PCT as physiology-psychology link

[DAVID_WOLSK1]

[From Dan Palmer (2002.09.13.1020)]

ps. I was also meaning to ask - would it be fair to say that the

traditional

distinction between physiology and psychology evaporates in PCT (i.e.,

that they

become fused in one continuous hierarchical control system)?

I invite PCTers to check out recent articles on the mind-body relationship
.... there's a lot of fascinating research filling in the chain of
cybernetic processes. Two interesting ones to start with using google.com:
    Ernest Lawrence Rossi and Bruce H. Lipton

David Wolsk

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.09.17 14:56) PDT]

I invite PCTers to check out recent articles
on the mind-body relationship

A quibble about this customary way of phrasing it: for there to be a
relationship between mind and body there must first be a
distinction between them. There is a strong case for this being a
(greatly influential) mistake by Decartes. Pertinently, I am not aware of
any PCT evidence or argument in support of such a distinction. The puzzle
is awareness and attention, not mind.

… there’s a lot of fascinating research
filling in the chain of

cybernetic processes. Two interesting ones to start with using
google.com:

Ernest Lawrence Rossi

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books-uk&field-author=Rossi%2C%20Ernest%20Lawrence/202-6094213-6687823

The Psychobiology of Mind-Body Healing

The Psychobiology of Gene Expressionh

Rossi worked closely with Milton H Erickson and wrote describing and
teaching his way of working with hypnosis.

I think Rossi’s writings here are pretty speculative, but have not read
them.

There is reason to question standard dogmas about molecular genetics.
First, molecules in the cellular environment determine diverse ways in
which a single gene may be expressed (“alternative splicing”).
This breaks the one-gene one-trait dogma. Second, a complex protein may
be folded in more than one way. This breaks the one-protein one-template
dogma. (See Barry Commoner’s critique in the February issue of Harper’s
Magazine. See
<http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/temp/0115-115.html>
for summary.) The consequences are beginning to become more visible now,
as for example in the recent statement by the Wistar Institute that
cloning is far too unreliable for anything beyond experimentation with
animals. Most cloned animals die.

and Bruce H. Lipton

Lipton is starting from his grounding in cellular biology and going in
two directions, quantum physics and psychology.

http://spiritcrossing.com/lipton/biography.[shtm

](http://spiritcrossing.com/lipton/biography.shtm)http://spiritcrossing.com/lipton/biology.shtm:

"Cellular biologists now recognize that the environment
(external universe and internal-physiology), and more importantly, our
perception of the environment, directly controls the activity of our
genes. The lecture will broadly review the molecular mechanisms by
which environmental awareness interfaces genetic regulation and guides
organismal evolution.

“The quantum physics behind these mechanisms provide insight into
the communication channels that link the mind-body duality. An
awareness of how vibrational signatures and resonance impact molecular
communication constitutes a master key that unlocks a mechanism by which
our thoughts, attitudes and beliefs create the conditions of our body and
the external world. This knowledge can be employed to actively
redefine our physical and emotional well-being.”

    /Bruce

Nevin

···

At 10:46 PM 9/13/2002 -0700, David Wolsk wrote:

David Wolsk

[Acree_Michael]

[From Mike Acree (2002.09.17.1522
PDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2002.09.17 14:56)
PDT–

I read Rossi’s The Psychobiology of Mind-Body
Healing when it first came out in 1986; it’s very good, but a little dated
by now. Rossi is a certified character; I would enjoy reading almost
anything he wrote. John Racy, a Tucson psychiatrist, introduced him
at the first Evolution of Psychotherapy conference in 1985 as someone who had
been physically and sexually abused as a child and had run away from home at the
age of 7 to apprentice himself to a shoemaker. It was only when he got to
the part about the shoemaker that I began to catch on that it was a joke, but
some people never did. Rossi’s talk focused on state-dependent memory and
learning systems. Memories are tied to particular physical states, which
can sometimes be used to aid recall (we can’t remember what we went into the
kitchen for until we go back into the bedroom and recreate the earlier
state). Early into his talk, when Rossi removed his sportcoat and threw it
on the floor, we all assumed the stage lights must be hot. Similarly when
he pulled off his sweater and loosened his tie. But he kept on until, in
time with the last sentence, he was standing there in boxer shorts and a green
T-shirt that said HYPOTHALAMUS. All by way, you see, of cementing that
particular point in our memory.

Mike

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2002.09.18.0813 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2002.09.17 14:56) PDT --

A quibble about this customary way of phrasing it: for there to be a
relationship between mind and body there must first be a distinction
between them. There is a strong case for this being a (greatly
influential) mistake by Decartes. Pertinently, I am not aware of any PCT
evidence or argument in support of such a distinction. The puzzle is
awareness and attention, not mind.

I see a strong distinction between mind and body, but perhaps I think of
"mind" a bit like others think of "body." I think the mind is in the brain,
but I don't think the brain is the mind. That is, the distinction between
one mind and other is not that of which brain the mind is in, but what the
different minds' organizations are. No matter what the mind's organization,
the brain in which it resides is essentially the same as the brains in
which other minds reside. The analogy to the stored-program-and-data
computer is my inspiration for this understanding.

