Anybody got and ideas?
Regards
Gavin
[From Bill Powers (2010.04.19.1833 MDT)]
Gavin Ritz (2010.04.09)
Anybody got and
ideas?
I don’t see the two-slit experiment as involving any control systems,
other than the experimenter.
Best,
Bill P.
( Gavin
Ritz, 2010.04.10.14.28NZT)
[From Bill Powers
(2010.04.19.1833 MDT)]
Gavin Ritz (2010.04.09)
Anybody got
and ideas?
I don’t see the two-slit experiment as involving any control systems,
That’s
correct. It has no meaning if there is no experimenter.
Just
like Rick’s flyball experiment. The flyball doesn’t have any involvement
in any control system unless there is a catcher.
other
than the experimenter.
Yes,
that’s so. Let’s talk about the experimenter. And the Copenhagen Interpretation. That
would be the most pertinent issue relating to PCT.
How would
PCT explain the dichotomy of the wave particle duality as in the Copenhagen Interpretation?
In terms
of the control variable, perceptual signal and the reference signal.
Regards
Gavin
[Shannon Williams 2010.04.09 23:00 CST]
Oh OH! Good topic. Perhaps a breakthough in how the experimenter
understands how he controls his perceptions could lead to a break
through in the wave particle duality or even in how gravity/magnetism
etc apear to operate at a distance. Very cool!
I can't think of anything to say though. Maybe if you throw out a
theory we can wrestle with it.
Best,
Shannon
···
On Fri, Apr 9, 2010 at 9:38 PM, Gavin Ritz <garritz@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
(Gavin Ritz, 2010.04.10.14.28NZT)
[From Bill Powers (2010.04.19.1833 MDT)]
Gavin Ritz (2010.04.09)
Anybody got and ideas?
I don't see the two-slit experiment as involving any control systems,
That�s correct. It has no meaning if there is no experimenter.
�Just like Rick�s flyball experiment. The flyball doesn�t have any
involvement in any control system unless there is a catcher.other than the experimenter.
Yes, that�s so. Let�s talk about the experimenter. And the Copenhagen
Interpretation. That would be the most pertinent issue relating to PCT.How would PCT explain the dichotomy of the wave particle duality as in the
Copenhagen Interpretation?In terms of the control variable, perceptual signal and the reference
signal.Regards
Gavin
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.09.23.25]
(Gavin Ritz,
2010.04.10.14.28NZT)
How would
PCT explain the dichotomy of the wave particle duality as in the
Copenhagen Interpretation?
In terms
of the control variable, perceptual signal and the reference signal.
Gavin, where do you see control being involved in the wave-particle
duality or in its manifestation in the two slit experiment? In other
words, what is your question?
vary the perceptual result of the experiment, and by what mechanism do
you see this variation being achieved?
You need an answer at least to the first part of this two-part question
before you can start to ask what you ask above and asked in your
initial posting. If there is no-one or no-thing with a desire to bring
about some specified perceptual result (the reference value) you can’t
ask about a control analysis, any more than you can ask about the
colour of the big armchair in an empty room.
For my part, I no longer see any “dichotomy” in the conjoint wave and
particle nature of the world, so I may be blind to the thrust of your
question. To me, wave and particle are just different aspects of
looking at a thing, neither sufficient by itself, both inherent in
anything that embodies the four forces currently identified in physics
(material objects, electromagnetic signals …).
Your mention of “the Copenhagen interpretation” suggests you may be
thinking of the so-called “collapse of the wavefunction” consequent on
observation, but not everyone adheres to the Copenhagen interpretation.
However, if we suppose the Copenhagen interpretation to be correct,
what does your question mean? What kind of statement would constitute
an answer?
Maybe if you specify precisely how you conceive the two slit experiment
– what are the experimental conditions you imagine, and what are the
intentions that lead you to consider that there should be an
appropriate control analysis for them – then various people on this
list could offer possible answers to your question.
Martin
···
from my side, I ask you who or what you see as having some desire to
(Gavin Ritz 2010.04.10.21.46NZT)
[Martin Taylor
2010.04.09.23.25]
(Gavin
Ritz, 2010.04.10.14.28NZT)
How would PCT explain the dichotomy of the wave
particle duality as in the Copenhagen Interpretation?
In terms of the control variable, perceptual
signal and the reference signal.
Gavin, where do you see control being involved in the wave-particle duality or
in its manifestation in the two slit experiment? In other words, what is your
question?
What is
the experimenter controlling, in the two slit experiment?
The Copenhagen
Interpretation is just that. I have no other interpretation of what it means
other than what it means.
perceptual result of the experiment, and by what mechanism do you see this
variation being achieved?
You need an answer at least to the first part of this two-part question before
you can start to ask what you ask above and asked in your initial posting. If
there is no-one or no-thing with a desire to bring about some specified
perceptual result (the reference value) you can’t ask about a control analysis,
any more than you can ask about the colour of the big armchair in an empty
room.
For my part, I no longer see any “dichotomy” in the conjoint wave and
particle nature of the world, so I may be blind to the thrust of your question.
To me, wave and particle are just different aspects of looking at a thing,
neither sufficient by itself, both inherent in anything that embodies the four
forces currently identified in physics (material objects, electromagnetic
signals …).
