Powers and Friston (was The missionary and the Scientist (was WIRED:...))

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.09.17.14]

[Rick Marken 2019-01-09_10:39:27]

  I think I now understand the source of our misunderstanding, and

I can quite sympathize with what you say at the end of your
message. So I requote the last bit of your message here, before I
try to clarify a little according to my understanding of the free
energy principle.

          RM:

The thing I liked about Powers theoretical work from the
start was that it was always tied to experimental
demonstrations of the phenomena to be explained. There was
no hand-waving or attempts to impress with mathematics
heavy laden with Greek symbols. It was always clear how
the math related to the phenomena to be explained and the
math itself was always presented clearly, like Bill
actually wanted you to understand it.

  I do so agree. But I think you are a bit unfair to Friston when

you say…

          Friston's

approach would have impressed me when I was a grad
student. But I can now tell when math is being used to
make an impression rather than provide understanding. And
I am not impressed by Friston’s free energy principle and
lovely mathematics.

  I don't think that's what Friston does. The problem, I think, is

that different people have their perceptual functions differently
developed. If you are used to controlling perceptions of
equations, it is natural to communicate through equations. If you
are not, you do not see the equation. You see a bunch of symbols,
some of them Greek, some representing functions that mean nothing
to you, but you don’t see any higher-level variable. If you see a
bunch of Arabic or Tamil text, you don’t see any words, and you
don’t get any sense out of the sequencing of the funny symbols,
but if you see English text written in Roman alphabetic symbols,
you don’t really see the symbols or perhaps even the words. You
see the meaning of what is written.
When I was an undergraduate Engineering Physicist and for several
years thereafter, I could look at an expression for, say, a
Fourier Transform or a Laplace Transform and see in my mind a
dynamic visual picture of a scene in which properties changed in a
coordinated fashion according to the equation. I can’t do that
anymore, because it is a long time since I ever controlled any
such perceptions and the perceptual functions seem to have
corroded away with age. But at the time, it was as natural to
communicate to myself or to others through the language of
equations and time-space transforms as through English text. I
don’t read Chinese, and you don’t read maths. But then I don’t
disparage those who communicate in Chinese.

Now let’s see if I can help with the rest of your comments.

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.08.23.09]

                      MT: Friston's insight doesn't ignore a fact

at the core of PCT, rather, it uses a fact
that PCT ignores.

                  RM: What is Friston's insight? What is the fact

that Friston’s insight uses that PCT ignores? What
data does Friston’s theory explain that PCT
doesn’t?Â

            MT: That has been explained in the WIRED thread, and if

that is insufficient for you, you can look it up in
Wikipedia or in Friston’s writings.

      RM: The closest I get to anything that sounds like PCT from

the wiki is that the free energy principle says that a system
“t ries to
minimize the difference between its model of the world and the perception  of its
sensors”. But things kind of goes off the rails when it says
that the difference between perception and world model is " minimized by
constantly updating the world model". This seems analogous
to PCT saying that an error signal is reduced by changing
the reference for the perception.

  I don't interpret it that way. I understand this version of

“world model” to to be represented not only in the current values
of perceptions but also in the perceptual and output functions in
the hierarchy. I don’t see it as applying to reference values,
except inasmuch as disturbances to perceptions at level N are
opposed by altering reference values sent down to level N-1
control units.

        This is

a way to “control” the error, keeping it at 0, but it
certainly isn’t a way to control perception. Perception
would actually just be causing the world-model to match it.
Doesn’t seem very PCT like to me.

  No, your interpretation doesn't seem at all like PCT. Mine does.

If you interpret “updating the world model” as “reorganizing the
functions and connecting weights in the control hierarchy” as well
as reducing current error values, then it sounds more like PCT. I
don’t think that’s a stretch at all. Something that long bothered
me about reorganization was time-scale, ever since you and Bill
did that experiment in which you switched the sign of the
environmental feedback function, and used the word
“reorganization” to describe the rapid switch the subject made to
keep tracking effectively.

  Reorganization, or at least its time scale and its modularity,

have never been satisfactorily described. It was a problem Bill
was addressing right to the end. In Friston’s approach, it happens
concurrently with what we would call on-line control. There is no
“now I am reorganizing” phase that alternates with a “now I am
controlling” phase. In both ways of looking at what I believe to
be the same phenomenon, reorganization happens along with control.
Well, so does any version of reorganization that I have
encountered. I think reorganization happens early and quickly at
low levels in both approaches, to produce stabilities (things
unlikely to create surprise) on which further stabilities can rely
– building ever higher levels in either hierarchy.

