perception and reality

[Jim Dundon 08.27.2006.1200edst]

Resent and edited post of 8/25

Rick, You said

Your discussion of rights is very interesting, and I agree with it. But
it doesn't really address my question, which was about the relationship
between perceptual variables and our models of external reality. I am
wondering whether you think any perceptual variable can be considered
objective in the sense that it corresponds to something in our models
of external reality. I'm just interested in hearing a discussion of
the relationship between perception and reality in PCT

Jim

Rick, when you "wonder whether or not something can be considered objective"
are you asking whether or not it can be considered an object? That is,
can we objectivise it? In the English-language we think of a great many
intangable concepts as things. Our first experience as children with words
taught us that we apply names to things in our environment. Having learned
that process we learn words for feelings or mental processes, words like
love, thought, in the English language they are utilized as things in the
sentence and so take on the aspect of an object.

I use the word objective to refer to a human mental capacity rather than the characteristic of a thing, and although I may say that I am being objective about something [meaning unemotional and indifferent] I simultaneously realize that it is probably not possible. But I can make abstract things objects. The question in that sense is "can I make something more of an object" ?

There are great many words
which could be thinged if we wanted to take the liberty, such as
the word be. If we reason that we shall use the word be to represent a
characteristic of existence of conditions and then stipulate that all
existing conditions be noted as bes we can now say about certain conditions
that they constitute a be. A be is now an abstract objectivised concept. And
we could proceed to carry on an intelligent conversation about various bes
that each of us knows about. If we were to speak about the process of naming
something a be we could speak of the act of being [that is naming our act],
that is we could say let us be that process with the word in each of the
foregoing meaning a naming act. In other words we be'd them, we named them
bes. Having done all this work we could then proceed to talk this way by
agreement, with comfort, confident that we would understand each other which
is pretty much the purpose of language. So are you not asking for agreement
and seeking common terminology? And yet you ask the question as though it
could yield an absolute nature of its own, as in having no help from us.

We could call all acts dos and make the past tense of all dos doods.

There is probably no concept which we cannot think of as an object and no named
object that we have not named and therefore no concept which we cannot think
of as a product of our naming, of our experiencing. We create much of our
experiencing with our application of namings.

Can we completely sort out
external reality from the internal, I doubt it. I call a tree a tree, but it is many things, and it wasn't here a thousand years ago and it may be furniture or firewood tomorrow. If trees ceased to exist the word would eventually cease to exist. The use of words requires a
certain measure of predictability and it is predictability that we seek in
languaging. If things did not exist long enough as conceptual entities we could not name them. .Our existence depends on it.

Reality is a concept which we can think of as an object because we are familliar with objects. Because it is a concept it has longevity not associated with external things. If there is a relationshp between reality and perception in PCT I would say that reality and perception enjoy the station of almost eternal existance as concepts about change rather than being the reality or perception which changes. Their longevity depends in part on how ecompassing they are.

Your investigation into the relationship between perception and reality in
PCT uses the words relationship, perception, reality and PCT as objects. You
have already made them objects you have already objectivised them.

You said:

I was just asking whether some perceptions are more
objective than others. For example, color could be considered an
objective perception because changes in color correspond to changes in
what we model as changes in wavelength of light.

Jim:

Should you not have said color should be considered "more" objective. You changed from allowiing perceptions of gradations of objectiveness to a perception of an absolute and exclusionary nature.Are you not asking here whether or not a perception should be considered
less valid if we cannot measure something in scientific terms, scientific.
here meaning narrowed parameters and purified components? It would be helpfull if you made a comparison between color and something else.

Is it more objective to focus on the component parts of red than to say the ball is red? It seems to me that the scientific approach is an attempt to find that thing which we can hold on to, to find the unchagable, the undying. The ball changes color with age, understanding
color in terms of wavelengths can be a more enduring experience and we can identify more enduringly with a more enduring experience. The tradeoff is, enduring things are static, lifeless.

