from the observer’s perspective.

MT: Today’s New Math principle (not new today, though) is that if x = f(v1, v2, …) where v1, v2,… are variables, then by definition of “variable” x is NOT a variable. I don’t know what x is in this New Math, but Rick has been very clear, today and in the past, that whatever it is, it is not a variable.

RM: Actually, I said that q.i is not an environmental variable. It is certainly a variable – a variable aspect of the environment that is controlled as a perceptual signal (also a variable) in a control system.

RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It’s probably important only for researchers to get it. But it can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.

MT: Why don’t you publish your new “Elements of New Math” book, because New Math certainly incorporates a lot of “tough concepts to get.” An exposition, like Euclid’s “Elements” from first principles, might make life easier for those of use who were brought up with the old-fashioned maths used by the rest of the world.

RM: And you were chiding me for the disturbing “tone” of CSGNet?

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[_Boris_Hartman]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.1045)

Bruce Nevin (2017.07.10.11:53 ET)

BN: We do not experience perceptual signals as signals.

RM: Yes. I think this is part of the difficulty people have with understanding the concept of perception.

HB : It’s not part of the principle that people have to understand but part of the principle that people have to forget so that they could understand PCT.

In the PCT model of people perceptions exist only as perceptual signals. In the people modeled (including the people doing the modeling) perceptions exist only as experiences. In the PCT model the nature of the perception that is experienced – whether what is experienced is a picture of a young or old woman, for example – is defined by the nature of the perceptual functions (f.y() or f.o(), for example) that transform environmental variables (or the sensory effects thereof) into perceptual signals (p.y and p.o, for example). Why those perceptual signals, which are simply trains of neural impulses, are experienced the way they are – as a lovely young woman or an old hag – is a mystery; I believe it’s called the “hard problem” of consciousness. My personal solution to this hard problem is that perceptual signals are experienced the way they are because that’s the way afferent neural signals are experienced when you are the afferent neural signals (and you are also the neural networks that produce them). Not very satisfying, I know, but fortunately I don’t think we have to solve this problem in order to understand purposeful behavior in terms of PCT.

HB : This is exactly what you’ll have to do if you’ll wnat to understand »purposefull behavior«. Bill started in B: CP and we’ll have to finnish it. I hope you’ll beo f any use.

BN: I have understood that q.i is a quantity that is determined by the experimenter controlling perceptions of measuring or counting some measurable or countable aspect of the perceived environment.

RM: Yes, pretty close;

HB : It’s clearly written what is i.q. in Bills’ diagram. You just have to read right. Why imagining things.

RM : I see q.i as a perception computed (or experienced) by the experimenter that corresponds to the perception, p, controlled by the control system.

HB : Again read what i.q. is in PCT.

RM : So in a tracking task q.i is computed by the experimenter as variations in the distance between cursor and target (t-c); q.i can also be experienced by the experimenter as the observed variations in the distance between the cursor and target.

HB : There is no »control of distance« in PCT. There is no »controlled variables« in environment. Nothing can be computed in environment. I.Q is not just perception of the target and cursor and distance between them, but is something more. Read carefully what PCT diagram says about i.q.

BN: But I believe that Rick is here using q.i metaphorically so as to include cases where no quantification occurs.

HB : It would be good if it would be so.

RM: No, as I said above, q.i can refer to a quantified measure of the variable the controller is controlling or to an experience of the variable the controller is controlling. In the tracking task q.i is typically a quantified variable, like t-c. In the “coin game” q.i is an experience (of an “N” pattern in the example in B;CP, for example)

BN: Quantification is easiest with perceptions at the lower levels of the hierarchy, up to simple Relationship perceptions. In most matters of broad and general interest (such as your interest in organizational psychology and management) and in many specialized fields (such as my interest in language and culture) quantification of q.i is often very difficult and may not be possible.

RM: A good point. In this case we must rely on the human experimenter’s perceptual system to “compute” the q.i’s that corresponds to these very complex kinds of perceptions, p’s, that are being controlled. But I think we can quantify perceptions that are more complex than relationships. I’ve done studies where I have quantified control of sequences and programs, for example. I don’t think we have to bring the human perceptual system into it until we get to perceptions like principles and system concepts.

HB : When you’ll finish it, please inform us. But it would be good if you are not exposing your »work« until it is finnished.

Boris.

Best

Rick

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 7:46 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: p vs q.i.

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[_Boris_Hartman]

Down….

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 6:32 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: p vs q.i.

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.0930)]

Fred Nickols (2017.07.10.0953)–

Rick: More about p vs q.i. See the diagram below.

FN: If q.i. is the cartoon, my perception of that cartoon, whether as a young or an old woman and whether of a duck or a rabbit.

RM: I think you are saying that p is your perception of the cartoon, and that the cartoon on the page is q.i. But the cartoon is actually just points of varying luminance on the page; these are the environmental variables, which I referred to in previous posts as the variables x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n. Your perception of those lines as a young or old woman is a function of these environmental variables. Your perception of the young woman, call it p.y, is thus

p.y = f.y(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.y is the neural network in your visual system that results in your seeing in those varying points of luminance, the x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n, a young woman, p.y. Your perception of the old woman, p.o, is:

p.o = f.o(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.o is a different neural network in your visual system that results in your seeing those same luminance variations on the page as an old woman, p.o.

RM: Note that there is no q.i out there in the environment to perceive. Your perceptions, p.y and p.o, are of the environmental variables, x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n, not of q.i; q.i is a symbol that represents the perception in an observer that corresponds to the perception you are experiencing (and, possibly, controlling).

FN: If there is an observer, that observer also happens to be a “living control systemâ€? and so the cartoon is also the observer’s q.i. and the observer has his or her own p or perception of the cartoon.

