Perceptions (again)

CSGnet Archive CSG2005
1

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.0657 EST]

Rick Marken (2005.11.13.2150)]
>> Journalists should describe
>> behavior as they would describe a table, saying what they see (a
>> nice, mahogany table done in the French provincial style) rather than
>> what they imagine (a collection of carbon atoms arranged in a
>> lattice).

Let's suppose that I first provide you with a list of identifying characteristics of "French provincial style" furniture. Along with that list I show you several sample pieces of furniture in the French provincial style so as to tangibly illustrate those characteristics. Then I show you several more pieces of furniture, some of which are French provincial and some of which are not, asking you to pick out those that are in the French provincial style, which you do. Moreover, you do not identify any as French provincial that are not such. Thereafter, on future occasions when you and I see pieces of furniture, we agree as to those that are in the French provincial style and those that are not. We can also point to certain identifying features of any particular piece of French provincial furniture and agree on those.

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" and that that something is a piece of French provincial furniture. I'd also wager that our descriptions of any given piece of such furniture are enough alike that we can agree on what it is we perceive. However, agreeing on what we perceive "out there" is not the same thing as saying we have the same perceptions "in here." Do I have that correct? If so, then here's my question: If you and I can agree on what we're perceiving "out there" then of what significance is it if our internal representations of what's out there are different? Your body chemistry, neural wiring, etc might be and probably is somewhat different from mine but I'd think they also have to be sufficiently alike or we could never reach any kind of tested (and testable) agreement about what's out there.

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT
Senior Consultant
Distance Consulting
"Assistance at A Distance"
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

2

[Form Rick Marken (2005.11.14.1120)]

Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.0657 EST)--

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" and that that
something is a piece of French provincial furniture.

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" too, but that that
something is more like atoms, photons and so on. The French provincial
furniture is, I believe (based on PCT), a perception _constructed_ by a
perceptual function. It's not "out there"; it is (like all perceptions) "in
here", in our brains.

I'd also wager that our
descriptions of any given piece of such furniture are enough alike that we can
agree on what it is we perceive.

I think that is an empirical fact. People agree to a remarkable extent about
what they perceive, suggesting to me that different human nervous systems
construct perceptions in pretty much the same way.

However, agreeing on what we perceive "out there" is not the same thing as
saying we have the same perceptions "in here." Do I have that correct?

Yes and no. I think it says: yes, we _can_ have pretty much the same
perceptions (all perceptions are "in here", by the way, even though some
seem to be "out there") in the sense that we can construct perceptions
(based on sense data) that we can agree are the same. But whether they are
actually experienced, subjectively, the same way, no, I think we'll never
know that. For example, I think we can agree that we are constructing the
same color perception when we can agree that the sky looks blue. But whether
what you experience as blue is the same as what I experience as blue we will
never know. Though I suspect our experiences are the same. But who, cares,
really, as long we agree on which perceptions are which. If we couldn't do
that, we wouldn't be able to communicate at all.

If so, then here's my question: If you and I can
agree on what we're perceiving "out there" then of what significance is it if
our internal representations of what's out there are different?

'm not sure I understand what you mean. For me, the "internal
representation" of the perception of a piece of French provincial furniture,
for example, is a neural signal that is the output of a perceptual function.
The perceptual function constructs, based on sensory/perceptual inputs the
neural signal that "represents" the furniture type. The rate of firing of
this neuron is, according to PCT, the "representation" of the type of
furniture. The neural network that is the perceptual function determines
what it is "out there" that, when input to the furniture type perceptual
function, will produce a perceptual output signal that _is_ the perception
"French provincial".

Your body
chemistry, neural wiring, etc might be and probably is somewhat different from
mine but I'd think they also have to be sufficiently alike or we could never
reach any kind of tested (and testable) agreement about what's out there.

I agree completely. To the extent that we can agree that certain furniture
is French provincial I think that our brains must be using very similar
neural network perceptual functions to construct this perception for us.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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3

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.1455 EST)] -
      

Rick Marken (2005.11.14.1120)]

> Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.0657 EST)--

> I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" and that that
> something is a piece of French provincial furniture.

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" too, but that that
something is more like atoms, photons and so on. The French provincial
furniture is, I believe (based on PCT), a perception _constructed_ by a
perceptual function. It's not "out there"; it is (like all perceptions) "in
here", in our brains.

Okay. Granted. I'll restate it.