So, is it more objective to say wavelength than to say "lets play with the red ball"?

If more objective means longer lasting, yes. But that is more as longer in time and that is somewhat metaphorical.

I have a more liberal view of the word scientific and so a more liberal view
of the word valid. I believe science begins with the child's first words. I
view each word as the naming of an experiencing, the naming of a unit of
experience, [thanks Bill] the naming of a percept. The child has
narrowed the parameters, he has culled from among the variables in his
environment a few with which to tag, make an object of, a particular
phonetic tags. This is the same kind of process as findink electromagnetic wavelenghts.

There are several realities here one of which is the nature of science,
another is at what level do we name and objectivise. Is PCT not a
perception? You are then asking what is the relationship between perception
[generally] and_the_perception named PCT. One answer to that is PCT is
in the set of perceptions. It looks to me like PCT is a relatively
durable reality. So that is one relatioship.

My question is, "is it the all of reality?". Does it encompass all
realities?

Best

Jim D

[From Rick Marken (2006.08.27.1210)]

Jim Dundon (08.27.2006.1200edst)

Resent and edited post of 8/25

Hi Jim

I sent a reply to this a couple days ago. You can see it (and other posts you might have missed) by going to the CSGNet archives at http://listserv.uiuc.edu/archives/csgnet.html

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bill Powers (980913.2024 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (981012.2000 EST)--

I don't know about you, but when I move, say, my hand to a certain position,
I want my hand to actually move to that position, I don't want to merely
perceive that it has gone there. All I can know is what I perceive, but I
certainly hope that my perceptions reflect reality.

You may hope that your perception of hand position "reflects reality," but
you will hope in vain, because there is no way to find out whether it does
or does not. That is because being an organism, all you will ever know
about reality is what you perceive and what further perceptions you build
on the basic ones. All you can ever do is "merely" perceive.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (981014.1052 EDT)]

Bill Powers (980913.2024 MDT)

Bruce Abbott (981012.2000 EST)--

>I don't know about you, but when I move, say, my hand to a
certain position,
>I want my hand to actually move to that position, I don't want to merely
>perceive that it has gone there. All I can know is what I
perceive, but I
>certainly hope that my perceptions reflect reality.

You may hope that your perception of hand position "reflects reality," but
you will hope in vain, because there is no way to find out whether it does
or does not. That is because being an organism, all you will ever know
about reality is what you perceive and what further perceptions you build
on the basic ones. All you can ever do is "merely" perceive.

Is it clear to you that you are describing a model and not "what's so"?

Bruce Gregory

[From Bill Powers (981014.0917 MDT)]

You may hope that your perception of hand position "reflects reality," but
you will hope in vain, because there is no way to find out whether it does
or does not. That is because being an organism, all you will ever know
about reality is what you perceive and what further perceptions you build
on the basic ones. All you can ever do is "merely" perceive.

Is it clear to you that you are describing a model and not "what's so"?

No, I am describing what's so as nearly as experimental science is capable
of determining it. If you can show me some aspect of reality in a way that
doesn't require me to experience the output of sensory nerves, I might
change my mind. But ALL evidence that we have supports the notion that we
experience only neural signals, and have no other way to know what lies
outside the nervous system. There is NO evidence that anyone has ever
experienced reality without the intermediary of sensory perception. I
simply assume that what's true of everyone else is true of me.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (981014.1151 EDT)]

Bill Powers (981014.0917 MDT)

>> You may hope that your perception of hand position "reflects
reality," but
>> you will hope in vain, because there is no way to find out
whether it does
>> or does not. That is because being an organism, all you will ever know
>> about reality is what you perceive and what further
perceptions you build
>> on the basic ones. All you can ever do is "merely" perceive.
>
>Is it clear to you that you are describing a model and not "what's so"?

