···
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
"What is the difference between organisms and machines?" I don't
know if there is any “the” difference, but one critical one seems to
me to be the sources of the top level reference values and of the
design of the perceptual functions that produce perceptions to be
controlled. In an organism, those sources are inside the organism,
whereas (to date) in a machine the sources are outside the machine
(humans always, so far as I know).
Martin
···
On 2018/03/27 11:29 AM, Alex
Gomez-Marin wrote:
--
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
That is precisely what I suspected PCT could add which, no matter how one wishes to stress it out, is actually very LITTLE, even barely nothing, in accounting for What is life?.. which a self-postulated paradigm-change theory for psychology and biology should deliver…
···
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 10:11 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
"What is the difference between organisms and machines?" I don'tknow if there is any “the” difference, but one critical one seems to
me to be the sources of the top level reference values and of the
design of the perceptual functions that produce perceptions to be
controlled. In an organism, those sources are inside the organism,
whereas (to date) in a machine the sources are outside the machine
(humans always, so far as I know).Martin On 2018/03/27 11:29 AM, AlexGomez-Marin wrote:
--
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.17.35]
I don't work in public relations, which is, I suppose, the object of
your comment “self-postulated paradigm change”. I prefer to let the
science speak for itself. Coming from a background in Engineering Physics and perception
psychology plus psycholinguistics, and with a career of which a
large part was devoted to human-computer interaction, I personally
found the shift in viewpoint from outside the organism to inside it
to solve and simplify a lot of issues that had been nagging. The
control hierarchy – the fact that there was nothing metaphorical
about it, but, as your original question suggested control by
organisms could be computed and modelled and get the right answers-- was additional magic. About 15 years before hearing of PCT I had used a hierarchic control
functional diagram to account for why objects felt actively were
perceived as objects, whereas the same sequence of touches produced
by an experimenter were perceived as simple touches (Taylor,
Lederman and Gibson, “Tactual Perception of Texture” in “Handbook of
Perception Vol III”, Carterette and Friedman, Eds., 1979). In the
ten years before I had heard of PCT my colleague David Waugh and I
had developed a hierarchical theory of human-computer interaction,
Layered Protocol Theory, which soon incorporated human-human
interaction. Only when I found the “inside view” of PCT and saw that my Layered
Protocol Theory was actually just a special case of PCT, and that
the control was not just a metaphor, did the power of PCT begin to
unfold for me. I’m quite sure that I still don’t know how much it
does explain in apparently quite unrelated fields of science. That’s
why the working title of the book I am working on has the punning
title “Powers of Perceptual Control”.
I don’t know whether you have read my note on Occam’s Razor
, but the gist
of it is that it is not just a nice idea. Rather, it is a
scientifically defensible way to select among hypotheses (theories,
if you like) that predict about the same thing. Though I did not
know it at the time, the underlying concept is Kolmogorov
Information Theory. Four interlocking criteria are involved: What
one understands already, the range of things about which the
hypothesis says something, and the accuracy with which it says what
it says about them. If on all these three criteria two hypotheses
are indistinguishable, then the fourth criterion, simplicity of
description of the theory, is with very high probability able to
choose the theory that will better survive further testing. If they
differ on any of the criteria, simplicity trades off with the
criterion on which they differ, but usually wins out. Simplicity,
however, depends on what you know already, because what you don’t
know already has to be explained as part of the description of the
hypothesis.
For me, and perhaps for nobody else, the discovery of PCT could
fairly be called “revolutionary”. Why? Because with my background
knowledge its statement was very much simpler than that of the set
of essentially independent theories that set out to explain the
range of things PCT explained almost effortlessly. In situations in
which it was possible to compare the accuracy of explanation, PCT
generally came out ahead except against the hypothesis “It happened
like that because God made it so”. But that hypothesis is far from
simple, since no matter how you define “God”, you need as many
parameters in the description as there are variables to be
described. So although the “God” hypothesis more accurately
specified the data to be observed than did PCT, its advantage in
that area was greatly overwhelmed by the simplicity criterion (see
the note for the mathematical argument why).
As for range of application, I don’t know of any specific
psychological theory that I would so casually apply in everyday life
as I do PCT. Taking other theories out of the laboratory usually
implies that one believes that the contextual variable that are
ignored in the experiments also do not matter in everyday life. But
they may have mattered in the laboratory, which is why experimenters
are usually so careful to keep everything as constant as they can
other than the variables they are studying. Does “X” have a
“significant effect” on “Y”? Try to keep everything but “X” constant
and see. If you have been successful in keeping everything else that
matters constant, you will get almost perfect or almost zero
relationship between changes in X and changes in Y. How often does that happen? Subjects might have had a good night’s
sleep or a bad one, they might have had a tiff with their
significant other, they might be anticipating a concert that
evening, … the list goes on and on. The PCT laboratory question is
different. It is “Does controlling X affect the stability of Y
despite all these possible contextual effects that might add to the
effect of the experimental variable”, followed by “Does a PCT model
explain the way X does (or does not) change the way Y is influenced
by contextual variables” (I know that’s not the way it is usually
put, but I think it is fair).
The range issue is about much more than whether you can take results
or the theory out of the laboratory and apply them in everyday life.
Clinical and social psychology are well-known (to CSGnet readers)
areas in which PCT has been effectively applied. Rick Marken and I
(and my colleagues) have used it in the design and analysis of
interfaces to machinery (beyond computers to helicopters, military
situation display interactions, and others). The working subtitle of
my book is “An enquiry onto language, culture, power, and politics”,
and includes a PCT view on the ill effects of attempts to balance
government budgets. Changing the view from outside to inside does not seem to me to be
such a “little” thing. And it wasn’t what you initially asked, which
was about the difference between organisms and machines. That was
about what makes something we call alive different from something we
call a machine. To me, the difference between being made of organic
(carbon-based) compounds as opposed to metallic or silicon
structural components seems irrelevant. The fact that the organism,
itself, in partnership with all its ancestors, is responsible for
what it controls and why – fact seems to me to be a
very big thing indeed.
Martin
···
On 2018/03/27 5:31 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin
wrote:
Thatis precisely what I suspected PCT could add which, no matter
how one wishes to stress it out, is actually very LITTLE, even
barely nothing, in accounting for What is life?.. which
a self-postulated paradigm-change theory for psychology and
biology should deliver…
-
as if the organism was
a machine*
http://www.mmtaylor.net/Academic/ockham.html
that
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 10:11 PM,Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
"What is the difference between organisms and machines?" Idon’t know if there is any “the” difference, but one
critical one seems to me to be the sources of the top
level reference values and of the design of the perceptual
functions that produce perceptions to be controlled. In an
organism, those sources are inside the organism, whereas
(to date) in a machine the sources are outside the machine
(humans always, so far as I know).Martin On2018/03/27 11:29 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin wrote:
–
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto deNeurociencias
I know this is a copout answer Alex, but I think Bill would have given you the answer you were looking for! Surely to answer it properly though, one needs to have a definition of a third category - ‘artificial life’ - to interpose between ‘life’ and ‘machine’?