RM: No, q.i is not something to be perceived by the observer; q.i is the observer’s perception that corresponds to the perception, p, in another person (you in this case). So if I am considered the observer, then my perception of the young and old woman in the lines of the cartoon could be called q.y and q.o and they correspond to your p.y and p.o. That is

q.y = f.y(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

and

q.o = f.o(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.y and f.o now refer to neural networks in my nervous system that correspond to the same neural networks in yours that produce the corresponding perceptions, q.y and q.o, in me, that correspond to the perceptions p.y and p.o in you.

FN: Do I have that right?

RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is actually a function of environmental variables and not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of environmental variables; q.i is p from the observer’s perspective.

RM: A better way to diagram the situation is the way Bill did it in Figure 1 of his 1973 Science paper; the Figure can be found on p. 66 of LCS. In that Figure q.i (which is called the Input Quantity in that Figure) is more clearly represented as a function of environmental variables, which are symbolized with v’s rather than x’s.

RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It’s probably important only for researchers to get it. But it can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.

HB : It’s not tough concept, it’s tough concept for you maybe, because you are complicating as usuall to »hide« product of your imagination.

Best

Rick

The attached visual was created with SmartDraw, The World’s First Visual Processor™

<

To edit this file, download a free SmartDraw trial at www.smartdraw.com

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Knowledge Worker

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.07.10.11:53 ET)]

I applaud Rick for working to state clearly concepts and relationships that do not easily fit into our accustomed ways of perceiving, thinking, and talking.

What Rick is saying (2017.07.08.1200) is that the three variables p, q.i, and the state of a perceived aspect of the environment (as represented by those two variables), all three co-vary, including their co-variation in the face of disturbances (a second controlled variable in the TCV).Â

Is there a distinction between ‘perceptual variable’ and ‘perceptual signal’, and a distinction between ‘perceptual signal’ and ‘experienced perception’? Let’s see.Â

Perceptual variables are functions of the sensory effects of the physical variables that are presumed to make up the external “environment”.Â

This may also be said of a perceptual signal p.

a “perceptual state” [is] what we experience as the state of a variable aspect of the external environment’’

So here ‘perceptual state’ is distinguished from ‘perceptual signal’ by identifying it with ‘experienced perception’. We do not experience perceptual signals as signals. The relation between rates of firing and experiences remains unaccounted for. Maybe Rick disregards any distinction between p and the associated experience of a perception. Little choice on those usual occasions when the experience of a perception is all that we know of the postulated rate of firing p. But what follows shows that no such distinction is relevant here.

So “perceptual state” actually refers to the state of a variable that corresponds to an aspect of the external environment that is under control. This perceptual variable  is called the “controlled variable” or “controlled quantity” and is typically represented by the symbol q.i or Q.i.Â

Here, ‘perceptual state’ is identified with the experimenter’s perception, since

both [q.i and p] are perceptual variables, q.i being the observer’s perception that corresponds to the controlled variable …Â

I have understood that q.i is a quantity that is determined by the experimenter controlling perceptions of measuring or counting some measurable or countable aspect of the perceived environment. Without quantification by measuring or counting, it is unclear how one might craft a generative model or simulation of the observed behavior. q.i is thus a function of the experimenter’s control of measuring or counting perceptions. Since the subject is ordinarily not controlling perceptions of measuring or counting, but rather is controlling perception(s) of that which the experimenter is measuring or counting, it may not be obvious what relation obtains between the perceptual signal p in the subject and the perceptual signal p=q.i in the experimenter. Or, if you wish, between their respective experiences resulting from those perceptual signals.

But I believe that Rick is here using q.i metaphorically so as to include cases where no quantification occurs. Quantification is easiest with perceptions at the lower levels of the hierarchy, up to simple Relationship perceptions. In most matters of broad and general interest (such as your interest in organizational psychology and management) and in many specialized fields (such as my interest in language and culture) quantification of q.i is often very difficult and may not be possible. “Not all that counts can be counted.” We are relegated to working with q.i as an experienced perception rather than as a number series for which we can postulate a correlation to a numerical rate of firing at some level of the hierarchy. We assume that the rate of firing entering a “duck” recognizer increases as more lifelike detail is added to the depiction and diminishes as we revert to a shadow of hands projected onto a wall (in a cartoon!).

In your diagram, Fred, q.i is shown in the environment. This is because the other control system, the experimenter, is not shown. q.i is a perceptual signal (and an experienced perception) in the experimenter. There’s no more justification for putting q.i in the environment than there is for putting p in the environment. p and q.i are all that is known about the CV in the environment, but they are not identical to it. The subjective projection of p and q.i into the environment is an important part of the experience of a perception that is associated with p or with q.i.

The perceptual signal is a theoretical variable that corresponds to variations in the perceptual variable – the controlled variable – in the control system under study and is typically represented by the symbol p. So q.i is the controlled variable from the point of view of an observer of the control system an p is the same controlled variable from the point of view of the system controlling q.i.

Here, it sounds like p and q.i are distinguished from the perceptual variable=the controlled variable. But no:

both [q.i and p] are perceptual variables, q.i being the observer’s perception that corresponds to the controlled variable … and p being behaving system’s perception that corresponds to the same variable… Since q.i  and p are the same variable from different perspectives, they can both be said to be controlled.

Returning now to Rick’s opening paragraph:

While Bill did define “control” in B:CP as achievement and maintenance of a “perceptual state” he was careful not to define it as achievement and maintenance of a “perceptual signal”.Â

Given the above, why was Bill careful not to define control as achievement and maintenance of the state of a “perceptual signal”? How is ‘perceptual state’ different from ‘state of a perception’, and how is that different from ‘state of a perceptual signal’?