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" (and that that something is, as you say, more like atoms, photons and so on). That something "out there" is also a particular configuration of atoms, photons and so on that we call "furniture" at one level and "French provincial" at another.

The rest we seem to agree on.

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT
Senior Consultant
Distance Consulting
"Assistance at A Distance"
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

4

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.1500 EST)] -

Hmm. Upon reflection I think I'd better tackle another piece of that first paragraph of yours...
      

Rick Marken (2005.11.14.1120)]

> Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.0657 EST)--

> I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" and that that
> something is a piece of French provincial furniture.

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" too, but that that
something is more like atoms, photons and so on. The French provincial
furniture is, I believe (based on PCT), a perception _constructed_ by a
perceptual function. It's not "out there"; it is (like all perceptions) "in
here", in our brains.

I agree that my perception of that piece of French provincial furniture is "in here" (i.e., in our brains). But I am perceiving something, am I not? In this case, that something is a piece of French provincial furniture, a particular configuration of atoms, photons and so on. So don't we need to make a distinction between our perception of something and that something? Or are you arguing that there is no something, just perception?

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT
Senior Consultant
Distance Consulting
"Assistance at A Distance"
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

5

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.15,11:20 EUST)]

From Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.0657 EST

You and Rick are discussing "Perceptions" in details that interest me. May I
join?
I think we all three agree. But ...

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" and that
that something is a piece of French provincial furniture.

If you wager a Dollar that the "something" at one moment of time is a piece
of French provincial furniture. At what time will the wager be determined?
Here you are going to get knowledge about something "out there" without
having to rely on neural signals. That's the only way you can get such
knowledge. If you rely on neural signals, you get knowledge about something
"in here", then the wager will never be determined.

I'd also
wager that our descriptions of any given piece of such furniture
are enough alike that we can agree on what it is we perceive.

If you wager a Dollar that your description of any given piece of such
furniture at one moment of time are enough alike Rick's description of the
same furniture. At what time will the wager be determined?
Here you are going to get knowledge about something "in there" within Rick.
The only way you can get such knowledge is to get it without having to rely
on neural signals. If you rely on neural signals, you get knowledge about
the description of the furniture in Rick's brain as something "in here" in
your brain, then the wager will never be determined.

However, agreeing on what we perceive "out there" is not the
same thing as saying we have the same perceptions "in here."
Do I have that correct?

Absolutely.

If so, then here's my question: If you
and I can agree on what we're perceiving "out there" then of
what significance is it if our internal representations of what's
out there are different?

If you wish an answer on your significance question that is more than chat,
I prefer to paraphrase it as: "If you and I can agree on what we're
perceiving "out there" then of what meaning is it if our internal
representations of what's out there are different"?
Then I will answer my own (your) question saying it is meaningless to
compare something we know with something we know exists, but don't know
anything about.

Your body chemistry, neural wiring,
etc might be and probably is somewhat different from mine
but I'd think they also have to be sufficiently alike or we could
never reach any kind of tested (and testable) agreement about
what's out there.

I absolutely agree. Rick expressed it as I will do.

Form Rick Marken (2005.11.14.1120)
I agree completely. To the extent that we can agree that certain furniture
is French provincial I think that our brains must be using very similar
neural network perceptual functions to construct this perception for us.

But I will add. If M and N agree about T (out there), M controls for such
agreement. For M, also N is something "out there" and the disturbance coming
from N contributes to a perceptual signal that after some time (enough
information from M) becomes equal N's reference. At this time M says he
agrees.

The same happens for N. Here M is something "out there".

We talk about agreement, but that is two controlled perceptions in M and in
N. But M will never know if his agreement is like N's agreement. If so, M
had to get knowledge about N's agreement without having to rely on neural
signals. If you rely on neural signals, M gets knowledge about N's agreement
from M's perception.

Final act.
There is something out there, but nobody will ever get a knowledge of it
that is not a perception.

Bjorn

6

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.15, 12:00 EUST)]
Form Rick Marken (2005.11.14.1120)

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" too, but that that
something is more like atoms, photons and so on.

Look at my comments to Fred Nickols. When will you get knowledge about the
atoms, photons and so on that is not a perception? I think you say the same
below. Don't wager if you never can get a verification. Or maybe we should
wager then.

Form Rick Marken (2005.11.14.1120)]

Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.0657 EST)--
I'd also wager that our
descriptions of any given piece of such furniture are enough alike that

we can

agree on what it is we perceive.