Warren
···
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 10:11 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
"What is the difference between organisms and machines?" I don'tknow if there is any “the” difference, but one critical one seems to
me to be the sources of the top level reference values and of the
design of the perceptual functions that produce perceptions to be
controlled. In an organism, those sources are inside the organism,
whereas (to date) in a machine the sources are outside the machine
(humans always, so far as I know).Martin On 2018/03/27 11:29 AM, AlexGomez-Marin wrote:
--
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-03-28_06:30:08 UTC]
Alex, as far as I know, no theory has any definitive or perhaps even promising answer to that question but only descriptions about how living and artificial entities are empirically
different. So it cannot be a standard for a paradigm-change or any other theory that is must readily have that answer. It would be fine if someone had one, but I suspect that the border line between living and non-living is so permeable and crooked that it
is maybe a vain dream. But instead PCT offers a clear and simple hypothesis on what is common and essential to all living beings and to a sub group of machines. That thing is purposiveness. PCT also has an operative definition of that otherwise quite indeterminate
concept. I think it is fairly good beginning.
···
Eetu
Please, regard all my statements as questions,
no matter how they are formulated.
From: Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com
Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2018 9:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: PCT: what is the difference between organisms and machines?
I know this is a copout answer Alex, but I think Bill would have given you the answer you were looking for! Surely to answer it properly though, one needs to have a definition of a third category - ‘artificial life’ - to interpose between
‘life’ and ‘machine’?
Warren
On 27 Mar 2018, at 22:31, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:
That is precisely what I suspected PCT could add which, no matter how one wishes to stress it out, is actually very LITTLE, even barely nothing, in accounting forWhat is life?.. which a self-postulated paradigm-change theory for psychology and biology should deliver…
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 10:11 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
“What is the difference between organisms and machines?” I don’t know if there is any “the” difference, but one critical one seems to me to be the sources of the top level reference values and of the design of the perceptual functions that
produce perceptions to be controlled. In an organism, those sources are inside the organism, whereas (to date) in a machine the sources are outside the machine (humans always, so far as I know).Martin
On 2018/03/27 11:29 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin wrote:
–
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
Very interesting responses indeed. Let me pick up on three of them:
-
“the shift in viewpoint from outside the organism to inside it to solve and simplify a lot of issues that had been nagging.” Indeed, towards the realisation that organisms have their Umwelt.
-
“control by organisms could be computed and modelled as if the organism was a machine”. Indeed “as if”… Yet, are they the same or not? Namely, Weiner made some effort at the beginning of his main book to emphasise that one would need need Bergsonian time.
-
Purposiveness in living beings and a sub group of machines: would you grant intentionality too to those? And, also, what about experience?
···
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:45 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:
[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-03-28_06:30:08 UTC]
Alex, as far as I know, no theory has any definitive or perhaps even promising answer to that question but only descriptions about how living and artificial entities are empirically
different. So it cannot be a standard for a paradigm-change or any other theory that is must readily have that answer. It would be fine if someone had one, but I suspect that the border line between living and non-living is so permeable and crooked that it
is maybe a vain dream. But instead PCT offers a clear and simple hypothesis on what is common and essential to all living beings and to a sub group of machines. That thing is purposiveness. PCT also has an operative definition of that otherwise quite indeterminate
concept. I think it is fairly good beginning.
Eetu
Please, regard all my statements as questions,
no matter how they are formulated.
From: Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com
Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2018 9:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: PCT: what is the difference between organisms and machines?
I know this is a copout answer Alex, but I think Bill would have given you the answer you were looking for! Surely to answer it properly though, one needs to have a definition of a third category - ‘artificial life’ - to interpose between
‘life’ and ‘machine’?
Warren
On 27 Mar 2018, at 22:31, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:
That is precisely what I suspected PCT could add which, no matter how one wishes to stress it out, is actually very LITTLE, even barely nothing, in accounting forWhat is life?.. which a self-postulated paradigm-change theory for psychology and biology should deliver…
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 10:11 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
“What is the difference between organisms and machines?” I don’t know if there is any “the” difference, but one critical one seems to me to be the sources of the top level reference values and of the design of the perceptual functions that
produce perceptions to be controlled. In an organism, those sources are inside the organism, whereas (to date) in a machine the sources are outside the machine (humans always, so far as I know).Martin
On 2018/03/27 11:29 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin wrote:
–
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.11.19]
I can't tell from this whether you understood my answer very well or
hardly at all. Let me abstract it in short form. Machines owe their
structural form to intentions of humans. Organisms owe their
structure to the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” that they
and their ancestors have been lucky enough to survive. If and when
machines evolve through reproduction and differential survival of
errors of reproduction, their descendants may come to deserve the
word “living”.
Is my iPad Air 2 the same as my wife’s iPad Air? Would it be the
same as an iPad Air 2 she might buy? Is it the same as it was
yesterday? Is it the same as an elephant? After all, an elephant is
made up of atoms and molecules, and has parts that depend on other
parts, just as does my iPad. My iPad has gained and lost some atoms
since yesterday, has changed the state of some of its memory chips,
and is sitting in a different place. What do you mean by “the same?”
Machines and living things are the same in some respects, and
different in others, just as are any two entities to which you could
refer by using words.
If the human-initiated design of a machine includes intentionality,
and the design is good, then the machine has intentionality. In
other words, if you want a sensible answer, you should define your
question. “What about experience” indeed. What about it would you
like to investigate? Do you consider “experience” to be passive? Or
is the “experience” of control success and failure that according to
PCT participates in and partially drives reorganization and
evolutionary survival included in the question?
More to the point, what is the point toward which your questions are
attempting to lead the answers you receive? Are you wanting to
learn, to teach, to learn by teaching, or to teach by the Socratic
method of making your respondents question their assumptions so that
they change their assumptions to match yours?
Martin
···
On 2018/03/28 3:53 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin
wrote:
Veryinteresting responses indeed. Let me pick up on three of them:
1.“the shift in viewpoint from outside the organism to inside
it to solve and simplify a lot of issues that had been
nagging.” Indeed, towards the realisation that organisms have
their Umwelt.
2.“control by organisms could be computed and modelled ** as if** the organism was a machine”. Indeed “as if”… Yet, are
they the same or not?
Namely,Weiner made some effort at the beginning of his main book to
emphasise that one would need need Bergsonian time.
3.Purposiveness in living beings and a sub group of machines:
would you grant intentionality too to those?
And, also, what about experience?
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:45 AM, EetuPikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi
wrote:[Eetu Pikkarainen2018-03-28_06:30:08 UTC]
Alex, as far asI know, no theory has any definitive or perhaps even
promising answer to that question but only
descriptions about how living and artificial
entities are empirically different. So it cannot be
a standard for a paradigm-change or any other theory
that is must readily have that answer. It would be
fine if someone had one, but I suspect that the
border line between living and non-living is so
permeable and crooked that it is maybe a vain dream.
But instead PCT offers a clear and simple hypothesis
on what is common and essential to all living beings
and to a sub group of machines. That thing is
purposiveness. PCT also has an operative definition
of that otherwise quite indeterminate concept. I
think it is fairly good beginning.
Eetu
Please,regard all my statements as questions,
no matterhow they are formulated.
