Purpose

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0520.1321)]

Kenny Kitzke (2003.05.20]

You are probably aware that I believe that a more complete understanding
of human nature requires more "self-purpose" articulation than what
current PCT/HPCT has proposed or demonstrated with its models.

According to my understanding of HPCT, the levels of perception exist to
maintain intrinsic variables at their reference levels. In this case a "belief
in god" exists to keep some set of IVs at their reference levels. From what I
understand of your view, there is at least one intrinsic variable associated
with "self-purpose." This IV is markedly different from what we ususally think
of as an IV, e.g., level on carbon dioxide in the blood stream. Presumably it
did not result from evolution, but was added by divine intervention. The
challenge is to find this mechanism and demonstrate that it is not the product
of evolution. When this barrier is successfully hurdled, adding an appropriate
level to the hierarchy whould seem to me to be pretty straight forward.

[Marc_Abrams1]

from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.20.1333) ]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.20.0830)]

If you really don't want to sell it then what's all the commotion about?

Got me?

> I simply believe that PCT is very important to researchers who are

interested

> in understanding how "homeostasis" works and how human minds work.

Wonderful. That's what I believe, too. So why are you so upset at me?

I am not upset with you or Bill. I am trying to have meaningful
conversations on the net. When those break down, "learning" ends, and the
flaming and attacks begin. I am not singleing you and Bill out. It happens
to us all. I would like to think that we can work toward reducing the
frequency and intensity of these negative events. I am trying hard to
"learn" a different way of doing something. I am not satisfied with the
level of communications _I_ have on CSGnet.

> Both of you have demonized "sales". To both of you it is a dirty word.

I think it's the effort to sell a scientific theory which was being

objected to. I

have nothing against sales per se. I think it can be a useful component of

commerce.

You have contradicted yourself here. You say you have nothing against sales
per se yet in the previous sentence you say you think it's the effort to
sell a scientific theory which is being objected to. Can you please clarify
your statement. I am confused.

> >Teaching is not like pouring wine into bottles.
> > In teaching, the bottles have to _want_ to get filled and they have
> > to put in a lot of effort to get filled with wine instead of vinegar.
>
> To use your analogy. What if someone were interested in soda instead of
> wine? Would you go out and get the soda or simply tell someone you only

have

> wine.

The latter. I am assuming that PCT is the wine.

Yes, that is the difference between you and I. Bill expressed similar
sentiments in a post after this one.

> What kind of "capabilities" are required to learn PCT?

The ability to reason logically. The ability to do basic mathematics

and/or

computer modeling. The ability to maintain an open but critical attitude

toward

information. Some basic knowledge of physics and physiology. The ability

(and

willingness) to carry out empirical tests of theoretical predictions.

What I have brought into question is not your integrity, or your honesty, or
your research. It is your willingness and ability to adhere to capability #2
above. You espouse a good game, but your theories-in-use ( a combination of
actions ) say that you do not really believe this. You simply want someone
to "prove" you wrong. That is all you are interested in. Nothing else
matters.

That remark shows no evidence that you understand that an action can be a
controlled variable and an action affecting another controlled variable at

the

same time.

To me it does. _EVERY_ single movement could be a controlled variable, in
fact every movement _is_ controlled. But some movements, when grouped
together are more significant then others with relation to conveying ideas
and meaning to others.

does not convince me that you have any idea what I'm talking about.

What would?

"Blame" suggests condemnation.

What does it suggest? That's how I read it. It is a demonization process
that takes the heat away from your efforts and places it squarely on the
shoulders of others. How have I misinterpreted this?

I don't blame people for not understanding PCT but
I do see them as being at least partly responsible for it.

The key word in this statement is "but". The word "but" negates the previous
statement and makes it meaningless. So the real question becomes, in my
mind, If people are only partly responsible, who is responsible for the
rest?, and if _you_ by some faint chance happen to be a part of that
responsibility, what part exactly is it? Aren't you even curious about the
answers to these questions?

As I said, I think Bill has been an incredibly generous teacher.

Yes he has. Maybe to generous. Being "kind" to people will not get Bill what
he wants. At least some of what he wants.

If, after a couple years learning PCT
from Bill, someone hasn't learned PCT, then I hold the person themselves

entirely responsible.

