From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.1646)]
Is there ANYONE out there, and I do mean ANYONE, who can define WHAT ‘official’ PCT is supposed to represent?
This is a VERY simple question. I want to know if I am doing MACT and everyone else is doing ??CT, or is there such a thing as ’ official PCT’.
How about you Martin, Does ‘PCT’, in ANY of your incantations have a cognitive component in it?
If so, where can I find it?
I would appreciate any and all responses, both public, or private.
regards,
Marc
[Martin Taylor [2005.02.14.17.15]
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.1646)]
Is there _ANYONE_ out there, and I do mean _ANYONE_, who can define _WHAT_ 'official' PCT is supposed to represent?
This is a _VERY_ simple question. I want to know if I am doing MACT and everyone else is doing ??CT, or is there such a thing as ' official PCT'.
It's not a simple question. It's either a naive one or a provocative one. But it's not simple.
Is there such a thing as "official" system dynamics? Or "Official" [name your branch of science]. I don't think so.
For PCT, what there is is a basic theoretical underlying structure, on top of which has been developed a generally agreed conventional structure, on top of which there is a whole raft of speculative suggestions. By "generally agreed" I mean "accepted by most of those who accept the underlying structure of perceptual control." So long as one is working from the basis that behaviour is the control of perception, where perception is defined as a state _internal_ to an entity, and behaviour as influences on the world _outside_ the entity, then one is doing PCT (according to me).
How about you Martin, Does 'PCT', in _ANY_ of your incantations have a cognitive component in it?
Yes. All of them do. I like the word "incantations". It suggests the later possibility of decanting fine wine!
If so, where can I find it?
Easiest to define in HPCT: anywhere above the category level, or perhaps it's a bit fuzzier, and extends down to some extent anywhere above the event or sequence level. If you don't like HPCT, you can find it in equivalent places in whatever structure your favourite implementation of PCT has arranged.
Actually, HPCT makes it a bit difficult to avoid cognition, and unquestioning acceptance of the canonical version of HPCT tends to lead one to downplay the non-logical, quasi-visual aspect of cognition. But I don't think that's an important point. What is probably important is that any sufficiently complex PCT structure is likely to imply cognition. I doubt that sufficient complexity exists in a bacterium, and it may not exist in a tree, but I think it highly probable that it exists in a dog. How one would ever test for this (especially in a tree), I wouldn't know. But perhaps if you have a clear definition of "cognition" it might be easier.
When you are thinking about an appropriate definition, remember the history of attempts to define "intelligence." Once upon a time, it was the ability to do arithmetic. But computers could do that better than people could, so that was obviously a wrong definition. Other definitions followed, only to meet a similar fate. In the end, it seems to have come down to "what humans can do that computers can't". So maybe you will wind up with a similar problem in defining "cognition". It may wind up being "what humans can do that non-humans can't. If that happens to the definition, then "cognition" won't exist in a dog, and probably you won't be able to find where it is in any specific PCT structure.
But for now, and thinking of the ill-defined everyday concept of cognition, then cognition appears in just about every version of a PCT structure, whether it be the rigid structure of HPCT or Peter Small's system of fluid attractor basins.
Martin
[from Brian D'Agostino (2005.02.14.2030 EST)]
I am responding to Martin's post, below. I agree with Martin that Marc needs to give a rigorous definition of cognition before his question of where cognition fits into PCT can be given a rigorous answer. Here are my own thoughts on this problem. First, the word "cognition" is used in many different ways across academic disciplines, and even within disciplines. This gets to Marc's point about the fragmentation of knowledge in academia. However, a more unified understanding is emerging across all disciplines, subdisciplines, and schools of thought around the concept of information.
From this perspective, "cognition" is fundamentally a kind of information
processing. What I have said so far is probably not very controversial. But when we try to specify the _kind_ of information processing, different people will probably give different definitions. My definition would be that cognition is the information processing that occurs on the input or perceptual side of control systems. By this definition, cognition occurs at every level of the hierarchy, not just above a certain level, as Martin is suggesting. I would be very interested to hear what others in CSG mean by "cognition."
Brian D'Agostino
[Martin Taylor [2005.02.14.17.15]
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.1646)]
Is there _ANYONE_ out there, and I do mean _ANYONE_, who can define _WHAT_ 'official' PCT is supposed to represent?
This is a _VERY_ simple question. I want to know if I am doing MACT and everyone else is doing ??CT, or is there such a thing as ' official PCT'.
It's not a simple question. It's either a naive one or a provocative one. But it's not simple.
Is there such a thing as "official" system dynamics? Or "Official" [name your branch of science]. I don't think so.
For PCT, what there is is a basic theoretical underlying structure, on top of which has been developed a generally agreed conventional structure, on top of which there is a whole raft of speculative suggestions. By "generally agreed" I mean "accepted by most of those who accept the underlying structure of perceptual control." So long as one is working from the basis that behaviour is the control of perception, where perception is defined as a state _internal_ to an entity, and behaviour as influences on the world _outside_ the entity, then one is doing PCT (according to me).
How about you Martin, Does 'PCT', in _ANY_ of your incantations have a cognitive component in it?
Yes. All of them do. I like the word "incantations". It suggests the later possibility of decanting fine wine!
If so, where can I find it?
Easiest to define in HPCT: anywhere above the category level, or perhaps it's a bit fuzzier, and extends down to some extent anywhere above the event or sequence level. If you don't like HPCT, you can find it in equivalent places in whatever structure your favourite implementation of PCT has arranged.
Actually, HPCT makes it a bit difficult to avoid cognition, and unquestioning acceptance of the canonical version of HPCT tends to lead one to downplay the non-logical, quasi-visual aspect of cognition. But I don't think that's an important point. What is probably important is that any sufficiently complex PCT structure is likely to imply cognition. I doubt that sufficient complexity exists in a bacterium, and it may not exist in a tree, but I think it highly probable that it exists in a dog. How one would ever test for this (especially in a tree), I wouldn't know. But perhaps if you have a clear definition of "cognition" it might be easier.
When you are thinking about an appropriate definition, remember the history of attempts to define "intelligence." Once upon a time, it was the ability to do arithmetic. But computers could do that better than people could, so that was obviously a wrong definition. Other definitions followed, only to meet a similar fate. In the end, it seems to have come down to "what humans can do that computers can't". So maybe you will wind up with a similar problem in defining "cognition". It may wind up being "what humans can do that non-humans can't. If that happens to the definition, then "cognition" won't exist in a dog, and probably you won't be able to find where it is in any specific PCT structure.
But for now, and thinking of the ill-defined everyday concept of cognition, then cognition appears in just about every version of a PCT structure, whether it be the rigid structure of HPCT or Peter Small's system of fluid attractor basins.