From: Warren Mansell
<wmansell@gmail.com >
Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2018 9:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: PCT: what is the difference
between organisms and machines?
I know this is a copoutanswer Alex, but I think Bill would have given
you the answer you were looking for! Surely to
answer it properly though, one needs to have a
definition of a third category - ‘artificial
life’ - to interpose between ‘life’ and
‘machine’?
Warren
On 27 Mar 2018, at 22:31, Alex Gomez-Marin <agomezmarin@gmail.com >wrote:
Thatis precisely what I suspected PCT could
add which, no matter how one wishes to
stress it out, is actually very LITTLE,
even barely nothing, in accounting forWhat is life?.. which a
self-postulated paradigm-change theory
for psychology and biology should
deliver…
AlexGomez-Marin, PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode Neurociencias
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at10:11 PM, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net >
wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
"What is thedifference between organisms and
machines?" I don’t know if there is
any “the” difference, but one critical
one seems to me to be the sources of
the top level reference values and of
the design of the perceptual functions
that produce perceptions to be
controlled. In an organism, those
sources are inside the organism,
whereas (to date) in a machine the
sources are outside the machine
(humans always, so far as I know).Martin
On 2018/03/2711:29 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin
wrote:
–
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
[philip 2018.03.28]
A lump of coal is not a machine. An inclined plane is a machine. A machine transmits forces. I don’t know if a computer is a machine. Does it transmit forces?
PCT helps you ask questions. But it is not a method of discovery. PCT is in the same environment as astronomy was in after Ptolemy and Copernicus. These celestial models provided a method of calculating the planets’ positions, but they did not provide the mechanism of gravity as Newton did after succeeding Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler.
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-28_17:12:07 PT]
The source of energy is a significant difference. Living things ingest substances from their environment and metabolize them to release and employ energy in input functions, output functions, reorganization, …
Complex life forms comprise organizations of simpler life forms in ways far more complex and interesting than the decomposition of a machine into its parts, not least because each of those constituent organisms is an autonomous control system with its own autonomous metabolism, functioning in an environment of its peers.
- “control by organisms could be computed and modelled **as if **the organism was a machine”. Indeed “as if”… Yet, are they the same or not? Namely,
Weiner made some effort at the beginning of his main book to emphasise that one would need need Bergsonian time.
Bergson saw the ‘mechanistic’ time of science as successive differentiations between discrete physical states, and in contrast emphasized the subjective experience of time as duration. In a digital computer continuous change is modeled by discrete changes of state; in an analog computer this is not necessary. You might say that an analog model of change occurs in Bergsonian time, though of course Bergson was writing of experience and qualia, not neural signals. We should also bear in mind that Weiner was not writing about a hierarchy of cascading control, where the higher levels are categorial, no longer analog.
···
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:36 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.11.19]
On 2018/03/28 3:53 AM, Alex Gomez-Marinwrote:
Veryinteresting responses indeed. Let me pick up on three of them:
1.“the shift in viewpoint from outside the organism to inside
it to solve and simplify a lot of issues that had been
nagging.” Indeed, towards the realisation that organisms have
their Umwelt.
I can't tell from this whether you understood my answer very well orhardly at all. Let me abstract it in short form. Machines owe their
structural form to intentions of humans. Organisms owe their
structure to the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” that they
and their ancestors have been lucky enough to survive. If and when
machines evolve through reproduction and differential survival of
errors of reproduction, their descendants may come to deserve the
word “living”.
2.“control by organisms could be computed and modelled ** as if** the organism was a machine”. Indeed “as if”… Yet, are
they the same or not?
Is my iPad Air 2 the same as my wife's iPad Air? Would it be thesame as an iPad Air 2 she might buy? Is it the same as it was
yesterday? Is it the same as an elephant? After all, an elephant is
made up of atoms and molecules, and has parts that depend on other
parts, just as does my iPad. My iPad has gained and lost some atoms
since yesterday, has changed the state of some of its memory chips,
and is sitting in a different place. What do you mean by “the same?”
Machines and living things are the same in some respects, and
different in others, just as are any two entities to which you could
refer by using words.Namely,Weiner made some effort at the beginning of his main book to
emphasise that one would need need Bergsonian time.
3.Purposiveness in living beings and a sub group of machines:
would you grant intentionality too to those?
And, also, what about experience?
If the human-initiated design of a machine includes intentionality,and the design is good, then the machine has intentionality. In
other words, if you want a sensible answer, you should define your
question. “What about experience” indeed. What about it would you
like to investigate? Do you consider “experience” to be passive? Or
is the “experience” of control success and failure that according to
PCT participates in and partially drives reorganization and
evolutionary survival included in the question?More to the point, what is the point toward which your questions areattempting to lead the answers you receive? Are you wanting to
learn, to teach, to learn by teaching, or to teach by the Socratic
method of making your respondents question their assumptions so that
they change their assumptions to match yours?Martin
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:45 AM, Eetu
Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi
wrote:
[Eetu Pikkarainen2018-03-28_06:30:08 UTC]
Alex, as far asI know, no theory has any definitive or perhaps even
promising answer to that question but only
descriptions about how living and artificial
entities are empirically different. So it cannot be
a standard for a paradigm-change or any other theory
that is must readily have that answer. It would be
fine if someone had one, but I suspect that the
border line between living and non-living is so
permeable and crooked that it is maybe a vain dream.
But instead PCT offers a clear and simple hypothesis
on what is common and essential to all living beings
and to a sub group of machines. That thing is
purposiveness. PCT also has an operative definition
of that otherwise quite indeterminate concept. I
think it is fairly good beginning.
Eetu
Please,regard all my statements as questions,
no matterhow they are formulated.
From: Warren Mansell
<wmansell@gmail.com >
Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2018 9:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: PCT: what is the difference
between organisms and machines?
I know this is a copoutanswer Alex, but I think Bill would have given
you the answer you were looking for! Surely to
answer it properly though, one needs to have a
definition of a third category - ‘artificial
life’ - to interpose between ‘life’ and
‘machine’?
Warren
On 27 Mar 2018, at 22:31, Alex Gomez-Marin <agomezmarin@gmail.com >wrote:
Thatis precisely what I suspected PCT could
add which, no matter how one wishes to
stress it out, is actually very LITTLE,
even barely nothing, in accounting forWhat is life?.. which a
self-postulated paradigm-change theory
for psychology and biology should
deliver…
AlexGomez-Marin, PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode Neurociencias
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at10:11 PM, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net >
wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
"What is thedifference between organisms and
machines?" I don’t know if there is
any “the” difference, but one critical
one seems to me to be the sources of
the top level reference values and of
the design of the perceptual functions
that produce perceptions to be
controlled. In an organism, those
sources are inside the organism,
whereas (to date) in a machine the
sources are outside the machine
(humans always, so far as I know).Martin
On 2018/03/2711:29 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin
wrote:
–
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
Alex wanted to know how PCT is different from other theories. Donât focus on the question âwhatâs the difference between living and non livingâ?.Â
···
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:36 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.11.19]
On 2018/03/28 3:53 AM, Alex Gomez-Marinwrote:
Veryinteresting responses indeed. Let me pick up on three of them:
1.“the shift in viewpoint from outside the organism to inside
it to solve and simplify a lot of issues that had been
nagging.” Indeed, towards the realisation that organisms have
their Umwelt.