        RM: The

only thing I see that might be considered a “fact” that PCT
ignores is that biological systems " maintain their
order ( non-equilibrium
steady-state
) by restricting themselves to a
limited number of states." I can’t find anything in the
article that gives concrete examples of a
non-equilibrium steady state and how you measure it.

  Ah, for that you have to go back to a quite different

intellectual foundation. But here’s an example–the temperature
inside your fridge. It is maintained in a non-equilibrium steady
state (colder than its environment) by exporting entropy in an
energy flow powered by its motor. But if you recall, I did not say
that PCT ignored a “fact”. I said that the free energy approach
was based on an “insight” that is ignored in PCT, and vice-versa.

  I don't know how far back the concept of self-organizing

steady-state structures goes, but at least to 1927 in the work of
a meteorologist called Lewis Fry Richardson, who was interested in
how the atmospheric patterns interacted with each other at all
scales from hemispheric to sub-micron. The relevant concept is
captured in a little ditty of his: * Big whirls have little
whirls that feed on their velocity/Little whirls have littler
whirls and so on to viscosity* . But the real work began, I
think, with Ilya Prigogine in about 1947, who recognized that the
Second Law of Thermodynamics (about entropy always increasing)
holds only in a closed system, and that such systems cannot, in
principle, be observed in Nature. Living things most certainly are
not closed systems, but they are structures of interacting
non-equilibrium steady states conceptually related to Richardson’s
whirls.

  Control is one way in which these non-equilibrium steady states

continue to exist, at many levels of complexity and dynamism. To
maintain each controlled perception or environmental variable
takes work – energy – to avoid them being disturbed and even
disrupted by their environment. Kent McClelland has a lovely
passage about that in LCS IV. The business of exporting entropy in
a through energy flow goes back a lot further. One site that I
found by googling for “first refrigerator invented” goes back to
the 11th century for a discovery of how to do it, and has been
more or less continuously developed since around 1750. The cold
refrigerator “has” a lot of free energy in a warm environment, in
the sense that one could run a motor or something using the heat
difference between the inside and the outside.

          So I

don’t know how the free energy principle accounts for that
“fact”.

  I'm not sure which "fact" you refer to. But I think the

unfortunately animistic wording in the sentence you first quoted
– “t ries to
minimize” – might be seriously misleading. It’s like saying
that the refrigerator tries to get its inside warm. If you
unplug the refrigerator, its inside will indeed get warm over
time, but is it “trying to minimize” the difference between its
inside and its outside? Does a control loop “try to minimize”
the difference between its reference and perceptual values? No,
but as a consequence of basic physics, minimizing that
difference is what happens. The principle is the same.

    I think a

better way of putting it might be that the self-organizing
properties of feedback in a through
energy flow producing stabilities (low entropy regions)
accounts for Friston’s formulation of the free energy principle
(if he was the inventor). The “limited number of states”
intuitively comes from the fact that if you have an eddy centred
“here”, you can’t have a similarly sized one centred on a point
too close to “here” or the two eddies will merge into one.
Taking the eddies as analogues of perceptual functions (in
either PCT or Friston formulation), it says that you can’t have
two controlled perceptions that are too close to one another,
because if you did, whatever influences one will similarly
influence the other.

    If you look

closely enough into it, the same self-organizing property that
is introduced by any asymmetry in a sufficient energy flow can
account in exactly the same way for the “Minimize surprise”
free-energy hierarchy described by Seth and Friston in the paper
I linked and for the equivalent perceptual control hierarchy.
Even though Powers and Friston arrived at this structure from
very different intuitive starting points, constraints imposed by
the underlying physics is probably the reason they both came up
with structures that function identically. Convergent conceptual
evolution!

    Despite that,

it does seem to me that thinking of perceptual control and of
the purposes of organisms is likely to be more productive in the
long run. Maybe that’s just my bias, based on my relative
current fluency in the different languages of description.

    By the way,

the “insight” that I said PCT missed was that the laws of
non-equilibrium thermodynamics lead to what we see as the
control hierarchy, and the “insight” that Friston seems to miss
is that control of perception leads to what he sees as a
“surprise-reduction” hierarchy.