Martin
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.2110)]
Cognition is ANY thought, and the processes involved in
In a message dated 2/14/2005 8:52:57 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, bdagostino@VERIZON.NET writes:
[from Brian D’Agostino (2005.02.14.2030 EST)]
I am responding to Martin’s post, below. I agree with Martin that Marc
needs to give a rigorous definition of cognition before his question of
where cognition fits into PCT can be given a rigorous answer. Here are my
own thoughts on this problem. First, the word “cognition” is used in many
different ways across academic disciplines, and even within disciplines.
This gets to Marc’s point about the fragmentation of knowledge in academia.
However, a more unified understanding is emerging across all disciplines,
subdisciplines, and schools of thought around the concept of information.
From this perspective, “cognition” is fundamentally a kind of information
processing. What I have said so far is probably not very controversial.
But when we try to specify the kind of information processing, different
people will probably give different definitions. My definition would be
that cognition is the information processing that occurs on the input or
perceptual side of control systems. By this definition, cognition occurs at
every level of the hierarchy, not just above a certain level, as Martin is
suggesting. I would be very interested to hear what others in CSG mean by
“cognition.”Brian D’Agostino
[Martin Taylor [2005.02.14.17.15]
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.1646)]
Is there ANYONE out there, and I do mean ANYONE, who can define WHAT
‘official’ PCT is supposed to represent?This is a VERY simple question. I want to know if I am doing MACT and
everyone else is doing ??CT, or is there such a thing as ’ official PCT’.It’s not a simple question. It’s either a naive one or a provocative one.
But it’s not simple.Is there such a thing as “official” system dynamics? Or “Official” [name
your branch of science]. I don’t think so.For PCT, what there is is a basic theoretical underlying structure, on top
of which has been developed a generally agreed conventional structure, on
top of which there is a whole raft of speculative suggestions. By
“generally agreed” I mean “accepted by most of those who accept the
underlying structure of perceptual control.” So long as one is working
from the basis that behaviour is the control of perception, where
perception is defined as a state internal to an entity, and behaviour as
influences on the world outside the entity, then one is doing PCT
(according to me).How about you Martin, Does ‘PCT’, in ANY of your incantations have a
cognitive component in it?Yes. All of them do. I like the word “incantations”. It suggests the later
possibility of decanting fine wine!If so, where can I find it?
Easiest to define in HPCT: anywhere above the category level, or perhaps
it’s a bit fuzzier, and extends down to some extent anywhere above the
event or sequence level. If you don’t like HPCT, you can find it in
equivalent places in whatever structure your favourite implementation of
PCT has arranged.Actually, HPCT makes it a bit difficult to avoid cognition, and
unquestioning acceptance of the canonical version of HPCT tends to lead
one to downplay the non-logical, quasi-visual aspect of cognition. But I
don’t think that’s an important point. What is probably important is that
any sufficiently complex PCT structure is likely to imply cognition. I
doubt that sufficient complexity exists in a bacterium, and it may not
exist in a tree, but I think it highly probable that it exists in a dog.
How one would ever test for this (especially in a tree), I wouldn’t know.
But perhaps if you have a clear definition of “cognition” it might be
easier.When you are thinking about an appropriate definition, remember the
history of attempts to define “intelligence.” Once upon a time, it was the
ability to do arithmetic. But computers could do that better than people
could, so that was obviously a wrong definition. Other definitions
followed, only to meet a similar fate. In the end, it seems to have come
down to “what humans can do that computers can’t”. So maybe you will wind
up with a similar problem in defining “cognition”. It may wind up being
"what humans can do that non-humans can’t. If that happens to the
definition, then “cognition” won’t exist in a dog, and probably you won’t
be able to find where it is in any specific PCT structure.But for now, and thinking of the ill-defined everyday concept of
cognition, then cognition appears in just about every version of a PCT
structure, whether it be the rigid structure of HPCT or Peter Small’s
system of fluid attractor basins.Martin
[from Brian D’Agostino (92005.02.14.2200 EST)]
Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.2110) wrote: Cognition is ANY thought, and the processes involved in
The above seems incomplete. Hope someone from CSG didn’t kill you in mid sentence, Marc!
But to define cognition as “any thought” sounds highly philosophical. It is so general that the answer to where cognition fits into PCT would have to be “everywhere.” We can analyze the brain as a physical system, and we can map the cognitive structures associated with it including control systems, memory, etc. If our maps are any good, they will relate in some systematic way to their physical substrate in the brain. But all of this is on the level of objective description. “Cognition” by your definition would be the totality of these brain phenomena experienced from the inside. Of course there is more to it than that, and much of the discipline of philosophy is devoted to working out the details, but it is unclear to me what relevance these discussions have for psychology.
Brian D’Agostino
212-864-1159
----- Original Message -----
From:
Marc Abrams
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 9:21 PM
Subject: Re: PCT, what is it?
In a message dated 2/14/2005 8:52:57 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, bdagostino@VERIZON.NET writes:
[from Brian D'Agostino (2005.02.14.2030 EST)] I am responding to Martin's post, below. I agree with Martin that Marc needs to give a rigorous definition of cognition before his question of where cognition fits into PCT can be given a rigorous answer. Here are my own thoughts on this problem. First, the word "cognition" is used in many different ways across academic disciplines, and even within disciplines. This gets to Marc's point about the fragmentation of knowledge in academia. However, a more unified understanding is emerging across all disciplines, subdisciplines, and schools of thought around the concept of information. From this perspective, "cognition" is fundamentally a kind of information processing. What I have said so far is probably not very controversial. But when we try to specify the _kind_ of information processing, different people will probably give different definitions. My definition would be that cognition is the information processing that occurs on the input or perceptual side of control systems. By this definition, cognition occurs at every level of the hierarchy, not just above a certain level, as Martin is suggesting. I would be very interested to hear what others in CSG mean by“cognition.”
Brian D’Agostino
> [Martin Taylor [2005.02.14.17.15]From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.1646)]
Is there ANYONE out there, and I do mean ANYONE, who can define WHAT
‘official’ PCT is supposed to represent?This is a VERY simple question. I want to know if I am doing MACT and
everyone else is doing ??CT, or is there such a thing as ’ official PCT’.It’s not a simple question. It’s either a naive one or a provocative one.
But it’s not simple.Is there such a thing as “official” system dynamics? Or “Official” [name
your branch of science]. I don’t think so.For PCT, what there is is a basic theoretical underlying structure, on top
of which has been developed a generally agreed conventional structure, on
top of which there is a whole raft of speculative suggestions. By
“generally agreed” I mean “accepted by most of those who accept the
underlying structure of perceptual control.” So long as one is working
from the basis that behaviour is the control of perception, where
perception is defined as a state internal to an entity, and behaviour as
influences on the world outside the entity, then one is doing PCT
(according to me).How about you Martin, Does ‘PCT’, in ANY of your incantations have a
cognitive component in it?Yes. All of them do. I like the word “incantations”. It suggests the later
possibility of decanting fine wine!If so, where can I find it?