Your mention of “the Copenhagen interpretation”
suggests you may be thinking of the so-called “collapse of the
wavefunction” consequent on observation, but not everyone adheres to the Copenhagen
interpretation. However, if we suppose the Copenhagen interpretation to be
correct, what does your question mean? What kind of statement would constitute
an answer?
Maybe if you specify precisely how you conceive the two slit experiment
This
makes no sense to me, the experiment is what it is there is no “my special
interpretation of the two slit experiment”. To my knowledge the entire
scientific community has complete agreement on what the two slit experiment is
and the results thereof.
The question
is clear, see my question above.
– what are the experimental conditions
you imagine,
I’m
not imagining anything other than what the experiment is. Can’t work out
what you mean by this.
and what are the intentions
Not sure
what you mean by this.
that lead you to consider that there should be an appropriate control
analysis for them
Pretty
simple really, there is a control system (the experimenter) clearly visualizing
a particular set of outcomes from the experiment.
– then various people on this list
could offer possible answers to your question.
I’m
looking forward to some really interesting answers.
Regards
Gavin
···
from my side, I ask you who or what you see as having some desire to vary the
(Gavin Ritz 2010.04.10.22.02NZT)
[Shannon Williams
2010.04.09 23:00 CST]
Oh OH! Good topic. Perhaps a
breakthough in how the experimenter
understands how he controls his perceptions
could lead to a break
through in the wave particle duality
Yip
or even in how gravity/magnetism
etc apear to operate at a distance.
Very cool!
Or maybe PCT can show
once and for all its all in the mind.
It’s just a mixed
up perceptual signal from the HPCT levels. I.e. some perceptual signal the visual
perceptual is using one level of HPCT and another visual perceptual signal using
another level. And that there’s seems like a duality but really its all
in the mind.
Hey that’s just a
wild ridiculous answer but then who knows.
There’s a game
called car surfing where you lie with your back on the roof of the car and you’re
strapped onto the car roof (looking up at the ceiling and the front of the car,
head on the top of the windscreen, slightly tilted downwards) The driver of the
car drives down a typical low roofed spiral car park exit ramp. The brain has
no idea how to deal with the visuals and is totally confused. And actually combines
the road and the ceiling. If the brain does this with such a simple game. What else
can it do?
Maybe PCT has the answers.
Regards
Gavin
I can’t think of anything to say
though. Maybe if you throw out a
theory we can wrestle with it.
Best,
Shannon
(Gavin Ritz, 2010.04.10.14.28NZT)
[From Bill Powers
(2010.04.19.1833 MDT)]
Gavin Ritz (2010.04.09)
Anybody got and ideas?
I don’t see the two-slit experiment as involving
any control systems,
That’s correct. It has no meaning if there
is no experimenter.
Just like Rick’s flyball experiment. The flyball doesn’t have any
involvement in any control system unless there is
a catcher.
other than the experimenter.
Yes, that’s so. Let’s talk about the
experimenter. And the Copenhagen
Interpretation. That would be the most pertinent
issue relating to PCT.
How would PCT explain the dichotomy of the wave
particle duality as in the
Copenhagen Interpretation?
In terms of the control variable, perceptual
signal and the reference
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.0857 EDT)]
The experimenter controls his perceptions as he sets up the experiment. The experimenter controls the perceptions associated with recording the results of the experiment. The results of the experiment are uncontrolled perceptions.
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.11.43]
(Gavin Ritz 2010.04.10.21.46NZT)
[Martin
Taylor
2010.04.09.23.25]
(Gavin
Ritz, 2010.04.10.14.28NZT)
How would
PCT explain the dichotomy of the wave
particle duality as in the Copenhagen Interpretation?
In terms of
the control variable, perceptual
signal and the reference signal.
Gavin, where do you see control being involved in the wave-particle
duality or
in its manifestation in the two slit experiment? In other words, what
is your
question?
What is
the experimenter controlling, in the two slit experiment?
His perceptions that the light source is where she has a reference
value for them to be, that the slits, prisms, reflectors,
beamsplitters, and the rest of the apparatus are where he has a
reference for them to be, that the source is switched on and off when
she has a reference for those events to happen, etc. etc. The
experimenter is controlling lots of perceptions when setting up the
experiment, including controlling for an imagined perception of the set
of results that may come from executing the experiment. The
experimenter is not controlling for which member of the set of possible
results will occur.
The
Copenhagen
Interpretation is just that. I have no other interpretation of what it
means
other than what it means.
Please make your interpretation of it explicit, if you want to get any
serious discussion going. There’s no point in asking about such
multi-interpretable things (Bohr’s interpretation, or which subsequent
variant?) unless we know exactly what you think you are asking about.
If one of us answers when thinking of one view of the Copenhagen
interpretation when you are thinking of something else, confusion will
be hard to avoid (as you have seen so often on this mailing list in
other threads).
The same applies to your (missing) description of what you imagine to
be the experimental setup and the different results obtained under
different experimental conditions. Please make them explicit, rather
than assuming everybody, with or without a physics background, has the
same concept of the basis for your questions. I’m trying to get you to
ask your question in a way that the non-physicists on the mailing list
can both understand and consider meaningfully.
