Perceptual Experience

[From Rick Marken (2001.09.07.0920)]

Bill Powers (2001.09.06.1553 MDT)--

A perception is a signal in a perceptual input channel leaving a
perceptual input function (whether or not that signal happens to be
under control). The proposal is that _all_ that can be experienced,
at any level, consists of perceptual signals.

i.kurtzer (2001.09.07.0000)

I don't think that this proposal gets us very far.

Perhaps. But I think it is a useful proposal. The proposal is that what
we are seeing when we look at the world -- what we can consciously
experience -- are the outputs of perceptual functions: perceptual
signals. This distinguishes PCT from some other approaches to behavior
-- such as that of J. J. Gibson and the interbehaviorists -- which imply
that we experience the world directly, with no perceptual processing.

Of course, all perceptions have to correlate to some signal, but why
would this signal correspond to any perception. Does a signal acting
as a reference make it "unperceivable", why, or a signal that acts as
an error signal, why?

The idea that it is only afferent signals (the outputs of perceptual
input functions) that are experienced as perceptions is simply a
_proposal_ regarding how the PCT model maps into actual experience. With
PCT (and all other behavioral models) we are in the peculiar position of
developing a model of a type of system of which we are an instance.
Bill's proposal above explains how the model maps into our own, private
experience. This kind of proposal is not associated with models of the
behavior of, say, molecules because those models were not developed by
the molecules themselves.

My five cent answer is "who cares".

That's fine. But I case because I am, myself, the thing modeled. I think
Bill's proposal suggests observations that can be made _from the point
of view of the model itself_ that can be considered tests of the model.
For example, I think I have used Bill's proposal when I developed my
demonstrations of hierarchical control. If my internet demo of
hierarchical perception
(http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/ControlDemo/HP.html) worked properly
on all computers you would be able to experience a hierarchy of
perceptions as the speed of the physical variables changed. It's pretty
nifty. Also, I think we use this proposal when we do the MOL. When you
suddenly experience the same reality from a higher level point of view
you can see, in a way, that you were experiencing the outputs of
perceptual functions -- not "reality" -- all along.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
MindReadings.com
10459 Holman Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Tel: 310-474-0313
E-mail: marken@mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0907.1241)]

Rick Marken (2001.09.07.0920)

Perhaps. But I think it is a useful proposal. The proposal is that what
we are seeing when we look at the world -- what we can consciously
experience -- are the outputs of perceptual functions: perceptual
signals.

The outputs of perceptual functions are presumably electrical impulses.
That is _not_ what we see (at least, that is not what I see). I'm perfectly
willing to agree that what I see is the result of electrical impulses in
the brain, if that's what you mean.

This distinguishes PCT from some other approaches to behavior
-- such as that of J. J. Gibson and the interbehaviorists -- which imply
that we experience the world directly, with no perceptual processing.

How extraordinary. How do they account for the fact that when is
blindfolded, one can no longer see? Presumably they mean that the sense
organs are noiseless transducers. It is easy enough to show that this model
is wrong.

When you
suddenly experience the same reality from a higher level point of view
you can see, in a way, that you were experiencing the outputs of
perceptual functions -- not "reality" -- all along.

For most people, a Necker cube demonstrates this quite well.

[From Rick Marken (2001.09.07.1015)]

Bruce Gregory (2001.0907.1241)--

The outputs of perceptual functions are presumably electrical impulses.
That is _not_ what we see (at least, that is not what I see). I'm perfectly
willing to agree that what I see is the result of electrical impulses in
the brain, if that's what you mean.

Yes, sort of. I believe that what we see results from the fact that we
_are_ (in part) the neurons carrying these signals. I think that the
computer screen I see now is just what the electrical output of a
particular perceptual function "look like" when you _are_ those
impulses. So it's not really that the perception "results from" the
electrical impulses. It's that you _are_ the electrical impulses. When I
look at another person's brain, the computer they are looking at looks
like electrical impulses to me. But it looks like a computer screen to
them because they _are_ those impulses. and those impulses are a
"computer screen" rather than a "mouse" because they are the output of a
perceptual function that computes "computer screen".

A least, that's my take on it.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
MindReadings.com
10459 Holman Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Tel: 310-474-0313
E-mail: marken@mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0907.1505)]

Rick Marken (2001.09.07.1015)

Yes, sort of. I believe that what we see results from the fact that we
_are_ (in part) the neurons carrying these signals. I think that the
computer screen I see now is just what the electrical output of a
particular perceptual function "look like" when you _are_ those
impulses. So it's not really that the perception "results from" the
electrical impulses. It's that you _are_ the electrical impulses. When I
look at another person's brain, the computer they are looking at looks
like electrical impulses to me. But it looks like a computer screen to
them because they _are_ those impulses. and those impulses are a
"computer screen" rather than a "mouse" because they are the output of a
perceptual function that computes "computer screen".

I think I understand your position, but I am not persuaded that I "am"
those electrical impulses. Or to be more accurate, I am not sure exactly
how I am those electrical impulses. Nevertheless, this is metaphysics, and
metaphysics should never be discussed without a drink in your hand....