Easiest to define in HPCT: anywhere above the category level, or perhaps
it’s a bit fuzzier, and extends down to some extent anywhere above the
event or sequence level. If you don’t like HPCT, you can find it in
equivalent places in whatever structure your favourite implementation of
PCT has arranged.Actually, HPCT makes it a bit difficult to avoid cognition, and
unquestioning acceptance of the canonical version of HPCT tends to lead
one to downplay the non-logical, quasi-visual aspect of cognition. But I
don’t think that’s an important point. What is probably important is that
any sufficiently complex PCT structure is likely to imply cognition. I
doubt that sufficient complexity exists in a bacterium, and it may not
exist in a tree, but I think it highly probable that it exists in a dog.
How one would ever test for this (especially in a tree), I wouldn’t know.
But perhaps if you have a clear definition of “cognition” it might be
easier.When you are thinking about an appropriate definition, remember the
history of attempts to define “intelligence.” Once upon a time, it was the
ability to do arithmetic. But computers could do that better than people
could, so that was obviously a wrong definition. Other definitions
followed, only to meet a similar fate. In the end, it seems to have come
down to “what humans can do that computers can’t”. So maybe you will wind
up with a similar problem in defining “cognition”. It may wind up being
"what humans can do that non-humans can’t. If that happens to the
definition, then “cognition” won’t exist in a dog, and probably you won’t
be able to find where it is in any specific PCT structure.But for now, and thinking of the ill-defined everyday concept of
cognition, then cognition appears in just about every version of a PCT
structure, whether it be the rigid structure of HPCT or Peter Small’s
system of fluid attractor basins.Martin
[Martin Taylor 2005.02.14.22.30]
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.2110)]
Cognition is _ANY_ thought, and the processes involved in
That doesn't help very much. Now you have to define "thought". The could be taken to be as broad as "brain activity" or as narrow as "conscious, rational use of logic" or just about anywhere in between.
Is it "thought" when an idea pops into your head unbidden? When you get a vision of a landscape you saw years ago? When a smell brings back a memory of childhood? When you tussle with an intellectual conundrum? When you step in a sharp rock and feel pain? When you drive a familiar route to work?
Where's the boundary?
Martin
Sorry folks I hit the send key prematurely again.
Marc
In a message dated 2/15/2005 3:28:48 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Matzaball50 writes:
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.0259)
From The OED;
cognition
(kQg"nIS@n) In 5 –6 -icio(u)n, -ycyo(u)n. [ad. L. cognitiZn-em a getting to know, acquaintance, notion, knowledge, etc., n. of action f. L. cognit- , ppl. stem of cognZscSre: see cognosce.]
†1. a. The action or faculty of knowing; knowledge, consciousness; acquaintance with a subject. Obs. exc. as in 2.
1447 O. Bokenham Seyntys (1835) 154 Illumynyd she is wyth clere cognycyoun In hyr soule. 1528 Lyndesay Dream 577 Filicitie they had Inuariabyll, And of his Godhed cleir cognitioun. 1604 T. Wright Passions v. 237 With conscience and perfit cognition of innocencie. 1606 Shakes. Tr. & Cr.
v. ii. 63, I will not be my selfe, nor haue cognition Of what I feele. 1682 Sir T. Browne
Chr. Mor. (1756) 106 A retrograde cognition of times past. 1796 Burney Mem. Metastasio II. 389 Tasting the first aliments of scientific cognition.
b. Apprehension, perception. (nonce-use.)
1822 Lamb Elia Ser. i. iii. (1865) 34 In thy cognition of some poignant jest.
2.
Philos. a. The action or faculty of knowing taken in its widest sense, including sensation, perception, conception, etc., as distinguished from feeling and volition; also, more specifically, the action of cognizing an object in perception proper.
1651 Stanley Poems 231 This Divines call intellectual intuitive cognition. 1690 Locke Hum. Und. iv. iii. §6 Finding not Cognition within the natural Powers of Matter. 1847
Lewes Hist. Philos. (1867) I. Introd. 113 A faculty of cognition a priori. 1879 Adamson Philos. Kant 45 The several elements which, according to Kant, make up the organic unity of Perception or real Cognition.
b. A product of such an action: a sensation, perception, notion, or higher intuition.
1819 Shelley Peter Bell III , 473 note, Peter’s progenitor+ seems to have possessed a ‘pure anticipated cognition’ of the nature and modesty of this ornament of his posterity. 1856 Meiklejohn tr. * Kant’s Krit. P.R.* 79 The fact that we do possess scientific a priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics. 1873 H. Spencer Princ. Psychol. I. iii. viii. 369 With purely intellectual cognitions+ also with+ moral cognitions. 1881 J. H. Stirling Text-bk. Kant 468 Let a cognition be intellectually what it may, it is no cognition proper, it is not properly Knowledge, unless and until it have an actual perceptive application.
c.
attrib.
1878 S. H. Hodgson Philos. Reflection
I. i. 68 Is not philosophy+ just what the Germans mean by Cognition-theory (Erkenntnisstheorie)? Ibid.
69 A cognition-principle (Erkenntnissprincip ) is opposed to a real-principle (Real-princip). Ibid.
230 Cognition that has a priori forms is already a cognition-faculty. 1909
Mind XVIII. 143 The ruin of the ordinary idealistic cognition-theory.
3. a. Law . = cognizance 3. (Chiefly Sc.)
1523 in W. H. Turner Select Rec. Oxf. 35 Ye+Chauncellor+shall have+full cognition of all+causes. 1581
Savile Agric. (1622) 203 To the rest belonged cognition of criminal causes. 1609 Skene Reg. Maj. 12 Incontinent cognition or tryal sall be taken be the assise. 1689 tr. Buchanan’s De Jure Regni 32 Obnoxious to the cognition of Judges. 1876 Grant Burgh Sch. Scotl.
ii. v. 198 The Council appoint a Committee to take cognition of the matter.
b. Sc. Law . † A process in the Court of Sessi ion for the determination of cases concerning disputed marches. *** cognition and sale*** : a process for obtaining a warrant to sell the whole or a part of a pupil’s estate. cognition and sasine : a form of entering an heir in burgage tenure.
a1809 * Scotch Dict.* in Tomlins Law Dict., Cognition , is the process whereby molestation is determined. 1868 * Act 31 & 32 Vict.* c. 101 §46 An instrument of cognition and sasine in regard to such lands and in favour of such heir.
†4. Recognition; gratitude. Obs. rare.
I am not sure who’s ‘problem’ you are trying to address, but it certainly is NOT mine.