No, I am describing what's so as nearly as experimental science is capable
of determining it. If you can show me some aspect of reality in a way that
doesn't require me to experience the output of sensory nerves, I might
change my mind. But ALL evidence that we have supports the notion that we
experience only neural signals, and have no other way to know what lies
outside the nervous system. There is NO evidence that anyone has ever
experienced reality without the intermediary of sensory perception. I
simply assume that what's true of everyone else is true of me.

Sigh. I was afraid of that. It explains why we get nowhere talking about the
difference between models and what is being modeled. In my view,
explanations are always appeals to models. I see a tree. You explain to me
what science knows about how I am able to see the tree. This explanation is
a model. We both agree that science has _no_ model for awareness, so the
model breaks down here, if not before.

Bruce Gregory

[From Chris Cherpas (981014.1315 PT)]

Bill Powers (980913.2024 MDT)--

You may hope that your perception of hand position "reflects
reality," but you will hope in vain, because there is no way
to find out whether it does or does not. That is because being
an organism, all you will ever know about reality is what you
perceive and what further perceptions you build on the basic
ones. All you can ever do is "merely" perceive.

Bruce Gregory (981014.1052 EDT)--

Is it clear to you that you are describing a model
and not "what's so"?

The dichotomy is a false dilemma in this context, although
I agree that a distinction between model and modeled is
crucial. The problem for me is the status of "what's so"
relative to an epistemology that arises outside of
perception. Powers' position does not suffer this
inconsistency -- it is coherent. To psychologize further
this traditionally philosophical problem, I would say
that the coherence criterion is ultimately achieved
via reorganization, which, thankfully, is a negative
feedback control process. But most of the time, I think
it is the hierarchical organization which accounts for
our ability to claim "objectivity," in that higher-order
perceptions consist of signals generated at lower orders
(the "objects" being perceived). At the bottom, below
intensity perception, there's no difference that makes
a difference -- we can only imagine. At the top, there
is no higher order to perceive system concepts "objectively"
we can only reshuffle lower-order constituents and wait
for the error (or lack thereof, the "coherence") to
show up. "Reality" as a system concept is the last
resort to arbitrate any given perceptual error, but within
the closed/coherent perceptual world of PCT, it is still
a system concept -- a controlled perception. At least
that's one way of stating my view of the problem.

To paraphrase Lao Tzu (and Dennis Delprato apparently)
once you have identified reality you have already
identified unreality...from whence do they both arise?

Bruce Gregory (981014.1151 EDT)--

I see a tree. You explain to me what science knows about
how I am able to see the tree. This explanation is
a model. We both agree that science has _no_ model for
awareness, so the model breaks down here, if not before.

If we are going to understand awareness, then it would
help to not invoke it when describing (what seems to me)
a straight-forward example of perceptual control. I don't
see that not having a model of awareness, at least one
exhibiting anywhere near the rigor as models of controlled
perceptions, entails a "breakdown" so much as a gap
in an otherwise potentially well-modeled theory.

Best regards,
cc

[From Rick Marken (981014.1410)]

Chris Cherpas (981014.1315 PT) --

"Reality" as a system concept is the last resort to arbitrate
any given perceptual error, but within the closed/coherent
perceptual world of PCT, it is still a system concept -- a
controlled perception. At least that's one way of stating
my view of the problem.

Brilliant! Beautiful post, Chris.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bruce Gregory 9981014.1722 EDT)]

Chris Cherpas (981014.1315 PT)

Bill Powers (980913.2024 MDT)--
> You may hope that your perception of hand position "reflects
> reality," but you will hope in vain, because there is no way
> to find out whether it does or does not. That is because being
> an organism, all you will ever know about reality is what you
> perceive and what further perceptions you build on the basic
> ones. All you can ever do is "merely" perceive.

Bruce Gregory (981014.1052 EDT)--
> Is it clear to you that you are describing a model
> and not "what's so"?

The dichotomy is a false dilemma in this context, although
I agree that a distinction between model and modeled is
crucial.

No dilemma intended, true or false.

The problem for me is the status of "what's so"
relative to an epistemology that arises outside of
perception. Powers' position does not suffer this
inconsistency -- it is coherent.