Both computers and brains have a relatively small number of different kinds
of computing elements -- vanishingly small in comparison with the number of
different processes and functions that exist and execute in a normal human
brain. Just consider the counting numbers. The brain can create a name for
every counting number between zero and, say, 10^16, which is 1,000,000
times the number of neurons in the brain. "Sixteen quadrillion, nine
hundred and thirty two trillion, six hundred and fourteen billion, eleven
million, three hundred and twenty-three thousand, two hundred and three."
So obviously there is not one neuron for each counting number. In fact
there can't even be one _synapse_ for every number. Unless you want to get
down to the molecular level (where the problem is how a molecule could
_write_ the number), it's just not possible that every thought, memory, or
perception corresponds to one neuron or synapse.

This is exactly parallel to the way computers operate. A relatively small
number of computing element types (but a large number of each type) become
organized and reorganized into "devices" that carry out an endless
assortment of functions. The variables that are manipulated are neural
signals, and the rules for manipulation exist as synaptic weights which
can be adjusted by other neural signals. Furthermore, many of these neural
signals are related to other variables outside the brain, in that their
frequencies correspond to the magnitudes of external variables; I'm
speaking, of course, of perceptions. Simple representations like signals
standing for light intensity are then combined by neural computers to form
more abstract representations, like colors or shadings. An infinity of
different visual worlds, as in a movie, can thus be represented inside the
the brain without any change in the physical complement of neurons or any
change in their mode of functioning. Control of the visually-represented
world can be carried out by organizations of other signal-carrying neurons,
with the very same neurons connected in the very same way being capable of
carrying out many different control processes as the environment changes.
Clearly, no neuron has such abilities. Only the _organization_ in the
collection of neurons can do such things. If all the neurons were replaced,
one by one, with little transistor arrays that performed the same
input-output operations, the rest of the brain wouldn't know the difference.

In fact, I claim, the brain itself doesn't know anything. The brain is just
a piece of meat. Only the organization in the brain can know things.
Knowing is a brain _activity_, not a _property_ of a brain, just as
deriving and representing the square root of a number is an _activity_ of a
computer, not a _property_ of the computer. Computers of vastly different
architecture can all compute square roots. When the activity in a brain
stops, all knowledge ceases, even though the same brain is still physically
present. In a computer, all computation by a program stops when the program
exits, even though the computer is still intact and present, and even still
running. Where does a thought go when you cease to think it? The same place
a program goes when it exits.

So while I'm convinced that a brain is a material object, that which
resides in the brain is not a material object. Organization weighs
nothing; it has no size, it is not an event, you can't point at it. The
mind is an immaterial entity residing in a physical brain. It can't exist
without a brain, because what becomes organized is a network of neural
signals and synaptic weightings. But the brain by itself is not the same as
the mind it supports, any more than the computer itself is the same as the
Star Wars program that is running in it.

Best,

Bill P.

···

.... there's a lot of fascinating research filling in the chain of
cybernetic processes. Two interesting ones to start with using google.com:
    Ernest Lawrence Rossi

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books-uk&field-author=Rossi%2C%20Ernest%20Lawrence/202-6094213-6687823
The Psychobiology of Mind-Body Healing
The Psychobiology of Gene Expressionh
Rossi worked closely with Milton H Erickson and wrote describing and
teaching his way of working with hypnosis.

I think Rossi's writings here are pretty speculative, but have not read them.

There is reason to question standard dogmas about molecular genetics.
First, molecules in the cellular environment determine diverse ways in
which a single gene may be expressed ("alternative splicing"). This breaks
the one-gene one-trait dogma. Second, a complex protein may be folded in
more than one way. This breaks the one-protein one-template dogma. (See
Barry Commoner's critique in the February issue of Harper's Magazine. See
<http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/temp/0115-115.html&gt; for summary.) The
consequences are beginning to become more visible now, as for example in
the recent statement by the Wistar Institute that cloning is far too
unreliable for anything beyond experimentation with animals. Most cloned
animals die.

and Bruce H. Lipton

Lipton is starting from his grounding in cellular biology and going in two
directions, quantum physics and psychology.
http://spiritcrossing.com/lipton/biography.shtm

http://spiritcrossing.com/lipton/biology.shtm:
"Cellular biologists now recognize that the environment (external
universe and internal-physiology), and more importantly, our perception
of the environment, directly controls the activity of our genes. The
lecture will broadly review the molecular mechanisms by which
environmental awareness interfaces genetic regulation and guides
organismal evolution.

"The quantum physics behind these mechanisms provide insight into the
communication channels that link the mind-body duality. An awareness of
how vibrational signatures and resonance impact molecular communication
constitutes a master key that unlocks a mechanism by which our thoughts,
attitudes and beliefs create the conditions of our body and the external
world. This knowledge can be employed to actively redefine our physical
and emotional well-being."

        /Bruce Nevin

David Wolsk

[Isaac_Kurtzer1]

i.kurtzer (2001.09.18.1130)

I think this is a neat, though oblique, issue. I see something like this
every time I've taken a psychology course. There the instructors
goes to great lengths/leaps to show that the "material" brain is
terribly scientific versus
the "immaterial"
mind (or soul if they want to be very nasty). But to me thats so patently
inaccurate a portrayl. Most "things" are not material starting with
"Recording from a neuron" or any of their theories or "collegue". When
I've mentioned this I get the impression they think I'm insane. But I
think this makes a great deal of sense if one thinks of a heirchy of
perception. Thats even talksed about in some of the books, but its as if
they don't really believe it.
Weird.