I don’t blame you for confusion, Fred. It’s not easy to be clear about these things. I applaud Rick for taking the proverbial bull by the horns and working to state clearly concepts and relationships that do not easily fit into our accustomed ways of perceiving, thinking, and talking. Seems to me, more work is needed.

···

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2017.07.10.0953)]

Â

Rick: More about p vs q.i. See the diagram below.

Â

If q.i. is the cartoon, my perception of that cartoon, whether as a young or an old woman and whether of a duck or a rabbit.

Â

If there is an observer, that observer also happens to be a “living control system� and so the cartoon is also the observer’s q.i. and the observer has his or her own p or perception of the cartoon.

Â

Do I have that right?

Â

Â

The attached visual was created with SmartDraw, The World’s First Visual Processor™

To edit this file, download a free SmartDraw trial at www.smartdraw.com

Â

Â

Regards,

Â

Fred Nickols

Knowledge Worker

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

Â

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.07.11.21:57 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.07.11.13.00 –

Rick not say say that q.i is not a variable. He said it is not an environmental variable. Elsewhere, he said that p and q.i are both perceptual variables.

···

On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 1:19 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.07.11.13.00]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.0930)]

I guess this is another of Rick's New Math principles, like the

principle that the shape of a curve depends on how fast points on it
move about when you look at it. Or the logic principle presented in
the “Perceptual Cartoon” thread that if a mother has two sons,
neither son has a mother.

Today's New Math principle (not new today, though) is that if x =

f(v1, v2, …) where v1, v2,… are variables, then by definition of
“variable” x is NOT a variable. I don’t know what x is in this New
Math, but Rick has been very clear, today and in the past, that
whatever it is, it is not a variable.

Why don't you publish your new "Elements of New Math" book, because

New Math certainly incorporates a lot of “tough concepts to get.” An
exposition, like Euclid’s “Elements” from first principles, might
make life easier for those of use who were brought up with the
old-fashioned maths used by the rest of the world.

Martin

        ...
          RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as

the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is
actually a function of environmental variables and
not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a
function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of
environmental variables; * q.i is p from the observer’s
perspective*.

…

          RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It's

probably important only for researchers to get it. But it
can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.07.11.22:00 ET)]

RM: Actually, I said that q.i is not an *environmental *variable. It is certainly a variable – a variable aspect of the environment that is controlled as a perceptual signal (also a variable) in a control system.

Saying “variable aspect of the environment” is what makes it sound like you are saying that q.i is in the environment.

More carefully yet, you might say “It is certainly a variable, a perceptual variable. It is a perception of that which perceptual evidence tells us is a variable aspect of the environment. It is controlled as a perceptual signal (also a variable) in two control systems: as the perceptual variable p in the subject and as the perceptual variable q.i in the experimenter.”

···

On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.1300)]

Martin Taylor (2017.07.11.13.00) –

MT: Today's New Math principle (not new today, though) is that if x =

f(v1, v2, …) where v1, v2,… are variables, then by definition of
“variable” x is NOT a variable. I don’t know what x is in this New
Math, but Rick has been very clear, today and in the past, that
whatever it is, it is not a variable.

RM: Actually, I said that q.i is not an environmental variable. It is certainly a variable – a variable aspect of the environment that is controlled as a perceptual signal (also a variable) in a control system.

MT: Why don't you publish your new "Elements of New Math" book, because

New Math certainly incorporates a lot of “tough concepts to get.” An
exposition, like Euclid’s “Elements” from first principles, might
make life easier for those of use who were brought up with the
old-fashioned maths used by the rest of the world.

Â

RM: And you were chiding me for the disturbing “tone” of CSGNet?Â

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as

the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is
actually a function of environmental variables and
not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a
function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of
environmental variables; * q.i is p from the observer’s
perspective*.Â

          RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It's

probably important only for researchers to get it. But it
can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.Â

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.07.13.12:28 ET)]

From Rick Marken (2017.07.12.1730) –

 At what point are the two functions different? I assume the standard proposal about the levels. The perception of the distribution of perceptions of light and dark points on the perception of the page is the same up through Sensations to the level where the contours of edges are made into the Configuration of a young woman in one input function or the Configuration of an old woman in another input function. The function is a combination of Intensity input functions (the same for both), Sensation input functions (the same for both), and Configuration input functions. The Configuration input functions are where they differ.

We assume that the page, the light and dark points, and their distribution on the page are really there in the environment, and there is plenty of evidence (present and remembered perceptions) to support that assumption. Breaking the configurations into constituent configurations, we might even insist in a Gibsonian way that e.g. a kind of rounded arrowhead contour pointing down and to the left  is really there in the environment, an affordance waiting to be perceived, but --to your point–even with that assumption it is clear that whether that contour constitutes a nose facing left or a chin and jaw facing away is in the eye and mind of the beholder.

···

Bruce Nevin (2017.07.11.22:00 ET)

BN: Saying “variable aspect of the environment” is what makes it sound like you are saying that q.i is in the environment.

RM: I don’t think this is a problem that can be solved by trying to find clearer ways of saying it. I think the best way to get this across is with a demonstration. The ambiguous figure seems like a pretty clear demonstration of the fact that an aspect of the environment is not “in” the environment. […]Â two different aspects of the environment – young and old woman – are based on exactly the same environmental variables – the distribution of dark and light points on the page. […]Â the two different aspects of the environment that you can experience must be different functions of the same environmental variables – the spatial variations in the darkness of the points.Â

BN> The two women, the old and the young, are not aspects of the environment, they are perceptions. The ambiguity demonstrates that only one of them can be claimed to be in the environment, and (as we switch back and forth from perceiving one or the other) the ambiguity also demonstrates that neither can be claimed to be in the environment. If like Martin I see a deceased friend in the crowd my deceased friend is not an aspect of the environment.