I can't tell from this whether you understood my answer very well orhardly at all. Let me abstract it in short form. Machines owe their
structural form to intentions of humans. Organisms owe their
structure to the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” that they
and their ancestors have been lucky enough to survive. If and when
machines evolve through reproduction and differential survival of
errors of reproduction, their descendants may come to deserve the
word “living”.
2.“control by organisms could be computed and modelled ** as if** the organism was a machine”. Indeed “as if”… Yet, are
they the same or not?
Is my iPad Air 2 the same as my wife's iPad Air? Would it be thesame as an iPad Air 2 she might buy? Is it the same as it was
yesterday? Is it the same as an elephant? After all, an elephant is
made up of atoms and molecules, and has parts that depend on other
parts, just as does my iPad. My iPad has gained and lost some atoms
since yesterday, has changed the state of some of its memory chips,
and is sitting in a different place. What do you mean by “the same?”
Machines and living things are the same in some respects, and
different in others, just as are any two entities to which you could
refer by using words.Namely,Weiner made some effort at the beginning of his main book to
emphasise that one would need need Bergsonian time.
3.Purposiveness in living beings and a sub group of machines:
would you grant intentionality too to those?
And, also, what about experience?
If the human-initiated design of a machine includes intentionality,and the design is good, then the machine has intentionality. In
other words, if you want a sensible answer, you should define your
question. “What about experience” indeed. What about it would you
like to investigate? Do you consider “experience” to be passive? Or
is the “experience” of control success and failure that according to
PCT participates in and partially drives reorganization and
evolutionary survival included in the question?More to the point, what is the point toward which your questions areattempting to lead the answers you receive? Are you wanting to
learn, to teach, to learn by teaching, or to teach by the Socratic
method of making your respondents question their assumptions so that
they change their assumptions to match yours?Martin
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de Neurociencias
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:45 AM, Eetu
Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi
wrote:
[Eetu Pikkarainen2018-03-28_06:30:08 UTC]
Â
Alex, as far asI know, no theory has any definitive or perhaps even
promising answer to that question but only
descriptions about how living and artificial
entities are empirically different. So it cannot be
a standard for a paradigm-change or any other theory
that is must readily have that answer. It would be
fine if someone had one, but I suspect that the
border line between living and non-living is so
permeable and crooked that it is maybe a vain dream.
But instead PCT offers a clear and simple hypothesis
on what is common and essential to all living beings
and to a sub group of machines. That thing is
purposiveness. PCT also has an operative definition
of that otherwise quite indeterminate concept. I
think it is fairly good beginning.
Â
Eetu
Â
 Please,regard all my statements as questions,
 no matterhow they are formulated.
Â
Â
From: Warren Mansell
<wmansell@gmail.com >
Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2018 9:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: PCT: what is the difference
between organisms and machines?
Â
I know this is a copoutanswer Alex, but I think Bill would have given
you the answer you were looking for! Surely to
answer it properly though, one needs to have a
definition of a third category - âartificial
lifeâ - to interpose between âlifeâ and
âmachineâ?
Warren
Â
On 27 Mar 2018, at 22:31, Alex Gomez-Marin <agomezmarin@gmail.com >wrote:
Thatis precisely what I suspected PCT could
add which, no matter how one wishes to
stress it out, is actually very LITTLE,
even barely nothing, in accounting forWhat is life?.. which a
self-postulated paradigm-change theory
for psychology and biology should
deliver…
AlexGomez-Marin, PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode Neurociencias
Â
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at10:11 PM, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net >
wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.27.16.06]
"What is thedifference between organisms and
machines?" I don’t know if there is
any “the” difference, but one critical
one seems to me to be the sources of
the top level reference values and of
the design of the perceptual functions
that produce perceptions to be
controlled. In an organism, those
sources are inside the organism,
whereas (to date) in a machine the
sources are outside the machine
(humans always, so far as I know).Martin
Â
On 2018/03/2711:29 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin
wrote:
–
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
Â
Â
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.23.25]
[philip 2018.03.28]
A lump of coal is not a machine. An inclined plane is a machine. A machine transmits forces. I don’t know if a computer is a machine. Does it transmit forces?
Is your definition of a machine something that transmits forces? If so, then everything massive or electromagnetic or composed of quarks is a machine. I rather think you intend something different. But what?
PCT helps you ask questions. But it is not a method of discovery. PCT is in the same environment as astronomy was in after Ptolemy and Copernicus. These celestial models provided a method of calculating the planets’ positions, but they did not provide the mechanism of gravity as Newton did after succeeding Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler.
Newton did not provide a mechanism for gravity. He proposed an abstract interactional relationship that he called gravity, which could be used in formulae that allowed some forces and orbits to be computed.
What would you call "a method of discovery"? If I were asked that question, I would suggest exploring, searching, trying putting random things together if they seem as though they might fit. Apparently you intend something quite different. Do you have an example?
Martin
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.23.33]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-28_17:12:07 PT]
The source of energy is a significant difference. Livingthings ingest substances from their environment and metabolize
them to release and employ energy in input functions, output
functions, reorganization, …
How do living things and machines differ in this? Some things I
would call machines even reorganize themselves, though not as PCT
suggests organisms do. Everything they do uses energy, just as
everything organisms do uses energy for essentially the same
reasons.
Complex life forms comprise organizations of simpler lifeforms in ways far more complex and interesting than the
decomposition of a machine into its parts, not least because
each of those constituent organisms is an autonomous control
system with its own autonomous metabolism, functioning in an
environment of its peers.
I don't think you can use complexity or quasi-fractal levels of
nested structure as a true criterion, because as science permits
ever more miniaturization, machines can become ever more complex,
each of its constituent parts being a machine. A single chip even
now contains millions of machines. “Autonomy” however, is another
word for a difference between machines and organisms that I thought
central. In that, we are in agreement.
Martin
···
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:36 AM, Martin
Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.11.19]
On2018/03/28 3:53 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin wrote:
Veryinteresting responses indeed. Let me pick up on
three of them:
1.“the shift in viewpoint from outside the organism
to inside it to solve and simplify a lot
of issues that had been nagging.” Indeed, towards
the realisation that organisms have their Umwelt.
I can't tell from this whether you understood myanswer very well or hardly at all. Let me abstract it in
short form. Machines owe their structural form to
intentions of humans. Organisms owe their structure to the
“slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” that they and
their ancestors have been lucky enough to survive. If and
when machines evolve through reproduction and differential
survival of errors of reproduction, their descendants may
come to deserve the word “living”.
2.“control by organisms could be computed and
modelled as if the organism was a
machine”. Indeed “as if”… Yet, are they the same
or not?