Isaac

···

On Wed, 18 Sep 2002, Bill Powers wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2002.09.18.0813 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2002.09.17 14:56) PDT --

>A quibble about this customary way of phrasing it: for there to be a
>relationship between mind and body there must first be a distinction
>between them. There is a strong case for this being a (greatly
>influential) mistake by Decartes. Pertinently, I am not aware of any PCT
>evidence or argument in support of such a distinction. The puzzle is
>awareness and attention, not mind.

I see a strong distinction between mind and body, but perhaps I think of
"mind" a bit like others think of "body." I think the mind is in the brain,
but I don't think the brain is the mind. That is, the distinction between
one mind and other is not that of which brain the mind is in, but what the
different minds' organizations are. No matter what the mind's organization,
the brain in which it resides is essentially the same as the brains in
which other minds reside. The analogy to the stored-program-and-data
computer is my inspiration for this understanding.

Both computers and brains have a relatively small number of different kinds
of computing elements -- vanishingly small in comparison with the number of
different processes and functions that exist and execute in a normal human
brain. Just consider the counting numbers. The brain can create a name for
every counting number between zero and, say, 10^16, which is 1,000,000
times the number of neurons in the brain. "Sixteen quadrillion, nine
hundred and thirty two trillion, six hundred and fourteen billion, eleven
million, three hundred and twenty-three thousand, two hundred and three."
So obviously there is not one neuron for each counting number. In fact
there can't even be one _synapse_ for every number. Unless you want to get
down to the molecular level (where the problem is how a molecule could
_write_ the number), it's just not possible that every thought, memory, or
perception corresponds to one neuron or synapse.

This is exactly parallel to the way computers operate. A relatively small
number of computing element types (but a large number of each type) become
organized and reorganized into "devices" that carry out an endless
assortment of functions. The variables that are manipulated are neural
signals, and the rules for manipulation exist as synaptic weights which
can be adjusted by other neural signals. Furthermore, many of these neural
signals are related to other variables outside the brain, in that their
frequencies correspond to the magnitudes of external variables; I'm
speaking, of course, of perceptions. Simple representations like signals
standing for light intensity are then combined by neural computers to form
more abstract representations, like colors or shadings. An infinity of
different visual worlds, as in a movie, can thus be represented inside the
the brain without any change in the physical complement of neurons or any
change in their mode of functioning. Control of the visually-represented
world can be carried out by organizations of other signal-carrying neurons,
with the very same neurons connected in the very same way being capable of
carrying out many different control processes as the environment changes.
Clearly, no neuron has such abilities. Only the _organization_ in the
collection of neurons can do such things. If all the neurons were replaced,
one by one, with little transistor arrays that performed the same
input-output operations, the rest of the brain wouldn't know the difference.

In fact, I claim, the brain itself doesn't know anything. The brain is just
a piece of meat. Only the organization in the brain can know things.
Knowing is a brain _activity_, not a _property_ of a brain, just as
deriving and representing the square root of a number is an _activity_ of a
computer, not a _property_ of the computer. Computers of vastly different
architecture can all compute square roots. When the activity in a brain
stops, all knowledge ceases, even though the same brain is still physically
present. In a computer, all computation by a program stops when the program
exits, even though the computer is still intact and present, and even still
running. Where does a thought go when you cease to think it? The same place
a program goes when it exits.

So while I'm convinced that a brain is a material object, that which
resides in the brain is not a material object. Organization weighs
nothing; it has no size, it is not an event, you can't point at it. The
mind is an immaterial entity residing in a physical brain. It can't exist
without a brain, because what becomes organized is a network of neural
signals and synaptic weightings. But the brain by itself is not the same as
the mind it supports, any more than the computer itself is the same as the
Star Wars program that is running in it.

Best,

Bill P.

>
>
>>.... there's a lot of fascinating research filling in the chain of
>>cybernetic processes. Two interesting ones to start with using google.com:
>> Ernest Lawrence Rossi
>
>http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books-uk&field-author=Rossi%2C%20Ernest%20Lawrence/202-6094213-6687823
>The Psychobiology of Mind-Body Healing
>The Psychobiology of Gene Expressionh
>Rossi worked closely with Milton H Erickson and wrote describing and
>teaching his way of working with hypnosis.
>
>I think Rossi's writings here are pretty speculative, but have not read them.
>
>There is reason to question standard dogmas about molecular genetics.
>First, molecules in the cellular environment determine diverse ways in
>which a single gene may be expressed ("alternative splicing"). This breaks
>the one-gene one-trait dogma. Second, a complex protein may be folded in
>more than one way. This breaks the one-protein one-template dogma. (See
>Barry Commoner's critique in the February issue of Harper's Magazine. See
><http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/temp/0115-115.html&gt; for summary.) The
>consequences are beginning to become more visible now, as for example in
>the recent statement by the Wistar Institute that cloning is far too
>unreliable for anything beyond experimentation with animals. Most cloned
>animals die.
>
>>and Bruce H. Lipton
>
>Lipton is starting from his grounding in cellular biology and going in two
>directions, quantum physics and psychology.
>http://spiritcrossing.com/lipton/biography.shtm
>
>http://spiritcrossing.com/lipton/biology.shtm:
> "Cellular biologists now recognize that the environment (external
> universe and internal-physiology), and more importantly, our perception
> of the environment, directly controls the activity of our genes. The
> lecture will broadly review the molecular mechanisms by which
> environmental awareness interfaces genetic regulation and guides
> organismal evolution.
>
>"The quantum physics behind these mechanisms provide insight into the
>communication channels that link the mind-body duality. An awareness of
>how vibrational signatures and resonance impact molecular communication
>constitutes a master key that unlocks a mechanism by which our thoughts,
>attitudes and beliefs create the conditions of our body and the external
>world. This knowledge can be employed to actively redefine our physical
>and emotional well-being."
>
> /Bruce Nevin
>
>
>>David Wolsk

[DAVID_WOLSK1]

I think you’ll find that both Rossi and Lipton are
well aware of the “standard dogmas in molecular genetics.” Also, please don’t
get hung up on my sloppy word choice …“mind-body relationship.” I find
Power’s analysis of this to be quite compelling and accurate.