My question is NOT about defining cognition as such, it is in trying to understand why PCT seems to address certain aspects of cognition and not others.
I am trying to find out who decides what aspects are of import to the model and WHY they are either included or excluded.
ANY person who is familiar with ANY type of ‘systems’ modeling, whether it be SD, or any other paradigm, knows that you always must decide what is in, and not in, any particular system of interest.
PCT claims to be a theory of human behavior. By this I am trying to determine exactly what this word ‘behavior’ means. NOT cognition. It is cognition I wish to study. Is PCT the study of cognition as well as motor control? I say yes. But it currently does not represent all of cognition. This makes PCT, in ANY of Martin Taylor’s incantations, from MY perspective , NOT wrong, just INCOMPLETE. Now if PCT is not supposed to represent what I believe needs to be in ANY theory of human behavior, and that is, accounting for ALL aspects of cognition, then I am NOT interested in PCT and MACT is where my interest lie.
Martin Taylor seems to support the notion, as I do, that cognition by default _must be in HPCT. So my question is why is it not all in there?
The ‘question’ you raise may be of interest to you in robotics but is a red herring in trying to answer my concerns. I am also not suggesting in this case that you are trying to divert the question for any devious reason. I think your concerns for your needs are important and worthwhile. They just don’t address my concerns and are a different question.
In a message dated 2/14/2005 10:17:29 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, bdagostino@VERIZON.NET writes:
[from Brian D'Agostino (92005.02.14.2200 EST)]
Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.2110) wrote: Cognition is _ANY_ thought, and the processes involved in
The above seems incomplete. Hope someone from CSG didn't kill you in mid sentence, Marc!
I hit the send button accidentally.
I really didn’t think I sent anything.
Sorry
But to define cognition as "any thought" sounds highly philosophical.
Sure it is. There can be no ‘scientific’ meaning because we don’t have one yet. I was hoping PCT might be able to lend a hand in us having one. I have been very disappointed that we have not been able to explore the possibilities on CSGnet.
It is so general that the answer to where cognition fits into PCT would have to be "everywhere."
Right!!! Now the question becomes HOW?
We can analyze the brain as a physical system, and we can map the cognitive structures associated with it including control systems, memory, etc. If our maps are any good, they will relate in some systematic way to their physical substrate in the brain.
You confuse the study Biology with Physiology. Biology is the study of and the naming of biological entities. Physiology is the study of those entities and how they actually work in processes, and in the various systems of the body.
But all of this is on the level of objective description. "Cognition" by your definition would be the totality of these brain phenomena experienced from the inside.
EXACTLY. The question then becomes HOW does control effect and are affected by these processes at the level of the organism?
Of course there is more to it than that, and much of the discipline of philosophy is devoted to working out the details, but it is unclear to me what relevance these discussions have for _psychology_.
That my dear friend IS the study of PSYCHOLOGY.
regards,
Marc
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.0259)
From The OED;
cognition
(kQg"nIS@n) In 5– >6 -icio(u)n, -ycyo(u)n. [ad. L. cognitiZn-em a getting to know, acquaintance, notion, knowledge, etc., n. of action f. L. cognit-, ppl. stem of cognZscSre: see cognosce.]
†< 1. a. The action or faculty of knowing; knowledge, consciousness; acquaintance with a subject. Obs. exc. as in 2.
1447 O. Bokenham Seyntys (1835) 154 Illumynyd she is wyth clere cognycyoun In hyr soule. 1528 Lyndesay Dream 577 Filicitie they had Inuariabyll, And of his Godhed cleir cognitioun. 1604 T. Wright Passions v. 237 With conscience and perfit cognition of innocencie. 1606 Shakes. Tr. & Cr.
v. ii. 63, I will not be my selfe, nor haue cognition Of what I feele. 1682 Sir T. Browne
Chr. Mor. (1756) 106 A retrograde cognition of times past. 1796 Burney Mem. Metastasio II. 389 Tasting the first aliments of scientific cognition.
b. Apprehension, perception. (nonce-use.)
1822 Lamb Elia Ser. i. iii. (1865) 34 In thy cognition of some poignant jest.
2.
Philos. a. The action or faculty of knowing taken in its widest sense, including sensation, perception, conception, etc., as distinguished from feeling and volition; also, more specifically, the action of cognizing an object in perception proper.
1651 Stanley Poems 231 This Divines call intellectual intuitive cognition. 1690 Locke Hum. Und. iv. iii. §6 Finding not Cognition within the natural Powers of Matter. 1847 Lewes Hist. Philos. (1867) I. Introd. 113 A faculty of cognition a priori. 1879 Adamson Philos. Kant 45 The several elements which, according to Kant, make up the organic unity of Perception or real Cognition.
b. A product of such an action: a sensation, perception, notion, or higher intuition.
1819 Shelley Peter Bell III, 473 note, Peter’s progenitor+seems to have possessed a ‘pure anticipated cognition’ of the nature and modesty of this ornament of his posterity. 1856 Meiklejohn tr. Kant’s Krit. P.R. 79 The fact that we do possess scientific a priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics. 1873 H. Spencer Princ. Psychol. I. iii. viii. 369 With purely intellectual cognitions+also with+moral cognitions. 1881 J. H. Stirling
Text-bk. Kant 468 Let a cognition be intellectually
what it may, it is no cognition proper, it is not properly Knowledge, unless and until it have an actual perceptive application.
c.
attrib.
1878 S. H. Hodgson
Philos. Reflection I. i. 68 Is not philosophy+just what the Germans mean by Cognition-theory (Erkenntnisstheorie)? Ibid.
69 A cognition-principle (Erkenntnissprincip) is opposed to a real-principle (Real-princip). Ibid.
230 Cognition that has a priori forms is already a cognition-faculty. 1909
Mind XVIII. 143 The ruin of the ordinary idealistic cognition-theory.
3. a. Law. = cognizance
3. (Chiefly Sc.)
1523 in W. H. Turner Select Rec. Oxf. 35 Ye+Chauncellor+shall have+full cognition of all+causes. 1581
Savile Agric. (1622) 203 To the rest belonged cognition of criminal causes. 1609 Skene Reg. Maj. 12 Incontinent cognition or tryal sall be taken be the assise. 1689 tr. Buchanan’s De Jure Regni 32 Obnoxious to the cognition of Judges. 1876 Grant Burgh Sch. Scotl.
ii. v. 198 The Council appoint a Committee to take cognition of the matter.
b. Sc. Law. †A process in the Court of Session for t the determination of cases concerning disputed marches. cognition and sale: a process for obtaining a warrant to sell the whole or a part of a pupil’s estate. cognition and sasine: a form of entering an heir in burgage tenure.
a1809 Scotch Dict. in Tomlins Law Dict., Cognition, is the process whereby molestation is determined. 1868 Act 31 & 32 Vict. c. 101 §46 An instrument of cognition and sasine in regard to such lands and in favour of such heir.