How do you come to this in light of your other statements above?

The same goes, even more emphatically, for acceptance of PCT.

I've never quite understood this. What does "accepting" PCT mean? How would
that effect my life or work? What is the significance? I don't believe there
is any.

I think whether or not a person accepts PCT is completely that person's
responsibility. I don't blame people if they don't accept PCT but I do

think they

are responsible for it.

Interesting use of the word "responsibility". Can you please elaborate on
what this means in this context?

The Test is not a guess. If you really believe that PCT is an important

topic for

researches to understand, don't you think it's important to communicate it
accurately?

Sure, "accuracy", like truth, is not always absolute. By this I mean that
sometimes somthing may be true and at times the very same thing might not
be. Such as an inference we might have about something.

The Test does involve guessing inasmuch as the Tester has to come up
with hypotheses (guesses) about the variables that might be under control.

So what you are testing is a "guess", not a "fact".

But these guesses are tested (via the Test) to see if they are _wrong_.

So are my questions when I ask someone to explain something to me.

A guess that can't be rejected by the Test is considered the controlled

variable.

You do mean a "guessed" control variable. Are you concerned with whether the
variable is "espoused" or the ones actually in use?
how do you determine the difference?

Marc

[Kenneth_Kitzke_Value]

[From Kenny Kitzke (2003.05.20.1806EDT)]

<Bruce Gregory (2003.0520.1306)>

<Do you think it is necessary to understand PCT in

order to use, and to benefit from MOL?>

I do not think it is necessary for a conflicted Subject to understand PCT to have the MOL work in resolving an internal conflict, even one that has not been resolved by any other attempted method. But, I think it helps the Subject if they have an overview understanding of what takes place in a MOL session so they can be honest about their perceptions when responding.

The MOL Facilitator probably needs at least a general understanding of HPCT to do a reasonable job of conducting an effective MOL session with a Subject.

<I ask this because from what I know

about MOL its connection to PCT seems tenuous.>

I don’t think the connection is tenuous, at least in regard to the Facilitator’s role. Does my answer make sense to you now? Why would it seem tenuous to you that there would be a connection? Have you ever been part of an MOL session as a Subject or Facilitator?

I do suspect that other methods of conflict resolution, called by different names and using different steps, could also resolve conflicts without either the Facilitator or Subject knowing anything about PCT or HPCT. But, the concept of rising above the clash of desires where the conflict resides, may well be present in a way similar to how it is theorized to work in MOL. I think Einstein made similar claims on how to resolve conflicting desires or ideas though to my knowledge he was unfamiliar with B:CP, PCT or MOL.

<Do you find that your consulting practice requires you to explicitly discuss

PCT with your clients?>

Again, I think it is possible for me to use PCT/HPCT understandings to facilitate desired results for a client without ever explaining why my consulting is getting them better desired results than other methods they have tried.

I am rather surprised how few client executives want to understand how the result was obtained. They just seem happy to have the problem resolved and that I was willing to help them. With few exceptions, the mention of psychology or understanding the behavior of people, is a variable they do not seem to want to control. Their eyes almost glaze over. Mention saving money or reducing management hassle, and their eyes grow wider again.

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0520.1854)]

Kenny Kitzke (2003.05.20.1806EDT)]

I don't think the connection is tenuous, at least in regard to the
Facilitator's role. Does my answer make sense to you now? Why would it
seem tenuous to you that there would be a connection? Have you ever
been part of an MOL session as a Subject or Facilitator?

No, but I've greatly benefited from marriage counseling so I know the
value of a first rate facilitator.

Thanks for the post. I found it very helpful.

···

--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.

www.joincanadanow.org

[Kenneth_Kitzke_Value]

[From Kenny Kitzke (2003.05.20.1845EDT)]

<Bruce Gregory (2003.0520.1321)>

You are probably aware that I believe that a more complete understanding

of human nature requires more “self-purpose” articulation than what

current PCT/HPCT has proposed or demonstrated with its models.

<According to my understanding of HPCT, the levels of perception exist to

maintain intrinsic variables at their reference levels.>

I find the term “intrinsic” to be rather fuzzy. Perhaps Ashby or Powers find it clear enough to be useful in describing the essential “state of an organism” along with some imagined system of reorganization that controls “intrinsic” variables. If they are essential and universal in human genetics, we ought to be able to make and agree upon a pretty comprehensive and testable list of them.