I think that is an empirical fact. People agree to a remarkable extent

about

what they perceive, suggesting to me that different human nervous systems
construct perceptions in pretty much the same way.

Yes, I think HPCT is the best available tool.
You say Fred Nickols statement is an empirical fact. What is an empirical
fact? Are you saying that Fred Nickols statement is a knowledge everybody
can get without neural signals? Or are you saying that many people say the
same.
You can never explain that many people say the same. If you do that you
express your own knowledge from inside you. How could you got it inside you
if you don't perceived it earlier?
What I say above is knowledge I get from "inside me".

An agreement is something that exists inside one of the two who agrees.
There is another agreement in the other person. Nobody will ever get a
knowledge telling us that the two agreements are equal.
I expect you will bring up The Test. And yes I think The Test will increase
the agreement in one of them or in both. But the agreement in the one is
still something "out there" in the other person.
I think you say the same below.

Yes and no. I think it says: yes, we _can_ have pretty much the same
perceptions (all perceptions are "in here", by the way, even though some
seem to be "out there") in the sense that we can construct perceptions
(based on sense data) that we can agree are the same. But whether they are
actually experienced, subjectively, the same way, no, I think we'll never
know that. For example, I think we can agree that we are constructing the
same color perception when we can agree that the sky looks blue. But

whether

what you experience as blue is the same as what I experience as blue we

will

never know. Though I suspect our experiences are the same. But who, cares,
really, as long we agree on which perceptions are which. If we couldn't do
that, we wouldn't be able to communicate at all.

Bjorn

7

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.145.0840)]

Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.1455 EST)

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" (and that that
something is, as you say, more like atoms, photons and so on). That something
"out there" is also a particular configuration of atoms, photons and so on
that we call "furniture" at one level and "French provincial" at another.

I think that what is "out there" is not necessarily morphologically similar
to our perception of it. The perception "French provincial" can also be
seen in a photograph, for example, where we know the configuration of atoms
and photons is nothing like the furniture itself. This also can't serve as a
general statement since we know that there are perceptions (like the color
purple) that have no unique correlate in the physical world.

Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.1500 EST)

I agree that my perception of that piece of French provincial furniture
is "in here" (i.e., in our brains). But I am perceiving something, am
I not? In this case, that something is a piece of French provincial
furniture, a particular configuration of atoms, photons and so on.
So don't we need to make a distinction between our perception of
something and that something? Or are you arguing that there is
no something, just perception?

I agree that we must make a distinction between the perception and what is
perceived. It's just the perception is not necessarily a map or isomorphic
representation of what is "out there". Here is a simple picture of my
general view of how perception works:

X

Y ---> |f(X',Y',Z')| ---> perception

Z

X, Y and Z are variables in the real world. They are your atoms and photons
and whatever is actually out there. The function f() is the perceptual
function. It constructs (or computes) a perception from the _sensed_ values
of X, Y and Z (which I call X',Y' and Z'). X', Y' and Z' are themselves
neural signals that result from a transduction process that converts
physical variables (X, Y and Z) into neural measures of the intensity of
those variables (X', Y' and Z').

The function, f() is really a complex neural network, the nature of which
determines the nature of the perception that is the output of this function.
Let's assume that f() is a network that constructs the perception "French
Provinciality". The greater the magnitude of the perception that is the
output of f() the more what we see is "French Provincial". In order to
produce a "French Provincial" perception, X, Y and Z must have certain
values. That is, the reality out there must be of a certain sort to evoke
(via f()) the perception "French Provincial". But, as in the case of color
perception, for example, many combinations of X, Y and Z could end up
producing a "French Provincial" perception.

For example, suppose that the function, f(), is X + Y + Z and we perceive
"French Provincial" when the output of this function is 10. There are
obviously lots of combinations of X, Y and Z that will result in 10 (eg. 3,
5, 2 or 10, 0, 0). There are also many combinations that will _not_ result
in 10. So some combinations of X, Y and Z -- physical reality -- will be
perceived as "French Provincial" and some won't. The point, however, is that
the physical realities that are perceived as "French Provincial" are not
necessarily "morphologically" the same. For example, both 3, 5, 2 and 10, 0,
0 will be seen as "French Provincial" while 2, 4, 1 (which is
morphologically closer to 3,5,2 than is 10,0,0) will not.