†< 4. Recognition; gratitude. Obs. rare.
I am not sure who’s ‘problem’ you are trying to address, but it certainly is NOT mine.
My question is NOT about defining cognition as such, it is in trying to understand why PCT seems to address certain aspects of cognition and not others.
I am trying to find out who decides what aspects are of import to the model and WHY they are either included or excluded.
ANY person who is familiar with ANY type of ‘systems’ modeling, whether it be SD or any other paradigm, knows that you always must decide what is in, and not in, any particular system of interest.
PCT claims to be a theory of human behavior. By this I am trying to determine exactly what this word ‘behavior’ means. NOT cognition. It is cognition I wish to study. Is PCT the study of cognition as well as motor control? I say yes. But it currently does not represent all of cognition. This makes PCT, in ANY of Martin Taylor’s incantations, from MY perspective , NOT wrong, just INCOMPLETE. Now if PCT is not supposed to represent what I believe needs to be in ANY theory of human behavior, and that is, accounting for ALL aspects of cognition, then I am NOT interested in PCT and MACT is where my interest lie.
Martin Taylor seems to support the notion, as I do, that cognition by default _must be in HPCT. So my question is why is it not all in there?
The ‘question’ you raise may be of interest to you in robotics but is a red herring in trying to answer my concerns. I am also not suggesting in this case that you are trying to divert the question for any devious reason. I think your concerns for your needs are important and worthwhile. They just don’t address my concerns and are a different question.
In a message dated 2/14/2005 10:17:29 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, bdagostino@VERIZON.NET writes:
[from Brian D’Agostino (92005.02.14.2200 EST)]
Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.2110) wrote: Cognition is ANY thought, and the processes involved in
The above seems incomplete. Hope someone from CSG didn’t kill you in mid sentence, Marc!
I hit the send button accidentally. 
I really didn’t think I sent anything.
Sorry
But to define cognition as “any thought” sounds highly philosophical.
Sure it is. There can be no ‘scientific’ meaning because we don’t have one yet. I was hoping PCT might be ablle to lend a hand in us having one. I have been very disappointed that we have not been able to explore the possibilities on CSGnet.
It is so general that the answer to where cognition fits into PCT would have to be “everywhere.”
Right!!! Now the question becomes HOW?
We can analyze the brain as a physical system, and we can map the cognitive structures associated with it including control systems, memory, etc. If our maps are any good, they will relate in some systematic way to their physical substrate in the brain.
You confuse the study Biology with Physiology. Biology is the study of and naming of biological entities. Physiology is the study of those entities and how they actually work in processes, and in the various systems of the body.
But all of this is on the level of objective description. “Cognition” by your definition would be the totality of these brain phenomena experienced from the inside.
EXACTLY. The question then becomes HOW does control affect these processes at the level of the organism?
Of course there is more to it than that, and much of the discipline of philosophy is devoted to working out the details, but it is unclear to me what relevance these discussions have for psychology.
That my dear friend IS the study of PSTCHOLOGY_.
regards,
Marc
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.0409)]
In a message dated 2/14/2005 10:33:49 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, mmt-csg@ROGERS.COM writes:
[Martin Taylor 2005.02.14.22.30]
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.14.2110)]
Cognition is ANY thought, and the processes involved in
That doesn’t help very much.
No; it doesn’t help YOU very much, and I can fully understand why it doesn’t. My concerns are at a much higher level then yours are. I am interested at the systems/organism level of the affects and effects of control.
I have little concern or interest for the ‘micro’ levels, although I demand a connection between the two, the details of the ‘lower’ levels’ are of no real concern for me. That is, although I demand a continuous path from DNA to the organism, and from individual control processes to more complicated structures, my interests lie in the aggregate affect and effects of the controlling processes, at the organ systems level and above.
Now you have to define “thought”.
NO, actually that is MY base unit. How they are formed are of little consequence. That they are formed, is self evident. How and why they change is of great import. I believe the answer to this question lies at the aggregated ‘systems’ level, NOT below.
Sort of like watching TV. If I get much to close (that is, micro) I see only pixels and NOT the entire picture. I might get a great understanding of what ‘pixels’ are all about but I lose the essence of what the big picture is trying to convey.
Right now PCT is the study of TV’s vis a vie ‘pixels’, and I have little interest in looking at TV’s this way.
The
could be taken to be as broad as “brain activity” or as narrow as
“conscious, rational use of logic” or just about anywhere in between.
Yep.
Is it “thought” when an idea pops into your head unbidden?
Sure is.
When you
get a vision of a landscape you saw years ago? When a smell brings
back a memory of childhood? When you tussle with an intellectual
conundrum? When you step in a sharp rock and feel pain? When you
drive a familiar route to work?
All excellent questions. Does PCT, HPCT or any other CT have anything to say about these things? I think so. But we sure as hell will not find out with the mind set and discourse on CSGnet. Nor will we foster anyone’s interest in these important questions in this forum
Where’s the boundary?
Boundary of what?
Of our interests, or of the affects and effects of control on cognition and behavior.
THAT Martin is the VERY question I posed in the subject line when first posting this thread.
I’m glad you seem to have the same questions because all of the ones you asked involve both control processes and ‘behavior’
Are we both talking PCT or are we into MACT and MTCT individually?
I say it looks like MACT and MTCT.
regards,
Marc
[From Brian D’Agostino (2005.02.15.0523)]
Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.0409) wrote:
Boundary of what?
Of our interests, or of the affects and effects of control on cognition and behavior.
THAT Martin is the VERY question I posed in the subject line when first posting this thread.
What do you mean by “affects and effects?” I think I know what you mean by “effects,” but the word “affect” usually means “emotion,” except when used as a verb.
Are we both talking PCT or are we into MACT and MTCT individually?
I say it looks like MACT and MTCT.
What are “MACT” and "MTCT?"
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.0544)]
Glad to see you also get up with the rooster’s
In a message dated 2/15/2005 5:26:02 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, bdagostino@VERIZON.NET writes:
** [From Brian D’Agostino (2005.02.15.0523)]**
** What do you mean by “affects and effects?” I think I know what you mean by “effects,” but the word “affect” usually means “emotion,” except when used as a verb.**
I believe control affects that is influences, or ACTS ON any number of cognitive processes. Emotions being but one of them. And emotions are also the RESULT or effects of control as well.
Of course not all cognitive processes are both affective or effective, but emotions are ubiquitous.
I believe control both affects and is effected by feedback processes. Whether or not they are strictly control processes remains to be seen.
Have I clarified this for you?
What are “MACT” and “MTCT?”