From my side, I ask you who or what you see as having some desire
to vary the
perceptual result of the experiment, and by what mechanism do you see
this
variation being achieved?You need an answer at least to the first part of this two-part question
before
you can start to ask what you ask above and asked in your initial
posting. If
there is no-one or no-thing with a desire to bring about some specified
perceptual result (the reference value) you can’t ask about a control
analysis,
any more than you can ask about the colour of the big armchair in an
empty
room.…
Maybe if you specify precisely how you conceive the two slit experiment
This
makes no sense to me, the experiment is what it is there is no “my
special
interpretation of the two slit experiment”. To my knowledge the entire
scientific community has complete agreement on what the two slit
experiment is
and the results thereof.
You are talking to a community of psychologists, not physicists, and I
doubt whether half of them even have heard of the two-slit experiment,
let alone realize that there are lots of variants of it in the
literature, including very recent ones.
I never suggested you had a “special interpretation” of the experiment.
I asked you to describe the experiment as you saw it, and to answer a
couple of absolutely basic questions whose answers must be clear before
we can have a coherent discussion. Please at least try to answer the
first question I made explicit above: “Who or what do you see as having
some desire to vary the perceptual result of the experiment”. We can
address the second question, of possible mechanism (environmental
feedback path) when you answer the first.
The question
is clear, see my question above.
I find that when a questioner says that the question is clear, and the
respondent says it isn’t, the questioner usually doesn’t get an answer
he finds satisfactory.
– what are the experimental
conditions
you imagine,
I’m
not imagining anything other than what the experiment is. Can’t work
out
what you mean by this.
I accept that you aren’t imagining anything other than what the
experiment is. I don’t know what that is, perhaps because I have been
interested in physics for too long and know of many variants of the
experiment; others may not know what you are imagining because they
have no physics background at all. Either way, you could allow us to
have an idea, if you wanted. Let me try a template for a possible
description of the experimental conditions you may be imagining:
-
A light source is set up (is this a coherent source, are photons
emitted individually under control or freely, etc., etc.) -
A screen is interposed that allow the light to pass through two
parallel slits (what happens to the light path between the source and
the slits? Where are the beamsplitters, and how are the paths between
the slits phased? If the source is coherent, how is it spread so that
individual photons are equally likely to pass through either slit, if
particle-like, or have equal amplitude if wave-like, etc. etc? Are both
slits necessarily open simultaneously?) -
What conditions correspond to observing (making possible an
observation of) which slit(s) the photon uses in its passage to the
screen? -
A screen records (observes) the passage of a photon. (What does the
screen actually do to make this record/observation, and what does the
experimenter perceive?) -
What differential results may be observed dependent on what
conditions of the foregoing?
Starting with a template something like that, could you describe how
you conceive the experiment?
and what are the intentions
Not sure
what you mean by this.
I tried to use everyday language, but translating “what are the
intentions” into PCT-talk, I asked: You have an implicit assumption
that there is an entity (person or thing) controlling some perceptions;
given that assumption, what is the entity, and what are the possible
reference values for what controlled perceptions?
that lead you to consider that there should
be an appropriate control
analysis for them
Pretty
simple really, there is a control system (the experimenter) clearly
visualizing
a particular set of outcomes from the experiment.
That is a partial answer to the question “what are the intentions”. It
is an answer to “what is the entity”. It does not answer what the
controlled perceptions might be, nor what reference values the
experimenter has for those perceptions. If, as your statement implies
but does not explicitly say, the experimenter is controlling for a
particular outcome of the experiment, either she is a dishonest
experimenter or you misunderstand the nature of control. If the
experimenter is controlling for the outcome of the experiment to be a
yet-to-be-determined member of a set of possible outcomes, then the
controlled perceptions are those mentioned above in relation to the
physical setup of the experiment. The set itself is a perception
controlled in the experimenter’s imagination, with a reference value
that is itself a set, the set of possibilities created by the
experimental setup. Changing the setup is the experimenter’s
environmental feedback means of controlling the “set of possible
outcomes” perception.
Visualizing a set of possible outcomes does not constitute control.
Control requires there to be a controlled perception, meaning that the
controller acts on the environment so as to produce a particular
(reference) value of a perception. Simply accepting whatever value of a
perception the environment provides, without influencing it, is not
control. An experimenter controls her perceptions of the experimental
setup, but does not control his perceptions of the results (at least an
honest experimenter doesn’t).
– then various
people on this list
could offer possible answers to your question.
I’m
looking forward to some really interesting answers.
Shannon seems to know what you are talking about, but I have seen no
evidence anyone else does. I certainly don’t. Apparently I was wrong in
thinking you were concerned with the collapse of the wavefunction that
is inherent in what I understand to be the Copenhagen interpretation.
If you had been thinking of that, there’s no PCT issue, since the
output action of observing (or making possible an observation) would be
the means of controlling for observing a particle-like or a wave-like
result.
I make the suggestions above in the hope that if you explain more
clearly just what you are getting at, you might justifiably look
forward to an interesting set of answers.