Is my iPad Air 2 the same as my wife's iPad Air?Would it be the same as an iPad Air 2 she might buy? Is it
the same as it was yesterday? Is it the same as an
elephant? After all, an elephant is made up of atoms and
molecules, and has parts that depend on other parts, just
as does my iPad. My iPad has gained and lost some atoms
since yesterday, has changed the state of some of its
memory chips, and is sitting in a different place. What do
you mean by “the same?” Machines and living things are the
same in some respects, and different in others, just as
are any two entities to which you could refer by using
words.Namely,Weiner made some effort at the beginning of his
main book to emphasise that one would need need
Bergsonian time.
3.Purposiveness in living beings and a sub group of
machines: would you grant intentionality
too to those? And, also, what about experience?
If the human-initiated design of a machineincludes intentionality, and the design is good, then the
machine has intentionality. In other words, if you want a
sensible answer, you should define your question. “What
about experience” indeed. What about it would you like to
investigate? Do you consider “experience” to be passive?
Or is the “experience” of control success and failure that
according to PCT participates in and partially drives
reorganization and evolutionary survival included in the
question?More to the point, what is the point toward which yourquestions are attempting to lead the answers you receive?
Are you wanting to learn, to teach, to learn by teaching,
or to teach by the Socratic method of making your
respondents question their assumptions so that they change
their assumptions to match yours?Martin
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de
Neurociencias
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at
8:45 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi
wrote:
[EetuPikkarainen 2018-03-28_06:30:08 UTC]
Alex,as far as I know, no theory has any
definitive or perhaps even promising
answer to that question but only
descriptions about how living and
artificial entities are empirically
different. So it cannot be a standard
for a paradigm-change or any other
theory that is must readily have that
answer. It would be fine if someone
had one, but I suspect that the border
line between living and non-living is
so permeable and crooked that it is
maybe a vain dream. But instead PCT
offers a clear and simple hypothesis
on what is common and essential to all
living beings and to a sub group of
machines. That thing is purposiveness.
PCT also has an operative definition
of that otherwise quite indeterminate
concept. I think it is fairly good
beginning.
Eetu
Please, regard all my statements as
questions,
no matter how they are formulated.
From:
Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com >
Sent: Wednesday, March 28,
2018 9:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: PCT: what is the
difference between organisms and
machines?
I know this isa copout answer Alex, but I think
Bill would have given you the
answer you were looking for!
Surely to answer it properly
though, one needs to have a
definition of a third category -
‘artificial life’ - to interpose
between ‘life’ and ‘machine’?
Warren
On 27 Mar 2018, at 22:31, AlexGomez-Marin <agomezmarin@gmail.com >
wrote:
Thatis precisely what I
suspected PCT could add
which, no matter how one
wishes to stress it out,
is actually very LITTLE,
even barely nothing, in
accounting for * What is
life?..* which a
self-postulated
paradigm-change theory for
psychology and biology
should deliver…
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
On Tue,Mar 27, 2018 at 10:11 PM,
Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net >
wrote:
[Martin Taylor2018.03.27.16.06]
"Whatis the difference
between organisms and
machines?" I don’t know
if there is any “the”
difference, but one
critical one seems to me
to be the sources of the
top level reference
values and of the design
of the perceptual
functions that produce
perceptions to be
controlled. In an
organism, those sources
are inside the organism,
whereas (to date) in a
machine the sources are
outside the machine
(humans always, so far
as I know).Martin
On2018/03/27 11:29
AM, Alex
Gomez-Marin wrote:
–
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-28_21:33:39 PT]
I think metabolism is a differentiator. Are you talking about machines with metabolisms? I didn’t know they existed.
···
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:42 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.23.33]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-28_17:12:07 PT]
The source of energy is a significant difference. Livingthings ingest substances from their environment and metabolize
them to release and employ energy in input functions, output
functions, reorganization, …
How do living things and machines differ in this? Some things Iwould call machines even reorganize themselves, though not as PCT
suggests organisms do. Everything they do uses energy, just as
everything organisms do uses energy for essentially the same
reasons.
Complex life forms comprise organizations of simpler lifeforms in ways far more complex and interesting than the
decomposition of a machine into its parts, not least because
each of those constituent organisms is an autonomous control
system with its own autonomous metabolism, functioning in an
environment of its peers.
I don't think you can use complexity or quasi-fractal levels ofnested structure as a true criterion, because as science permits
ever more miniaturization, machines can become ever more complex,
each of its constituent parts being a machine. A single chip even
now contains millions of machines. “Autonomy” however, is another
word for a difference between machines and organisms that I thought
central. In that, we are in agreement.Martin
2.“control by organisms could be computed and modelled ** as
if ** the
organism was a machine”. Indeed “as if”… Yet, are they
the same or not? Namely,
Weiner
made some effort at the beginning of his main book to
emphasise that one would need need Bergsonian time.
Bergson saw the 'mechanistic' time of science as successivedifferentiations between discrete physical states, and in
contrast emphasized the subjective experience of time as
duration. In a digital computer continuous change is modeled
by discrete changes of state; in an analog computer this is
not necessary. You might say that an analog model of change
occurs in Bergsonian time, though of course Bergson was
writing of experience and qualia, not neural signals. We
should also bear in mind that Weiner was not writing about a
hierarchy of cascading control, where the higher levels are
categorial, no longer analog.
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:36 AM, Martin
Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.11.19]
On2018/03/28 3:53 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin wrote:
Veryinteresting responses indeed. Let me pick up on
three of them:
1.“the shift in viewpoint from outside the organism
to inside it to solve and simplify a lot
of issues that had been nagging.” Indeed, towards
the realisation that organisms have their Umwelt.
I can't tell from this whether you understood myanswer very well or hardly at all. Let me abstract it in
short form. Machines owe their structural form to
intentions of humans. Organisms owe their structure to the
“slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” that they and
their ancestors have been lucky enough to survive. If and
when machines evolve through reproduction and differential
survival of errors of reproduction, their descendants may
come to deserve the word “living”.
2.“control by organisms could be computed and
modelled as if the organism was a
machine”. Indeed “as if”… Yet, are they the same
or not?
Is my iPad Air 2 the same as my wife's iPad Air?Would it be the same as an iPad Air 2 she might buy? Is it
the same as it was yesterday? Is it the same as an
elephant? After all, an elephant is made up of atoms and
molecules, and has parts that depend on other parts, just
as does my iPad. My iPad has gained and lost some atoms
since yesterday, has changed the state of some of its
memory chips, and is sitting in a different place. What do
you mean by “the same?” Machines and living things are the
same in some respects, and different in others, just as
are any two entities to which you could refer by using
words.Namely,Weiner made some effort at the beginning of his
main book to emphasise that one would need need
Bergsonian time.
3.Purposiveness in living beings and a sub group of
machines: would you grant intentionality
too to those? And, also, what about experience?
If the human-initiated design of a machineincludes intentionality, and the design is good, then the
machine has intentionality. In other words, if you want a
sensible answer, you should define your question. “What
about experience” indeed. What about it would you like to
investigate? Do you consider “experience” to be passive?
Or is the “experience” of control success and failure that
according to PCT participates in and partially drives
reorganization and evolutionary survival included in the
question?More to the point, what is the point toward which yourquestions are attempting to lead the answers you receive?