Marc Abrams’ Control Theory (MACT) & Martin Taylors’ Control Theory (MTCT)
regards,
Marc
“Nothing is so firmly believed as that which least is known”
Montaigne
“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.”
Richard Hooker (1554? - 1600)
English theologian.
[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.02.15,14:20 EST)]
from Brian D'Agostino (2005.02.14.2030 EST)
I would be very interested to hear what others in CSG mean by
"cognition."
I think a "cognition" is the same as control of a perception. I am not
enthusiastic to name control of perceptions at levels above the event or
sequence level for "cognitions", as Martin gave expression to. That's
because we very often put such "cognitions" into words. And I feel it not
correct to say that the "cognition" stops at the event level (down).
bjorn
Re: PCT, what is it?
[Martin Taylor 2005.02.15.10.00]
From [Marc Abrams
(2005.02.15.0409)]Where’s the
boundary?Boundary of
what?Of our interests,
or of the affects and effects of control on cognition and
behavior.THAT Martin is
the VERY question I posed in the subject line when first posting
this thread.I’m glad you seem
to have the same questions because all of the ones you asked involve
both control processes and ‘behavior’Are we both talking
PCT or are we into MACT and MTCT individually?I say it looks like
MACT and MTCT.
I don’t. I believe in the unity of science.
For me, when I’m dealing with the control of perception, I’m studying
PCT.
Your messages quoting dictionary
definitions of “cognition” suggest that you are interested
only in what Bill P. calls “The Observer”, the perception
that one has a perception. It’s a tiny part of psychology, though
potentially an important one, much as the subject of aromatic
hydrocarbons is a small part of chemistry, albeit a potentially
important one. In another message, you suggest you are interested in
affect and emotion (as you have in the past. That’s another niche. If
you can link the two in a scientific way, more power to
you.
No science is the property of any person.
You may wish to hold patents on “MACT”, but if it turns out
to be real science when it is revealed to the world, you will find
that other people will take it and develop it in ways that you may not
approve. That will advance the science, but it won’t be good for your
sense of proprietorship.
The loss of proprietorship happened to me
with Layered Protocol Theory. I had one way of looking at it, and a
colleague who took months of sometimes difficult argument before he
persuaded me that a better way existed. It was only because he was
successful that I was later able to realize that LPT actually was a
manifestation of PCT involving multi-level control in two people (or
one and a computer). His was the real science.
So, no. I won’t accept proprietorship of
MTCT. What I do in this area is PCT. We may be looking at the
implications of PCT in different niche areas, and it may be that in
those areas assumptions beyond “core PCT” are required, but
it always behooves us to demonstrate that those extra assumptions are
truly needed.
The same applies when I consider HPCT. If
analysis or experiment with basic PCT turns out to require HPCT, then
it will be (to use your recently favourite term) a mathematical
requirement. If experiemnt and observation determine HPCT to be
correct within its own domain, the unity of science (faith) requires
that it eventually be shown to be compatible with, or required by PCT.
My current belief is that HPCT is probably compatible with PCT, but
that neither observation nor analysis yet requires HPCT, given PCT or
given experimental results. So I feel at liberty to seek structures
that differ from HPCT, whereas I don’t feel at liberty to seek
alternatives for PCT.
Whether or not we need extra assumptions to
deal with the niche areas such as cognition, emotion, or interpersonal
communication, we can take a cue from other sciences. It’s often the
case that a science develops its own basic assumptions and models out
of fundamentals observations (e.g. chemistry from observations of how
substances combine and dissociate), but if it is a true science,
sooner or later some connection will be found to other branches of
science. When that connection is discovered, none of the assumptions
and models that can be derived from those of the other science will be
contradicted, though some may be refined and the boundaries of their
applicability may be determined (e.g. first principles derivations of
molecular structures from quantum mechanics).
If PCT is correct, it has to not contradict
physics – and it doesn’t, since its basic requirement is a physical
necessity, that for life to exist control must be of a
“perception” (= internal state representation of an external
state).
Likewise, since PCT is a requirement for
life and is based on normal physics, MACT, whatever it may assert
within its small niche within human psychology, must eventually be
provably consistent with PCT. There’s absolutely no problem if MACT
introduces novel assumptions in addition to PCT, just as chemistry has
all sorts of rules and “laws” based on regularities of
observations. But in the end, if those assumptions turn out to
contradict PCT, they will have to change, regardless of
proprietorship.
Martin
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.1122)
First, thank you for a most thoughtful post. I hope I respond in kind.
In a message dated 2/15/2005 11:07:59 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, mmt-csg@ROGERS.COM writes:
[Martin Taylor 2005.02.15.10.00]
>I'm glad you seem to have the same questions because _all_ of the >ones you asked involve _both_ control processes and 'behavior'
Yes, that was one of my points. Am I talking ‘PCT’ or something else?
Are we both talking PCT or are we into MACT and MTCT individually? I say it looks like MACT and MTCT.
I don’t. I believe in the unity of science. For me, when I’m dealing with the control of perception, I’m studying PCT.
So did I. But Powers say’s we are not interested in the ‘same’ thing. I think he is wrong. I think we are interested in different aspects of the same thing. But who am I to argue? So it seems MACT it is, and as such it is MTCT as well.
Ask Marken and Powers if they believe in the existence of the various conventions of PCT you have made; ‘canonical PCT’ , ‘classic PCT’ and HPCT.
But I really don’t believe these guys have the ability to designate what a science should or should not encompass. To me, like you, I believe PCT could be a science. Right now, it is simply a set of ideas spread out over a wide range of writing’s.
Your messages quoting dictionary definitions of “cognition” suggest that you are interested only in what Bill P. calls “The Observer”, the perception that one has a perception.
No Martin, you are equivocating here. You are using the word ‘perception’ to represent two distinct entities. One being a sensation or signal, and the other being a sensation or signal we have attached a meaning to. These are NOT the same thing, I don’t care what Powers says.
It’s a tiny part of psychology, though potentially an important one, much as the subject of aromatic hydrocarbons is a small part of chemistry, albeit a potentially important one. In another message, you suggest you are interested in affect and emotion (as you have in the past. That’s another niche. If you can link the two in a scientific way, more power to you.
You just don’t ‘get’ it either. I am NOT interested in ANY ‘niche’. I am looking to UNIFY the social sciences, NOT further ‘niche’ them. We have spent close to 300 years reducing them to death, and it’s time we begin to understand what is COMMON among the various theories and disciplines, NOT what makes them different, and I believe the control mechanism is the unifier
That is why economists and psychologists can’t share the research data. Neither one believes they are inspecting the same thing. Well I got news for both you and them. You ARE studying the same thing, and that is called HUMAN BEHAVIOR. Just different aspects, that is all.