This is the way I think of perception (and I think it is consistent with the
PCT model of perception). This model of perception assumes that there is a
real world out there that is perceived but it also assumes that these
perceptions are constructions that are not necessarily "isomorphic" maps of
that reality.

Does this help?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

--------------------

This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
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8

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.15.0950)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.15, 12:00 EUST)

Rick Marken (2005.11.14.1120)

I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" too, but that that
something is more like atoms, photons and so on.

Look at my comments to Fred Nickols. When will you get knowledge about the
atoms, photons and so on that is not a perception? I think you say the same
below. Don't wager if you never can get a verification. Or maybe we should
wager then.

My wager would be based on the results of experimental tests of _models_
which are rigorous conjectures about what is "out there". In other words, my
wager about the something out there being like atoms and photons is based on
the results of the scientific enterprise that has been going on for the last
400 years or so. It's not based on any special ability I might have to see
past my own perceptions. I know that all I have are perceptions. But I also
have the ability to invent models (imaginations), to reason about them and
test them, all within the (usually) happy confines of my perceptual world.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

--------------------

This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use,
disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies
of the original message.

9

From [Marc Abrams (2005.11.15.1447)]

Ah, one last salvo before heading off into the sunset. :wink:

In a message dated 11/15/2005 11:53:48 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, marken@MINDREADINGS.COM writes:

···

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.15.0950)]

My wager would be based on the results of experimental tests of models
which are rigorous conjectures about what is “out there”.

Sorry pal, your models as well as everyone else’s models are about what is INSIDE your head not outside.

What you need is empirical data to support your models. Data, you do not possess, nor will you ever, as long as you continue to do the same tests

I wish you much luck, or rather your students, much luck in having you as a teacher of cognition.

I actually think you would be much better off teaching economics. At least there you couldn’t use your pseudo-scientific ‘models’ on unsuspecting students and get away with it.

What a bunch of clap-trap. BTW, for anyone who actually believes what Rick is dishing out, I have two very nice bridges that have just come up for sale here in NYC, and they are real cheap. A once in a lifetime deal.

Ta, Ta folks, its been fun.

Marc

10

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.16,07:30 EUST)]

From Rick Marken (2005.11.15.0950)
My wager would be based on the results of experimental tests of _models_
which are rigorous conjectures about what is "out there".

Undoubtedly

In other words, my
wager about the something out there being like atoms and photons is based

on

the results of the scientific enterprise that has been going on for the

last

400 years or so.

Undoubtedly

It's not based on any special ability I might have to see
past my own perceptions. I know that all I have are perceptions.

You think as I think

But I also
have the ability to invent models (imaginations), to reason about them and
test them, all within the (usually) happy confines of my perceptual world.

Yes, you are clever. I have played with your models from the opposite part
of earth before you knew anything about me. But that was my perceptions.
I am lacking in the explanation that tells me that you know anything more
about "out there" because you have a lot of experiences (a perceptual world)
and because you put your models into work.

When shall your wager be determined?

Bjorn

11

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.16.1510 EST)] -
  

Rick Marken (2005.11.145.0840)]

> Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.1455 EST)

> I'm willing to wager that there's something "out there" (and that that
> something is, as you say, more like atoms, photons and so on). That something
> "out there" is also a particular configuration of atoms, photons and so on
> that we call "furniture" at one level and "French provincial" at another.

I think that what is "out there" is not necessarily morphologically similar
to our perception of it. The perception "French provincial" can also be
seen in a photograph, for example, where we know the configuration of atoms
and photons is nothing like the furniture itself. This also can't serve as a
general statement since we know that there are perceptions (like the color
purple) that have no unique correlate in the physical world.

Agreed, I can see "French provincial" in a photograph and that two-dimensional image is quite different from the physical piece of furniture. And I agree that my perception (i.e., neural signal) of a piece of French provincial is quite unlike the physical piece of furniture. But I think we're talking past one another, probably owing to my shallow grasp of PCT, etc. Maybe I should say that by "my perception of a piece of French provincial furniture" I am referring to the visual image I see. So, when I talk about "out there" and "in here" I'm talking about (1) that physical configuration we agree is a piece of French provincial furniture and (2) my visual image of it. My visual image, I think, correlates nicely with that physical configuration out there and it seems to correlate nicely with the images of it that others perceive. That the image I perceive is in reality some configuration of neural signals and not really a picture per se, is something I understand but, to !
be quite honest, I can cope with the images I perceive (and those that others perceive). I can't see how I can do a darn thing about perceptions as neural signals inside my nervous system.