BN> But you are not saying that the two female images are in the environment. You are saying that the perception of one or the other is a function of aspects of the environment. The perception of the old woman is a function of various pixels of luminance in the environment, and the perception of the young woman is a different function of the same various pixels of luminance in the environment. The two functions are in our heads, not in the environment. And the two perceptions that result are in our head, not in the environment. The pixels of luminance are certainly on the retinas of the eyes. Are they in the environment? Let me see …

On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 8:30 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.12.1730)]

Bruce Nevin (2017.07.11.22:00 ET)

BN: Saying “variable aspect of the environment” is what makes it sound like you are saying that q.i is in the environment.

RM: I don’t think this is a problem that can be solved by trying to find clearer ways of saying it. I think the best way to get this across is with a demonstration. The ambiguous figure seems like a pretty clear demonstration of the fact that an aspect of the environment is not “in” the environment.Â

RM: In the ambiguous figure I posted, two different aspects of the environment – young and old woman – are based on exactly the same environmental variables – the distribution of dark and light points on the page. These two aspects of the environment – the young and old woman --can’t both be “in” the environment since there is only one thing “in” the environment – the distribution of light and dark points.

RM: Â In fact, the two different aspects of the environment that you can experience must be different functions of the same environmental variables – the spatial variations in the darkness of the points. The young and old woman exist only as states of perceptual variables, not as states of environmental variables. There is no young or old woman out there in the environment to be perceived; your perceptual system constructs these two different aspects of the environment from the exact same raw material – the distribution of light and dark points on the page.

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2017.07.10.0953)]

Rick: More about p vs q.i. See the diagram below.

If q.i. is the cartoon, my perception of that cartoon, whether as a young or an old woman and whether of a duck or a rabbit.

If there is an observer, that observer also happens to be a “living control system” and so the cartoon is also the observer’s q.i. and the observer has his or her own p or perception of the cartoon.

Do I have that right?

The attached visual was created with SmartDraw, The World’s First Visual Processor™

To edit this file, download a free SmartDraw trial at www.smartdraw.com

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Knowledge Worker

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

PCT Formal Model1.SDR (62.1 KB)

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2017.07.11.1318 ET)]

Gee whillikers! I think I get it. Thanks for being patient.

Fred

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 12:32 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: p vs q.i.

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.0930)]

Fred Nickols (2017.07.10.0953)–

Rick: More about p vs q.i. See the diagram below.

FN: If q.i. is the cartoon, my perception of that cartoon, whether as a young or an old woman and whether of a duck or a rabbit.

RM: I think you are saying that p is your perception of the cartoon, and that the cartoon on the page is q.i. But the cartoon is actually just points of varying luminance on the page; these are the environmental variables, which I referred to in previous posts as the variables x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n. Your perception of those lines as a young or old woman is a function of these environmental variables. Your perception of the young woman, call it p.y, is thus

p.y = f.y(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.y is the neural network in your visual system that results in your seeing in those varying points of luminance, the x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n, a young woman, p.y. Your perception of the old woman, p.o, is:

p.o = f.o(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.o is a different neural network in your visual system that results in your seeing those same luminance variations on the page as an old woman, p.o.

RM: Note that there is no q.i out there in the environment to perceive. Your perceptions, p.y and p.o, are of the environmental variables, x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n, not of q.i; q.i is a symbol that represents the perception in an observer that corresponds to the perception you are experiencing (and, possibly, controlling).

FN: If there is an observer, that observer also happens to be a “living control system� and so the cartoon is also the observer’s q.i. and the observer has his or her own p or perception of the cartoon.

RM: No, q.i is not something to be perceived by the observer; q.i is the observer’s perception that corresponds to the perception, p, in another person (you in this case). So if I am considered the observer, then my perception of the young and old woman in the lines of the cartoon could be called q.y and q.o and they correspond to your p.y and p.o. That is

q.y = f.y(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

and

q.o = f.o(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.y and f.o now refer to neural networks in my nervous system that correspond to the same neural networks in yours that produce the corresponding perceptions, q.y and q.o, in me, that correspond to the perceptions p.y and p.o in you.

FN: Do I have that right?

RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is actually a function of environmental variables and not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of environmental variables; q.i is p from the observer’s perspective.

RM: A better way to diagram the situation is the way Bill did it in Figure 1 of his 1973 Science paper; the Figure can be found on p. 66 of LCS. In that Figure q.i (which is called the Input Quantity in that Figure) is more clearly represented as a function of environmental variables, which are symbolized with v’s rather than x’s.

RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It’s probably important only for researchers to get it. But it can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.

Best

Rick

The attached visual was created with SmartDraw, The World’s First Visual Processor™

To edit this file, download a free SmartDraw trial at www.smartdraw.com

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Knowledge Worker

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2017.07.11.1347 ET)]

Oh, drat! I guess I didn’t get it after all. Darn!

Fred

···

From: Martin Taylor [mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net]
Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 1:19 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: p vs q.i.

[Martin Taylor 2017.07.11.13.00]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.0930)]

…

RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is actually a function of environmental variables and not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of environmental variables; q.i is p from the observer’s perspective.

I guess this is another of Rick’s New Math principles, like the principle that the shape of a curve depends on how fast points on it move about when you look at it. Or the logic principle presented in the “Perceptual Cartoon” thread that if a mother has two sons, neither son has a mother.