          Indeed, I don't see how the free energy principle connects

to any measurable aspect of the behavior of living things.

  No, that's a problem when you don't understand the language. I'm

not sure that my explanation will help you, because I may have
pitched it at too simple a level for the connections to be clear,
just as the use of equations and Greek symbols pitches it in a
language that is unintelligible to you at its root. I hope that
some glimmering might get through, though.

Martin

···
          RM:

The thing I liked about Powers theoretical work from the
start was that it was always tied to experimental
demonstrations of the phenomena to be explained. There was
no hand-waving or attempts to impress with mathematics
heavy laden with Greek symbols. It was always clear how
the math related to the phenomena to be explained and the
math itself was always presented clearly, like Bill
actually wanted you to understand it. Friston’s approach
would have impressed me when I was a grad student. But I
can now tell when math is being used to make an impression
rather than provide understanding. And I am not impressed
by Friston’s free energy principle and lovely mathematics.

rsm


Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
   Â
            --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2019-01-10_11:57:50]

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.09.17.14]

          RM:

The thing I liked about Powers theoretical work from the
start was that it was always tied to experimental
demonstrations of the phenomena to be explained. There was
no hand-waving or attempts to impress with mathematics
heavy laden with Greek symbols. It was always clear how
the math related to the phenomena to be explained and the
math itself was always presented clearly, like Bill
actually wanted you to understand it.

  MT: I do so agree. But I think you are a bit unfair to Friston when

you say…

          RM: Friston's

approach would have impressed me when I was a grad
student. But I can now tell when math is being used to
make an impression rather than provide understanding. And
I am not impressed by Friston’s free energy principle and
lovely mathematics.

  MT: I don't think that's what Friston does. The problem, I think, is

that different people have their perceptual functions differently
developed. If you are used to controlling perceptions of
equations, it is natural to communicate through equations.

RM: The problem, as I said in the paragraph above with which you so enthusiastically agreed, is that I can find no link between Friston’s theory and any data that the theory must have been developed to explain. If you know of any papers where Friston shows how his model explains data I’d be interested in seeing it. Otherwise I will remain unimpressed (and uninterested).Â

rsm

Â

···
  If you

are not, you do not see the equation. You see a bunch of symbols,
some of them Greek, some representing functions that mean nothing
to you, but you don’t see any higher-level variable. If you see a
bunch of Arabic or Tamil text, you don’t see any words, and you
don’t get any sense out of the sequencing of the funny symbols,
but if you see English text written in Roman alphabetic symbols,
you don’t really see the symbols or perhaps even the words. You
see the meaning of what is written.

  When I was an undergraduate Engineering Physicist and for several

years thereafter, I could look at an expression for, say, a
Fourier Transform or a Laplace Transform and see in my mind a
dynamic visual picture of a scene in which properties changed in a
coordinated fashion according to the equation. I can’t do that
anymore, because it is a long time since I ever controlled any
such perceptions and the perceptual functions seem to have
corroded away with age. But at the time, it was as natural to
communicate to myself or to others through the language of
equations and time-space transforms as through English text. I
don’t read Chinese, and you don’t read maths. But then I don’t
disparage those who communicate in Chinese.

Now let’s see if I can help with the rest of your comments.

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.08.23.09]

                      MT: Friston's insight doesn't ignore a fact

at the core of PCT, rather, it uses a fact
that PCT ignores.

                  RM: What is Friston's insight? What is the fact

that Friston’s insight uses that PCT ignores? What
data does Friston’s theory explain that PCT
doesn’t?Â

            MT: That has been explained in the WIRED thread, and if

that is insufficient for you, you can look it up in
Wikipedia or in Friston’s writings.

      RM: The closest I get to anything that sounds like PCT from

the wiki is that the free energy principle says that a system
“t ries to
minimize the difference between its model of the world and the perception  of its
sensors”. But things kind of goes off the rails when it says
that the difference between perception and world model is " minimized by
constantly updating the world model". This seems analogous
to PCT saying that an error signal is reduced by changing
the reference for the perception.

  I don't interpret it that way. I understand this version of

“world model” to to be represented not only in the current values
of perceptions but also in the perceptual and output functions in
the hierarchy. I don’t see it as applying to reference values,
except inasmuch as disturbances to perceptions at level N are
opposed by altering reference values sent down to level N-1
control units.

