Perceptions

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.11.23.1015)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.11.22.1252)--

Rick Marken (2003.11.22.0920)

So it seems to me that the difference in people's "taste" regarding
the same perceptions is largely a matter of a difference in their
references for the preferred state of perceptual variables.

I suspect that you misspoke. There is, as you have pointed out, no
evidence that people have the "same" perceptions. Perhaps "similar" is
a more accurate modifier.

There are two senses in which perceptions in different people can be
the "same". People can control the same perceptual variable or they
can experience a perception in the same way. The former kind of
sameness can be established by test, such as the test for the
controlled variable. Such a test will show that people are controlling
the same variable when they control, say, the position of a cursor, the
orientation of a rectangle or the fairness of a business deal. What I
had pointed out is that there is no way to know whether these people
experience the same thing when they are perceiving these variables. We
will never know, for example, whether another person's experience of
cursor position is the same as our own. This is an interesting
philosophical point but irrelevant to the question of why different
people (or the same person at different times) have different tastes
for the _same_ perception (the same state of a perceptual variable).
According to PCT, people have different tastes for the same perception
because they have different references for the state of the perceptual
variable on which the perception in question is just one state.

Bill Powers (2003.11.23.0709 MST) explained this rather well in his
reply to Bjorn Simonsen (2003.11.23.09:35 EuST):

The "good-ness" or "bad-ness" of a taste, according to the PCT model,
is not in the kind of taste, but in wanting more or less of it. If
your reference level for a taste is set close to zero, any amount of
that taste will result in your rejecting it -- spitting out the food,
rinsing out your mouth with water, saying "YUK!", and so on. You
cognitively interpret your own reaction as meaning that the taste is
bad. Yet if you had a high reference level for that taste, you'd stuff
the food in your mouth and ask for more, while the taste remained
exactly the same.

In this case Bill was talking about literal, gustatory taste
perceptions. But it applies to all cases of differences in "taste"
(preference) for a perception, such as differences in taste for art.
According to PCT, you like a particular painting and I don't, not
because we perceive the painting differently but because you _want_ the
perceptions that make up the painting and I don't.

I think the informal observation that people do have different tastes
(preferences) is based on the assumption that people perceive the world
in the same way (that is, in terms of the same perceptual variables).
For example, I dislike Lima beans and my son loves them. I think this
is a difference in our taste (preference) for the same perception. It
would not be a difference in taste if I thought that we perceived Lima
beans differently. If I thought my son liked Lima beans because he
perceives them as ice cream then I would say that we don't differ in
our tastes at all; we both prefer the perception of ice cream to the
perception of Lima beans.

What is interesting about taste (to me) is that you have two people
perceiving exactly the same thing -- the same cursor position,
painting, music, medicare bill, presidency, etc -- and have one person
liking the perception and the other hating it. PCT explains this
difference in terms of differences in references -- differences between
people in terms of the states of perceptual variables that people
_want_. I think our demonstrations of conflict, using the rubber band
demo, for example, show that people can perceive in terms of the same
perceptual variables and set references for different states of these
variables. Conflict is a demonstration of the effects of having
different "tastes" for the same perceptual variable.

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2001.11.23.1032 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2003.11.23.1124)

Bruce Gregory (11.23.1145)

In addition to both of you
gentleman being right, there is one other

property that all 5 perceptions Bill has listed here have. They are

Cognitive constructs. That is, they are ‘interpreted’ signals that we
have

in memory. There is NO level in the current hierarchy that we can
‘know’

about ‘non-cognitively’ (I know it’s not a word but it sounds good
:-))

EVERY perception is a cognitive construct, including each level of
the

hierarchy. In fact your hierarchy is a perception of a perception.

I would say it is a cognitive model, or just a model (since everything
above a certain level would be “cognitive.”) The structure the
model describes, however, is not cognitive at the lower levels.

Bill, Bruce Gregory is not
referring to a single level model. It is

currently believed by many (myself included) that all neuronal activity
is

based on patterns of networked neurons.