Are you wanting to learn, to teach, to learn by teaching,
or to teach by the Socratic method of making your
respondents question their assumptions so that they change
their assumptions to match yours?Martin
Alex Gomez-Marin, PhD
Research Group Leader
Instituto de
Neurociencias
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at
8:45 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi
wrote:
[EetuPikkarainen 2018-03-28_06:30:08 UTC]
Alex,as far as I know, no theory has any
definitive or perhaps even promising
answer to that question but only
descriptions about how living and
artificial entities are empirically
different. So it cannot be a standard
for a paradigm-change or any other
theory that is must readily have that
answer. It would be fine if someone
had one, but I suspect that the border
line between living and non-living is
so permeable and crooked that it is
maybe a vain dream. But instead PCT
offers a clear and simple hypothesis
on what is common and essential to all
living beings and to a sub group of
machines. That thing is purposiveness.
PCT also has an operative definition
of that otherwise quite indeterminate
concept. I think it is fairly good
beginning.
Eetu
Please, regard all my statements as
questions,
no matter how they are formulated.
From:
Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com >
Sent: Wednesday, March 28,
2018 9:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: PCT: what is the
difference between organisms and
machines?
I know this isa copout answer Alex, but I think
Bill would have given you the
answer you were looking for!
Surely to answer it properly
though, one needs to have a
definition of a third category -
‘artificial life’ - to interpose
between ‘life’ and ‘machine’?
Warren
On 27 Mar 2018, at 22:31, AlexGomez-Marin <agomezmarin@gmail.com >
wrote:
Thatis precisely what I
suspected PCT could add
which, no matter how one
wishes to stress it out,
is actually very LITTLE,
even barely nothing, in
accounting for * What is
life?..* which a
self-postulated
paradigm-change theory for
psychology and biology
should deliver…
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
On Tue,Mar 27, 2018 at 10:11 PM,
Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net >
wrote:
[Martin Taylor2018.03.27.16.06]
"Whatis the difference
between organisms and
machines?" I don’t know
if there is any “the”
difference, but one
critical one seems to me
to be the sources of the
top level reference
values and of the design
of the perceptual
functions that produce
perceptions to be
controlled. In an
organism, those sources
are inside the organism,
whereas (to date) in a
machine the sources are
outside the machine
(humans always, so far
as I know).Martin
On2018/03/27 11:29
AM, Alex
Gomez-Marin wrote:
–
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.29.00.54]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-28_21:33:39 PT]
I think metabolism is a differentiator. Are you talkingabout machines with metabolisms? I didn’t know they existed.
I wasn't. I was talking about " <strike>Living things</strike>
machines that ingest substances [coal, oil, electricity] from their
environment and metabolize them alter their form
to release and employ energy in …". Is that the same or different?
I would say it is functionally the same, but if you are talking
about necessarily chemical conversion of organic materials into
other organic materials to extract energy, I’d say that making this
a distinction was implicitly excluded as a differentiator in Alex’s
initial question, at least as I understood it.
Martin
···
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 8:42 PM, Martin
Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.23.33]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-28_17:12:07 PT]
The source of energy is a significantdifference. Living things ingest substances from
their environment and metabolize them to release
and employ energy in input functions, output
functions, reorganization, …
How do living things and machines differ in this?Some things I would call machines even reorganize
themselves, though not as PCT suggests organisms do.
Everything they do uses energy, just as everything
organisms do uses energy for essentially the same reasons.
Complex life forms comprise organizations ofsimpler life forms in ways far more complex and
interesting than the decomposition of a machine
into its parts, not least because each of those
constituent organisms is an autonomous control
system with its own autonomous metabolism,
functioning in an environment of its peers.
I don't think you can use complexity orquasi-fractal levels of nested structure as a true
criterion, because as science permits ever more
miniaturization, machines can become ever more complex,
each of its constituent parts being a machine. A single
chip even now contains millions of machines. “Autonomy”
however, is another word for a difference between machines
and organisms that I thought central. In that, we are in
agreement.Martin
2.“control by organisms could be computed and
modelled ** as
if ** the
organism was a machine”. Indeed “as if”…
Yet, are they the same or not? Namely,
Weiner
made some effort at the beginning of his
main book to emphasise that one would need
need Bergsonian time.
Bergson saw the 'mechanistic' time of scienceas successive differentiations between discrete
physical states, and in contrast emphasized the
subjective experience of time as duration. In a
digital computer continuous change is modeled by
discrete changes of state; in an analog computer
this is not necessary. You might say that an
analog model of change occurs in Bergsonian
time, though of course Bergson was writing of
experience and qualia, not neural signals. We
should also bear in mind that Weiner was not
writing about a hierarchy of cascading control,
where the higher levels are categorial, no
longer analog.
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at
8:36 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.11.19]
On2018/03/28 3:53 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin
wrote:
Veryinteresting responses indeed. Let me
pick up on three of them:
1.“the shift in viewpoint from outside
the organism to inside it to
solve and simplify a lot of issues
that had been nagging.” Indeed,
towards the realisation that
organisms have their Umwelt.
I can't tell from this whether youunderstood my answer very well or hardly at
all. Let me abstract it in short form.
Machines owe their structural form to
intentions of humans. Organisms owe their
structure to the “slings and arrows of
outrageous fortune” that they and their
ancestors have been lucky enough to survive.
If and when machines evolve through
reproduction and differential survival of
errors of reproduction, their descendants
may come to deserve the word “living”.
2.“control by organisms could be
computed and modelled as if the
organism was a machine”. Indeed “as
if”… Yet, are they the same or
not?
Is my iPad Air 2 the same as mywife’s iPad Air? Would it be the same as an
iPad Air 2 she might buy? Is it the same as
it was yesterday? Is it the same as an
elephant? After all, an elephant is made up
of atoms and molecules, and has parts that
depend on other parts, just as does my iPad.
My iPad has gained and lost some atoms since
yesterday, has changed the state of some of
its memory chips, and is sitting in a
different place. What do you mean by “the
same?” Machines and living things are the
same in some respects, and different in
others, just as are any two entities to
which you could refer by using words.Namely,Weiner made some effort at the
beginning of his main book to
emphasise that one would need need
Bergsonian time.
3.Purposiveness in living beings and a
sub group of machines: would you
grant intentionality
too to those? And, also, what about
experience?
If the human-initiated design of amachine includes intentionality, and the
design is good, then the machine has
intentionality. In other words, if you want
a sensible answer, you should define your
question. “What about experience” indeed.
What about it would you like to investigate?
Do you consider “experience” to be passive?
Or is the “experience” of control success
and failure that according to PCT
participates in and partially drives
reorganization and evolutionary survival
included in the question?More to the point, what is the point towardwhich your questions are attempting to lead
the answers you receive? Are you wanting to
learn, to teach, to learn by teaching, or to
teach by the Socratic method of making your
respondents question their assumptions so
that they change their assumptions to match
yours?Martin
Alex
Gomez-Marin,
PhD
Research
Group Leader
Instituto
de
Neurociencias
On Wed, Mar
28, 2018 at 8:45 AM, Eetu
Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi
wrote:
[EetuPikkarainen
2018-03-28_06:30:08 UTC]
Alex, asfar as I know, no theory
has any definitive or
perhaps even promising
answer to that question
but only descriptions
about how living and
artificial entities are
empirically different.