I don't believe anyone has questioned this. I certainly have not.

To psychologize further
this traditionally philosophical problem, I would say
that the coherence criterion is ultimately achieved
via reorganization, which, thankfully, is a negative
feedback control process.

I thought reorganization was a random process. What sets the reference level
for reorganization?

But most of the time, I think
it is the hierarchical organization which accounts for
our ability to claim "objectivity," in that higher-order
perceptions consist of signals generated at lower orders
(the "objects" being perceived).

Is fantasy then on an equal footing with "reality"? Both exist as principles
in the hierarchy.

At the bottom, below
intensity perception, there's no difference that makes
a difference -- we can only imagine. At the top, there
is no higher order to perceive system concepts "objectively"
we can only reshuffle lower-order constituents and wait
for the error (or lack thereof, the "coherence") to
show up. "Reality" as a system concept is the last
resort to arbitrate any given perceptual error, but within
the closed/coherent perceptual world of PCT, it is still
a system concept -- a controlled perception.

Fantasy is also a system concept -- a controlled perception.

Bruce Gregory (981014.1151 EDT)--
> I see a tree. You explain to me what science knows about
> how I am able to see the tree. This explanation is
> a model. We both agree that science has _no_ model for
> awareness, so the model breaks down here, if not before.

If we are going to understand awareness, then it would
help to not invoke it when describing (what seems to me)
a straight-forward example of perceptual control.

I'm not sure what is being controlled by what. Remember, the PCT model works
exactly the same way in the complete absence of "awareness" which is not
even identifiable in PCT.

I don't
see that not having a model of awareness, at least one
exhibiting anywhere near the rigor as models of controlled
perceptions, entails a "breakdown" so much as a gap
in an otherwise potentially well-modeled theory.

A distinction without a difference as far as I can tell. Either a gap or a
breakdown is fine with me. There's a definite gap between awareness and any
scientific model. You might even argue that this gap is what insures that
our explanations are all models.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bill Powers (981014.1557 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (981014.1151 EDT)--

No, I am describing what's so as nearly as experimental science is capable
of determining it. If you can show me some aspect of reality in a way that
doesn't require me to experience the output of sensory nerves, I might
change my mind. But ALL evidence that we have supports the notion that we
experience only neural signals, and have no other way to know what lies
outside the nervous system. There is NO evidence that anyone has ever
experienced reality without the intermediary of sensory perception. I
simply assume that what's true of everyone else is true of me.

Sigh. I was afraid of that.

That paragraph has three or four major topics in it. Which "that" were you
afraid of?

It explains why we get nowhere talking about the
difference between models and what is being modeled.

Whichever idea is "it."

In my view,
explanations are always appeals to models. I see a tree. You explain to me
what science knows about how I am able to see the tree. This explanation is
a model. We both agree that science has _no_ model for awareness, so the
model breaks down here, if not before.

PCT includes a model of perceptual signals and how they are related to
external variables. Perception is defined in PCT so it is independent of
consciousness. Of course explanations always appeal to models; the point is
that some explanations work a lot better than others do, when converted
into predictions. Some models predict very well; others hardly at all. I
know which kind I prefer.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (981014.0555 MDT)]

Chris Cherpas (981014.1315 PT)--

I have been greatly enjoying your recent posts.

One quibble regarding this:

I don't
see that not having a model of awareness, at least one
exhibiting anywhere near the rigor as models of controlled
perceptions, entails a "breakdown" so much as a gap
in an otherwise potentially well-modeled theory.

I think the point here is that the control model seems to work perfectly
well without giving awareness any function in the model. For control of
cursor position, sound pitch, shape, rotation rate, similarity of figures,
and other variables, the model without awareness fits the behavior with the
usual accuracy. There can hardly be said to be a "gap" in the theory when
it accounts for all but one percent of the variance in the data.