David Wolsk

···

----- Original Message -----

From:
Bruce Nevin

To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu

Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:56
PM

Subject: Re: PCT as physiology-psychology
link

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.09.17 14:56) PDT]

At 10:46 PM > 9/13/2002 -0700, David Wolsk wrote:

I invite PCTers to check out recent articles

on the mind-body relationship

A quibble about this customary
way of phrasing it: for there to be a relationship between mind and
body there must first be a distinction between them. There is a strong
case for this being a (greatly influential) mistake by Decartes. Pertinently,
I am not aware of any PCT evidence or argument in support of such a
distinction. The puzzle is awareness and attention, not mind.

[DAVID_WOLSK1]

Friday, Sept 20, 2002 3 pm

Check our Rossi’s website for more recent articles:

[http://home.earthlink.net/~rossi/](http://home.earthlink.net/~rossi/)

And, I think there is an updated “Psychobiology of
Mind-Body healing”

David

···

----- Original Message -----

From:
Acree,
Michael

To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu

Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 3:25
PM

Subject: Re: PCT as physiology-psychology
link

[From Mike Acree (2002.09.17.1522
PDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2002.09.17
14:56) PDT–

I read Rossi’s The Psychobiology of
Mind-Body Healing when it first came out in 1986; it’s very good, but a
little dated by now. Rossi is a certified character; I would enjoy
reading almost anything he wrote. John Racy, a Tucson psychiatrist,
introduced him at the first Evolution of Psychotherapy conference in 1985 as
someone who had been physically and sexually abused as a child and had run
away from home at the age of 7 to apprentice himself to a shoemaker. It
was only when he got to the part about the shoemaker that I began to catch on
that it was a joke, but some people never did. Rossi’s talk focused on
state-dependent memory and learning systems. Memories are tied to
particular physical states, which can sometimes be used to aid recall (we
can’t remember what we went into the kitchen for until we go back into the
bedroom and recreate the earlier state). Early into his talk, when Rossi
removed his sportcoat and threw it on the floor, we all assumed the stage
lights must be hot. Similarly when he pulled off his sweater and
loosened his tie. But he kept on until, in time with the last sentence,
he was standing there in boxer shorts and a green T-shirt that said
HYPOTHALAMUS. All by way, you see, of cementing that particular point in
our memory.

Mike

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.09.20 17:25 PDT)]

Bill Powers (2002.09.18.0813 MDT)–

Bateson suggested what may be the clearest way out of all these confusing
circumlocutions, that that is to see “mind” as an
organizational property of matter.

His view doesn’t constrain “mind” to inhabiting brains. For
him, the smallest unit of “mind” is a difference which makes a
difference (in a feedback loop); and this is the smallest unit of
“information” as well. This leads him to see cybernetic
feedback loops in a continuum beyond the sensors and effectors of the
organism and out through the environment.

The obvious brake on this enthusiasm is to stipulate that, to qualify as
“mind”, there must be at some point in each loop a difference
between an input value and a commensurate reference value – no
comparator, no mind. Or at least not any that makes a difference. (In
addition, we’d have to stipulate that other loop parameters be
appropriately tuned to sustain negative feedback control.)

For Bateson, at every point in the feedback loop of the home heating
system there is a difference that makes a difference. The electrical
current turned on by the thermostat makes a difference in the magnetic
field surrounding a coil, which makes a difference in the position of a
relay arm, which makes a difference in the flow of electricity at a
higher voltage than is permitted in a thermostat, which turns on the
furnace pumps, etc. The above restriction would say that not every such
difference that makes another difference is an elementary unity of mind,
but rather only the entire loop containing a comparator (the thermostat).

Alternatively, if each constituent difference that makes a difference is
a minimal element of mind, then it is only by virtue of its participation
in a feedback loop that includes a comparator and is properly tuned for
negative feedback control. Otherwise, sunrise heating a rock counts as an
instance of mind. So Bateson’s position can only be reached analytically,
given a functioning negative feedback loop to start with.

That quibble aside, it is helpful to think of mind as an organizational
property of matter, because it frees us from the Cartesian delusion that
mind is some disembodied essence that somehow inhabits matter, the ghost
in the machine.

i.kurtzer (2001.09.18.1130) –

Most “things” are not material
starting with

“Recording from a neuron” or any of their theories or
“colleague”. When

I’ve mentioned this I get the impression they think I’m insane. But
I

think this makes a great deal of sense if one thinks of a heirarchy
of

perception. Thats even talked about in some of the books, but its
as if

they don’t really believe it.