So it cannot be a
standard for a
paradigm-change or any
other theory that is
must readily have that
answer. It would be fine
if someone had one, but
I suspect that the
border line between
living and non-living is
so permeable and crooked
that it is maybe a vain
dream. But instead PCT
offers a clear and
simple hypothesis on
what is common and
essential to all living
beings and to a sub
group of machines. That
thing is purposiveness.
PCT also has an
operative definition of
that otherwise quite
indeterminate concept. I
think it is fairly good
beginning.
Eetu
Please,regard all my
statements as
questions,
nomatter how they are
formulated.
From:
Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com >
Sent:
Wednesday, March 28,
2018 9:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re:
PCT: what is the
difference between
organisms and
machines?
Iknow this is a
copout answer Alex,
but I think Bill
would have given you
the answer you were
looking for! Surely
to answer it
properly though, one
needs to have a
definition of a
third category -
‘artificial life’ -
to interpose between
‘life’ and
‘machine’?
Warren
On 27 Mar 2018, at22:31, Alex
Gomez-Marin <agomezmarin@gmail.com >
wrote:
Thatis precisely
what I
suspected PCT
could add
which, no
matter how one
wishes to
stress it out,
is actually
very LITTLE,
even barely
nothing, in
accounting for* What is
life?..* which
a
self-postulated
paradigm-change theory for psychology and biology should deliver…
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
OnTue, Mar 27,
2018 at 10:11
PM, Martin
Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net >
wrote:
[MartinTaylor
2018.03.27.16.06]
"Whatis the
difference
between
organisms and
machines?" I
don’t know if
there is any
“the”
difference,
but one
critical one
seems to me to
be the sources
of the top
level
reference
values and of
the design of
the perceptual
functions that
produce
perceptions to
be controlled.
In an
organism,
those sources
are inside the
organism,
whereas (to
date) in a
machine the
sources are
outside the
machine
(humans
always, so far
as I know).Martin
On2018/03/27
11:29 AM, Alex
Gomez-Marin
wrote:
–
AlexGomez-Marin,
PhD
ResearchGroup Leader
Institutode
Neurociencias
[philip 2018.03.28]
-
A machine has a shape designed to transmit purposive forces.
-
Darwin’s theory of evolution is a method of discovery.
···
On Wednesday, March 28, 2018, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.23.25]
[philip 2018.03.28]
A lump of coal is not a machine. An inclined plane is a machine. A machine transmits forces. I don’t know if a computer is a machine. Does it transmit forces?
Is your definition of a machine something that transmits forces? If so, then everything massive or electromagnetic or composed of quarks is a machine. I rather think you intend something different. But what?
PCT helps you ask questions. But it is not a method of discovery. PCT is in the same environment as astronomy was in after Ptolemy and Copernicus. These celestial models provided a method of calculating the planets’ positions, but they did not provide the mechanism of gravity as Newton did after succeeding Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler.
Newton did not provide a mechanism for gravity. He proposed an abstract interactional relationship that he called gravity, which could be used in formulae that allowed some forces and orbits to be computed.
What would you call “a method of discovery”? If I were asked that question, I would suggest exploring, searching, trying putting random things together if they seem as though they might fit. Apparently you intend something quite different. Do you have an example?
Martin
[philip 2018.03.28]
PCT was invented to explain how the brain can control movement despite spinal reflexes. It does not provide a mechanism for thought.
···
On Wednesday, March 28, 2018, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:
[philip 2018.03.28]
- A machine has a shape designed to transmit purposive forces.
- Darwin’s theory of evolution is a method of discovery.
On Wednesday, March 28, 2018, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.28.23.25]
[philip 2018.03.28]
A lump of coal is not a machine. An inclined plane is a machine. A machine transmits forces. I don’t know if a computer is a machine. Does it transmit forces?
Is your definition of a machine something that transmits forces? If so, then everything massive or electromagnetic or composed of quarks is a machine. I rather think you intend something different. But what?
PCT helps you ask questions. But it is not a method of discovery. PCT is in the same environment as astronomy was in after Ptolemy and Copernicus. These celestial models provided a method of calculating the planets’ positions, but they did not provide the mechanism of gravity as Newton did after succeeding Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler.
Newton did not provide a mechanism for gravity. He proposed an abstract interactional relationship that he called gravity, which could be used in formulae that allowed some forces and orbits to be computed.
What would you call “a method of discovery”? If I were asked that question, I would suggest exploring, searching, trying putting random things together if they seem as though they might fit. Apparently you intend something quite different. Do you have an example?
Martin
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.29.11.10]
[philip2018.03.28]
PCT was invented to explain how the brain can control
movement despite spinal reflexes. It does not provide a
mechanism for thought.
As usual, you are very cryptic. I don't understand "despite spinal
reflexes" which are well described as perceptual control loops, or
“PCT was invented to explain how the brain can control movement”,
since one of the main points of difference between PCT and earlier
theories is that THEY purported to explain how the brain can control
movement, whereas PCT basically says that the brain does NOT control
movement. What is controlled is always and only perception (though
it acknowledges that one can perceive movement, and in principle can
control perceptions of movement).
To what question is the comment "It [PCT] does not provide a
mechanism for thought" relevant? Or is it an assertion developed
through a deep understanding of PCT, implying a deeper continuation
“… and we should be asking whether some extension to PCT ought to
be developed to provide such a mechanism”, or perhaps “… and
therefore PCT should be abandoned in favour of some as yet
unspecified theory that does provide a mechanism for thought”?
Without asserting whether it does or not, I'm wondering why you
think PCT does not provide a mechanism for thought.
[philip2018.03.28]
(A different message, despite having the same ID tag.)
1. A machine has a shape designed to transmit purposiveforces.
OK, a computer is defined as not a machine. Machines are restricted
by definition to be only the bodies of living things and perhaps
also the kinds of constructions imagined by 18th century automaton
builders.
But it's good to know how our languages differ. I wonder if that
definition was the one Alex had in mind when he asked his initial
question about the difference between machines and living things.
2. Darwin’s theory of evolution is a method ofdiscovery.
Could you explain less cryptically the method?
Martin
···
On Wednesday, March 28, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > > wrote:[MartinTaylor 2018.03.28.23.25]
[philip 2018.03.28]
A lump of coal is not a machine. An inclined plane isa machine. A machine transmits forces. I don’t know if
a computer is a machine. Does it transmit forces?Is your definition of a machine something that transmitsforces? If so, then everything massive or
electromagnetic or composed of quarks is a machine. I
rather think you intend something different. But what?PCT helps you ask questions. But it is not a method ofdiscovery. PCT is in the same environment as astronomy
was in after Ptolemy and Copernicus. These celestial
models provided a method of calculating the planets’
positions, but they did not provide the mechanism of
gravity as Newton did after succeeding Galileo, Tycho
Brahe, and Kepler.Newton did not provide a mechanism for gravity. Heproposed an abstract interactional relationship that he
called gravity, which could be used in formulae that
allowed some forces and orbits to be computed.What would you call "a method of discovery"? If I wereasked that question, I would suggest exploring,
searching, trying putting random things together if they
seem as though they might fit. Apparently you intend
something quite different. Do you have an example?Martin
[philip 2018.03.29]
Do I really need to time stamp when the email automatically includes one?