I don’t know anyone who doesn’t believe that, unless they believe in
magic.
Suppose you have a visual pattern that looks like this (between the
quotes): “A”. Then there is a pattern that looks like this:
“B”. Somehow we can see that one pattern is not like the other
pattern, although they are both patterns. What makes the difference
between them is not that they are patterns, but that there are
differences in the details of the patterns.
However, “differences” are not enough, either, because we can
say that “A” is different from “C” as well.
“A” is different from “B”, and it is also different
from “C”, so we have two differences here. Being
“different” from “A” is clearly not enough to
distinguish “B” from “C”.They are both
different from A, yet they are also different from each other. What
matters is not so much the fact that they are different, but the details
of how they are different.
The problem here is that words like “pattern” and
“difference” are not specific enough to tell us how anything
works. Somehow when the pattern “A” is present, there has to be
some indication that this pattern and not some other pattern is present.
Something has to respond when the pattern “A” is
present, and not respond (significantly) when any other pattern is
present. This is how research into “pattern recognition” has
always gone, with PCT following the same general paths. The mere fact
that one pattern is different from another does not cause anything to
happen. Something must happen as a result of “A” being present
that does not happen when “A” is not present. There must be
some sort of physical signal indicating the presence of “A”
which is turned on only when the pattern “A” exists in the
visual field. And the signal must be derived by something from the
signals or inputs representing the details of “A”. That
something is what we call a perceptual input function in PCT.
Of course perceptual input functions themselves are, physically, neural
networks: arrangements of synapsing neurons that receive inputs and
combine them to produce output signals. Different arrangements within
these networks create different relationships between inputs and outputs.
The primary question about perceptual networks, therefore, is WHAT THESE
“ARRANGEMENTS” ARE. Given a pattern of light and dark on the
retina, what sort of neural interconnections must be present to form an
“A” recognizer? This recognizer might not be needed at the
retina, for the retina maps onto midbrain neurons with spatial relations
preserved. There is even mapping from there to various regions of the
visual cortex. But at some point there must be a neural network that can
output a signal only when “A” is present, and only to the
degree that “A” is present. The signal is not itself a pattern,
but it signals that a particular pattern is there.
The term “pattern” indicates generally something that is seen
in a collection of elements. The elements themselves may or may not be
patterns, but the pattern is seen in the way the elements are arranged
relative to each other. In classical biology and other fields, patterns
were considered to exist in the objective world, so that all a person had
to do was learn to respond to them, like stimuli. But in modern times we
recognize that what is seen in an assembly of elements depends critically
on the way the input processes seeing them are organized. Any assembly of
elements can be seen as representing a variety of patterns, depending on
how the perceiving system is organized. There is no such thing as
“the” pattern in any collection of elements – although we
often deliberately make patterns that are as unlike others in the same
set as possible (like the letters in the words here). Basically, patterns
are in the eye of the beholder. A “V” on top of an inverted
“V” can also be seen as an “X”.
Patterns of a particular type arise when the same patterning principle is
being applied by separate networks to all inputs. Static spatial
patterns, or what I call visual configurations, arise from a principle of
spatial invariance: a cube remains a cube no matter how it is turned,
what its size, or what color its sides are (as long as they contrast with
the background and each other). All visual configurations are invariants,
aspects of the visual world that are independent of size, orientation,
location, and other changes in details – yet at the same time, dependent
on other details.
Once we have a set of configurations, the signals indicating their
presence can be elements of patterns formed according to a new principle:
trajectories through time and space, the kind I call
“transitions” in HPCT. Acceleration and motion, both linear and
angular, are kinds of temporal patterns that result. The elements of
these patterns are configuration signals, which themselves represent
patterns perceived in sets of sensations, which represent patterns of
intensity signals coming from sensory endings.
So you are both, Bruce and Marc, quite correct, in HPCT terms, when you
speak of patterns of patterns. Each level in the hierarchy is a set of
perceptions of patterns formed from elements in the next lower level (and
perhaps even lower elements). Each perceptual signal indicates the
presence of a pattern detected in the lower perceptual signals by a
neural network specialized to respond to one example of one type of
pattern. A level of perception is made of many such networks of the same
computational type, all responding to the same type of pattern:
intensities, sensations, configurations, transitions, and at the next
level the space-time patterns we call “events.”
“Events” are the result of applying still another patterning
principle to lower-order elements.
“God is in the details,” it is said. There is no doubt that
patterns are involved in perception, and that networks of neurons are
involved in creating responses to patterns. But there are many distinct
types of patterns, and even within one type, many different neural
networks are needed to produce signals when a wide variety of patterns
within the type is present. HPCT is an attempt to be explicit about the
types of patterns that exist, as a step toward understanding the kinds of
neural networks that would be needed to generate each type of pattern
response – each type of perception.
As to all perceptions being cognitive, Marc, speak for yourself. Perhaps
you are unable to experience pain, or sweetness, or shapes, or motion,
without first naming these perceptions and then thinking about them in
words or symbols. But that is not true of everyone; it’s certainly not
true of me. I know that people like us spend a great deal of our
conscious lives immersed in symbol manipulations of various kinds, from
verbal to mathematical, but that is not all there is to experience. I
don’t think you are really “unable” to experience sensations
and so forth without moving your lips (as it were), but it is common for
intellectuals (you’ve been promoted) to pretty much ignore the lower
levels of their experiential worlds, or put them into some other category
they keep at a distance. While our models are necessarily
cognitive in origin and nature, the world of experience they are intended
to describe is not limited to cognition.

Best,

Bill P.

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.11.23.1404)]

Bill Powers (2003.11.23.0914 MST)

Bruce Gregory (2003.11.23.0954)--

Yes. They are "all the same" in the sense that the process is
recursive.

"Recursive" is a mathematical notion that unfortunately involves
several
kinds of infinities.

Kind of like hierarchies.

My other objection to such "complex systems" ideas is that they are not
very good approximations to reality. Consider fractals. I'm sure you
have
read about the way fractals describe coastlines or mountain skylines,
which
are "self-similar" on all scales of magnification. Except that they're
not.
If you get close to a real example of either kind of "fractal"
landscape,
you find that its character changes completely. Instead of a continuous
irregular line, you start seeing granules, cracks, and other
discontinuities that do not look like the large-scale picture at all.
Fractals fit imaginary landscapes, not real ones. Nothing in the real
world
actually looks like the Mandelbrot set.

I promise not to try to model human behavior using the Mandelbrot set.

I don't care much for the word "pattern" for the simple reason that it
can
mean anything you want it to mean. If it were limited to the meaning of
"static pattern" (configuration) or "space-time pattern" (event), it
would
mean something, but when used to mean "any regularity whatsoever,"
there is
nothing to which it doesn't apply, and it loses whatever meaning it
might
have had. If the whole world turned blue, we would soon cease seeing
blue.
If everything is a pattern, soon nothing will be a pattern.

You've eliminated most of the function of the cortex. I hope there's
enough left to suit your purposes.

Bruce Gregory

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.11.23.1419)]

Rick Marken (2003.11.23.1015)

Bruce Gregory (2003.11.22.1252)--

Rick Marken (2003.11.22.0920)

So it seems to me that the difference in people's "taste" regarding
the same perceptions is largely a matter of a difference in their
references for the preferred state of perceptual variables.

I suspect that you misspoke. There is, as you have pointed out, no
evidence that people have the "same" perceptions. Perhaps "similar" is
a more accurate modifier.

There are two senses in which perceptions in different people can be
the "same". People can control the same perceptual variable or they
can experience a perception in the same way. The former kind of
sameness can be established by test, such as the test for the
controlled variable.

The test for the controlled variable establishes only that whatever is
being controlled is sufficiently like the variable being postulated
that the variance of the observed versus computed data falls with
acceptable limits. Or did I miss something?

What I
had pointed out is that there is no way to know whether these people
experience the same thing when they are perceiving these variables.

I know of no one who disputes this. If there is such a one on this
list, let he or she speak now or forever hold their peace.

We
will never know, for example, whether another person's experience of
cursor position is the same as our own. This is an interesting
philosophical point but irrelevant to the question of why different
people (or the same person at different times) have different tastes
for the _same_ perception (the same state of a perceptual variable).

You seem to think that if you repeat something often enough it becomes
true by assertion. Your not a Republican by any chance are you?

According to PCT, people have different tastes for the same perception
because they have different references for the state of the perceptual
variable on which the perception in question is just one state.

O.K. PCT says that perceptions are identical. I'll try to remember that
little idiosyncrasy.