Analytically, it’s pretty straightforward. What is puzzling, however, are
the nature of attention or awareness, and the qualia of subjective
experience.
These qualia have something in common with “boss
Reality”, the Ding an sich “behind” our perceptions, and
that is that I haven’t a clue whether ‘blue’ or ‘colleague’ is “the
same” for you as it is for me, and there is no possible way for me
to find out, because my own perceptions are my only means of trying to
find out.
I don’t believe they think you’re insane, they’re probably just nervous.
We can suppose that the Professors skirt sarcastically around this as a
vestige of antireligiosity. (Some of my best friends are devout
and observant anti-Catholics, etc., which I regard as another kind
of ecclesiasticism.) But I think it may have as much or more to do with
there being something there that is inherently inaccessible to proof.

Mathematicians have got used to being unable to prove some things (which
Gödel demonstrated by an
analogous kind of self-reflexivity) and have sort of given up on the
Foundations of Mathematics. But I think they still don’t like it.

    /Bruce

Nevin

···

At 11:47 AM 9/18/2002 -0400, Marc Kurtzer wrote:

[Dan_Palmer]

[From Dan Palmer (2002.09.23 11:40 Melbourne Time)]

Hey Bruce,

Your reply reminded me of a very short definition of self-correction
(i.e., negative feedback) Bateson once gave in an interview, where
self-correction entailed that �differences can be used to stimulate that
which will make them not different.� The example he then gave
incorporated your rightly-emphasized comparator-clause - "The difference
between the way I want to go and the way I am going can be used as
information to touch off events which allow me to correct."

I always liked the example of the difference in color between a
chameleon's body and background contributing to the elimination of that
difference via a change in body color. The chameleon's job is to avoid
becoming information - and thereby making various differences to some
predator's processes of digestion ;-).

Like you, I've found a lot of sense in Bateson's proposal that mind-body
dualism is resolved if mental organization (Bateson's creatura) is
viewed as _immanent_ in matter (his pleroma). The same point has been
made by Maturana and Varela in terms of organization and structure and
by John Dewey in terms of life-activity and environmental medium.
Interestingly, all three sets of scholars ended up arguing that
organism, as ongoing organization, literally extends beyond sensory and
motor surfaces (i.e., the skin).

Cheers,
Dan Palmer

ps. Rick - thanks for that link to Abbot's work with computers - I'll
follow it up.

Bruce Nevin wrote:

···

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.09.20 17:25 PDT)]

Bateson suggested what may be the clearest way out of all these
confusing circumlocutions, that that is to see "mind" as an
organizational property of matter.

His view doesn't constrain "mind" to inhabiting brains. For him, the
smallest unit of "mind" is a difference which makes a difference (in a
feedback loop); and this is the smallest unit of "information" as
well. This leads him to see cybernetic feedback loops in a continuum
beyond the sensors and effectors of the organism and out through the
environment.

The obvious brake on this enthusiasm is to stipulate that, to qualify
as "mind", there must be at some point in each loop a difference
between an input value and a commensurate reference value -- no
comparator, no mind. Or at least not any that makes a difference. (In
addition, we'd have to stipulate that other loop parameters be
appropriately tuned to sustain negative feedback control.)

For Bateson, at every point in the feedback loop of the home heating
system there is a difference that makes a difference. The electrical
current turned on by the thermostat makes a difference in the magnetic
field surrounding a coil, which makes a difference in the position of
a relay arm, which makes a difference in the flow of electricity at a
higher voltage than is permitted in a thermostat, which turns on the
furnace pumps, etc. The above restriction would say that not every
such difference that makes another difference is an elementary unity
of mind, but rather only the entire loop containing a comparator (the
thermostat).

Alternatively, if each constituent difference that makes a difference
is a minimal element of mind, then it is only by virtue of its
participation in a feedback loop that includes a comparator and is
properly tuned for negative feedback control. Otherwise, sunrise
heating a rock counts as an instance of mind. So Bateson's position
can only be reached analytically, given a functioning negative
feedback loop to start with.

That quibble aside, it is helpful to think of mind as an
organizational property of matter, because it frees us from the
Cartesian delusion that mind is some disembodied essence that somehow
inhabits matter, the ghost in the machine.

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2002.09.22.2210)]

Dan Palmer (2002.09.23 11:40 Melbourne Time) to Bruce Nevin

Like you, I've found a lot of sense in Bateson's proposal that mind-body
dualism is resolved if mental organization (Bateson's creatura) is
viewed as _immanent_ in matter (his pleroma). The same point has been
made by Maturana and Varela in terms of organization and structure and
by John Dewey in terms of life-activity and environmental medium.
Interestingly, all three sets of scholars ended up arguing that
organism, as ongoing organization, literally extends beyond sensory and
motor surfaces (i.e., the skin).

So are the keys that I'm pressing to create this reply part of me? If an
organism (like me) _literally_ extends beyond "the skin", how far beyond
the skin does it extend? Isn't it likely that the three sets of scholars
mentioned above ended up arguing that the "organism literally extends
beyond the sensory and motor surfaces" because they had nothing else to do
but argue since they were not busy building and testing models of
organisms?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[Bill_Williams_UMKC]

[From Bill Williams UMKC 23 September 2002 1:00 AM CST]

Rick,

they had nothing else to do but argue since they were not busy
building and testing models of
organisms?

You have an exceptional capacity for inventing reasons to sneer at
people.

Bill Williams

···

______________________________________________________________________
Do you want a free e-mail for life ? Get it at http://www.email.ro/

[Fred_Nickols2]

[From Fred Nickols (2002.09.23.0800)] --

[From Rick Marken (2002.09.22.2210)]

> Dan Palmer (2002.09.23 11:40 Melbourne Time) to Bruce Nevin
>
> Interestingly, all three sets of scholars ended up arguing that
> organism, as ongoing organization, literally extends beyond sensory and
> motor surfaces (i.e., the skin).

