Perceptions II was Discouraged or one more Try

From [Marc Abrams (2003.12.13.2145)]

From [Bruce Gregory (2003.12.12.2111)]

Marc Abrams (2003.12.11.1645)

Ok. The hierarchy certainly attempts to ‘account’ for the control of
perception. Again, I ask, what is a perception? According to canonical
PCT, our sensory inputs are the only elements involved in our

perceptions. I vigorously disagree with this notion.

It’s not clear to me why you are so convinced that memory and emotion

cannot be traced back to sensory inputs.

Bruce, that is exactly my point. Memory and emotion are, and need to be, traced back to the input function at a minimum. I think there is ample evidence to suggest they both need to be tied to the reference condition and output function as well. But I’m not advocating that yet. I am advocating a need to explore and bring emotion and memory out of the black box and into the model as independent elements or processes of the input function. What I was saying above is that the hierarchy as presently configured only takes the five main sensory modalities as input into account for the purposes of constructing perceptions.

If you are suggesting that an ‘input’ is an ‘input’ and at the aggregate level of the HPCT model, further breakdowns are not necessary, I would again disagree with that notion. In order to explain what happens at one level you must go ‘down’ a level. This holds for any hierarchical structure. So in order to ‘explain’ why the model works as it does, we need to go down a level. That means, breaking out the functions from black boxes to real entities and/or processes.

In the statement you quoted above, where do you think I was saying anything differently? Both memory and emotion have 'unofficial and undefined capacities in the model. They are treated as a ‘black box’.

What is a sensory input in your view?

Any input that contributes to the formation of a ‘perception’. And, in a normal human, that probably means about 20 different kinds of sensory receptors.

Why aren’t we aware of our emotional states as the result of sensory inputs?

But we are. We are always in An emotional state. We may not always be cognizant of a ‘particulair’ state such as ‘happiness’ or ‘sadness’ but we are always ‘feeling’ something. Feeling nothing is an emotional state as well. Remember, zero does not necessarily mean the absence of something. By the same token, our emotional states play a huge role in what we sense as well.

Is memory a sensory input?

If by memory you mean imagination, than I would say absolutely yes.

Bruce, I think between your post today and Martin’s yesterday, I have been able focus in on what and where my questions are focused.

I do not disagree with the notion of a hierarchy per se. I disagree specifically with the notion that the HPCT hierarchy is the binding structure for our sensory modalities. Now what is interesting here is that this aspect of the hierarchy is never discussed. What is discussed is the seemingly hierarchical nature of our thought processes, which I don’t disagree with. We also seem to talk about the ‘cascading’ effects that ‘error’ has on those thoughts, except in order for the HPCT hierarchy to perform in that manner you would possibly have to skip levels on the way down to ‘correct’ and you couldn’t do that without imagination ‘filling in’ for the missed levels. So if the HPCT hierarchy actually existed the way it is talked about rather than what the theory say’s it should do, I would not disagree at all. It would obviously not change what I am interested in doing, but it might help me on CSGnet in my attempts at clarification.

If I have misspoken please tell me where. I certainly don’t want to be walking around with the wrong assumptions.

Has this helped clarify my thoughts?


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