        This is

a way to “control” the error, keeping it at 0, but it
certainly isn’t a way to control perception. Perception
would actually just be causing the world-model to match it.
Doesn’t seem very PCT like to me.

  No, your interpretation doesn't seem at all like PCT. Mine does.

If you interpret “updating the world model” as “reorganizing the
functions and connecting weights in the control hierarchy” as well
as reducing current error values, then it sounds more like PCT. I
don’t think that’s a stretch at all. Something that long bothered
me about reorganization was time-scale, ever since you and Bill
did that experiment in which you switched the sign of the
environmental feedback function, and used the word
“reorganization” to describe the rapid switch the subject made to
keep tracking effectively.

  Reorganization, or at least its time scale and its modularity,

have never been satisfactorily described. It was a problem Bill
was addressing right to the end. In Friston’s approach, it happens
concurrently with what we would call on-line control. There is no
“now I am reorganizing” phase that alternates with a “now I am
controlling” phase. In both ways of looking at what I believe to
be the same phenomenon, reorganization happens along with control.
Well, so does any version of reorganization that I have
encountered. I think reorganization happens early and quickly at
low levels in both approaches, to produce stabilities (things
unlikely to create surprise) on which further stabilities can rely
– building ever higher levels in either hierarchy.

        RM: The

only thing I see that might be considered a “fact” that PCT
ignores is that biological systems " maintain their
order ( non-equilibrium
steady-state
) by restricting themselves to a
limited number of states." I can’t find anything in the
article that gives concrete examples of a
non-equilibrium steady state and how you measure it.

  Ah, for that you have to go back to a quite different

intellectual foundation. But here’s an example–the temperature
inside your fridge. It is maintained in a non-equilibrium steady
state (colder than its environment) by exporting entropy in an
energy flow powered by its motor. But if you recall, I did not say
that PCT ignored a “fact”. I said that the free energy approach
was based on an “insight” that is ignored in PCT, and vice-versa.

  I don't know how far back the concept of self-organizing

steady-state structures goes, but at least to 1927 in the work of
a meteorologist called Lewis Fry Richardson, who was interested in
how the atmospheric patterns interacted with each other at all
scales from hemispheric to sub-micron. The relevant concept is
captured in a little ditty of his: * Big whirls have little
whirls that feed on their velocity/Little whirls have littler
whirls and so on to viscosity* . But the real work began, I
think, with Ilya Prigogine in about 1947, who recognized that the
Second Law of Thermodynamics (about entropy always increasing)
holds only in a closed system, and that such systems cannot, in
principle, be observed in Nature. Living things most certainly are
not closed systems, but they are structures of interacting
non-equilibrium steady states conceptually related to Richardson’s
whirls.

  Control is one way in which these non-equilibrium steady states

continue to exist, at many levels of complexity and dynamism. To
maintain each controlled perception or environmental variable
takes work – energy – to avoid them being disturbed and even
disrupted by their environment. Kent McClelland has a lovely
passage about that in LCS IV. The business of exporting entropy in
a through energy flow goes back a lot further. One site that I
found by googling for “first refrigerator invented” goes back to
the 11th century for a discovery of how to do it, and has been
more or less continuously developed since around 1750. The cold
refrigerator “has” a lot of free energy in a warm environment, in
the sense that one could run a motor or something using the heat
difference between the inside and the outside.

          So I

don’t know how the free energy principle accounts for that
“fact”.

  I'm not sure which "fact" you refer to. But I think the

unfortunately animistic wording in the sentence you first quoted
– “t ries to
minimize” – might be seriously misleading. It’s like saying
that the refrigerator tries to get its inside warm. If you
unplug the refrigerator, its inside will indeed get warm over
time, but is it “trying to minimize” the difference between its
inside and its outside? Does a control loop “try to minimize”
the difference between its reference and perceptual values? No,
but as a consequence of basic physics, minimizing that
difference is what happens. The principle is the same.