So are the keys that I'm pressing to create this reply part of me? If an
organism (like me) _literally_ extends beyond "the skin", how far beyond
the skin does it extend? Isn't it likely that the three sets of scholars
mentioned above ended up arguing that the "organism literally extends
beyond the sensory and motor surfaces" because they had nothing else to do
but argue since they were not busy building and testing models of
organisms?

I'm no physicist or scientist but I seem to vaguely recall that,
technically (and "literally"), we do extend beyond the skin; indeed, that
the surface of everything extends beyond what we perceive to be that
surface and that the space between the things we perceive isn't empty space
at all but filled with matter we simply do not perceive with our unaided
senses. Moreover, all this matter is in motion, intertwined and
interacting. Thus, everything is quite literally connected to everything
else even if those connections are not strong enough to take into
consideration on a regular basis for most practical purposes.

So, if it can be argued that we act to control our perceptions instead of
what it is we perceive (which some are sure to view as a very technical
point even if it is literally true), why can't it be equally validly argued
that "we" extend beyond our skin?

Puzzled...

Fred Nickols
nickols@safe-t.net

[Stephen_O_Shaughness]

I’ve not read Bateson so I can’t, intelligently, guess what he means by ‘difference’. However, from the comments and examples given in this discussion I have to wonder if difference and change are the same thing? The sun beating down on a rock certainly causes a difference in temperature. But is this temperature change the same as the difference Bateson is talking about? The rock is still a rock. It’s attributes remain the same (i.e. the same set of attributes) even if their values have changed.

Steve O

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnevin@CISCO.COM]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 6:26 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.UIUC.EDU
Subject: Re: PCT as physiology-psychology link

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.09.20 17:25 PDT)]

Bill Powers (2002.09.18.0813 MDT)–

… His view doesn’t constrain “mind” to inhabiting brains. For him, the smallest unit of “mind” is a difference which makes a difference (in a feedback loop); and this is the smallest unit of “information” as well. This leads him to see cybernetic feedback loops in a continuum beyond the sensors and effectors of the organism and out through the environment.
…

For Bateson, at every point in the feedback loop of the home heating system there is a difference that makes a difference. The electrical current turned on by the thermostat makes a difference in the magnetic field surrounding a coil, which makes a difference in the position of a relay arm, which makes a difference in the flow of electricity at a higher voltage than is permitted in a thermostat, which turns on the furnace pumps, etc. The above restriction would say that not every such difference that makes another difference is an elementary unity of mind, but rather only the entire loop containing a comparator (the thermostat).

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2002.09.23.0545 MDT)]

Dan Palmer (2002.09.23 11:40 Melbourne Time)--

> ... a very short definition of self-correction

(i.e., negative feedback) Bateson once gave in an interview, where
self-correction entailed that "differences can be used to stimulate that
which will make them not different." The example he then gave
incorporated your rightly-emphasized comparator-clause - "The difference
between the way I want to go and the way I am going can be used as
information to touch off events which allow me to correct."

This is OK, but it tends to slow down and fragment the picture of the loop
to the point where the way most of them operate is unrecognizable. You get
the idea that first I see a difference, then I use this information as a
trigger that sets off automatic processes that correct the error, and then
it's all done. Most real processes of control involve errors that are
driving actions that are bringing perceptions closer to their desired state
which is resulting in continuously diminishing error, all parts of the
process overlapping in time. This process continues while the perception
approaches the reference condition and the error gets smaller and the
action changes according to disturbances or the demands of environmental
properties or both, thus causing the perception to approach the reference
condition .... Everything in the loop is changing at the same time, rather
than a sequence of events taking place. Hard to talk about, but well worth
understanding.

I always liked the example of the difference in color between a
chameleon's body and background contributing to the elimination of that
difference via a change in body color. The chameleon's job is to avoid
becoming information - and thereby making various differences to some
predator's processes of digestion ;-).

That would be a very good example of a control system if we could prove
that the chameleon is capable of sensing the difference in color between
its body and the background. I've never thought of that before, but
obviously if the chameleon's color comes to a close match with different
backgrounds of varying shades, _something_ has to be detecting the
difference. I would suspect the chameleon's own eye, unless its skin is
photosensitive.

The alternative to a control system would be a stimulus-response system in
which each different shade of background caused a corresponding skin color
to be produced, which is roughly what biologists think now, as far as I
know. That's possible, of course, but then we'd be looking at a very slow
evolutionary contriol process for adjusting the amount of the response
until a match, or an effecty of a match, were achieved. How about arranging
to place a chameleon on a series of backgrounds of varying colors or shades
and using a color photometer to record its skin color relative to the
background? Has anyone ever done that? Has anyone ever done that while
presenting _other_ colors to the chameleon's eyes?

The interesting thing, of course, is that ideally the contrast should be
eliminated in the eye of the predator, not the chameleon's eye, so if the
eyes have different spectral responses we would see a match in terms of
the predator's color vision rather than the chameleon's or the meter's. I
rather suspect that it's the chameleon's color vision that determines the
result and that we have a true control system. On that hypothesis I would
guess that a chameleon's color vision has evolved to be similar to that of
its predators.