Martin
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.10.1015)]
···
On Fri, Apr 9, 2010 at 5:03 PM, Gavin Ritz garritz@xtra.co.nz wrote:
Anybody got and ideas?
One thing that strikes me (regarding the relationship between PCT and the 2 slit experiment) is the fact that physicists readily accept the idea that the surprising results of these simple little experiments reveals some deep truth about the nature of physical reality while psychologists (and laymen) typically dismiss the idea that the equally surprising results of our simple little compensatory tracking experiments reveal a deep truth about the nature of psychological reality. I have never heard people dismiss the results of the 2 slit experiments as “trivial” but I frequently hear people (particularly reviewers) dismiss the results of my tracking experiments this way. So that’s the relationship I see between PCT and the 2 slit experiment. The 2 slit experiment reveals physics to be a far more mature science than psychology.
Best
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[Shannon Williams 2010.04.10.1300]
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.0857 EDT)]
The results of the experiment are uncontrolled perceptions.
But when the experimenter 'tries to make sense' of the uncontrolled
perceptions, he does so by comparing them to his existing references.
So although the complete set of results might include uncontrolled
perceptions, he only perceives and makes note of the controlled ones.
If he correctly controlled all of the relevant perceptions then he
would not need the concept of 'duallity' to explain the results.
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.11.43]
The experimenter is not controlling for which member of the set of possible results will occur.
The issue isn't the results. The issue is the interpreation of the
results. 'Duallity' is a reference in the brain used to control the
results.
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.10.1015)]
The 2 slit experiment reveals physics to be a far more mature science than psychology.
The 2 slit experiments may be more mature, but when the 2 slit
experimenters put on their theorizing hats, they are forging a
reference that is built of perceptions that are only in their heads.
The interesting part of Gavin's question is: how can the theorizer
use his knowledge of how he controlls his perceptions to help him
discover which of his references prevents him from percieving what
would be simple to percieve if the reference were different.
Best,
Shannon
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.1512 EDT)]
[Shannon Williams 2010.04.10.1300]
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.0857 EDT)]
The results of the experiment are uncontrolled perceptions.
SW: But when the experimenter ‘tries to make sense’ of the uncontrolled
perceptions, he does so by comparing them to his existing references.
So although the complete set of results might include uncontrolled
perceptions, he only perceives and makes note of the controlled ones.
If he correctly controlled all of the relevant perceptions then he
would not need the concept of ‘duallity’ to explain the results.
BG: I don’t think the experimenter ever controls the uncontrolled perceptions. They are what they are. Any effort to control them is called fraud. It is not true that he only perceives and takes note of the controlled perceptions. Most of our perceptions are uncontrolled. We take no action to bring them to desired reference states. As far as I can tell, your claim that if the experimenter correctly controlled all the relevant perceptions he would not need the concept of duality to explain the results comes awfully close to wishful thinking. Unless you are saying that his life would be simpler if he fudged the results. With that I can agree.
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.11.43]
The experimenter is not controlling for which member of the set of possible results will occur.
SW: The issue isn’t the results. The issue is the interpreation of the
results. ‘Duallity’ is a reference in the brain used to control the
results.
BG: I assume by “duality” you are referring to the need to make use of probability amplitudes to explain (model) the outcome of the experiments. The only control that seems to me to be involved in this process is the control needed to carry out the calculations. No one that I know is controlling a perception of duality. Perhaps I miss your point.
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.10.1015)]
The 2 slit experiment reveals physics to be a far more mature science than psychology.
SW: The 2 slit experiments may be more mature, but when the 2 slit
experimenters put on their theorizing hats, they are forging a
reference that is built of perceptions that are only in their heads.
The interesting part of Gavin’s question is: how can the theorizer
use his knowledge of how he controlls his perceptions to help him
discover which of his references prevents him from percieving what
would be simple to percieve if the reference were different.
BG: Either you know something that the rest of us don’t or you are making an unsubstantiated claim. It is true that we see the world in terms of particles and waves and that these two representations are very different. The simplest “solution” to this “problem” is to simply say that light consists of particles called photons. When you want to predict how light will behave you must invoke a model that involves waves (probability amplitudes). The model, however, is not the the physical world. In the physical world there are only photons; there are no waves as far as we know.
Bruce
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.16.46]
[Shannon Williams 2010.04.10.1300]
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.0857 EDT)]
The results of the experiment are uncontrolled perceptions.
But when the experimenter 'tries to make sense' of the uncontrolled
perceptions, he does so by comparing them to his existing references.
That makes no sense to me. References are values that the perceiver would like the corresponding controlled perceptions to take. Each controlled perception is compared only to its own reference value. If a perception is uncontrolled, it has effectively no reference value. So what can it mean to compare an uncontrolled perception to an existing reference, let alone to the whole set of existing references?
If you mean that the experimenter might look at the results and say "I don't like that result, and must change the setup to get the result I do like", then you aren't talking about an honest experimenter.
So although the complete set of results might include uncontrolled
perceptions, he only perceives and makes note of the controlled ones.