Today’s New Math principle (not new today, though) is that if x = f(v1, v2, …) where v1, v2,… are variables, then by definition of “variable” x is NOT a variable. I don’t know what x is in this New Math, but Rick has been very clear, today and in the past, that whatever it is, it is not a variable.

…

RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It’s probably important only for researchers to get it. But it can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.

Why don’t you publish your new “Elements of New Math” book, because New Math certainly incorporates a lot of “tough concepts to get.” An exposition, like Euclid’s “Elements” from first principles, might make life easier for those of use who were brought up with the old-fashioned maths used by the rest of the world.

Martin

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2017.07.11.1410 ET)]

Regarding your last comment in your email below (reproduced immediately below for brevity’s sake):

RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It’s probably important only for researchers to get it. But it can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.

What is beginning to emerge in my mind ties to your use of the word “experiences.â€? I get that what I experience takes the form of perceptual signals. I also get that my experience of the cartoon is mine, not yours.Â

It seems to me that it is perhaps more useful for me to think about my behavior as serving to align what I experience with what I want to experience than talking about the alignment between a theoretical perceptual signal and an equally theoretically reference signal.

That leads me to B:CE. Behavior: The Control of Experience.

What say you, Rick?

Fred

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 12:32 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: p vs q.i.

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.0930)]

Fred Nickols (2017.07.10.0953)–

Rick: More about p vs q.i. See the diagram below.

FN: If q.i. is the cartoon, my perception of that cartoon, whether as a young or an old woman and whether of a duck or a rabbit.

RM: I think you are saying that p is your perception of the cartoon, and that the cartoon on the page is q.i. But the cartoon is actually just points of varying luminance on the page; these are the environmental variables, which I referred to in previous posts as the variables x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n. Your perception of those lines as a young or old woman is a function of these environmental variables. Your perception of the young woman, call it p.y, is thus

p.y = f.y(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.y is the neural network in your visual system that results in your seeing in those varying points of luminance, the x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n, a young woman, p.y. Your perception of the old woman, p.o, is:

p.o = f.o(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.o is a different neural network in your visual system that results in your seeing those same luminance variations on the page as an old woman, p.o.

RM: Note that there is no q.i out there in the environment to perceive. Your perceptions, p.y and p.o, are of the environmental variables, x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n, not of q.i; q.i is a symbol that represents the perception in an observer that corresponds to the perception you are experiencing (and, possibly, controlling).

FN: If there is an observer, that observer also happens to be a “living control system� and so the cartoon is also the observer’s q.i. and the observer has his or her own p or perception of the cartoon.

RM: No, q.i is not something to be perceived by the observer; q.i is the observer’s perception that corresponds to the perception, p, in another person (you in this case). So if I am considered the observer, then my perception of the young and old woman in the lines of the cartoon could be called q.y and q.o and they correspond to your p.y and p.o. That is

q.y = f.y(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

and

q.o = f.o(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)

where f.y and f.o now refer to neural networks in my nervous system that correspond to the same neural networks in yours that produce the corresponding perceptions, q.y and q.o, in me, that correspond to the perceptions p.y and p.o in you.

FN: Do I have that right?

RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is actually a function of environmental variables and not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of environmental variables; q.i is p from the observer’s perspective.

RM: A better way to diagram the situation is the way Bill did it in Figure 1 of his 1973 Science paper; the Figure can be found on p. 66 of LCS. In that Figure q.i (which is called the Input Quantity in that Figure) is more clearly represented as a function of environmental variables, which are symbolized with v’s rather than x’s.

RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It’s probably important only for researchers to get it. But it can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.

Best

Rick

The attached visual was created with SmartDraw, The World’s First Visual Processor™

To edit this file, download a free SmartDraw trial at www.smartdraw.com

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Knowledge Worker

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2017.07.12.1338)]

Thanks, Rick. I think I’ll go down that path for a while and see where it leads.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2017 1:16 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: p vs q.i.

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.12.1015)]

Fred Nickols (2017.07.11.1410 ET)–

FN: It seems to me that it is perhaps more useful for me to think about my behavior as serving to align what I experience with what I want to experience than talking about the alignment between a theoretical perceptual signal and an equally theoretically reference signal.

FN: That leads me to B:CE. Behavior: The Control of Experience.

FN: What say you, Rick?

RM: I think this is a great idea. I think the word “perception” has created a great deal of problems for PCT. Most people – lay people but also many professional psychologists – hear the word “perception” to mean either “point of view” as in “that’s just my perception” or “a distorted view of what can ordinarily be seen clearly” as in “we see the world through a glass, darkly” or “detection of something difficult to detect” as in “that was a very perceptive observation”.

RM: Powers had none of those things meanings of “perception” in mind when he developed the theory that behavior is the control of perception. What he meant is that we act to control the effects on ourselves of various functions of environmental variables on ourselves. This meaning of “perception” is clear from the the definition of “perception” in B:CP as a perceptual signal emitted by an input function, this signal being an analog of some *aspect of the environment.*That is, a perception is a function of environmental variables or the sensory effects thereof.

RM: The problem created by describing PCT as a theory that says “behavior is the control of perception” is that it has led many people – particularly those who understand “perception” to have one of the non-technical meanings that I describe above – to think that what is unique and important about the theory is the “perception” part of the description. In fact, all theories of behavior – behaviorist, cognitive, psychoanalytic, etc – recognize that behavior is based on perception. What is unique and important about PCT is the “control of” part of the definition of the theory. While all other theories view behavior as controlled by (actually meaning caused by) perception, only PCT says that behavior is the control of perception.