Like you, I've found a lot of sense in Bateson's proposal that mind-body
dualism is resolved if mental organization (Bateson's creatura) is
viewed as _immanent_ in matter (his pleroma). The same point has been
made by Maturana and Varela in terms of organization and structure and
by John Dewey in terms of life-activity and environmental medium.
Interestingly, all three sets of scholars ended up arguing that
organism, as ongoing organization, literally extends beyond sensory and
motor surfaces (i.e., the skin).

I don't see why we have to resolve it. Who said it's a bad thing in the
first place? I detect a rather pronounced difference between my mind and my
body -- I've never known my stomach to think, or my fingernails to have
goals, or my muscles to decide where I want to walk. I really think the
whole argument comes from scientific nervousness about anything that looks
like mysticism or religion.

Also, I think I can distinguish rather easily between my body and its
environment. After all, I move the same body around through all sorts of
different environments, and when I do, it is the environment that changes,
not my body. You have to retreat into the upper reaches of abstraction
before you have any problem with that, I should think. If you get abstract
enough, of course, you can no longer tell the difference between an
elephant and an elevator, but that would be viewed as a pathological state,
I believe, like the man who mistook his wife for a hat.

For similar reasons, I don't like thinking of mind as a property of matter.
If it were, we would see signs of all matter having goals, perceptions,
error signals, computational methods, and so on (all the things I think of
as having to do with mind), and that is far from true of most matter. It's
not true even of most matter inside a living organism (the water, for
example). To say it's a property of a piece of matter, you must show that
you can take a piece of matter and demonstrate that it has this property,
and of course you won't find mind in _any_ "piece" of an organism. It
exists only in the _intact arrangement_ of parts relative to each other,
and that, of course, is not a property of any of the parts by itself. You
can alter the arrangement of the parts without (necessarily) altering the
parts, given fine enough dissection techniques, but what's left will not
necessarily be alive. It certainly won't be the same organism, or mind.

As far as I can see, organization is an immaterial aspect of every
organized thing, living or not. Some organizations amount to minds, but
most do not. As in all categorical definitions, when you look at them too
closely they develop fuzzy edges -- does my lawn mower have a tiny bit of
mind because it contains a speed control system? I wouldn't say so.What
about my pocket calculator? No, it doesn't contain any control systems --
except the voltage regulator, but that doesn't affect the computations
being carried out. B. F. Skinner? Yes, of course, but if Skinner worked as
he claimed that organisms worked, he would have to say he had no mind.

It's fun to speculate, but I've never been turned on by that sort of stuff,
or rather, my liking for it is satisfied by a very small amount of it. It's
like a Westerner eating Chinese food -- two hours later, all the unsatified
reference signals start becoming noticeable.

Best,

Bill P.

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2002.09.23.1030 MDT)]

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.09.20 17:25 PDT)]

I stole this from Steve O;Shaughnessy’s post since I haven’t received it
yet.

Bill Powers (2002.09.18.0813 MDT)–

…
His view doesn’t constrain “mind” to inhabiting brains. For him, the smallest unit of “mind” is a difference which makes a difference (in a feedback loop); and this is the smallest unit of “information” as well. This leads him to see cybernetic feedback loops in a continuum beyond the sensors and effectors of the organism and out through the environment…
For Bateson, at every point in the feedback loop of the home heating system there is a difference that makes a difference. The electrical current turned on by the thermostat makes a difference in the magnetic field surrounding a coil, which makes a difference in the position of a relay arm, which makes a difference in the flow of electricity at a higher voltage than is permitted in a thermostat, which turns on the furnace pumps, etc. The above restriction would say that not every such difference that makes another difference is an elementary unity of mind, but rather only the entire loop containing a comparator (the thermostat).

That pretty much sums up what I don’t like about cybernetics. By Bateson’s definition every law of nature, every property of matter, is of a bit of mind. This search for the ultimate generalization leads pretty quickly to absurdities. If everything is mind, mind becomes nothing at all. Note that you have to say “makes a difference in …” and fill in WHAT. The excess current through the relay coil makes a difference in its temperature. All differences “make a difference” in something. We’re just talking about physical interactions here. This isn’t what I call learning something about nature.

Bateson said a few good things, the best one for my money being his definition of a “dormitive principle” (a medieval medical term). The rubber-band recoveres its size after being stretched because it has something called elasticity. Variable B changes when variable A changes because A has the property of causality relative to B. And of course, the prototype: a barbiturate will make you sleepy because it contains a dormitive principle, that one actually having been offered as an explanation.

However, cyberneticists are not noted for paying attention to their own clever sayings. Differences make a difference because they are instances of mind, eh?

Best,

Bill P.

···

[DAVID_WOLSK1]

Monday, September 23, 2002, 10.00 am PST

···

----- Original Message -----
From: "Dan Palmer" <daniel.palmer@education.monash.edu.au>
To: <csgnet@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2002 6:43 PM
Subject: Re: PCT as physiology-psychology link

[From Dan Palmer (2002.09.23 11:40 Melbourne Time)]

I always liked the example of the difference in color between a
chameleon's body and background contributing to the elimination of that
difference via a change in body color. The chameleon's job is to avoid
becoming information - and thereby making various differences to some
predator's processes of digestion ;-).

A few evenings ago, there was an incrdedible National Geographic tv
programme on octopuses. It helped to answer a question of mine from long
ago when I read J.Z. Young's classic on the anatomy of an octopus' brain:
how come it's so big? They have two separate control systems for changing
their skin colour and texture ....... many thousands of individually
controlled chromatophores and a whole other system who's name I've forgotten
....... and, of course, those eight arms with exquisite control.