It's probably true that one does not "make note of" (consciously become aware of) most uncontrolled perceptions. It is accepted that one is not aware of most controlled perceptions, so why should it not be true even more strongly of uncontrolled ones? Looking at the other side of the question, what is it about perceptions not at the moment being controlled that makes them not be perceived (I presume you mean "in conscious awareness" when you say "perceived" in this context)? We (most of us, most of the time) don't control our perception of the height of the sun in the sky, but we can easily be aware of it, as we can of a myriad of other perceptions we don't, at that moment, control.
When you are talking about an honest experiment, all interesting results are uncontrolled. Even in a tracking study, what is controlled is the moment-by-moment cursor location, whereas the experimental result may be how well that matches the target location, or the phase shift of the cursor relevant to the track as a fucntion of frequency, or something like that. The experimental result is a set of one or more perceptions, all uncontrolled.
If he correctly controlled all of the relevant perceptions then he
would not need the concept of 'duallity' to explain the results.
The logic of this jump escapes me.
What I think you may be talking about is the existence of perceptual functions, particularly at the category level. If you have a perceptual function that outputs a value "degree of particle-ness" and another that outputs a value of "degree of waviness", and you have reorganized so that for you these are mutually inhibitory, then you need a concept of duality. But if you have a perceptual function that outputs a value for "degree of wavicle-ness", you don't.
In most every day, human-scale, objects and events, the concept of "particleness" seems to correspond with a unitary motion -- all parts of the object move together. But this is not true of, for example, a flag in the breeze, for which you can perceive a "degree of waviness" at the same time as a "degree of particle-ness". A flag is a wavy coherent object. I imagine an entity with a mass of a few or a few thousand electron volts as much the same. It has a more or less extended waviness over space, and a more or less precise location and coherent motion. But it's no more a particle XOR a wave than is a flag. Wherein is the need for "duality"?
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.11.43]
The experimenter is not controlling for which member of the set of possible results will occur.
The issue isn't the results. The issue is the interpreation of the
results. 'Duallity' is a reference in the brain used to control the
results.
The results are what they are. An honest experimenter does not "control the results". "Interpretation" is the generation or emulation of a perceptual function that allows the results to be consistent with other perceptual functions. It's much the same, at a different level, as the problem that a chair cannot at the same time be perceived as all red and all blue and all green. If you have developed perceptual functions that operate so that an entity can't at the same time be a particle and a wave, then you have a problem at, perhaps, the program level, when you get results that are consistent with it being both. It's the same as having experimental results that show your chair to be simultaneously all red and all blue. Maybe if you had a perceptual function for the category "purple" you wouldn't have a problem, and would be asking "when do the conditions make it look blue and when do they make it look red, even though I believe it to be both all the time?.
The issue (in the two-slit experiment) is the role of observation in altering the results so that sometimes it seems more as though the entity is a particle and sometimes more as though it is a wave. That issue is not affected by your (in)ability to perceive it as being both at the same time.
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.10.1015)]
The 2 slit experiment reveals physics to be a far more mature science than psychology.
The 2 slit experiments may be more mature, but when the 2 slit
experimenters put on their theorizing hats, they are forging a
reference that is built of perceptions that are only in their heads.
Again you use the word "reference", which, in PCT, means "a desired value for an existing type of perception". You can't "forge" a reference, whether by "forge" you refer to a blacksmith or to a counterfeiter. I think you want a different word. I would rephrase this sentence as follows:
"The 2 slit experiments may be more mature, but when the 2 slit
experimenters put on their theorizing hats, they are forging a
new perceptual function that is built of perceptions that are only in their heads, as are all perceptual functions."
That's a pretty good description of what theorists usually do. You can "forge" (blacksmith sense) new perceptual functions, and you may even develop desired values (references) for those new perceptions.
The interesting part of Gavin's question is: how can the theorizer
use his knowledge of how he controlls his perceptions to help him
discover which of his references prevents him from percieving what
would be simple to percieve if the reference were different.
Even with rephrasing, I don't understand that. Unless one is Buddha, perhaps, one does not know how one controls his perceptions, though it is possible that some perception is of the control of some other. Knowledge of how one controls one's perceptions would be irrelevant in discovering which perceptions were being controlled, which is equivalent to discovering which references were currently effective.
No amount of knowledge of one's own reference values could affect what one actually perceives, though it might be possible to realize (perceive) that one was, like Lord Nelson, controlling not to acquire some potentially available sensory data (putting the telescope to one's blind eye). Likewise, no variation of reference values would affect what one actually perceives, though the resulting errors in the corresponding control systems might well induce actions that affected the corresponding controlled perceptions. Overall, that paragraph sounds a bit like word salad to me. Perhaps you could rewrite it. I would try, but I don't know what you are getting at. Sorry.
Martin
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.1804 EDT)]
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.16.46]
In most every day, human-scale, objects and events, the concept of “particleness” seems to correspond with a unitary motion – all parts of the object move together. But this is not true of, for example, a flag in the breeze, for which you can perceive a “degree of waviness” at the same time as a “degree of particle-ness”. A flag is a wavy coherent object. I imagine an entity with a mass of a few or a few thousand electron volts as much the same. It has a more or less extended waviness over space, and a more or less precise location and coherent motion. But it’s no more a particle XOR a wave than is a flag. Wherein is the need for “duality”?