No science is the property of any person. You may wish to hold patents on “MACT”, but if it turns out to be real science when it is revealed to the world, you will find that other people will take it and develop it in ways that you may not approve. That will advance the science, but it won’t be good for your sense of proprietorship.
Martin, there is NO such thing as proprietorship in science.
NO ONE, and I mean NO ONE OWNS any ideas. We only use and borrow from others as the needs arise.
I did not learn from thin air. I learned in part from reading the ideas of others and THEN seeing THOSE ideas in a different way. DISCOVERY intimates that there was something there already that simply needed to be revealed.
It is my sincerest hope and ONLY wish that I may provide someone else with an idea that proves useful in moving our understanding forward. CONTRARY to Powers’ rants, I have absolutely no interest in money, nor fame. I am_way_ past that. I’ve made my money, and I’m NOT interested in fame. What I am interested in is the advance of a feedback theory as a basis of human behavior and cognition.
I believe this will require the efforts of large numbers of people from many different disciplines.
ANY viable theory of human behavior and cognition MUST account for ALL economic, political, social and psychological activities.
The loss of proprietorship happened to me with Layered Protocol Theory. I had one way of looking at it, and a colleague who took months of sometimes difficult argument before he persuaded me that a better way existed. It was only because he was successful that I was later able to realize that LPT actually was a manifestation of PCT involving multi-level control in two people (or one and a computer). His was the real science.
So, no. I won’t accept proprietorship of MTCT. What I do in this area is PCT. We may be looking at the implications of PCT in different niche areas, and it may be that in those areas assumptions beyond “core PCT” are required, but it always behooves us to demonstrate that those extra assumptions are truly needed.
Needed for WHAT? And for WHOM? By WHOM.
The same applies when I consider HPCT. If analysis or experiment with basic PCT turns out to require HPCT, then it will be (to use your recently favourite term) a mathematical requirement. If experiemnt and observation determine HPCT to be correct within its own domain, the unity of science (faith) requires that it eventually be shown to be compatible with, or required by PCT. My current belief is that HPCT is probably compatible with PCT, but that neither observation nor analysis yet requires HPCT, given PCT or given experimental results. So I feel at liberty to seek structures that differ from HPCT, whereas I don’t feel at liberty to seek alternatives for PCT.
THIS is an extremely important point. For YOU, the PCT model is axiomatic. That is, PCT for you is the base of ‘truth’ you work from.
Mathematically, you can ‘prove’ anything by showing it adheres to the PCT model. This is all well and good, except what does the PCT model represent? An organism? A single control process? What does a single control process entail in a human? Do we think the same way we act? How are they connected? By the hierarchy? I don’t think so.
Whether or not we need extra assumptions to deal with the niche areas such as cognition, emotion, or interpersonal communication, we can take a cue from other sciences. It’s often the case that a science develops its own basic assumptions and models out of fundamentals observations (e.g. chemistry from observations of how substances combine and dissociate), but if it is a true science, sooner or later some connection will be found to other branches of science. When that connection is discovered, none of the assumptions and models that can be derived from those of the other science will be contradicted, though some may be refined and the boundaries of their applicability may be determined (e.g. first principles derivations of molecular structures from quantum mechanics).
So according to this I am doing MACT and not PCT. Thanks for the clarification
If PCT is correct, it has to not contradict physics – and it doesn’t, since its basic requirement is a physical necessity, that for life to exist control must be of a “perception” (= internal state representation of an external state).
This is NOT true. WE all have many perceptions that do NOT reflect the external environment and very often we have perceptions of representations of INTERNAL states as well.
So there can be three different types of 'perceptions. One of an external ‘reality’, one of an internal ‘reality’, and one of pure fantasy and no reality.
The New Scientist a couple of weeks ago provided some interesting insight on why they feel we have not 5 but 21 senses.
Then of course we also have feelings and emotional ‘perceptions’. These are ‘perceptions’ but not 'representative of anything.
Likewise, since PCT is a requirement for life and is based on normal physics, MACT, whatever it may assert within its small niche within human psychology, must eventually be provably consistent with PCT. There’s absolutely no problem if MACT introduces novel assumptions in addition to PCT, just as chemistry has all sorts of rules and “laws” based on regularities of observations. But in the end, if those assumptions turn out to contradict PCT, they will have to change, regardless of proprietorship.
Provided of course that ‘PCT’ proves to be as axiomatic as you believe it to be. You may be right here. I’m just not sure at what level this will turn out to be true for. ‘PCT’ in this case being your ‘classic’ version I assume.
regards,
Marc
“Nothing is so firmly believed as that which least is known”
Montaigne
“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.”
Richard Hooker (1554? - 1600)
English theologian.
Re: PCT, what is it?
[Martin Taylor 2005.02.15.17.35]
From [Marc Abrams
(2005.02.15.1122)Your messages quoting
dictionary definitions of “cognition” suggest that you are
interested only in what Bill P. calls “The Observer”, the
perception that one has a perception.No
Martin, you are equivocating here. You are using the word ‘perception’
to represent two distinct entities. One being a sensation or signal,
and the other being a sensation or signal we have attached a meaning
to.
If you think that, you misread my intention. I think if you look
at those definitions again, you will see quite a few references to
“knowing.” To me, that means the awareness of the
Observer.
You
just don’t ‘get’ it either. I am NOT interested in ANY
‘niche’.
No, I don’t get it. Everything you write sounds as if you are
concerned with only a small niche. It’s only when you make a general
statement like:
I am looking to UNIFY the social sciences,
NOT further ‘niche’ them. We have spent close to 300
years reducing them to death, and it’s time we begin to
understand what is COMMON among the various theories and
disciplines, NOT what makes them different, and I believe the
control mechanism is the unifier
that you don’t sound as
tightly restrictive.
Martin, there is NO such thing as proprietorship
in science.
NO
ONE, and I mean NO ONE OWNS any ideas. We only use and borrow
from others as the needs arise.
That’s what I tried to get you to understand. So will you now
stop talking about “MACT” and the more offensive
“MTCT”?
For YOU, the PCT model is axiomatic. That
is, PCT for you is the base of ‘truth’ you work
from.
A base, not “the” base. Actually it’s the body of
classical physics that I take as that particular base, which in
dealing with living systems implies PCT. Lots of other observations
over a lifetime provide other bases.
Mathematically, you can ‘prove’ anything by showing it
adheres to the PCT model.
Showing something is consistent with physics is necessary, but it
isn’t sufficient to prove anything. But if a conclusion is demanded by
the mathematics and the underlying physics, then it’s a prediction and
its falsification would cause trouble for some part of the
theory.
Incidentally, in several of your recent positngs, you have been
objecting to mathematics as if it were a synonym for Aristotelian
logic. Maths goes beyond that, and it even includes fuzzy logic!