I can't help but add: the coast of British Columbia is one of the best
places to find the really huge ones. That's to add to our recent find of a
huge undersea source of frozen hydrate gas .... to "solve" the looming oil
shortage.

David Wolsk
Victoria

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2002.09.23.1230)]

Fred Nickols (2002.09.23.0800) --

So, if it can be argued that we act to control our perceptions instead of
what it is we perceive (which some are sure to view as a very technical
point even if it is literally true), why can't it be equally validly argued
that "we" extend beyond our skin?

Because I think it unnecessarily obfuscates an important distinction made by
PCT between functions of the organism (controller) and functions of the
environment in which the organism controls. Consider, for example, the
"behavioral illusion" where an apparent change in the functional
characteristics of an organism result from changes in the functional
characteristics (feedback function) of the organism's environment. This
illusion is what undermines the foundations of scientific psychology. In order
to see this illusion you have to see behavior through the lens of the PCT
model, which draws an important boundary between organism and the environment.
Without this boundary, there is control theory, no behavioral illusion and
nothing particularly interesting about PCT.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2002.09.23/1638 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2002.09.23.0800)--

>So, if it can be argued that we act to control our perceptions instead of

what it is we perceive (which some are sure to view as a very technical
point even if it is literally true), why can't it be equally validly argued
that "we" extend beyond our skin?

I think the problem here is in what we mean by the word "we" (or "I").
Those words indicate a perception, and human perceptions are capable of
creating any imaginable representation of experience. If I want to perceive
my car as part of myself, so I feel that damage to it is an injury to "me",
I can certain perceive and act that way. Lots of people do, although not all.

The question as I see it is not what perceptions we can set up, but what is
really part of the behaving system, speaking as a modeler or theoretician.
In any given situation, the external world is certainly part of all our
control loops, supplying the connections through which we act to affect the
states of our perceptions. However, that is the "objective" view, and has
nothing to do with "I" or "we". The "I" or "we" consists of whatever set of
input information, at several levels, we mentally draw a circle around and
mean when we use such words. A given person may include variables we call
environmental in that perception, but clearly not all such variables. And
another person may include a different set of environmental variables --
more or them, fewer of them, and different ones.

So if you ask whether a person extends outside his skin, you have to
specify in whose perceptions you mean. If you mean the person himself or
herself as a self-perceived entity, you're asking if the person can
perceive the self as including things that exist outside the skin, and the
answer is clearly yes. If you're asking an external observer, you may be
asking whether the person's perceptual control systems operate partly
outside his skin, and there the answer is only a very limited yes -- the
external feedback connnections are part of all control systems in the
active mode (as opposed to imagination), but they do not supply the
perception, reference signal, comparison, or conversion to action that make
up any control loops. From this standpoint we would just be saying that the
nervous system and muscles are all inside the skin.

What this boils down to is not a matter of fact but a matter of
classification, for which there are no objective rules. If you want, you
can include chairs in the category named "quadruped," and only a need to
communicate can determine whether this is a good choice.and even if it's a
bad choice, there's nothing to keep you from doing it. So, does the "I"
extend outside the skin? Sure, if that's how you want to see yourself. But
does it _really_? Well, that's a different matter.

Best,

Bill P.

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2002.09.23.2220)]

Bill Williams UMKC 23 September 2002 1:00 AM CST]

Rick,

>
> they had nothing else to do but argue since they were not busy
> building and testing models of
> organisms?

You have an exceptional capacity for inventing reasons to sneer at
people.

Is it the inventing or the sneering (or both) that gets you down?

Regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[Bill_Williams_UMKC]

[From Bill Williams UMKC 24 September 2002 12:33

[From Rick Marken (2002.09.23.2220)]

Is it the inventing or the sneering (or both) that gets you down?

Who said anything about me being down? More inventiveness on your part.

I have, however, been thinking about why a control theory persepective hasn't
been more widely adopted. The preconception that behavior is a stimulus-

organism->response process is obviously a massive obstacle to overcome. It

seems to have survived the recent "revolution" in psychology, so that now what
we have in mainstream psychology is an information processing sequence of
something like a sequence data input-->organism-->decision sequence. The more
things change the more they stay the same!!! And, I think about your case. You
were one of the earliest, if not _the_ earliest, to recognize the merits of
Bill Power's book _The Control of Perception_. And, you've been continuously
and very actively involved in the CSG process from the start. Yet, despite all
this, you still haven't yourself adopted a control theory perspective regarding
human behavior.

You ask, is it your inventiveness or your sneering that "gets me down?" You
don't seem to be aware that in asking the question the way you have, you are
doing so from a non-control theory perspective. Where are you PCT glasses???
The question you ask is consistent with a belief that an environmental
stimulus, or input can generate causal forces within me which result in my
becoming depressed or "down." And, in fact I'm not depressed either by your
sneering or your inventiveness. If I were depressed, which I'm not, from a
control theory persepctve ( the magic glasses ) it would be the result of my
own internal organization, and in a condition which I have choosen rather than
some external cause-- whether you or someone else.

This is in a sense a repeat of the argument we had a year ago, when you claimed
that some arabs jumping up and down with glee over the trade center attack
caused you pain. Then you were attributing your distress to an external cause.
So, my question for you would be how would you justify from a control theory
perspective an argument that external circumstance is the cause of behavior.

Bill Williams

···

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