Bill Powers (2003.11.23.0709 MST) explained this rather well in his
reply to Bjorn Simonsen (2003.11.23.09:35 EuST):

The "good-ness" or "bad-ness" of a taste, according to the PCT model,
is not in the kind of taste, but in wanting more or less of it. If
your reference level for a taste is set close to zero, any amount of
that taste will result in your rejecting it -- spitting out the food,
rinsing out your mouth with water, saying "YUK!", and so on. You
cognitively interpret your own reaction as meaning that the taste is
bad. Yet if you had a high reference level for that taste, you'd stuff
the food in your mouth and ask for more, while the taste remained
exactly the same.

Bill was, as usual, very clear. However, I don't see anything about two
people sharing identical perceptual variables.

In this case Bill was talking about literal, gustatory taste
perceptions. But it applies to all cases of differences in "taste"
(preference) for a perception, such as differences in taste for art.
According to PCT, you like a particular painting and I don't, not
because we perceive the painting differently but because you _want_ the
perceptions that make up the painting and I don't.

I see. So you maintain that we see the painting in the same way. How
might we test this claim?

I think the informal observation that people do have different tastes
(preferences) is based on the assumption that people perceive the world
in the same way (that is, in terms of the same perceptual variables).
For example, I dislike Lima beans and my son loves them. I think this
is a difference in our taste (preference) for the same perception. It
would not be a difference in taste if I thought that we perceived Lima
beans differently. If I thought my son liked Lima beans because he
perceives them as ice cream then I would say that we don't differ in
our tastes at all; we both prefer the perception of ice cream to the
perception of Lima beans.

I see. You dislike the painting because you have a low reference for
great art. That's consistent.

What is interesting about taste (to me) is that you have two people
perceiving exactly the same thing -- the same cursor position,
painting, music, medicare bill, presidency, etc -- and have one person
liking the perception and the other hating it. PCT explains this
difference in terms of differences in references -- differences between
people in terms of the states of perceptual variables that people
_want_. I think our demonstrations of conflict, using the rubber band
demo, for example, show that people can perceive in terms of the same
perceptual variables and set references for different states of these
variables. Conflict is a demonstration of the effects of having
different "tastes" for the same perceptual variable.

The more you explain PCT, the less plausible it becomes. But as long as
we stick to the untestable, there's no accounting for tastes, is there?

Bruce Gregory

[Marc_Abrams1]

from [Marc Abrams (2003.11.23.1734)]

[From Bill Powers (2001.11.23.1032 MST)]

I would say it is a cognitive model, or just a model (since everything
above a certain level would be "cognitive.") The structure the model
describes, however, is not cognitive at the lower levels.

Why not? How is the ability to either describe or differeniate an
'intensity' different than it would to be to discern or describe a
'relationship'. The concept of 'intensity' is a human interpretation. An
intensity has no 'objective' meaning outside of what we confer upon it.

I understand that in the hierarchy, you are trying show how a 'signal'
becomes a perception, but conscious awareness of _anything_ means that it is
'cognitively' generated and is by definition an _INTERPRETATION_ of what is
actually out there, that is, a perception.

I just don't think that our perceptions are _built_ this way. I do not
disagree with you that each of the levels represents a _type_ of possible
perception nor do I disagree with you that the first 'level' represents an
incoming signal of some kind that is not necessarily perceived. But if you
were, able to 'perceive' a signal, that would mean that signal was already a
perception and had gone through whatever processes a signal goes through
before it becomes a perception.

>Bill, Bruce Gregory is not referring to a single level model. It is
>currently believed by many (myself included) that _all_ neuronal activity

is

>based on patterns of networked neurons.

I don't know anyone who doesn't believe that, unless they believe in

magic.

First, lets deal with neuronal firing patterns. The neuronal patterns I
speak of mainly come from a handful of neuroscience physiologists who have
spent the past 25 years in neuronal communication research. They have found
that through the thalamocortical system neurons oscillate at 40 hz.
coherently in patterened waves. This oscillation is pulsative, that is
discontinuous, and is rythmatic and simultaneous. if you are interested in
the particulars concerning this let me know and I will get it to you

Are we talking about the same kind of patterns Bill?

Of course perceptual input functions themselves are, physically, neural
networks: arrangements of synapsing neurons that receive inputs and

combine

them to produce output signals.

As to all perceptions being cognitive, Marc, speak for yourself. Perhaps
you are unable to experience pain, or sweetness, or shapes, or motion,
without first naming these perceptions and then thinking about them in
words or symbols. But that is not true of everyone; it's certainly not

true

of me.

Interesting. How do you know that anything exists? How do you know that a
letter is a letter and a ball is a ball? Pain, shapes, motion, are all
perceptions. When you experience something you can call it whatever you
like. You can even deny it's existence (but isn't that in and of itself an
admission of perception)A 'label' does not make the perception. I like to
call them perceptions. btw, what is sweetness, I don't know if I have ever
experienced it but I just had a piece of the best pickled strawberry
shortcake Ive ever had and nobody can pickle it like my wife.

While our models are necessarily cognitive in origin and nature, the world

of

experience they are intended to describe is not limited to cognition.

It is as far as each of us knowing the world and experiencing it is. I
_know_ that there is a world that is _much_ different than my perceptions of
it. In fact if there are 30 billion people in the world there are 30 billion
'reality's'. My perceptions of my wife are not who she 'really' is any more
than her mothers perception of her is. I cannot think of anything I have not
experienced, even if the experience was solely in my imagination.

Marc

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

RE: Perceptions
[Bjorn Simonsen (2003.11.24;13:25 EuST)]

From Bill Powers (2003.11.23.0709 MST)

I am much satisfied with your answer. You are so distinct. But….
<The “good-ness” or “bad-ness” of a taste, according to the PCT model, is not
in the kind of taste, but in wanting more or less of it. If your reference level for
a taste is set close to zero, any amount of that taste will result in your rejecting it
– spitting out the food, rinsing out your mouth with water, saying “YUK!”, and
so on. You cognitively interpret your own reaction as meaning that the taste is
bad. Yet if you had a high reference level for that taste, you’d stuff the food
In your mouth and ask for more, while the taste remained exactly the same.>
<There are probably some tastes for which the reference level is set to zero by
Inheritance – poisons, for example, or rotted food. A zero reference level does
not mean indifference; it means that any amount of the perception produces an

    error signal. A built-in reference level of zero for some tastes would result in

    automatic rejection of those tastes by whatever means is there, like spitting out

    and vomiting. And we interpret our own reaction by placing a negative cognitive

    value on the taste -- which is usually the right thing to do but not always.>

Do I understand you correct if I say:

A newborn Child experiences many new environmental variables. It is not probable that the variables immediately are re-arranged in the input function to perceptual signals with values like the reference signal (which often in this situations are zero ???). The result is a behavior which sooner or later will lead to a perceptual signal with a value like the reference signal. In this situation it often takes so long time to zero the error that reorganization starts up.