    I think a

better way of putting it might be that the self-organizing
properties of feedback in a through
energy flow producing stabilities (low entropy regions)
accounts for Friston’s formulation of the free energy principle
(if he was the inventor). The “limited number of states”
intuitively comes from the fact that if you have an eddy centred
“here”, you can’t have a similarly sized one centred on a point
too close to “here” or the two eddies will merge into one.
Taking the eddies as analogues of perceptual functions (in
either PCT or Friston formulation), it says that you can’t have
two controlled perceptions that are too close to one another,
because if you did, whatever influences one will similarly
influence the other.

    If you look

closely enough into it, the same self-organizing property that
is introduced by any asymmetry in a sufficient energy flow can
account in exactly the same way for the “Minimize surprise”
free-energy hierarchy described by Seth and Friston in the paper
I linked and for the equivalent perceptual control hierarchy.
Even though Powers and Friston arrived at this structure from
very different intuitive starting points, constraints imposed by
the underlying physics is probably the reason they both came up
with structures that function identically. Convergent conceptual
evolution!

    Despite that,

it does seem to me that thinking of perceptual control and of
the purposes of organisms is likely to be more productive in the
long run. Maybe that’s just my bias, based on my relative
current fluency in the different languages of description.

    By the way,

the “insight” that I said PCT missed was that the laws of
non-equilibrium thermodynamics lead to what we see as the
control hierarchy, and the “insight” that Friston seems to miss
is that control of perception leads to what he sees as a
“surprise-reduction” hierarchy.

          Indeed, I don't see how the free energy principle connects

to any measurable aspect of the behavior of living things.

  No, that's a problem when you don't understand the language. I'm

not sure that my explanation will help you, because I may have
pitched it at too simple a level for the connections to be clear,
just as the use of equations and Greek symbols pitches it in a
language that is unintelligible to you at its root. I hope that
some glimmering might get through, though.

Martin

          RM:

The thing I liked about Powers theoretical work from the
start was that it was always tied to experimental
demonstrations of the phenomena to be explained. There was
no hand-waving or attempts to impress with mathematics
heavy laden with Greek symbols. It was always clear how
the math related to the phenomena to be explained and the
math itself was always presented clearly, like Bill
actually wanted you to understand it. Friston’s approach
would have impressed me when I was a grad student. But I
can now tell when math is being used to make an impression
rather than provide understanding. And I am not impressed
by Friston’s free energy principle and lovely mathematics.

rsm


Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
   Â
            --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.11.23.37]

···

[Rick Marken 2019-01-10_11:57:50]

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.09.17.14]

                  RM: The thing I liked about

Powers theoretical work from the start was that it
was always tied to experimental demonstrations of
the phenomena to be explained. There was no
hand-waving or attempts to impress with
mathematics heavy laden with Greek symbols. It was
always clear how the math related to the phenomena
to be explained and the math itself was always
presented clearly, like Bill actually wanted you
to understand it.

          MT: I do so agree. But I think you are a bit unfair to

Friston when you say…

                  RM: Friston's approach

would have impressed me when I was a grad student.
But I can now tell when math is being used to make
an impression rather than provide understanding.
And I am not impressed by Friston’s free energy
principle and lovely mathematics.

          MT: I don't think that's what Friston does. The problem, I

think, is that different people have their perceptual
functions differently developed. If you are used to
controlling perceptions of equations, it is natural to
communicate through equations.

        RM: The problem, as I said in the paragraph above with

which you so enthusiastically agreed, is that I can find no
link between Friston’s theory and any data that the theory
must have been developed to explain.If you know of any
papers where Friston shows how his model explains data I’d
be interested in seeing it.

  I wonder how hard you have looked for it. For myself, I never

looked for any until I read your comment, as I was interested only
in how such a different starting point resulted in the development
of what is functionally the same theorized circuitry as the Powers
perceptual control hierarchy. However, a quick google scholar scan
for papers with Friston as an author came up with a few, mostly in
the clinical or neural imagery areas. You can find them easily
enough if you want.

        Otherwise I will remain unimpressed (and

uninterested).