Do you have such a list of intrinsic variables that describe the physiological state of all human beings?

<In this case a “belief in god” exists to keep some set of IVs at their reference levels.>

And, then, a non-belief in God, would also exist to keep the same, or a different, set of IV’s at their reference levels? Please add some of your understanding and whether it completely conforms to HPCT as envisioned by Powers.

<From what I understand of your view, there is at least one intrinsic variable

associated with “self-purpose.”>

I view my self-purpose to be a collection of system level variables and references along with intrinsic/inherited desires unique to human beings which I strive to perceive in my own behavior. I do not view self-purpose behavior as something separate from normal control of hierarchal perceptions as in some theoretical “reorganization system.”

<This IV is markedly different from what we ususally think

of as an IV, e.g., level on carbon dioxide in the blood stream.>

Agree. And, a belief in God, or a desire to understand how behavior works, are not essential for life. But, they may be essential for ones life’s purpose.

<Presumably it did not result from evolution, but was added by divine intervention. The challenge is to find this mechanism and demonstrate that it is not the product of evolution. When this barrier is successfully hurdled, adding an appropriate level to the hierarchy whould seem to me to be pretty straight forward.>

My perception is that the majority of scientists in many fields have concluded that Darwinian espoused evolution is rather inconsistent with evidence. But, this specific area of imagination of a God, or chance, is not the essence of my perception of the incompleteness of HPCT.

It is with adequately explaining the nature of human beings that have longings and desires not in the animal world that are not learned or satisfactorily explained for me by a random and mysterious, non-tangible, physiological system that somehow acts to reorganize our hierarchy of reference perceptions to somehow control equally hard to document “intrinsic” variables.

If you can fill in my knowledge (teach me) about where self-purpose fits in within the proposed hierarchy, or how some “reorganization system” outside our hierarchy but somewhere within us, would overwhelm our minds and comparators, I would be most appreciative. I am open-minded and a willing learner, or at least have that purpose residing somewhere within myself where I would act to control for it.

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0521.0643)]

Kenny Kitzke (2003.05.20.1845EDT)

<Bruce Gregory (2003.0520.1321)>

> You are probably aware that I believe that a more complete understanding
> of human nature requires more "self-purpose" articulation than what
> current PCT/HPCT has proposed or demonstrated with its models.

<According to my understanding of HPCT, the levels of perception exist to
maintain intrinsic variables at their reference levels.>

I find the term "intrinsic" to be rather fuzzy. Perhaps Ashby or Powers
find it clear enough to be useful in describing the essential "state of
an organism" along with some imagined system of reorganization that
controls "intrinsic" variables. If they are essential and universal in
human genetics, we ought to be able to make and agree upon a pretty
comprehensive and testable list of them.

Do you have such a list of intrinsic variables that describe the
physiological state of all human beings?

I would think any recent text on human physiology would be an excellent
place to start.

<In this case a "belief in god" exists to keep some set of IVs at their
reference levels.>

And, then, a non-belief in God, would also exist to keep the same, or a
different, set of IV's at their reference levels?

Yes.

Please add some of

your understanding and whether it completely conforms to HPCT as
envisioned by Powers.

Nothing much to add. In my understanding of Powers this completely
conforms to his views of HPCT.

<From what I understand of your view, there is at least one intrinsic
variable
associated with "self-purpose.">

I view my self-purpose to be a collection of system level variables and
references along with intrinsic/inherited desires unique to human beings
which I strive to perceive in my own behavior. I do not view
self-purpose behavior as something separate from normal control of
hierarchal perceptions

Since I seem to lack these intrinsic/inherited desires unique to human
beings I can't comment usefully on this topic. In my case , my desires
seem to be those I share with most mammals and particularly, primates.

as in some theoretical "reorganization system."

The reorganization system as I understand it is a mechanism that allows
the hierarchy to adapt. I don't think it is any more or less theoretical
than the hierarchy itself.

<This IV is markedly different from what we ususally think
of as an IV, e.g., level on carbon dioxide in the blood stream.>

Agree. And, a belief in God, or a desire to understand how behavior
works, are not essential for life. But, they may be essential for ones
life's purpose.