BG: You are not alone in that way of thinking of a sub-atomic particle, but there is another picture that may be more helpful. In this picture a photon is always a particle. However, when you want to calculate how it moves from point A to point B, you have to account for all possible paths. Each path has a wavelength associate with it, and these paths can interfere the way waves do. This is, of course, the picture we owe to Feynman, and is probably the one most physicists would give if they were pressed to do so.
Bruce
[From Bill Powers (2010.04.10.1642 MDT)]
Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.16.46
In most every day, human-scale, objects and events, the concept of "particleness" seems to correspond with a unitary motion -- all parts of the object move together. But this is not true of, for example, a flag in the breeze, for which you can perceive a "degree of waviness" at the same time as a "degree of particle-ness". A flag is a wavy coherent object. I imagine an entity with a mass of a few or a few thousand electron volts as much the same. It has a more or less extended waviness over space, and a more or less precise location and coherent motion. But it's no more a particle XOR a wave than is a flag. Wherein is the need for "duality"?
Martin, that is the most beautiful explanation of a wavicle that I have ever seen. It makes the concept sensible and possible instead of self-contradictory and mysterious. Thank you very much. Phil Runkle, I am absolutely sure, would be echoing my thanks.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.1900 EDT)]
[From Bill Powers (2010.04.10.1642 MDT)]
Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.16.46
In most every day, human-scale, objects and events, the concept of “particleness” seems to correspond with a unitary motion – all parts of the object move together. But this is not true of, for example, a flag in the breeze, for which you can perceive a “degree of waviness” at the same time as a “degree of particle-ness”. A flag is a wavy coherent object. I imagine an entity with a mass of a few or a few thousand electron volts as much the same. It has a more or less extended waviness over space, and a more or less precise location and coherent motion. But it’s no more a particle XOR a wave than is a flag. Wherein is the need for “duality”?
Martin, that is the most beautiful explanation of a wavicle that I have ever seen. It makes the concept sensible and possible instead of self-contradictory and mysterious. Thank you very much. Phil Runkle, I am absolutely sure, would be echoing my thanks.
BG: The description is nice, but it has one limitation. The wavicle must be large enough to pass through both slits in the two-slit experiment. A wavicle arriving from the Andromeda galaxy must be really big.
Bruce
[Shannon Williams 2010.04.10.1300]
OK. Martin, Bruce, et al. If you want to argue that there is nothing
more to be understood about 2-slit experiment, and that 100 years from
now the people will not know more about how to perceive any aspect of
the experiment, then fine. Surely there exists some physical
phenomenon isolated by some experiment which still baffles theorists.
(Or for that matter, how does gravity operate from a distance?) The
point is that someday, future theorists will no longer be baffled.
They will run the experiment and get the exact same results, but they
will have different references. The question is: how does the
theorist identify the blocking references? For example, if you have a
reference that prevents temperature from rising above 100 degrees,
you will never know what you feel like at 101 degrees. If you have a
reference that prevents you from being silent in the presence of
another person, you will never know what it is like to see another
person in contemplation. If you have a reference that prevents X, you
will never be able to see that gravity is not working from a distance.
How do we isolate these references?
Best,
Shannon
···
On Sat, Apr 10, 2010 at 4:38 PM, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net> wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.16.46]
[Shannon Williams 2010.04.10.1300]
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.0857 EDT)]
The results of the experiment are uncontrolled perceptions.
But when the experimenter 'tries to make sense' of the uncontrolled
perceptions, he does so by comparing them to his existing references.That makes no sense to me. References are values that the perceiver would
like the corresponding controlled perceptions to take. Each controlled
perception is compared only to its own reference value. If a perception is
uncontrolled, it has effectively no reference value. So what can it mean to
compare an uncontrolled perception to an existing reference, let alone to
the whole set of existing references?If you mean that the experimenter might look at the results and say "I don't
like that result, and must change the setup to get the result I do like",
then you aren't talking about an honest experimenter.So although the complete set of results might include uncontrolled
perceptions, he only perceives and makes note of the controlled ones.It's probably true that one does not "make note of" (consciously become
aware of) most uncontrolled perceptions. It is accepted that one is not
aware of most controlled perceptions, so why should it not be true even more
strongly of uncontrolled ones? Looking at the other side of the question,
what is it about perceptions not at the moment being controlled that makes
them not be perceived (I presume you mean "in conscious awareness" when you
say "perceived" in this context)? We (most of us, most of the time) don't
control our perception of the height of the sun in the sky, but we can
easily be aware of it, as we can of a myriad of other perceptions we don't,
at that moment, control.When you are talking about an honest experiment, all interesting results are
uncontrolled. Even in a tracking study, what is controlled is the
moment-by-moment cursor location, whereas the experimental result may be how
well that matches the target location, or the phase shift of the cursor
relevant to the track as a fucntion of frequency, or something like that.
The experimental result is a set of one or more perceptions, all
uncontrolled.If he correctly controlled all of the relevant perceptions then he
would not need the concept of 'duallity' to explain the results.The logic of this jump escapes me.
What I think you may be talking about is the existence of perceptual
functions, particularly at the category level. If you have a perceptual
function that outputs a value "degree of particle-ness" and another that
outputs a value of "degree of waviness", and you have reorganized so that
for you these are mutually inhibitory, then you need a concept of duality.