I'm sure that awareness or attention plays some part in control processes.
We just haven't yet devised the experiments that will show what it is.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory 9981015.0945 EDT)]

Bill Powers (981014.1557 MDT)

Bruce Gregory (981014.1151 EDT)--

>> No, I am describing what's so as nearly as experimental
science is capable
>> of determining it. If you can show me some aspect of reality
in a way that
>> doesn't require me to experience the output of sensory nerves, I might
>> change my mind. But ALL evidence that we have supports the
notion that we
>> experience only neural signals, and have no other way to know what lies
>> outside the nervous system. There is NO evidence that anyone has ever
>> experienced reality without the intermediary of sensory perception. I
>> simply assume that what's true of everyone else is true of me.
>
>Sigh. I was afraid of that.

That paragraph has three or four major topics in it. Which "that" were you
afraid of?

Bill, let me introduce to my friend, Bill

I think the point here is that the control model seems to work perfectly
well without giving awareness any function in the model. For control of
cursor position, sound pitch, shape, rotation rate, similarity of figures,
and other variables, the model without awareness fits the behavior with

the

usual accuracy. There can hardly be said to be a "gap" in the theory when
it accounts for all but one percent of the variance in the data.

I'm sure that awareness or attention plays some part in control processes.
We just haven't yet devised the experiments that will show what it is.

You don't see a problem with juxtaposing these two passages, I realize. I
do. What's missing from the model at present is everything we aware of.
Apparently this accounts for but one percent of the variance. If we were
total automata, only one percent of the world would be lost, as far as the
model is concerned. Is this a limitation of the model? Perhaps not. I remain
to be convinced.

Of course explanations always appeal to models;
the point is
that some explanations work a lot better than others do, when converted
into predictions. Some models predict very well; others hardly at all. I
know which kind I prefer.

Then we agree. I'm relieved.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bill Powers (981015.0925 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory 9981015.0945 EDT)--

Me:

I'm sure that awareness or attention plays some part in control processes.
We just haven't yet devised the experiments that will show what it is.

You don't see a problem with juxtaposing these two passages, I realize. I
do. What's missing from the model at present is everything we aware of.

No, what's missing is what we're aware _with_. The objects of awareness are
just the perceptual signals in the model. It's the aware agency that's
missing, the faculty of being aware, and some concept of what awareness is
for. Actually, I'm completely baffled at your statement above. Please explain.

Best,

Bill P.

···

Apparently this accounts for but one percent of the variance. If we were
total automata, only one percent of the world would be lost, as far as the
model is concerned. Is this a limitation of the model? Perhaps not. I remain
to be convinced.

Of course explanations always appeal to models;
the point is
that some explanations work a lot better than others do, when converted
into predictions. Some models predict very well; others hardly at all. I
know which kind I prefer.

Then we agree. I'm relieved.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bruce Gregory (981015.1700 EDT)]

Bill Powers (981015.0925 MDT)

Bruce Gregory (981015.0945 EDT)--

Me:

What's missing from the model at present is everything we are aware of.

No, what's missing is what we're aware _with_. The objects of
awareness are
just the perceptual signals in the model. It's the aware agency that's
missing, the faculty of being aware, and some concept of what awareness is
for. Actually, I'm completely baffled at your statement above.
Please explain.

What I was trying to say is that the model does not claim to include
awareness. But the model works very well in the few cases where it has been
applied. This success might seem to allow us to infer that, at best,
awareness can play a very small role in the behavior of living control
systems. It may not be an epiphenomenon, but it is not much more important.
Also absent from the model is a mechanism to explain why we are controlling
one perception rather than another, and why it is difficult (or easy) to
switch from controlling one perception to control another when we "want" to.