Again, I lack intrinsic variables that I would label "life's purpose".
I, of course, have purposes, but they serve the intrinsic physiological
variables, at least as far as I can tell.

<Presumably it did not result from evolution, but was added by divine
intervention. The challenge is to find this mechanism and demonstrate
that it is not the product of evolution. When this barrier is
successfully hurdled, adding an appropriate level to the hierarchy
whould seem to me to be pretty straight forward.>

My perception is that the majority of scientists in many fields have
concluded that Darwinian espoused evolution is rather inconsistent with
evidence.

This is completely inconsistent with my experience. I have heard of a
handful of biologists who seem to feel this way, but none that I know
personally. I doubt one could find a scientist on the faculty of Harvard
who feels this way, for example. I know nothing of scientists on the
staffs of religious colleges, who may feel differently. By and large
they must keep their opinions to themselves, or at least do not publish
them in the peer-reviewed literature.

But, this specific area of imagination of a God, or chance,

is not the essence of my perception of the incompleteness of HPCT.

It is with adequately explaining the nature of human beings that have
longings and desires not in the animal world that are not learned or
satisfactorily explained for me by a random and mysterious,
non-tangible, physiological system that somehow acts to reorganize our
hierarchy of reference perceptions to somehow control equally hard to
document "intrinsic" variables.

Since I seem to lack this component of human nature I cannot usefully
comment.

If you can fill in my knowledge (teach me) about where self-purpose fits
in within the proposed hierarchy, or how some "reorganization system"
outside our hierarchy but somewhere within us, would overwhelm our minds
and comparators, I would be most appreciative. I am open-minded and a
willing learner, or at least have that purpose residing somewhere within
myself where I would act to control for it.

If you can recall learning to ride a bicycle, I think you will have a
good example of the reorganization system at work. I don't think you
would say that the process overwhelmed your mind and your comparators,
but then again you might. Self-purpose, I would think, is a system level
perception that functions in exactly the same way as other system level
perceptions (in my case "let the evidence decide") to maintain intrinsic
variables at their reference levels. How do you think it is different?

···

--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.

www.joincanadanow.org

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.21.1010)]

Kenny Kitzke (2003.05.21.0935)–
I am surprised you
would not see the reorganization system as more theoretical than the hierarchy.
There are numerous experiments and models that demonstrate and support
the theory of levels of controlled perceptions. I am not aware of
any that have been done for the reorganization system.
See Robertson, RJ and Glines, LA (1985) The phantom plateau returns. Perceptual
and Motor Skills, 61, 55- 64. Excellent demonstration of reorganization
in action.
Best regards

Rick

···

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Senior Behavioral Scientist

The RAND Corporation

PO Box 2138

1700 Main Street

Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971

Fax: 310-451-7018

E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Kenneth_Kitzke_Value]

[From Kenny Kitzke (2003.05.21.0935)]

<Bruce Gregory (2003.0521.0643)>

Do you have such a list of intrinsic variables that describe the

physiological state of all human beings?

<I would think any recent text on human physiology would be an excellent

place to start.>

I take it that you don’t have such a list, or are unwilling to share it with me? I am certainly not going to try to find a list in a text book which doesn’t define the “intrinsic” variables that an hypothesized “reorganization system” in HPCT mentions. I thought a man of your educational stature would be in position to answer of yourself.

<Since I seem to lack these intrinsic/inherited desires unique to human

beings I can’t comment usefully on this topic. In my case , my desires

seem to be those I share with most mammals and particularly, primates.>

I am not only perplexed by this statement, if true, I would feel very sorry for you. Has any non-human mammal or primate you know of desired to write a book about “Inventing Reality?” Where did your desire to do that come from? Was it inherited from a primate who to our best understanding never had nor acted upon such a desire themselves, yet somehow shared it with you? Just what was your purpose in writing this book? How did that purpose develop? How do you determine whether the variable you were controlling was “intrinsic” or simply part of the hierarchy? These are serious questions, and should be readily explainable within the context of HPCT if it accurately describes the nature of human beings. So, please expound and enlighten me about how you work, Bruce, and why you do what you do.