In this way the child keep their reference values until new reorganizing establishes a new reference value.

If that is a correct statement I have problems with the following statements.

In different situations we control different Programs. It is probable that the output from these Programs goes different paths down the hierarchy. When we control the one Program a comparator at the sensation level may get signals from two or three Outputs the level above. When we control the other Program the same comparator may get different signals from the Outputs above (maybe four or five signals). Isn’t there a chance for different reference values in these examples.

Can the same person all the same have different tastes when he control different Programs?

bjorn

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.11.24.0630 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2003.11.23.1734) –

The structure the model
describes, however, is not cognitive at the lower levels.

Why not? How is the ability to either describe or differeniate an

‘intensity’ different than it would to be to discern or describe a

‘relationship’.

You seem to be adding an extra step into perception. It is known (as well
as anything is known in science) that all sensory nerves generate trains
of impulses when they are stimulated in the appropriate way (light for
the retina, pressure for skin receptors, and so on). When such trains of
impulses appear (however they are caused), we experience the
corresponding qualities of sensory experience, to a degree that depends
on the intensity of stimulation. You don’t want to call those experiences
“perceptions,” but whatever they are called, they
exist.
You seem to be concerned about solipsism, or at least that is what I
infer when you say " But if you were, able to ‘perceive’ a signal,
that would mean that signal was already a perception and had gone through
whatever processes a signal goes through before it becomes a
perception."
That, of course, is exactly what I have always proposed. In MSOB (see the
top of page 24), I say it in almost those words. The world we experience
is made of neural signals; it is the output of neural networks,
not the input to them. We never experience the actual outside world
directly (consciously or otherwise). Of course those ideas are also a
model in our brains, our attempt to explain how it is that we experience
the world we esperience (including how we experience the nervous system
using scientific instruments).

If you’re concerned that this negates any external reality, there is
plenty of evidence, though it is indirect, that a consistent external
reality exists. We can learn to act through the external reality to
affect our own perceptions, and there are apparently rules as to what we
must do to achieve specific repeated effects. Also, we experience changes
in our perceptions even when we don’t act, so there are evidently
independent causal influences at work in the outside reality.

The concept of ‘intensity’ is a
human interpretation.

What isn’t?

An intensity has no
‘objective’ meaning outside of what we confer upon it.

What does?

Actually “intensity” has a specifric meaning in the physics
model of reality: it is energy flow per unit area, measured, for example,
in watts per square centimeter. Light and heat stimuli are defined that
way, so the signals they produce are measures of incoming energy flow.
Other stimuli (like pressure or taste) are not directly linked to energy
flow, but the signals still correspond to a physical measure of the
amount of stimulation. The physics model is, as you say, a human
interpretation, but it is quite a useful one.

I understand that in the hierarchy,
you are trying show how a ‘signal’

becomes a perception, but conscious awareness of anything means that it
is

‘cognitively’ generated and is by definition an INTERPRETATION of what
is

actually out there, that is, a perception.

In the hierarchy, as I have carefully defined perceptions, an afferent
neural signal is a perception. However, I distinguish between
perception and conscious perception. Signals, as I have shown in various
writings, may exist either with or without one’s being aware of them. I
can’t model awareness since neither I nor anyone else has the slightest
idea of how it works, but we can note phenomena related to awareness
while we wait for an explanation to come along. We know that negative
feedback control requires the presence of perceptual signals; we know
also that some control processes (like breathing) can be carried out
either with or without awareness. If a control process is going on
without awareness, that is presumptive proof that perceptual signals can
exist without awareness. Afferent neural signals (if you want to avoid
the word perception) can exist and play a part in a control process
without consciousness of the variables they represent.

I just don’t think that our
perceptions are built this way. I do not

disagree with you that each of the levels represents a type of
possible

perception nor do I disagree with you that the first ‘level’ represents
an

incoming signal of some kind that is not necessarily perceived. But if
you

were, able to ‘perceive’ a signal, that would mean that signal was
already a

perception and had gone through whatever processes a signal goes
through

before it becomes a perception.

Yes. See above. As you said to Jim Beardsley, sometimes these ideas take
a while to sink in.

Bill, Bruce Gregory is not referring to a single level model. It
is

currently believed by many (myself included) that all neuronal
activity

is

based on patterns of networked neurons.

I don’t know anyone who doesn’t believe that, unless they believe
in

magic.

First, lets deal with neuronal firing patterns. The neuronal patterns
I

speak of mainly come from a handful of neuroscience physiologists who
have

spent the past 25 years in neuronal communication research. They have
found

that through the thalamocortical system neurons oscillate at 40 hz.

coherently in patterened waves. This oscillation is pulsative, that
is

discontinuous, and is rythmatic and simultaneous. if you are interested
in

the particulars concerning this let me know and I will get it to
you./

Fine, I’d like to see it. Coherent firing is an interesting phenomenon,
though it doesn’t explain what determines the firing rate of the whole.
As to the 40 Hz, there are all sorts of frequencies present in any
record of neural firings; what you see depends very much on which
narrow-band filters you use (as in EEG studies). Fourier analysis can
reveal the relative strengths of harmonics, and there are other
techniques like autocorrelation that can reveal dominant frequencies. But
whether these methods reveal or create the observed
frequencies is a matter for debate.

Anyhow, the PCT model doesn’t depend on any assumptions about the form in
which information is carried by neural signals. I assume that frequency
of firing is the primary measure, but too little is known to elevate that
or any other assumption to the status of a fact.

Perhaps
you are unable to experience pain, or sweetness, or shapes, or motion,
without first naming these perceptions and then thinking about them in
words or symbols. But that is not true of everyone; it’s certainly
not

true of me.