RM: So I think a better way to describe PCT is as a theory that says behavior is a process of controlling one’s own experience. Leaving out that loaded word “perception” might help people get what is most important about PCT – that it views organisms as controllers of their own experience rather than as reactors to that experience.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.07.11.13.00]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.0930)]

I guess this is another of Rick's New Math principles, like the

principle that the shape of a curve depends on how fast points on it
move about when you look at it. Or the logic principle presented in
the “Perceptual Cartoon” thread that if a mother has two sons,
neither son has a mother.

Today's New Math principle (not new today, though) is that if x =

f(v1, v2, …) where v1, v2,… are variables, then by definition of
“variable” x is NOT a variable. I don’t know what x is in this New
Math, but Rick has been very clear, today and in the past, that
whatever it is, it is not a variable.

Why don't you publish your new "Elements of New Math" book, because

New Math certainly incorporates a lot of “tough concepts to get.” An
exposition, like Euclid’s “Elements” from first principles, might
make life easier for those of use who were brought up with the
old-fashioned maths used by the rest of the world.

Martin

···

…
RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as
the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is
actually a function of environmental variables and
not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a
function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of
environmental variables; * q.i is p from the observer’s
perspective*.

…

          RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It's

probably important only for researchers to get it. But it
can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.07.12.16.20]

following up

In this scenario, the CEV is not the chair, but its location, the qi

in question. If the chair has no location in the real world, I will
not perceive it as having one unless I am in imagination mode. I
asked why an experimenter is necessary in order for me to move the
chair so that my perception of its location is the same as my
reference for that perception. I don’t think I was answered.
Labelling, in this case, has nothing to do with the chair or its
location. It has to do with a diagram of a control loop. That’s
where labels are used, so that when we communicate we don’t have to
point to the part we want to talk about at the particular moment. If
I want to talk with you about the value of a particular variable in
the diagram, I like to give it a label, just as Euclid did when
writing his geometric proofs so long ago. Euclid don’t need an
experimenter in order to discuss the properties of his diagrams or
of what they might represent in the real world. Neither, I think, do
I.
Martin

···

[Martin Taylor 2017.07.12.16.03]

      [MT, earlier] I have an aphorism "The Perceptual Function

proposes; the Real World disposes." The inputs to the sensors
limit what the perceptual functions (PFs) can propose to exist
in the RW, and the PFs can be any function at all. But if the
perceptual signal produced by a PF is not controllable by
actions on the RW that our effectors are capable of, to create
that perceptual signal is actively detrimental to our overall
wellbeing, as it is a waste of energy and neural real-estate.
The same is true if controlling that perception does nothing
to improve our wellbeing in the longer term. If we believe
that part of PCT, reorganization will eliminate such PFs over
time, leaving those that produce perceptions that correspond
to aspects of the RW through which we can control those
perceptions to survive.

      For example, by controlling a perception of the location of a

chair, using our muscles, we can create a situation in which
the unknowable RW will allow us to perceive ourselves sitting
where we want to sit. The property “location” of the perceive
entity “chair” may not exist as such in the RW, but the RW
allows us to act as though it does, which is all we can ask of
it. We perceive something of the RW as “a chair” and we
perceive something of the RW as “the location of the chair”.
If the RW is different, we don’t perceive the chair, and must
go to look for it. The RW disposes, no matter what we want to
perceive.

Bruce followed by quoting my next paragraph.

        [MT] Why do we need an

experimenter to also perceive the chair and its location?
Can we not sit because the chair is as there as our sensors
can allow us to perceive it, without assistance?

      [Bruce Nevin] If you put the

chair in the diagram, you call it the CEV I think, which is
not the same as q.i., but all we can know of this CEV is my p
and your p, which latter (if you are the experimenter) = q.i.
These perceptual variables, p and q.i, or transforms of them,
are the only appropriate labels for that which is really in
the real environment. Labeling is an act of perceptual
control. This is not solipsism or denial of reality, it is
recognition of an essential limitation. A difficult thing to
carry through rigorously, but there it is.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.0930)]

···

Fred Nickols (2017.07.10.0953)–

Rick: More about p vs q.i. See the diagram below.

Â

FN: If q.i. is the cartoon, my perception of that cartoon, whether as a young or an old woman and whether of a duck or a rabbit.

RM: I think you are saying that p is your perception of the cartoon, and that the cartoon on the page is q.i. But the cartoon is actually just points of varying luminance on the page; these are the environmental variables, which I referred to in previous posts as the variables x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n. Your perception of those lines as a young or old woman is a function of these environmental variables. Your perception of the young woman, call it p.y, is thus

p.y = f.y(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)Â

where f.y is the neural network in your visual system that results in your seeing in those varying points of luminance, the x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n, a young woman, p.y. Your perception of the old woman, p.o, is:

p.o = f.o(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)Â

where f.o is a different neural network in your visual system that results in your seeing those same luminance variations on the page as an old woman, p.o.Â

RM: Note that there is no q.i out there in the environment to perceive. Your perceptions, p.y and p.o, are of the environmental variables, x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n, not of q.i; q.i is a symbol that represents the perception in an observer that corresponds to the perception you are experiencing (and, possibly, controlling).Â

FN: If there is an observer, that observer also happens to be a “living control system� and so the cartoon is also the observer’s q.i. and the observer has his or her own p or perception of the cartoon.

RM: No, q.i is not something to be perceived by the observer; q.i is the observer’s perception that corresponds to the perception, p, Â in another person (you in this case). So if I am considered the observer, then my perception of the young and old woman in the lines of the cartoon could be called q.y and q.o and they correspond to your p.y and p.o. That is

q.y = f.y(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)Â

and

q.o = f.o(x.1,x.2,x.3…x.n)Â

where f.y and f.o now refer to neural networks in my nervous system  that correspond to the same neural networks in yours that produce the corresponding perceptions, q.y and q.o, in me, that correspond to the perceptions p.y and p.o in you.Â

FN: Do I have that right?

RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is actually a function of environmental variables and not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of environmental variables; q.i is p from the observer’s perspective.Â

RM: A better way to diagram the situation is the way Bill did it in Figure 1 of his 1973 Science paper; the Figure can be found on p. 66 of LCS. In that Figure q.i (which is called the Input Quantity in that Figure) is more clearly represented as a function of environmental variables, which are symbolized with v’s rather than x’s.

RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It’s probably important only for researchers to get it. But it can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Â

The attached visual was created with SmartDraw, The World’s First Visual Processor™>

To edit this file, download a free SmartDraw trial at www.smartdraw.com

Â

Â

Regards,

Â

Fred Nickols

Knowledge Worker

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

Â

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.1045)

···

Bruce Nevin (2017.07.10.11:53 ET)

Â

BN: We do not experience perceptual signals as signals.

RM: Yes. I think this is part of the difficulty people have with understanding the concept of perception. In the PCT model of people perceptions exist only as perceptual signals. In the people modeled (including the people doing the modeling) perceptions exist only as experiences. In the PCT model the nature of the perception that is experienced – whether what is experienced is a picture of a young or old woman, for example – is defined by the nature of the perceptual functions (f.y() or f.o(), for example) that transform environmental variables (or the sensory effects thereof) into perceptual signals (p.y and p.o, for example). Why those perceptual signals, which are simply trains of neural impulses, are experienced the way they are – as a lovely young woman or an old hag – is a mystery; I believe it’s called the “hard problem” of  consciousness. My personal solution to this hard problem is that perceptual signals are experienced the way they are because that’s the way afferent neural signals are experienced when you are the afferent neural signals (and you are also the neural networks that produce them). Not very satisfying, I know, but fortunately I don’t think we have to solve this problem in order to understand purposeful behavior in terms of PCT.

BN: I have understood that q.i is a quantity that is determined by the experimenter controlling perceptions of measuring or counting some measurable or countable aspect of the perceived environment.

RM: Yes, pretty close; I see q.i as a perception computed (or experienced) by the experimenter that corresponds to the perception, p, controlled by the control system. So in a tracking task q.i is computed by the experimenter as variations in the distance between cursor and target (t-c); q.i can also be experienced by the experimenter as the observed variations in the distance between the cursor and target.

Â

BN: But I believe that Rick is here using q.i metaphorically so as to include cases where no quantification occurs.

RM: No, as I said above, q.i can refer to a quantified measure of the variable the controller is controlling or to an experience of the variable the controller is controlling. In the tracking task q.i is typically a quantified variable, like t-c. In the “coin game” q.i is an experience (of an “N” pattern in the example in B;CP, for example)Â

Â

BN: Quantification is easiest with perceptions at the lower levels of the hierarchy, up to simple Relationship perceptions. In most matters of broad and general interest (such as your interest in organizational psychology and management) and in many specialized fields (such as my interest in language and culture) quantification of q.i is often very difficult and may not be possible.

RM: A good point. In this case we must rely on the human experimenter’s perceptual system to “compute” the q.i’s that corresponds to these very complex kinds of perceptions, p’s, that are being controlled. But I think we can quantify perceptions that are more complex than relationships. I’ve done studies where I have quantified control of sequences and programs, for example. I don’t think we have to bring the human perceptual system into it until we get to perceptions like principles and system concepts.

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.11.1300)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.07.11.13.00) –

MT: Today's New Math principle (not new today, though) is that if x =

f(v1, v2, …) where v1, v2,… are variables, then by definition of
“variable” x is NOT a variable. I don’t know what x is in this New
Math, but Rick has been very clear, today and in the past, that
whatever it is, it is not a variable.

RM: Actually, I said that q.i is not an environmental variable. It is certainly a variable – a variable aspect of the environment that is controlled as a perceptual signal (also a variable) in a control system.

MT: Why don't you publish your new "Elements of New Math" book, because

New Math certainly incorporates a lot of “tough concepts to get.” An
exposition, like Euclid’s “Elements” from first principles, might
make life easier for those of use who were brought up with the
old-fashioned maths used by the rest of the world.

Â

RM: And you were chiding me for the disturbing “tone” of CSGNet?Â

BestÂ

Rick

–

          RM: The problem, I believe, is that in diagrams such as

the one below, it is not made clear that q.i (or Q.i) is
actually a function of environmental variables and
not an environmental variable itself. That is, p is not a
function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of
environmental variables; * q.i is p from the observer’s
perspective*.Â

          RM: I know this is a tough concept to get. It's

probably important only for researchers to get it. But it
can’t hurt for non-researchers to get it as well.Â

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.12.1015)]

···

 Fred Nickols (2017.07.11.1410 ET)–

Â

FN: It seems to me that it is perhaps more useful for me to think about my behavior as serving to align what I experience with what I want to experience than talking about the alignment between a theoretical perceptual signal and an equally theoretically reference signal.

Â

FN: That leads me to B:CE. Behavior: The Control of Experience.

Â

FN: What say you, Rick?