<The reorganization system as I understand it is a mechanism that allows

the hierarchy to adapt. I don’t think it is any more or less theoretical

than the hierarchy itself.>

Is it a model mechanism or a human mechanism? I am surprised you would not see the reorganization system as more theoretical than the hierarchy. There are numerous experiments and models that demonstrate and support the theory of levels of controlled perceptions. I am not aware of any that have been done for the reorganization system. Or, have I missed some that you have verified?

<Again, I lack intrinsic variables that I would label “life’s purpose”.

I, of course, have purposes, but they serve the intrinsic physiological

variables, at least as far as I can tell.>

Well, why not just tell me what your personal intrinsic physiological variables are and about the system in you that controls them? Surely, the textbooks you suggest I read would have already helped you construct them specifically for yourself, at least as far as you (or anyone) can tell.

<I doubt one could find a scientist on the faculty of Harvard

who feels this way, for example. I know nothing of scientists on the

staffs of religious colleges, who may feel differently. By and large

they must keep their opinions to themselves, or at least do not publish

them in the peer-reviewed literature.>

I don’t know anyone on the Harvard faculty period. I would be surprised if there is not one faculty member who sees intelligent design within humans that is inconsistent with chance evolution, and even in the origin of the universe where you have some expertise.

I do know a man from the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley named Dr. Phillip E. Johnson who is quite different from what your experience perceives. I have listened to him speak and talked with him about his public views of the perceived scientific fallacies in proclaimed “evolution” science.

Of course, I recognize that Johnson’s theories are just his speculations. Others on the staff of Berkeley speculate differently in supporting Darwinian evolution. [Not really that different from the reorganization system of Powers is a plausible speculation to some, or the Action Science of Argyris is plausible for others.] And, we have the fortunate ability to intake all their speculations and decide which ones we choose to believe as more credible and which ones we resist. Such differences of belief makes life interesting and can lead to conflict. It is fine when it remains intellectual conflict. It gets more “intrinsic” and unfortunate when it turns to physical conflict, up to and including murder and war. Hopefully, you and I can constrain ourselves to the intellectual part.

<If you can recall learning to ride a bicycle, I think you will have a

good example of the reorganization system at work.>

I do recall learning to ride a bicycle. I can’t verify that my speculated “reorganization system” acted to control any “intrinsic variable.” If this is a good example of your reorganization system at work, please tell me how it did this in your case.

<I don’t think you

would say that the process overwhelmed your mind and your comparators,

but then again you might.>

Yes, I would indeed. Seems to happen to me all the time. I know I should not drink alcohol according to my beliefs and system understanding of the consequences for a diabetic, but I occasionally have a self-purpose that sets those references aside. I don’t think that is reorganization according to HPCT. It may be that I just want more to be part of the toast to the bride and groom.

<Self-purpose, I would think, is a system level

perception that functions in exactly the same way as other system level

perceptions (in my case “let the evidence decide”) to maintain intrinsic

variables at their reference levels. How do you think it is different?>

I think this is inconsistent with HPCT. I have belief and system references for drinking or not drinking alcohol. My human spirit considers which I want to control for when it comes time to toast the bride and groom. This is not done at the system level of awareness and control but above the system level and it is not done randomly in my experience. What about your experience for such conflicting system choices?

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0521.1258)]

Kenny Kitzke (2003.05.21.0935)

<Bruce Gregory (2003.0521.0643)>

> Do you have such a list of intrinsic variables that describe the
> physiological state of all human beings?

<I would think any recent text on human physiology would be an excellent
place to start.>

I take it that you don't have such a list, or are unwilling to share it
with me? I am certainly not going to try to find a list in a text book
which doesn't define the "intrinsic" variables that an hypothesized
"reorganization system" in HPCT mentions. I thought a man of your
educational stature would be in position to answer of yourself.

I'm sorry, but I have neither the time nor the inclination to teach you
elementary physiology. An intrinsic variable is any quantity, such as oxygen
in the blood stream, that the system regulates often without conscious
awareness. If you are really interested you will learn more, if not, you won't.

<Since I seem to lack these intrinsic/inherited desires unique to human
beings I can't comment usefully on this topic. In my case , my desires
seem to be those I share with most mammals and particularly, primates.>

I am not only perplexed by this statement, if true, I would feel very
sorry for you. Has any non-human mammal or primate you know of desired
to write a book about "Inventing Reality?" Where did your desire to do
that come from?