Interesting. How do you know that anything exists? How do you know that
a

letter is a letter and a ball is a ball? Pain, shapes, motion, are
all

perceptions. When you experience something you can call it whatever
you

like. You can even deny it’s existence (but isn’t that in and of itself
an

admission of perception)A ‘label’ does not make the perception. I like
to

call them perceptions. btw, what is sweetness, I don’t know if I have
ever

experienced it but I just had a piece of the best pickled
strawberry

shortcake Ive ever had and nobody can pickle it like my wife.

That’s the solipsism problem that you’re worried about. My answer is
simply that you know these experiences exist because you have them. But
you don’t know what caused them – what it was in the external
reality that led to the experience. You can believe there is a picture on
the screen of a television set without knowing how it is created there.
In the same way, you can believe you are experiencing pickled
strawberries without having to know what aspect of reality leads to this
experience. Experience is like the screen of a television set, although
this television set works in three-D, and it also includes sound,
touchavision, smellavision, tasteavision, and so forth.

While our models are
necessarily cognitive in origin and nature, the world

of experience they are intended to describe is not limited to
cognition.

It is as far as each of us knowing the world and experiencing it
is.

If you want to define cognition so it includes things like feeling
nauseated or cold or tired, as well as thinking and reasoning, then what
you say is OK. But I think that cognition is a word we use when we mean
thinking, reasoning, interpretation, and communication, rather than just
silently experiencing something. It was because of problems like this,
and worse ones, that I decided to dump the whole traditional way of
dividing experience into vague classes like “sense data” and
“concrete experience” and “concepts” and
“ideas” and “cognitions,” and just refer to ALL
incoming information as “perception.” Then, to distinguish the
low-order from the high-order or “abstract” perceptions, I
studied the world of perception to see how it came apart into specific
types of perceptions. This resulted in the labels running from
“intensity” to “system concept.” The upgoing signals
at each of these levels are called “perceptions” or
“perceptual signals.” The specific labels propose the
kind of perception that is present at each level. I think this way
of handling perception is much more specific than all the vague terms
that have been used in the past.

I_know_ that there is a world
that is much different than my perceptions of it. In fact if there are
30 billion people in the world there are 30 billion ‘reality’s’. My
perceptions of my wife are not who she ‘really’ is any more than her
mothers perception of her is. I cannot think of anything I have not
experienced, even if the experience was solely in my
imagination.

That is why I say that by the time you are perceiving anything in the
world, it is already in the form of a neural signal. However, this may
not mean that we have as many realities as people. People are, after all,
constructed pretty much alike, and it is possible to predict
approximately what they will say they are experiencing when we are also
experiencing something in a common space. At least this is what our
studies of neurology, physiology, and physics seem to suggest. All we can
do is try to make our models consistent with each other, and with what we
experience, and to require that they predict accurately. I say “All
we can do,” but doing this results in some pretty powerful ways of
predicting experience and controlling what happens to us.

Best,

Bill P.

[Bill_Powers]

Do I understand you correct if I
say:
[From Bill Powers (2003.11.24.07512 MST)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2003.11.24;13:25
EuST)–

A newborn Child experiences many new
environmental variables. It is not probable that the variables
immediately are re-arranged in the input function to perceptual signals
with values like the reference signal (which often in this situations are
zero ???). The result is a behavior which sooner or later will lead to a
perceptual signal with a value like the reference signal. In this
situation it often takes so long time to zero the error that
reorganization starts up.

Remember, however, that there are many levels of “environmental
variables,” and the newborn child probably does not have many
higher-level perceptual functions. They have not been constructed yet.

I think there are a few built-in reference signals and comparators for
sensations of different kinds, but not a great many. Babies will reject
some experiences, and seek others, but they are pretty simple (see the
Plooij’s books). The means of rejecting or accepting are also pretty
simple: a few stereotyped movements, and a lot of crying and yelling. I
think that babies are pretty much in a continuous state of
reorganization, as you suggest.

If that is a correct statement I have
problems with the following statements.

In
different situations we control different Programs. It is probable that
the output from these Programs goes different paths down the hierarchy.
When we control the one Program a comparator at the sensation level may
get signals from two or three Outputs the level above. When we
control the other Program the same comparator may get different signals
from the Outputs above (maybe four or five signals). Isn’t there a chance
for different reference values in these
examples.

Babies don’t have many higher-order systems; they’re trying things at
random. In an adult, what you say is very true: “liking” or
“not liking” a given perception can depend on what Programs, or
other higher goals, one is controlling, and can even vary from moment to
moment. Do you like to hear good whistling? In church? At a
funeral?

Think of how good salt tastes when you’re sweating and working hard. And
how bad it tastes when there’s too much of it. Think of how good a large
gourmet dinner tastes, and how bad it would taste if you had to eat
another one immediately. Think of how pleasant it is to hear someone
laugh at a joke you told, and how much you would like it if the person
were still laughing 30 minutes later.

Can the
same person all the same have different tastes when he control different
Programs?

Yes, I think so. See above.

Best,

Bill P.

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.11.24.1000)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.11.23.1419)--

> Rick Marken (2003.11.23.1015)

> There are two senses in which perceptions in different people can be
> the "same". People can control the same perceptual variable or they
> can experience a perception in the same way. The former kind of
> sameness can be established by test, such as the test for the
> controlled variable.

The test for the controlled variable establishes only that whatever is
being controlled is sufficiently like the variable being postulated
that the variance of the observed versus computed data falls with
acceptable limits. Or did I miss something?

Only that the variable being postulated as the controlled variable is a perceptual
variable, something perceived by the person doing the test. When the tester
discovers that the testee is, indeed, controlling the postulated controlled
variable, protecting it from disturbances in all possible dimensions of variation,
then the tester is perceiving what the testee is perceiving, and controlling.
This is what happens in the "Mind Reading" demo when the test discovers the square
that is being moved intentionally by the testee. The movements of the filled-in
square that you are perceiving are what the testee is perceiving (and
controlling). Of course, the testee and tester might not give the same perception
the same name. Bill Powers makes this point in his discussion of the coin game (a
version of the test for the controlled variable) in B:CP. You might find that the
testee is controlling a "Z" pattern of coins; the testee might protest and say
that the controlled perception is an "N" pattern. In fact, both testee and tester
are talking about the same perception, no matter what they call it.