  I'm not controlling for you or anyone else to be impressed or

interested, but I am controlling for this list to be devoid of
comments along the lines of “I don’t understand X, so X must be
wrong” or “It isn’t PCT, so it must be wrong.” Your rejection of
Friston’s ideas seemed to fall into this class, but if you aren’t
interested in his work, that’s fine by me. When I wrote my little
tutorial [Martin Taylor 2019.01.09.17.14], I thought you were
interested. I apologise for wasting your time.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2019.01.12.1300)

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.11.23.37]

  MT:Â I'm not controlling for you or anyone else to be impressed or

interested, but I am controlling for this list to be devoid of
comments along the lines of “I don’t understand X, so X must be
wrong” or “It isn’t PCT, so it must be wrong.” Your rejection of
Friston’s ideas seemed to fall into this class,

RM: I rejected the idea that Friston’s ideas are similar in any important ways to PCT. I didn’t say Friston’s ideas were wrong. They may be the right way to explain something but it certainly doesn’t explain what PCT explains: purposeful behavior aka control.Â

  MT: but if you aren't

interested in his work, that’s fine by me.

RM: I’m not interested in Friston’s ideas only because they make no obvious contribution to understanding what I am interested in understanding: the controlling done by living systems. If someone could show me how Friston’s ideas can explain, say, how a fielder controls for catching a fly ball, then I would certainly be interested.

Best

Rick

Â

···
  When I wrote my little

tutorial [Martin Taylor 2019.01.09.17.14], I thought you were
interested. I apologise for wasting your time.


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.15]

I don't know whether his theory would do that, and I get the

impression that it’s not the kind of problem that interests him. But
the MoL people might perhaps find more in common with his interests.
I don’t really care. What interests me is that so far as I can see, PCT implies the
free-energy principle, and the circuit he and Seth published does
exactly what the Powers hierarchy does, and a little more, in that
reference and error values at level N are available as separate
inputs to perceptual functions at level N+1. This being the case, if
I am correct, the Friston explanation for ball catching would
necessarily be the same as the PCT explanation. As with so much else, when there is more than one possible viewpoint

···

[From Rick Marken (2019.01.12.1300)

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.11.23.37]

            MT: I'm not controlling for you or anyone else to be

impressed or interested, but I am controlling for this
list to be devoid of comments along the lines of “I
don’t understand X, so X must be wrong” or “It isn’t
PCT, so it must be wrong.” Your rejection of Friston’s
ideas seemed to fall into this class,

        RM: I rejected the idea that Friston's ideas are similar

in any important ways to PCT. I didn’t say Friston’s ideas
were wrong. They may be the right way to explain something
but it certainly doesn’t explain what PCT explains:
purposeful behavior aka control.

            MT: but if you aren't interested in his work, that's

fine by me.

        RM: I'm not interested in Friston's ideas only because

they make no obvious contribution to understanding what I am
interested in understanding: the controlling done by living
systems. If someone could show me how Friston’s ideas can
explain, say, how a fielder controls for catching a fly
ball, then I would certainly be interested.

Martin, Rick

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Saturday, January 12, 2019 10:05 PM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Powers and Friston (was The missionary and the Scientist (was WIRED:…))

[From Rick Marken (2019.01.12.1300)

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.11.23.37]

MT: I’m not controlling for you or anyone else to be impressed or interested, but I am controlling for this list to be devoid of comments along the lines of “I don’t understand X, so X must be wrong” or “It isn’t PCT, so it must be wrong.” Your rejection of Friston’s ideas seemed to fall into this class,

RM: I rejected the idea that Friston’s ideas are similar in any important ways to PCT. I didn’t say Friston’s ideas were wrong. They may be the right way to explain something but it certainly doesn’t explain what PCT explains: purposeful behavior aka control.

HB : PCT explains “Purposeful behavior” and control in Living organisms as mechanism for purposefull behavior. Purposes are inside organism not outside. Behavior is purposeful because inside purpose (goal, reference) is driving behavior not because behavior is oriented to goals outside like : I want to go to New York - the goal of my trip. That’s Carver’s purposefull behavior. As the goals (referecne points) are outside, perception in Carvers theory is used for “monitoring” that behavior is properly controlled toward outside goals. It’s common psychological logic, which you Rick show incredibly good. Well as I said before. Friston has a little better thinking about “Control of perception” as you do.

MT: but if you aren’t interested in his work, that’s fine by me.

RM: I’m not interested in Friston’s ideas only because they make no obvious contribution to understanding what I am interested in understanding: the controlling done by living systems.

HB : And what exactly are you interested in controlling done by living systems ? What is control done by organisms ? Controlling "controlling “controlled variable” with control of behavior and produce “Controlled Perceptual Variable” or CPV ???

