[From Bill Powers (930823.1600 MDT)]
Hal Pepinski (930823) --
PCT, too, has another "level" after the top one, except that it's
not really above the other levels, but beside them. We call it
the "reorganizing system" for lack of a better term. This system
does not control variables of the system-environment
relationship, but variables that represent the state of the
individual system itself. Some of these variables might represent
such mundane aspects as state of nutrition, wellness, and other
housekeeping stuff, but in human beings there might also be
aspects such as self-consistency, orderliness, beauty, or
whatever you like that are involved. There are built-in
(inherited) reference levels for the variables monitored by the
reorganizing system.
The main difference between the reorganizing system and the
ordinary behavioral control systems is that the actions of the
reorganizing system are random. The effects of these actions are
not to produce behavior, but to alter the organization of the
behavioral control systems at any and all existing levels.
Anything and everything in the behavioral systems may be
reorganized when there is "intrinsic error." This includes
perceptions, selection of reference conditions, everything. The
reorganizing system accounts for the acquisition of the
behavioral control systems in the first place.
The basic "given" reference signals are inherited, and define a
state of optimal functioning -- or at least good enough
functioning for survival. These reference signals are one link to
evolution.
So at least in a tangential way, PCT does contain provision for
unpredictability in the basic model.
There is unpredictability of related kind, possibly closer to the
kind you are envisioning. When independent organisms interact in
a variable (and significantly unpredictable) environment, each
organism individually is trying to achieve a state of inner
equilibrium, peace, harmony -- freedom from internal conflict.
This is done largely through reorganization. At the same time,
however, other organisms, in the course of their own control
processes, tend to disturb the variables any individual organism
is trying to control. This can lead to external conflict, the
condition in which it is impossible for all organisms involved to
control successfully at the same time. To resolve such conflicts,
each organism must reorganize itself toward a state that is
compatible with the existence of all the other coequal organisms
in the same environment, and that also takes into account the
properties of the nonliving world. The outcome of this sort of
interaction-with-reorganization is doubly unpredictable:
reorganization itself relies on random changes, and the resulting
changes in interactions with the outside world (living and
nonliving) lead to unpredictable shifts in relationships among
organisms. The only thing that is predictable in the long run is
that the result will be a general tendency for behavioral control
by individual organisms to improve and for conflict, both
internal and external, to decrease.
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The PCT model is an attempt to bridge the gap between subjective
experience and physical models of organisms: between phenomena
and mechanisms. One major difference between the PCT approach and
other mechanistic approaches is that in PCT we don't try to
explain away phenomena just because they are subjective. We
accept private experience as a reality (perhaps the most real
reality), putting the onus on the model to adapt to what is
observed. Another way to say this is that we are trying to
achieve harmony among many models: the models of physics and
neurology and biochemistry on the one hand, and the less formal
models by which we represent ordinary experiences of all kinds to
ourselves on the other hand. The PCT model is an attempt to
explain why the world appears to us as it does, in terms of other
models that have been successful in explaining certain parts of
experience.
Your approach seems to be entirely at the phenomenal level --
that is, a person either experiences things the way you describe
them, or doesn't. I have no opinion on many of your propositions,
in part because I don't know what many of your terms mean to you.
What I'm doing here is just trying to point out features of the
PCT model which could be taken as correlates of the phenomena you
describe. It may be that you reject the concept of a mechanistic
model of experience; if so, you will reject PCT. The validity of
PCT doesn't rest on a match between its conclusions and yours. It
rests on our ability to show that real organisms actually work as
the model says they work. We haven't gone very far with this
reality check, so we can't say much about advanced topics like
the ones you deal with.
As to your remarks about central tendencies for variation and the
like, in PCT research we don't use statistics much. The model
either fits behavior well or it doesn't. We expect every single
subject in a PCT experiment to behave as the model predicts,
within very narrow limits. If there are exceptions, we have to
ask why, track down the reasons, and modify the model until it
predicts correctly again.
I should also point out, in relation to some of your remarks,
that a human control system works best when it is not attempting
to control other human control systems. When control is operating
properly, there is no conflict either internally or externally.
Attempting to control another control system is mostly likely to
lead to failure of control all around, often to violent failure.
Under PCT, equating goal-seeking and control with violence is
incorrect. There is no necessary connection. Violence appears
only under certain conditions.
You've spent, you say, a long time trying to figure out what
Magnus meant. Did it ever occur to you that he was just being
impressive? I'll bet he zipped (or buttoned) his fly the same way
everyone else does. One of the most ancient guru tricks is to
make mysterious statements full of seeming portent, knowing that
the awed listeners will not dare challenge you by asking what you
mean, but will go away and try to untangle the koan (and will
succeed, even if you didn't know what you meant). I have little
patience with such autoapotheosis. It's a big bluff. If you know
what you mean, say it. Otherwise keep it to yourself until you do
know what you mean.
Ah, blessed silence.
Best,
Bill P.