> According to PCT, people have different tastes for the same perception
> because they have different references for the state of the perceptual
> variable on which the perception in question is just one state.

O.K. PCT says that perceptions are identical. I'll try to remember that
little idiosyncrasy.

This is not an idiosyncrasy of PCT. If you look at any book on perception (I
recommend Cornsweet's _Visual Perception_ and Julesz's _Cyclopean Perception_,
which shows my age, I suppose) I think you will see that it is assumed that all
people, with normal sensory systems, perceive in the same way. In psychophysics,
for example, it is assumed that the perception, p, of loudness as a function of
acoustical amplitude, a, is the same for all people (p = k log a or p = ka^b,
depending on who you believe). The study of higher level perceptions also assumes
that all people perceive in the same way. All people with normal sense organs are
assumed to perceive color in the same way as a function of the combinations of
wavelengths of light. All people are assumed to perceive size in the same way as a
function of contour. And, indeed, all people seem to see the illusions of size --
the Ames room, the Muller -Lyer, etc -- that result from particular arranged of
contours. People would not all see these illusions if they did not perceive in the
same way.

What PCT says, I think, which is consistent with all the research on perception
that I know of, is that what is identical (or, at least, homomorphic) across
people is that _many_ (not necessarily all) of their perceptual _functions_-- the
functions that produce perceptual signals as a function of environmental
variations--- are the same. I think this identity is very clear for the lower
level of perception. This may not be true for all higher level perceptions. It's
certainly the perception of many intensities, sensations, configurations,
transitions, and relationships.

Bill Powers (2003.11.23.0709 MST) explained this rather well in his

> reply to Bjorn Simonsen (2003.11.23.09:35 EuST):
>
>> The "good-ness" or "bad-ness" of a taste, according to the PCT model,
>> is not in the kind of taste, but in wanting more or less of it...

Bill was, as usual, very clear. However, I don't see anything about two
people sharing identical perceptual variables.

My point was that the example can be applied to two people who perceive the same
thing. The difference in their preferences is a difference in their references. Of
course, it's possible that that the difference could result from a difference in
perception across people. I might say I like "lemonade" because I like the color
(the color is at my reference for color); you might say you dislike lemonade
because you dislike the taste (the taste is not at your reference for taste). In
this case, the difference in our preferences seems to be result from a difference
in perception. In fact, it still a result of the discrepancy (or lack thereof)
between perception and reference: I like lemonade because it's color matches my
reference for color; you dislike lemonade because it's taste does not match your
reference for taste. But there is also a difference in perception here. If we were
both evaluating lemonade in terms of the same perceptions, taste, say, we might
both agree that we dislike it. But this would occur, not because we are now
judging the same perception but because our reference for that perception is the
same (we want none of it). If our references for the taste of lemonade were
different, our liking for lemonade would differ, even though we are evaluating the
same perception.

> According to PCT, you like a particular painting and I don't, not
> because we perceive the painting differently but because you _want_ the
> perceptions that make up the painting and I don't.

I see. So you maintain that we see the painting in the same way. How
might we test this claim?

As you can see from my example above, I don't maintain the we see the painting in
the same way. You might like the painting because of it's composition (among
other things); I might dislike the painting because of it's color scheme (without
even seeing the composition). So we might be perceiving different aspects of the
painting. But our evaluation of those aspects comes from our references, which
determine whether we want those perceptions or not. But I do think it is often
the case that people differ in terms of their liking for the same perceived
aspect(s) of a painting. I think that, through discussion, people can do a pretty
good job of determining that they are judging the painting in terms of the same
perceptions. When people agree that they are seeing the same thing and some say
they like it and others say they don't , you are seeing, I believe, a difference
in references for the same perception.

The more you explain PCT, the less plausible it becomes. But as long as
we stick to the untestable, there's no accounting for tastes, is there?

Actually, you are providing a little test right here of the "different references
for the same perception" theory of taste. Presumably, the more I explain PCT, the
more your perception of PCT corresponds to mine. Yet, as our perceptions of PCT
become more alike, our liking for PCT becomes more unalike. How could this be if
it's differences in perception that are the basis of differences in taste? I think
this result is precisely consistent with the PCT explanation of taste. It's our
references for PCT that make the difference. As we both come to perceive PCT in
the same way -- in particular, as a theory that explains many differences in
preference in terms of differences in reference for the _same_ perception -- our
liking for the theory diverges because this perception differs from your reference
but matches mine. PCT is a testable way to account for differences in tastes,
even differences in taste in PCT itself.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory 2003.11.24.1430)]

Rick Marken (2003.11.24.1000)

If I understand your reasoning, a wine connoisseur and I taste the same
thing when we sample a wine. Call me pig headed, but I simply don't
believe this is true, no matter how often you repeat it.

Here's a simple example of a tracking task. I am controlling my
perception that delta x, delta y is a minimum. You are controlling your
perception that delta r is a minimum. Assuming we are controlling
roughly equally well, are we perceiving the same thing? When a
pickpocket encounters a saint does the pickpocket perceive the same
thing as a devoted acolyte standing next to pickpocket?

Actually, you are providing a little test right here of the "different
references
for the same perception" theory of taste. Presumably, the more I
explain PCT, the
more your perception of PCT corresponds to mine. Yet, as our
perceptions of PCT
become more alike, our liking for PCT becomes more unalike.

Really? So you see me as an expert in PCT who has a reference for his
perception of PCT that causes him to dislike it. I would have thought
that my reservations were due to a faulty grasp of the strengths of the
model, but I will defer to your judgment.

Bruce Gregory

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.11.24.1420)]

Bruce Gregory 2003.11.24.1430)]

   > Rick Marken (2003.11.24.1000)

   If I understand your reasoning, a wine connoisseur and I taste the same
   thing when we sample a wine. Call me pig headed, but I simply don't
   believe this is true, no matter how often you repeat it.

I would say that the wine connoisseur and you _could_ taste the same things.
You
would simply have to learn (as the wine connoisseur had to learn at some
time) which
perceptual variables to notice when evaluating wine and at which references
those
perceptions should be at for the wine to be considered good. Winemakers use
wine
connoisseurs (tasters) to judge whether people will like their wine. If wine
tasters
didn't perceive wine as did the potential purchasers of the wine -- and
adopt
references for those perceptions that were, hopefully, similar to those of
the
potential purchasers -- they would not be of much use to the winemaker.

