[From Bill Powers (2003.12.14.1608 MST)]
Marc Abrams (2003.12.14.1545)–
Bill the key here is
“…PROVISIONS FOR…” Yes, which is why I mistakenly assumed
that my interest in both imagination and emotions were simply an
extension and elaboration of what you INTENDED. But ‘provisions for’ is
not equal to ‘is explicitly part of’
I make provisions for perceiving configurations, by proposing a level
that perceives and controls such things. However, since I can’t draw the
circuits that will actually construct configurations out of collections
of sensations, I have to draw a box and label it “third-order input
function” without giving the details. Would you say, because of
that, that configuration perception and control are not explicitly part
of the HPCT model?
I have proposed that imagination and memory consist of replaying recorded
perceptions into the perceptual signal channel from which they were
originally recorded (not into the input function). I have drawn block
diagrams to show the arrangement I propose, and have explained why the
connections have to be switched in and out (because the states that the
different connections represent never occur together in experience, or so
I claim to have observed in myself). So I have provided a place in the
model for memory and imagination to occur, although I can’t fill in the
details of circuitry. There are some things that can be checked, however.
Try looking at the palm of your hand, and at the same time try to
imaginelooking at the back of the same hand. I claim that nobody sees two
hands superimposed, one right side up and one upside down. This is why
there is a switch in the model that allows only the imagined (or
remembered) perception or only the present-time perception, but not both,
to exist in the same perceptual signal channel at the same time. A
similar observation applies to the other switch. If you imagine slapping
the table with the palm of your hand, you can imagine this without
actually slapping the table (at least, I can). So this tells me that the
remembered/imagined experience can be imagined without also serving as a
reference signal for an actual motor process. Of course it can be used as
a reference signal (you can “repeat the same experience as
before”), but then I claim that one cannot also imagine it (though
I’m not quite as sure of that prohibition). That is why the second switch
is placed where it is.
I don’t know how to make reorganization any more explicitly part of the
model of the whole system, other than to specify where in the brain or
body the comparators and output functions of this system are physically
located. I have drawn a box labeled “reorganizing effects” to
represent the output function of this system, but since I’m not even sure
whether this is a localized or distributed system it’s hard to get any
more specific than that.
So I guess I don’t know what you mean by making these things
“explicitly part of” the model.
I welcome suggestions for
revisions of the model as long as they amount to upgrades.
Without data, exactly what is an ‘upgrade’?
Something that takes into account more phenomena than the current model
does, or accounts for the same phenomena more economically. Experimental
data, of course, would give us more to go on, but right now we’re trying
to interpret experience as best we can without the advantages of formal
experimentation.
Just to make sure I understand you
correctly, and as I said in a previous post today. As long as I bring
‘convincing’ (that is, according to your standards) data that ‘upgrades’
(code word for replaces) your idea you seem to be willing to challenge
that ‘upgrade’ and try to dismiss it. If on the other hand, there is no
‘convincing’ data, then you will simply consider it no better than your
own and refuse to discuss it.
I believe the foregoing what you refer to as the imagination component of
perception. Why not just wait and see what I actually do, and thenscold me for it?
Sounds like a no win situation for
me.
Maybe it would be if what you imagine actually happened.
I lose either way I go. One
is considered a ‘challenge’ to you and the other isn’t worth your time.
In neither case do I get the mind of Bill Powers thinking about my
ideas critically without thinking about me personally.
When you start imagining, and then get mad at someone for what you
imagine is going to happen, we’re getting pretty far off the
track.
But
anyone who wants to suggest revisions should define terms as much as
possible, in a modeling-friendly way,
Could you be a bit more explicit here?
The ideas should have at least some concept of mechanisms behind them,
and should account for specific phenomena, or predict phenomena not
directly built in to the model.
Marc,
how about starting by saying exactly what you mean by memory,
imagination, and emotion?
Fair enough, I welcome the
opportunity and thank you for asking. I will put a post together in the
next couple of days.
OK.
Best,
Bill P.