-
Despite âinterveningâ? spinal reflexes.Â
-
Why is there thought?
-
A machine is a simple machine only.Â
···
On Thursday, March 29, 2018, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.29.11.10]
[philip2018.03.28]
PCT was invented to explain how the brain can control
movement despite spinal reflexes. It does not provide a
mechanism for thought.
As usual, you are very cryptic. I don't understand "despite spinalreflexes" which are well described as perceptual control loops, or
“PCT was invented to explain how the brain can control movement”,
since one of the main points of difference between PCT and earlier
theories is that THEY purported to explain how the brain can control
movement, whereas PCT basically says that the brain does NOT control
movement. What is controlled is always and only perception (though
it acknowledges that one can perceive movement, and in principle can
control perceptions of movement).To what question is the comment "It [PCT] does not provide amechanism for thought" relevant? Or is it an assertion developed
through a deep understanding of PCT, implying a deeper continuation
“… and we should be asking whether some extension to PCT ought to
be developed to provide such a mechanism”, or perhaps “… and
therefore PCT should be abandoned in favour of some as yet
unspecified theory that does provide a mechanism for thought”?Without asserting whether it does or not, I'm wondering why youthink PCT does not provide a mechanism for thought.
[philip2018.03.28]
(A different message, despite having the same ID tag.)
1. A machine has a shape designed to transmit purposiveforces.
OK, a computer is defined as not a machine. Machines are restrictedby definition to be only the bodies of living things and perhaps
also the kinds of constructions imagined by 18th century automaton
builders.But it's good to know how our languages differ. I wonder if thatdefinition was the one Alex had in mind when he asked his initial
question about the difference between machines and living things.
2. Darwinâs theory of evolution is a method ofdiscovery.
Could you explain less cryptically the method? Martin
On Wednesday, March 28, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > > > wrote:[MartinTaylor 2018.03.28.23.25]
[philip 2018.03.28]
A lump of coal is not a machine. An inclined plane isa machine. A machine transmits forces. I donât know if
a computer is a machine. Does it transmit forces?Is your definition of a machine something that transmitsforces? If so, then everything massive or
electromagnetic or composed of quarks is a machine. I
rather think you intend something different. But what?PCT helps you ask questions. But it is not a method ofdiscovery. PCT is in the same environment as astronomy
was in after Ptolemy and Copernicus. These celestial
models provided a method of calculating the planetsâ
positions, but they did not provide the mechanism of
gravity as Newton did after succeeding Galileo, Tycho
Brahe, and Kepler.Newton did not provide a mechanism for gravity. Heproposed an abstract interactional relationship that he
called gravity, which could be used in formulae that
allowed some forces and orbits to be computed.What would you call "a method of discovery"? If I wereasked that question, I would suggest exploring,
searching, trying putting random things together if they
seem as though they might fit. Apparently you intend
something quite different. Do you have an example?Martin
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.29.17.01]
[philip 2018.03.29]
Do I really need to time stamp when the email automaticallyincludes one?
Only if you want people later to be able to find your posts in the
archive from back references in messages such as this. The received
e-mail automatic time stamp differs depending on where in the world
the recipient lives, so that’s not much use for searching through
the archives. The ID stamp helps get your messages into later
discussions, though in your case, I think the severe cryptic style
would make it difficult for future understanding of what you were
talking about. Maybe that is the result you are trying to achieve,
in which case you are doing very well.
- Despite “intervening� spinal reflexes.
Have you read for example B:CP p 82? There's no "intervening" to be
despite of.
- Why is there thought?
Good question. I have my own ideas about that, but I will use your
style to explain them: Because we may encounter something new.
- A machine is a simple machine only.
That's too cryptic for me. I have some software called "Simple
Machine." It is a kind of CMS system, but I don’t know how it fits
into this discussion. Otherwise, a lever is a simple machine. Is
that what you mean?
A good PCT-style question is: "What are you controlling for when you
go to such lengths to make your statements and questions so hard to
interpret in any sensible PCT-related way?"
Are you going to explain the "method of discovery" that is implicit
in Darwin’s theory of evolution, or in any other way explain what
you means when you complained that PCT was not a method of
discovery? Or how it could not be a “method of discovery” if it
“helps you ask questions”. Is there any method of discovery that
does not consist of asking questions?
Martin
···
On Thursday, March 29, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > wrote:[Martin Taylor 2018.03.29.11.10]
[philip 2018.03.28]
PCT was invented to explain how the brain can
control movement despite spinal reflexes. It does not
provide a mechanism for thought.
As usual, you are very cryptic. I don't understand“despite spinal reflexes” which are well described as
perceptual control loops, or “PCT was invented to explain
how the brain can control movement”, since one of the main
points of difference between PCT and earlier theories is
that THEY purported to explain how the brain can control
movement, whereas PCT basically says that the brain does
NOT control movement. What is controlled is always and
only perception (though it acknowledges that one can
perceive movement, and in principle can control
perceptions of movement).To what question is the comment "It [PCT] does not providea mechanism for thought" relevant? Or is it an assertion
developed through a deep understanding of PCT, implying a
deeper continuation “… and we should be asking whether
some extension to PCT ought to be developed to provide
such a mechanism”, or perhaps “… and therefore PCT
should be abandoned in favour of some as yet unspecified
theory that does provide a mechanism for thought”?Without asserting whether it does or not, I'm wonderingwhy you think PCT does not provide a mechanism for
thought.[philip2018.03.28]
(A different message, despite having the same ID tag.)
1. A machine has a shape designed to transmitpurposive forces.
OK, a computer is defined as not a machine. Machines arerestricted by definition to be only the bodies of living
things and perhaps also the kinds of constructions
imagined by 18th century automaton builders.But it's good to know how our languages differ. I wonderif that definition was the one Alex had in mind when he
asked his initial question about the difference between
machines and living things.
2. Darwin’s theory of evolution is a methodof discovery.
Could you explain less cryptically the method? Martin
On Wednesday, March 28, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > > > > wrote:[Martin Taylor2018.03.28.23.25]
[philip2018.03.28]
A lump of coal is not a machine. An inclinedplane is a machine. A machine transmits
forces. I don’t know if a computer is a
machine. Does it transmit forces?Is your definition of a machine something thattransmits forces? If so, then everything
massive or electromagnetic or composed of
quarks is a machine. I rather think you intend
something different. But what?PCT helps you ask questions. But it is not amethod of discovery. PCT is in the same
environment as astronomy was in after
Ptolemy and Copernicus. These celestial
models provided a method of calculating the
planets’ positions, but they did not provide
the mechanism of gravity as Newton did after
succeeding Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler.Newton did not provide a mechanism forgravity. He proposed an abstract interactional
relationship that he called gravity, which
could be used in formulae that allowed some
forces and orbits to be computed.What would you call "a method of discovery"?If I were asked that question, I would suggest
exploring, searching, trying putting random
things together if they seem as though they
might fit. Apparently you intend something
quite different. Do you have an example?Martin