But if you have a perceptual function that outputs a value for "degree of
wavicle-ness", you don't.In most every day, human-scale, objects and events, the concept of
"particleness" seems to correspond with a unitary motion -- all parts of the
object move together. But this is not true of, for example, a flag in the
breeze, for which you can perceive a "degree of waviness" at the same time
as a "degree of particle-ness". A flag is a wavy coherent object. I imagine
an entity with a mass of a few or a few thousand electron volts as much the
same. It has a more or less extended waviness over space, and a more or less
precise location and coherent motion. But it's no more a particle XOR a wave
than is a flag. Wherein is the need for "duality"?[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.11.43]
The experimenter is not controlling for which member of the set of
possible results will occur.The issue isn't the results. �The issue is the interpreation of the
results. �'Duallity' is a reference in the brain used to control the
results.The results are what they are. An honest experimenter does not "control the
results". "Interpretation" is the generation or emulation of a perceptual
function that allows the results to be consistent with other perceptual
functions. It's much the same, at a different level, as the problem that a
chair cannot at the same time be perceived as all red and all blue and all
green. If you have developed perceptual functions that operate so that an
entity can't at the same time be a particle and a wave, then you have a
problem at, perhaps, the program level, when you get results that are
consistent with it being both. It's the same as having experimental results
that show your chair to be simultaneously all red and all blue. Maybe if you
had a perceptual function for the category "purple" you wouldn't have a
problem, and would be asking "when do the conditions make it look blue and
when do they make it look red, even though I believe it to be both all the
time?.The issue (in the two-slit experiment) is the role of observation in
altering the results so that sometimes it seems more as though the entity is
a particle and sometimes more as though it is a wave. That issue is not
affected by your (in)ability to perceive it as being both at the same time.[From Rick Marken (2010.04.10.1015)]
The 2 slit experiment reveals physics to be a far more mature science
than psychology.The 2 slit experiments may be more mature, but when the 2 slit
� experimenters put on their theorizing hats, they are forging a
reference that is built of perceptions that are only in their heads.Again you use the word "reference", which, in PCT, means "a desired value
for an existing type of perception". You can't "forge" a reference, whether
by "forge" you refer to a blacksmith or to a counterfeiter. I think you want
a different word. I would rephrase this sentence as follows:"The 2 slit experiments may be more mature, but when the 2 slit
experimenters put on their theorizing hats, they are forging a
new perceptual function that is built of perceptions that are only in their
heads, as are all perceptual functions."That's a pretty good description of what theorists usually do. You can
"forge" (blacksmith sense) new perceptual functions, and you may even
develop desired values (references) for those new perceptions.The interesting part of Gavin's question is: �how can the theorizer
use his knowledge of how he controlls his perceptions to help him
discover which of his references prevents him from percieving what
would be simple to percieve if the reference were different.Even with rephrasing, I don't understand that. Unless one is Buddha,
perhaps, one does not know how one controls his perceptions, though it is
possible that some perception is of the control of some other. Knowledge of
how one controls one's perceptions would be irrelevant in discovering which
perceptions were being controlled, which is equivalent to discovering which
references were currently effective.No amount of knowledge of one's own reference values could affect what one
actually perceives, though it might be possible to realize (perceive) that
one was, like Lord Nelson, controlling not to acquire some potentially
available sensory data (putting the telescope to one's blind eye). Likewise,
no variation of reference values would affect what one actually perceives,
though the resulting errors in the corresponding control systems might well
induce actions that affected the corresponding controlled perceptions.
Overall, that paragraph sounds a bit like word salad to me. Perhaps you
could rewrite it. I would try, but I don't know what you are getting at.
Sorry.Martin
[From Bill Powers(2010.04.10.1834 MDT)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.04.10.1900 EDT) –
bp earlier: Martin, that is the
most beautiful explanation of a wavicle that I have ever
seen
BG: The description is nice, but
it has one limitation. The wavicle must be large enough to pass through
both slits in the two-slit experiment. A wavicle arriving from the
Andromeda galaxy must be really big.
BP: The basic problem is how two wavicles arriving through different
slits at well-separated times can produce interference patterns. I came
up with an alternate explanation, which has had remarkably little
influence. It is that when each wavicle gets to a slit, diffracts, and
reaches the detector, it leaves a pattern in the form of persistent
oscillations in the atoms of the detector material. The next wavicle
allowed to reach the detector through the other slit also leaves a
persistent oscillation pattern in the detector, which interacts with the
first persistent oscillation, in phase, out of phase, or in between
depending on the separation of the points, resulting in interference
patterns on, or rather in, the surface of the detector. These patterns
represent interference not between the wavicles, but between effects of
the wavicles in the material of the detector. This accounts for the
apparent ability of photons arriving at well-separated times to show
interactions with each other. The interactions are not really
wavicle-to-wavicle but effect-to-effect in the detector material. This
eliminates the need for interactions between wavicles which are not
simultaneously present.