RM: I think this is a great idea. I think the word “perception” has created a great deal of problems for PCT. Most people – lay people but also many professional psychologists – hear the word “perception” to mean either “point of view” as in “that’s just my perception” or “a distorted view of what can ordinarily be seen clearly” as in “we see the world through a glass, darkly” or “detection of something difficult to detect” as in “that was a very perceptive observation”.Â

RM: Powers had none of those things meanings of “perception” in mind when he developed the theory that behavior is the control of perception. What he meant is that we act to control the effects on ourselves of various functions of environmental variables on ourselves. This meaning of “perception” is clear from the the definition of “perception” in B:CP as a perceptual signal emitted by an input function, this signal being an analog of some *aspect of the environment.*That is, a perception is a function of environmental variables or the sensory effects thereof. Â

RM: The problem created by describing PCT as a theory that says “behavior is the control of perception” is that it has led many people – particularly those who understand “perception” to have one of the non-technical meanings that I describe above – to think that what is unique and important about the theory is the “perception” part of the description. In fact, all theories of behavior – behaviorist, cognitive, psychoanalytic, etc – recognize that behavior is based on perception. What is unique and important about PCT is the “control of” part of the definition of the theory. While all other theories view behavior as controlled by (actually meaning caused by) perception, only PCT says that behavior is the control of perception.Â

RM: So I think a better way to describe PCT is as a theory that says behavior is a process of controlling one’s own experience. Leaving out that loaded word “perception” might help people get what is most important about PCT – that it views organisms as controllers of their own experience rather than as reactors to that experience.Â

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.12.1730)]

···

Bruce Nevin (2017.07.11.22:00 ET)

BN: Saying “variable aspect of the environment” is what makes it sound like you are saying that q.i is in the environment.

RM: I don’t think this is a problem that can be solved by trying to find clearer ways of saying it. I think the best way to get this across is with a demonstration. The ambiguous figure seems like a pretty clear demonstration of the fact that an aspect of the environment is not “in” the environment.Â

RM: In the ambiguous figure I posted, two different aspects of the environment – young and old woman – are based on exactly the same environmental variables – the distribution of dark and light points on the page. These two aspects of the environment – the young and old woman --can’t both be “in” the environment since there is only one thing “in” the environment – the distribution of light and dark points.

RM: Â In fact, the two different aspects of the environment that you can experience must be different functions of the same environmental variables – the spatial variations in the darkness of the points. The young and old woman exist only as states of perceptual variables, not as states of environmental variables. There is no young or old woman out there in the environment to be perceived; your perceptual system constructs these two different aspects of the environment from the exact same raw material – the distribution of light and dark points on the page.

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.07.13.1250)]

···

Bruce Nevin (2017.07.13.12:28 ET)–

RM: A perception is an aspect of the environment. What I call the “environment” is just the distribution of light and dark points on the page. The two women are two of many different possible aspects of the environment. That is, they are two of many different ways to perceive the distribution of light and dark points on the page.Â

RM: No, the ambiguity shows that neither are “in” the environment.Â

Â

RM: I don’t see how it could demonstrate anything else.Â

RM: I’m saying that the perception of one or the other is created by different functions of the environment, which is the distribution of light and dark points on the page. These functions define the aspect of that environment – young versus old woman – that is perceived.Â

BN>Â At what point are the two functions different?

RM: There are clearly two different functions in people’s nervous systems, one that produces the perception of a young woman and another than produces the perception of an old one from the same state of the environment – the same environmental variables.Â

Â

BN>Â If we say that q.i is that which impinges on the sensory organs,

RM: It’s not q.i that impinges on the sensory organs; it’s the environmental variables – v.1, v.2, …v.n – which in the ambiguous figure correspond to the the distribution of n points on the page that vary in luminance.

BN: So what we call q.i is in practice not at the level of v.1, v.2…v.n or pixels of luminance.

RM: Right. The only thing I would add is that this is not just true “in practice”; it is always true. Even when the controlled variable (q.i) is an intensity, as it is in many psychophysical experiments, q.i is a perceptual function of the physical intensity of the environmental variable, v; p always equals f(v.1,v2…vn).

BN: In practice, q.i is a perception controlled by the experimenter, and the TCV enables the experimenter to affirm that his or her controlled perception p=q.i corresponds closely to the subject’s controllled perception p.Â

RM: Everything here is correct except that q.i is not a perception controlled by the experimenter except in the special case where the experimenter is the one who applies the disturbance to q.i. And even in that case, the experimenter must quickly give up control of q.i after the disturbance is applied or s/he will remain in conflict with the subject and the TCV will fail. In the TCV the experimenter just monitors the state of the hypothetical controlled variable.Â

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BN>Â Now, looking at the diagram, we together with the experimenter quite naturally assume that q.i is a fact about the environment…

RM: We sure do. And I have no problem with that. In my mindreading demo, for example, ( www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) I have no problem talking about the position of the controlled avatar as being something happening in the environment. If the CEV just referred to the way a controlled variable looks to an experimenter then I would have no problem with it. My problem comes from the idea that the CEV is not really controlled; that just the perception of it is. This apparently esoteric little point is important to me because it places a red herring in the path of fruitful research aimed at understanding the purposeful behavior of living systems. It’s a red herring I can ignore but other potential PCT researchers might be thrown off track by it.Â

Best

Rick

BN>Â We perceive paradoxical and ambiguous input from lower levels to be interesting (or troubling) because it unseats this comfortable assumption that what we perceive is really as we perceive it.

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

BN> The two women, the old and the young, are not aspects of the environment, they are perceptions.

BN: The ambiguity demonstrates that only one of them can be claimed to be in the environment,

BN: and (as we switch back and forth from perceiving one or the other) the ambiguity also demonstrates that neither can be claimed to be in the environment.

BN> But you are not saying that the two female images are in the environment. You are saying that the perception of one or the other is a function of aspects of the environment.

BN: The perception of the old woman is a function of various pixels of luminance in the environment, and the perception of the young woman is a different function of the same various pixels of luminance in the environment. The two functions are in our heads, not in the environment. And the two perceptions that result are in our head, not in the environment. The pixels of luminance are certainly on the retinas of the eyes. Are they in the environment? Let me see …