These comments are not intended to be criticisms of the PCT model. I think
it is truly in a class by itself when it comes to predictive power. I made
the point in an effort to make it clear that PCT _is_ a model. Rather than
saying we _are_ hierarchical control systems, I prefer to say that the best
model we have of how we act is based on hierarchical control systems. This
may seem trivial to many, but it got Galileo into trouble with the
inquisition. Although as the victors we get to the tell the story our way,
in this sense at least Ptolemy (who knew he was building a model) was more
"modern" than Galileo (who was sure that Copernicus had "gotten it right").
In fact, Galileo's evidence also supports Brahe's model in which the sun
circles the earth and the "other" planets circle the sun. Convincing
evidence in the form of stellar parallax came two hundred years after
Galileo. But by that time the battle had been won, not the basis of new
evidence, but on the basis of yet another model--Newton's.

Bruce Gregory

[From Chris Cherpas (981015.1550 PT)]

Bruce Gregory (981015.1700 EDT)--

...a mechanism to explain why we are controlling one
perception rather than another, and why it is difficult
(or easy) to switch from controlling one perception to
control another when we "want" to.

These are very interesting practical questions for me too,
as well as considerations for formulating the scientific
questions that will keep developing the theory. I would
want to see how far we could go by using what's already
in the theory before being forced to take on new mechanisms,
of course.

Best regards,
cc

[From Bill Powers (981015.1652 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (981015.1700 EDT)--

What I was trying to say is that the model does not claim to include
awareness. But the model works very well in the few cases where it has been
applied. This success might seem to allow us to infer that, at best,
awareness can play a very small role in the behavior of living control
systems. It may not be an epiphenomenon, but it is not much more important.

I think it's important, but that we just haven't done the right kinds of
experiments to show what it's important FOR. Simple control tasks probably
don't help much, because the participant only has to do one thing, one main
thing, at a time. I have a hunch that awareness is going to start making a
difference when several main tasks are going on, especially difficult ones
or ones that conflict. There ought to be a lot of helpful ideas in the
literature on attention. Or at least a couple.

Also absent from the model is a mechanism to explain why we are controlling
one perception rather than another, and why it is difficult (or easy) to
switch from controlling one perception to control another when we "want" to.

Well, that's debatable. I think the reorganizing system idea goes part of
the way, and of course the hierarchy explains more. As to why switching is
hard, the concept of conflicting control systems could provide some leads.

I prefer to say that the best
model we have of how we act is based on hierarchical control systems.

Me, too. That's all I ever mean. But some models work pretty damned well
while other don't, so it's not just a matter of personal preference.

In fact, Galileo's evidence also supports Brahe's model in which the sun
circles the earth and the "other" planets circle the sun. Convincing
evidence in the form of stellar parallax came two hundred years after
Galileo. But by that time the battle had been won, not the basis of new
evidence, but on the basis of yet another model--Newton's.

Well, the fact that there is never a transit of any planet from Mars to
Saturn ought to have raised some questions about Brahe's model, even
without Newton. There can be evidence _against_ a model that doesn't come
from other models.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (981016.0930 EDT)]

Bill Powers (981015.1652 MDT)

me:

>In fact, Galileo's evidence also supports Brahe's model in which the sun
>circles the earth and the "other" planets circle the sun. Convincing
>evidence in the form of stellar parallax came two hundred years after
>Galileo. But by that time the battle had been won, not the basis of new
>evidence, but on the basis of yet another model--Newton's.

thee:

Well, the fact that there is never a transit of any planet from Mars to
Saturn ought to have raised some questions about Brahe's model, even
without Newton. There can be evidence _against_ a model that doesn't come
from other models.

While I agree with your conclusion in general, in this particular case there
was no such evidence. In the Tychonic model the sun travels around the
earth, Mercury and Venus can pass between the earth and the Sun, but the
orbits of the outer planets lie outside the this compact inner group. They
cannot transit the sun. Tycho's model is identical to Copernicus's model
_when viewed from the Earth_. Thus any evidence confined to the solar system
that supports one supports the other. You must have very good data of the
apparent motions of the stars before you can see that each star undergoes
motion with a period of one year. These observations can be predicted from
the Copernican model, but require additional very _ad hoc_ assumptions to
save the Tychonic model. This arcane information _might_ even be relevant to
current discussions!

Bruce Gregory