>Fred Nickols (2005.11.14.1500 EST)

> I agree that my perception of that piece of French provincial furniture
> is "in here" (i.e., in our brains). But I am perceiving something, am
> I not? In this case, that something is a piece of French provincial
> furniture, a particular configuration of atoms, photons and so on.
> So don't we need to make a distinction between our perception of
> something and that something? Or are you arguing that there is
> no something, just perception?

I agree that we must make a distinction between the perception and what is
perceived. It's just the perception is not necessarily a map or isomorphic
representation of what is "out there".

I think the distinction I'm making between "image" and "perception" applies to the paragraph above.

Here is a simple picture of my

general view of how perception works:

X

Y ---> |f(X',Y',Z')| ---> perception

Z

X, Y and Z are variables in the real world. They are your atoms and photons
and whatever is actually out there. The function f() is the perceptual
function. It constructs (or computes) a perception from the _sensed_ values
of X, Y and Z (which I call X',Y' and Z'). X', Y' and Z' are themselves
neural signals that result from a transduction process that converts
physical variables (X, Y and Z) into neural measures of the intensity of
those variables (X', Y' and Z').

The function, f() is really a complex neural network, the nature of which
determines the nature of the perception that is the output of this function.
Let's assume that f() is a network that constructs the perception "French
Provinciality". The greater the magnitude of the perception that is the
output of f() the more what we see is "French Provincial". In order to
produce a "French Provincial" perception, X, Y and Z must have certain
values. That is, the reality out there must be of a certain sort to evoke
(via f()) the perception "French Provincial". But, as in the case of color
perception, for example, many combinations of X, Y and Z could end up
producing a "French Provincial" perception.

For example, suppose that the function, f(), is X + Y + Z and we perceive
"French Provincial" when the output of this function is 10. There are
obviously lots of combinations of X, Y and Z that will result in 10 (eg. 3,
5, 2 or 10, 0, 0). There are also many combinations that will _not_ result
in 10. So some combinations of X, Y and Z -- physical reality -- will be
perceived as "French Provincial" and some won't. The point, however, is that
the physical realities that are perceived as "French Provincial" are not
necessarily "morphologically" the same. For example, both 3, 5, 2 and 10, 0,
0 will be seen as "French Provincial" while 2, 4, 1 (which is
morphologically closer to 3,5,2 than is 10,0,0) will not.

This is the way I think of perception (and I think it is consistent with the
PCT model of perception). This model of perception assumes that there is a
real world out there that is perceived but it also assumes that these
perceptions are constructions that are not necessarily "isomorphic" maps of
that reality.

Does this help?

I don't know. Does my response help you?

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT
Senior Consultant
Distance Consulting
"Assistance at A Distance"
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

12

[Martin Taylor 2005.11.16.16.30]

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.16.1510 EST)] -

  Maybe I should say that by "my perception of a piece of French provincial furniture" I am referring to the visual image I see.

Are you? When you say "A manufactured assemblage of wood and glass" are you referring to the same visual image? When you say "A piece of furniture that really suits the room" are you referring to the same visual image?

In other words, what I'm asking is whether you conceive all these and "French Provincial furniture" to be the same perception? My notion is that they are all different perceptions, though all of them use the same visual image as part of their input data.

Martin

13

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.17.0830)]

Fred Nickols (2005.11.16.1510 EST)--

My visual image, I think, correlates nicely with that physical configuration
out there and it seems to correlate nicely with the images of it that others
perceive.

I think the problem may be that what you mean by " physical configuration"
is what I mean by a "perception" or "visual image" of the piece of
furniture. In my epistemology I believe I will never know what the actual
physical basis of anything we experience. What we perceive as a piece of
furniture -- the visual image -- is all there is. We might call what we see
a "physical configuration" because it looks like a physical thing out there.
But the actual physical reality on which this perception is based -- what we
have called "boss reality" -- is known to us only in the form of the models
of chemistry and physics. We will never see the actual physical reality
(which is likely to be a configuration of sorts but we will never know this
for sure) on which our perception of the "physical configuration" that we
call a piece of furniture is based. That is. We will never see "boss
reality". All we will experience is what we do experience: our perceptions,
which is what we call "reality" in our philosophically weak moments;-)

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

--------------------

This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use,
disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies
of the original message.