   Here's a simple example of a tracking task. I am controlling my
   perception that delta x, delta y is a minimum. You are controlling your
   perception that delta r is a minimum. Assuming we are controlling
   roughly equally well, are we perceiving the same thing?

No. We would be controlling different variables. In this case, you can tell
whether
or not people are controlling the same perceptual variables -- a Cartesian
or polar
representation of cursor position -- by doing the appropriates tests for the
controlled variable. I describe an experiment that does just this in my
"Degrees of
freedom" paper in _Mind Readings_. I tested to see whether people who are
controlling the two dimensional position of a cursor are controlling a
Cartesian or
polar representation of the cursor. It turns out that all the people tested
in my
experiment controlled the same Cartesian representation of the cursor. This
doesn't
mean that people can't control a polar representation; they just didn't in
my study.

You seem to think I'm saying that people all perceive the world in the same
way. This
is not true. I know that people can perceive things I can't or don't
perceive and
vice versa. What I am saying is that people clearly perceive many of the
same
perceptual variables. According to PCT they all perceive the same _types_ of
variables. And they clearly control many of the same variables within those
type
classes. If this were not true, communication would be impossible and
conflicts would
not exist.

People do often have different "tastes" regarding the _same_ perceptual
variable. I
think this difference can only be explained in terms of a difference in
references
for the state of that variable. People clearly have different tastes, for
example,
regarding the "doneness of meat". This is a perceptual variable that is
unquestionably perceived the same by different people. There is not a
steakhouse in
the world that hasn't figured out that all steak eaters control this _same_
perceptual variable relative to different references. If how one likes the
steak were
a matter of differences in how people perceive doneness then the steakhouses
would be
out of business. Since different people would perceive the same steak in
different
ways the steakhouse would have no way of knowing how to cook the steak to
satisfy
different customers. As it is, the steakhouse can control it's perception
of the
"doneness" of a steak and have a pretty good idea that it can get close to
the
different references of a person who like this variable in the state "rare",
"medium"
or "well done".

  > Yet, as our perceptions of PCT
  > become more alike, our liking for PCT becomes more unalike.

   Really? So you see me as an expert in PCT who has a reference for his
   perception of PCT that causes him to dislike it.

No. I'm saying that _as you and I come to perceive PCT in the same way _,
your
references lead you to dislike PCT (or, as you said, find it "less
plausible")
whereas mine allow me to continue to like it (or, if you prefer, find it
highly
plausible). This is basically a restatement of your conclusion:

The more you explain PCT, the less plausible it becomes.

My explanations of PCT are attempts to communicate my perception of PCT.
The more I
explain PCT, the better (I presume) you are able to see how I see PCT. You
are saying
that when you move closer to seeing PCT as I do (based on my explanations)
you find
it less plausible. It seems to me that this is a clear example of what I
was talking
about. The better you are able to perceive things as I do, the less you like
those
things. So the closer we come to perceiving things the same way, the less we
agree.
This is a phenomenon that can be explained, it seems to me, only by
recognizing that
how much two people like a perception depends on how much each wants (has a
reference
for) that perception, not on how similar that perception is for each.

Best Regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.11.24.2123)]

[From Rick Marken (2003.11.24.1420)]

This is a phenomenon that can be explained, it seems to me, only by
recognizing that
how much two people like a perception depends on how much each wants
(has a
reference
for) that perception, not on how similar that perception is for each.

Since two people can have the same perception (otherwise it makes no
sense to say, "how much two people like _a_ perception"). Apparently we
all share the same perceptual world but differ in our preferences.
Sounds like metaphysics to me, but if you say it's PCT who am I to
argue?

Bruce Gregory

[Marc_Abrams1]

from [Marc Abrams (2003.11.24.2200)

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.11.24.2123)]

Sounds like metaphysics to me, but if you say it's PCT who am I to
argue?

Bruce, I also had these thoughts until Rick's last post. As Bill pointed me
to page 35 in B:CP, I will do the same to you.

It seems in PCT, a perception is an afferent signal to one of our sensory
receptors. Nothing more, nothing less.

Bill states on pg 35 in B:CP

"A "perception" means a neural current in a single fiber or bundle of
redundant fibers which has a magnitude of some set of primary sensory-nerve
stimulations."

This signal is supposed to represent some aspect of the environment. It
explains the existence of everything from an quark to a 747 jumbo jet. In
terms of PCT it doesn't matter _what_ it is, only that it has some magnitude
and it might or might not be something an individual might want in a certain
desired state.

_Anything_ else concerning a perception or the reasons _why_ you have a
particular reference condition currently lie outside the realm of PCT.

Marc

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.11.24.2114 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2003.11.24.2200) –

It seems in PCT, a perception is an
afferent signal to one of our sensory

receptors. Nothing more, nothing less.

Afferent signals come from sensory receptors; they don’t go
to them. And perceptual signals, while some of them do come from
sensory receptors, are considerably more than sensory signals. Most of
them are functions of multiple signals of lower levels, and not
necessarily of the first level.You’re madly flunking your PCT exam here,
Marc – what’s going on?

Bill states on pg 35 in
B:CP

"A “perception” means a neural current in a single fiber
or bundle of

redundant fibers which has a magnitude of some set of primary
sensory-nerve

stimulations."

If you’re going to quote me, please guote accurately.The whole sentence
was

"A ‘perception’ means a neural current in a single fiber or bundle
of

redundant fibers which has a magnitude that is related to the magnitudes
of some set of primary sensory-nerve stimulations."

The phrase “related to” means that it is some function of these
input stimulations. “Set of” means more than one.

This signal is supposed to
represent some aspect of the environment. It

explains the existence of everything from an quark to a 747 jumbo jet.
In

terms of PCT it doesn’t matter what it is, only that it has some
magnitude

and it might or might not be something an individual might want in a
certain

desired state.

That is a hasty garble of what was said, or else it shows that you don’t
get the idea of perceptual input functions at all. A neural signal
doesn’t “explain the existence” of anything. The neural signals
are functions of primary sensory nerve stimulation, which is true of
everything we can know about the environment, including 747s and quarks,
if you will. However, 747s would not be recognized at the first level,
would they? How do you think information about the environment
gets into the brain? ESP?