RM : If someone could show me how Friston’s ideas can explain, say, how a fielder controls for catching a fly ball, then I would certainly be interested.

HB : Fielder is not catching the ball with continuous observing and “calculating vertical and horizontal whatever” in 2-dimensions. It’s quite common knowledge that people perceive space in 3-dimensions. You don’t need spreadsheet to complicate things. It’s just understanding of PCT that you need. And Friston can help you understand that with aknowledging that “Behavior is not controlled” but “Perception is”. And beside that you have to understand as he does that “random actions” are not “controlled actions” as the result of “Control of perception”.

Fielder is setting the goal (references) for catching the ball and realize goal through control loop with minimizing the “error” to where estimation is made that ball will fall. No need for complications. Friston would problably tell you the same thing : Fielder would reduce the gulf between his expectations and his sensory inputs (flight of the ball in 3 dimensional space).

Boris

Best

Rick

When I wrote my little tutorial [Martin Taylor 2019.01.09.17.14], I thought you were interested. I apologise for wasting your time.

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Martin

···

From: Martin Taylor (mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2019 5:24 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Powers and Friston (was The missionary and the Scientist (was WIRED:…))

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.15]

[From Rick Marken (2019.01.12.1300)

[Martin Taylor 2019.01.11.23.37]

MT: I’m not controlling for you or anyone else to be impressed or interested, but I am controlling for this list to be devoid of comments along the lines of “I don’t understand X, so X must be wrong” or “It isn’t PCT, so it must be wrong.” Your rejection of Friston’s ideas seemed to fall into this class,

RM: I rejected the idea that Friston’s ideas are similar in any important ways to PCT. I didn’t say Friston’s ideas were wrong. They may be the right way to explain something but it certainly doesn’t explain what PCT explains: purposeful behavior aka control.

MT: but if you aren’t interested in his work, that’s fine by me.

RM: I’m not interested in Friston’s ideas only because they make no obvious contribution to understanding what I am interested in understanding: the controlling done by living systems. If someone could show me how Friston’s ideas can explain, say, how a fielder controls for catching a fly ball, then I would certainly be interested.

MT : I don’t know whether his theory would do that, and I get the impression that it’s not the kind of problem that interests him. But the MoL people might perhaps find more in common with his interests. I don’t really care.

MT : What interests me is that so far as I can see, PCT implies the free-energy principle, and the circuit he and Seth published does exactly what the Powers hierarchy does,

HB : I’m interested to “hear” how you see that ?

MT : …and a little more, in that reference and error values at level N are available as separate inputs to perceptual functions at level N+1.

HB : So if I understand right "references"and “error” goes up a hierarchy ?

HB : If the similarity is so high I somehow doubt that they could come to the same conclussions in separate ways although nervous system function in the same way for both of them. Bill wrote the sketch of the theory in 1960 and the main work in 1973. Friston was born in that time or he was a little child with no knowledge that “Perception could be controlled” and so on. Do we know when exactly Fristons’ theory was born ?

I still don’t understand why he didn’t want to talk to you and Warren as representative of PCT. Was he afraid to tell too much ?

I’m really interested where did “Control of perception” came into Fristons theory and hierarchy and how’s that that he is describing the hierarchy in the same way as Bill and more. Bills’ idea is unique and authors protected. Did Friston ever mentioned Bill as reference ?

This look quite suspicious beacuse Friston is hiding behind mathematics if I understood right. Nobody understand him iether. Strange ?

MT : This being the case, if I am correct, the Friston explanation for ball catching would necessarily be the same as the PCT explanation.

HB : I bet too. So everything looks like even more suspisious to me.

MT : As with so much else, when there is more than one possible viewpoint on something complex, it is often more useful to take one, sometimes the other, and sometimes both together. It’s like treating a waveform sometimes as a time series, sometimes as a frequency spectrum, and sometimes as a short-time spectrum that has aspects of both time series and spectrum. Just as the Powers hierarchy says: multiple means to the same end. To control a perception of yourself being at another place, you might walk, bicycle, drive, take a bus, or do some of each.

HB : Well I’m really interested to hear how “Control of Perception” and hierarchy were extracted from “free energy principle” ??? I have no problems understanding Bills logic and evidences. Friston as neurophysiologist could simply transform his formulas into physiological language, which much more people would understand and it can be used in practice. Why he don’t do this ?

Boris

Martin