So
according to this I am doing MACT and not PCT. Thanks for the
clarification
If you choose proprietorship, you can say that and patent the
results. If it were me, I’d be talking about the way PCT can help (or
confuse) our understanding of the parts cognition and emotion may play
in behaviour. And if I wanted to give that niche a name, I’d find one
that didn’t have any connection to my personal name.
If PCT is correct, it
has to not contradict physics – and it doesn’t, since its basic
requirement is a physical necessity, that for life to exist control
must be of a “perception” (= internal state representation
of an external state).This
is NOT true. WE all have many perceptions that do NOT reflect
the external environment and very often we have perceptions of
representations of INTERNAL states as well.
It’s not untrue. It’s insufficient. You are quite correct in your
extension. I would have been better to say “that for life to
exists, some of the control must be …”
Martin
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.2024)]
In a message dated 2/15/2005 5:55:06 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, mmt-csg@ROGERS.COM writes:
[Martin Taylor 2005.02.15.17.35]
If PCT is correct, it has to not contradict physics -- and it doesn't, since its basic requirement is a physical necessity, that for life to exist control must be of a "perception" (= internal state representation of an external state).This is _NOT_ true. WE all have _many_ perceptions that do _NOT_ reflect the external environment and very often we have perceptions of representations of _INTERNAL_ states as well.
It’s not untrue. It’s insufficient.
NO, Your claim is FALSE (i.e. untrue), and the REASON is because it is insufficient.
You are quite correct in your extension. I would have been better to say “that for life to exists, some of the control must be …”
Thanks for the tip, I’ll keep that in mind for the future.
regards,
Marc
“Nothing is so firmly believed as that which least is known”
Montaigne
“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.”
Richard Hooker (1554? - 1600)
English theologian.
[From Bill Powers (2005.02.15.1832 MST)]
If PCT is correct, it has to not contradict physics – and it
doesn’t, since its basic requirement is a physical necessity, that for
life to exist control must be of a “perception” (= internal
state representation of an external
state).
[Martin Taylor 2005.02.15.17.35]
The “internal state” is internal to the control system, and the
external state is external to it. What is external to the control system
can still be inside the body.
Control of perception isn’t a slogan (I know you know this); it’s a
fact of negative feedback control. Negative feedback control works by
sensing some aspect of the world outside the control system and
representing it as a perceptual signal inside the system. It is that
signal that is controlled. All negative feedback control systems without
exception work this way.
If the input function changes its characteristics, the same external
situation would corresponds to a changed perceptual signal. But the
internal signal is kept close to a reference condition, meaning that an
external observer would see a different value of the external controlled
variable being controlled. From the viewpoint of the control system
itself, the perception is still being maintained at the same value as
before, and nothing has changed.
Control is necessary for life to exist because control is necessary to
maintain the life support systems in operating condition: without control
they would quickly deteriorate and cease to function. Death is total loss
of negative feedback control.
Just amplifying on your terse statement; I know you already understand
all this. But some others don’t.
Best,
Bill P.
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.2105)]
In a message dated 2/15/2005 8:45:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, powers_w@FRONTIER.NET writes:
[From Bill Powers (2005.02.15.1832 MST)]
Control of perception isn’t a slogan (I know you know this); it’s a fact of negative feedback control. Negative feedback control works by sensing some aspect of the world outside the control system and representing it as a perceptual signal inside the system. It is that signal that is controlled. All negative feedback control systems without exception work this way…
You said all this 35 years ago, and we still don’t know HOW this all happens and we don’t understand the significance this has on the organism, and until we do, you can keep on repeating this mantra until you are blue in the face and people simply will continue to ignore it.
There is NOBODY on this list of 97 people who do not know and think this to be so. You are preaching to the choir here. There is no one on this list you need to impress
Marc
[From Rick Marken (2005.02.15.2020)]
Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.2105)--
Bill Powers (2005.02.15.1832 MST)--
Control of perception isn't a slogan (I know you know this); it's a fact of negative feedback control. Negative feedback control works by sensing some aspect of the world outside the control system and representing it as a perceptual signal inside the system. It is that signal that is controlled. All negative feedback control systems without exception work this way....
You said all this 35 years ago, and we still don't know _HOW_ this all happens and we don't understand the significance this has on the organism...
Do you have a mouse in your pocket? Are you speaking for some group? Who is "we"?
---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400
[From Bill Powers (2005.02.16.0120 MST)]
Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.2105) --
You said all this 35 years ago, and we still don't know _HOW_ this all happens and we don't understand the significance this has on the organism, and until we do, you can keep on repeating this mantra until you are blue in the face and people simply will continue to ignore it.
There is _NOBODY_ on this list of 97 people who do not know and think this to be so. You are preaching to the choir here. There is no one on this list you need to impress
Is this your idea of how to avoid ad hominem remarks? Dismissing my ideas as "mantras"? Saying that I need to impress people? I would not have amplified on Martin's comment if I didn't think I was providing some answers to questions he had been asked that could have been answered more fully.
As to the HOW, I think all researchers in PCT are working on that, although it's important to establish the WHAT first. As you say, we need data, and we are gradually accumulating it. I dispute your claim that we don't know the significance of control of perception for the organism; it makes a vast difference in how we understand what people are doing. The actions we see people carrying out -- their behavior -- we now know do not necessarily reflect what they are controlling. Once we understand that, we can work out ways of determining and measuring what they are controlling and how they do it. You don't like this sort of "micro" science, but without it, how can we ever build a base for larger ideas? How can we know what higher levels of organization are doing until we can separate out the characteristics of the lower levels?
If you have any positive contributions to make, why not just make them, instead of anticipating failure and lack of understanding of them? You will probably experience doubts from others, and hear counterproposals and objections, but isn't that how science works? Nobody gets to have his ideas accepted just because he thinks they are right. I certainly don't; why should you? We are always looking for solid ground to stand on, and part of that process is discovering where the foundations lack firmness and trying to do something about that.
You commented to Bryan T. that your manner of speaking is just how you are and you have no intention of changing it. This way of seeing yourself is understandable: to change anything important feels like a loss of self, and is not to be done lightly. But, as one William Glasser says, is it getting you what you want (at a higher level)? Human beings, above all other animals, learn from experience, when they are free to do so. What is your experience telling you?
Bill P.
From [Marc Abrams (2005.02.15.0551)]
In a message dated 2/16/2005 12:59:11 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, marken@MINDREADINGS.COM writes:
[From Rick Marken (2005.02.15.2020)]
Do you have a mouse in your pocket? Are you speaking for some group?
Who is “we”?
I speak for NO one but myself.
The ‘we’ addresses all the folks who LEFT CSGnet because they found it inhospitable, unfulfilling, and generally worthless in helping them get to where they wanted to go, and those others who were exposed to Bill’s ideas and never found them worthwhile enough to even come on to CSGnet in the first place.