This idea should be testable by having the material of the detector move
enough between arrivals of wavicles so different areas are exposed to the
arrivals of photons from the different slits. That should eliminate the
interference patterns if the interaction is in the material, but the
pattern should persist if the interaction is – somehow – between the
waves just before they are absorbed.
A wikipedia article included this interesting paragraph:
···
=============================================================================
However, an experiment performed in
1987
[7] produced results that demonstrated that which-path
information could be obtained without destroying the possibility of
interference. This showed the effect of measurements that disturbed the
particles in transit to a lesser degree and thereby influenced the
interference pattern only to a comparable extent.
[
](Double-slit experiment - Wikipedia)
That is more in line with my explanation than the quantum-mechanical
one.
Best,
Bill P.
(Gavin Ritz 2010.01.11.13.33NZT)
[Shannon Williams
2010.04.10.1300]
[From Bruce Gregory
(2010.04.10.0857 EDT)]
It’s beginning to sound
like Gödel’s Incompleteness Theory. (That’s Quantum Mechanics).
Actually Rick’s flyball experiment is
very pertinent to this.
You’ve hit the nail on
the Head, Shannon.
Maybe PCT after all can explain
this. We just need to come up with a very good (Where do you live Bill?) Lafayette Interpretation.
Regards
Gavin
The results of the experiment are uncontrolled
perceptions.
But when the experimenter ‘tries to make sense’ of the
uncontrolled
perceptions, he does so by comparing them to his
existing references.
So although the complete set of results might include
uncontrolled
perceptions, he only perceives and makes note of the
controlled ones.
If he correctly controlled all of the relevant perceptions
then he
would not need the concept of ‘duallity’ to explain
the results.
[Martin Taylor
2010.04.10.11.43]
The experimenter is not controlling for which
member of the set of possible results will occur.
The issue isn’t the results. The issue is the
interpreation of the
results. ‘Duallity’ is a reference in the brain used
to control the
results.
[From Rick Marken
(2010.04.10.1015)]
The 2 slit experiment reveals physics to be a far
more mature science than psychology.
The 2 slit experiments may be more mature, but when
the 2 slit
experimenters put on their theorizing hats, they are
forging a
reference that is built of perceptions that are only
in their heads.
The interesting part of Gavin’s question is: how can
the theorizer
use his knowledge of how he controlls his perceptions
to help him
discover which of his references prevents him from
percieving what
would be simple to percieve if the reference were
different.
···
( Gavin
Ritz 2010.04.11.13.41)
[From Bruce
Gregory (2010.04.10.1512 EDT)]
[Shannon Williams
2010.04.10.1300]
[From Bruce
Gregory (2010.04.10.0857 EDT)]
Bruce do you actually believe there is such things called photons. Or do
you think that is just a very clever interpretation of some reality we are
trying to interpret. Do you actually believe there are also such things called hydrogen
or is that just an interpretation of something? Albeit an extremely clever one
with universal acceptance. (discounting the creationist).
The results of the
experiment are uncontrolled perceptions.
SW: But when the experimenter ‘tries to make sense’ of the uncontrolled
perceptions, he does so by comparing them to his existing references.
So although the complete set of results might include uncontrolled
perceptions, he only perceives and makes note of the controlled ones.
If he correctly controlled all of the relevant perceptions then he
would not need the concept of ‘duallity’ to explain the results.
BG: I don’t think the
experimenter ever controls the uncontrolled perceptions. They are what they
are. Any effort to control them is called fraud. It is not true that he only
perceives and takes note of the controlled perceptions. Most of our perceptions
are uncontrolled. We take no action to bring them to desired reference states.
As far as I can tell, your claim that if the experimenter correctly controlled
all the relevant perceptions he would not need the concept of duality to
explain the results comes awfully close to wishful thinking. Unless you are
saying that his life would be simpler if he fudged the results. With that I can
agree.
[Martin Taylor 2010.04.10.11.43]
The experimenter is not
controlling for which member of the set of possible results will occur.
SW: The issue isn’t the results. The issue is the interpreation of the
results. ‘Duallity’ is a reference in the brain used to control the
results.
BG: I assume by
“duality” you are referring to the need to make use of probability
amplitudes to explain (model) the outcome of the experiments. The only control
that seems to me to be involved in this process is the control needed to carry
out the calculations. No one that I know is controlling a perception of
duality. Perhaps I miss your point.
[From Rick Marken
(2010.04.10.1015)]
The 2 slit experiment
reveals physics to be a far more mature science than psychology.
SW: The 2 slit
experiments may be more mature, but when the 2 slitexperimenters put on their theorizing hats, they are forging a
reference that is built of perceptions that are only in their heads.
The interesting part of Gavin’s question is: how can the theorizer
use his knowledge of how he controlls his perceptions to help him
discover which of his references prevents him from percieving what
would be simple to percieve if the reference were different.
BG: Either you know
something that the rest of us don’t or you are making an unsubstantiated claim.
It is true that we see the world in terms of particles and waves and that these
two representations are very different. The simplest “solution” to
this “problem” is to simply say that light consists of particles
called photons. When you want to predict how light will behave you must invoke
a model that involves waves (probability amplitudes). The model, however, is
not the the physical world. In the physical world there are only photons; there
are no waves as far as we know.
Bruce