Anything else concerning a
perception or the reasons why you have a

particular reference condition currently lie outside the realm of
PCT.

Flunk. If this is all you’ve got out of PCT so far, Marc, you have quite
a way to go. Or are you deliberately misrepresenting the theory? I hope
others reading what you say about PCT know enough to recognize the
distortions. whether due to ignorance, carelessless, or malice.

This has gone far past anything I want to participate in.

Bill P.

···

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.11.24.2110)]

I have been getting only intermittent posts from the CSGNet server to my personal mailbox. So I am now monitoring the conversation via the CSGNet Archives. I hope the CSGNet mail distributor becomes unplugged soon.

Bruce Gregory (2003.11.24.2123)--

Since two people can have the same perception (otherwise it makes no
sense to say, "how much two people like _a_ perception"). Apparently we
all share the same perceptual world but differ in our preferences.
Sounds like metaphysics to me, but if you say it's PCT who am I to
argue?

It sounds like metaphysics when you deal with it only as a verbal concept. "We all share the same perceptual world" does sound rather metaphysical. It's the word "share" that seems to be the problem. In PCT we would just say that people perceive the world via very similar perceptual functions. They don't literally "share" these functions. The functions are properties of the brains of each individual. But these perceptual functions result in the what seem to be virtually the same perceptual variations as a function of environmental variations in most individuals. If all individuals perceive color, for example, as the same weighted average of the amplitude of light energy in the same three frequency bands, then all will have perceptions that are "same" in the sense that they vary in the same way as a function of variations in the light energy in these three frequency bands. And I think there is considerable evidence that the perception of color varies in the same way for all non-color blind people as a function of variations in the energy in three frequency bands. This seems less like metaphysics than Perception 101.

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.11.25.0654)]

Rick Marken (2003.11.24.2110)

This seems less like metaphysics than Perception 101.

Where I come from it's called naive realism.

Bruce Gregory

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.11.25.0539 MST)]

Rick Marken (2003.11.24.2110) --

It sounds like metaphysics when you deal with it only as a verbal concept.
"We all share the same perceptual world" does sound rather
metaphysical. It's the word "share" that seems to be the problem. In PCT
we would just say that people perceive the world via very similar
perceptual functions.

Somehow Bruce G. gets "naive realism" out of this. I think it was a clear
and straightforward exposition. Goes to show how higher-level perceptions vary.

You have Delphi 6, don't you? I now have the multiple-control-system demo
running with 500 control systems, each one controlling a perception made up
of 500 weighted sums of a common set of 500 environmental variables. Also,
I have started experimenting with reorganizing the input weights (250,000
of each) to minimize the global error (sum of squares of all error
signals).Next will be to allow a choice between reorganizing globally
versus locally, locally meaning reorganizing the weights for each control
system to minimize only its own error, independently of the others. Also,
reorganization of input or output weights will be another choice.

I know that Bruce Abbott and Jim Beardsley have done OOP programming, and
you apparently do it in Java. It would be interesting to see how this
program would look when implemented in terms of classes rather than
procedural code (i.e., putting the procedures into classes as methods).As
far as I know, David Goldstein is the only other person who can compile and
run Delphi 6 programs. Who am I forgetting?

To handle 500-fold complexity, I think you will need quite a lot of RAM --
I have 256 megs. I'n using "single" variable types -- single-precision
floating point -- to save some space. Haven't run out of memory yet so I
don't know what is actually required.

The three essential Delphi files are appended. The "reorg" button starts
and stops reorganization, the spinner lets you pick the number of control
systems (before starting), and the START button starts the program going. A
red number shows the RMS error signal over all systems. Reorganization is
set for the input matrix weightings. It takes a long time to make an
improvement. Probably doing something wrong.

The reference signals are white circles; the controlled perceptions are red
dots; the environmental variables are dim purple dots. You can set the
values of reference signals (using buttons) to random, sine wave, or cosine
wave, to make it easier to see the patterns. Three of the reference signals
vary slowly and sinusoidally.

Note to Jim B. Delphi 6 is available from Borland free -- it's a 109 MB
download. After you have it, you call Borland for an activation code. What
are your programming resources?

Best,

Bill P.

MultiControlUnit.pas (6.81 KB)

MultiControlUnit.dfm (102 Bytes)

MultiControlPrj.dpr (101 Bytes)

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.1125.0901)]

Bill Powers (2003.11.25.0539 MST)

You have Delphi 6, don't you? I now have the multiple-control-system
demo
running with 500 control systems, each one controlling a perception
made up
of 500 weighted sums of a common set of 500 environmental variables.

Isn't it wonderful how we all managed to have the same weightings of
these 500 environmental variables? Just luck I guess.

I've never known a naive realist to admit to it, so don't feel like the
Lone Ranger.

Bruce Gregory

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.11.25.1026)]

With our present lack of data, there is no reason not to pick the
simplest possible model -- one in which we all have identical
perceptual structures and differ only in reference levels. It seems it
will be a long time before we have the kind of data needed to test more
realistic models.

Bruce Gregory

[Jim_Beardsley]

[From Jim Beardsley (2003.11.25.0930 EST -0500)]

Bill Powers (2003.11.25.0539 MST)

I know that Bruce Abbott and Jim Beardsley have done OOP programming,
and you apparently do it in Java.

..you knew I would jump, with tail wagging. Still brushing up the mundane, practical Java skills -- but I already decided this would be a worthy project & experiment -- 'when' remains the biggest challenge.

It would be interesting to see how this program would look when
implemented in terms of classes rather than procedural code (i.e.,
putting the procedures into classes as methods).

My delusional enthusiasm already wonders what 'macro patterns' (better term?) might emerge from self-instantiating, self-constructing, self-(re)organizing multi-thread simulations running on a supercomputer. ..but I return to stark reality.

I've been weighing when to dive into the Excel models too, leveraging (& perhaps at least expanding) its UI convenience like Rick. Custom classes have some potential in Excel-VB too (is that what you've been using Rick, or anyone?), but memory & performance would remain premiums.

Note to Jim B. Delphi 6 is available from Borland free
What are your programming resources?

..decent, but overdue for modernization. Delphi's been in the wings but just got promoted into 'tinker' status..

Jim B

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