It was a higher level perception established by reorganization to satisfy
intrisic needs for status, approval and, no doubt, other social "goals."

Was it inherited from a primate who to our best
understanding never had nor acted upon such a desire themselves, yet
somehow shared it with you?

Probably not. As far as I know symbolic language is unique to human beings.
Neverthess we speak and write books to keep the same intrinsic variables at
desired reference levels. At least this is how I understand HPCT.

Just what was your purpose in writing this
book? How did that purpose develop? How do you determine whether the
variable you were controlling was "intrinsic" or simply part of the
hierarchy? These are serious questions, and should be readily
explainable within the context of HPCT if it accurately describes the
nature of human beings. So, please expound and enlighten me about how
you work, Bruce, and why you do what you do.

My life story would take too much time to develop right here. If I ever write
my autobiography, I promise to send you a copy.

<The reorganization system as I understand it is a mechanism that allows
the hierarchy to adapt. I don't think it is any more or less theoretical
than the hierarchy itself.>

Is it a model mechanism or a human mechanism?

It is a mechanism in the model that predicts how humans behave.

I am surprised you would
not see the reorganization system as more theoretical than the
hierarchy.

I'm full of surprises.

There are numerous experiments and models that demonstrate

and support the theory of levels of controlled perceptions.

Oh, can you site a few?

  I am not

aware of any that have been done for the reorganization system. Or,
have I missed some that you have verified?

All learning involves reorganization in the HPCT model. To the extent that I
have observed that learning occurs I have verified the existence of
reorganization.

<Again, I lack intrinsic variables that I would label "life's purpose".
I, of course, have purposes, but they serve the intrinsic physiological
variables, at least as far as I can tell.>

Well, why not just tell me what your personal intrinsic physiological
variables are and about the system in you that controls them? Surely,
the textbooks you suggest I read would have already helped you construct
them specifically for yourself, at least as far as you (or anyone) can tell.

The entire disciple of physiology deals with this question. I can no more
explain it to you than I can explain physics in a few well chosen words. it
takes time and effort to learn. I wish it were otherwise, but it is not.

<I doubt one could find a scientist on the faculty of Harvard
who feels this way, for example. I know nothing of scientists on the
staffs of religious colleges, who may feel differently. By and large
they must keep their opinions to themselves, or at least do not publish
them in the peer-reviewed literature.>

I don't know anyone on the Harvard faculty period. I would be surprised
if there is not one faculty member who sees intelligent design within
humans that is inconsistent with chance evolution, and even in the
origin of the universe where you have some expertise.

Well perhaps you will be surprised. I am talking about science faculty. I have
no idea what members of the Slavic Languages Department, for example, think
about quantum electrodynamics or about evolution.

I do know a man from the faculty of the University of California at
Berkeley named Dr. Phillip E. Johnson who is quite different from what
your experience perceives. I have listened to him speak and talked with
him about his public views of the perceived scientific fallacies in
proclaimed "evolution" science.

I believe Johnson is a lawyer. Lawyers have a very different approach than
scientists. They are advocates and free to ignore evidence that conflicts with
what they advocate and the emphasize evidence that supports it. As laywers
say, if the facts are with you argue the facts; if the facts are against you
argue the law.

Of course, I recognize that Johnson's theories are just his
speculations. Others on the staff of Berkeley speculate differently in
supporting Darwinian evolution. [Not really that different from the
reorganization system of Powers is a plausible speculation to some, or
the Action Science of Argyris is plausible for others.] And, we have
the fortunate ability to intake all their speculations and decide which
ones we choose to believe as more credible and which ones we resist.

If you think that science is nothing but speculation that you are free to
accept or deny than please excuse me if I avoid discussing science with you.

Such differences of belief makes life interesting and can lead to
conflict. It is fine when it remains intellectual conflict. It gets
more "intrinsic" and unfortunate when it turns to physical conflict, up
to and including murder and war. Hopefully, you and I can constrain
ourselves to the intellectual part.

<If you can recall learning to ride a bicycle, I think you will have a
good example of the reorganization system at work.>

I do recall learning to ride a bicycle. I can't verify that my
speculated "reorganization system" acted to control any "intrinsic
variable." If this is a good example of your reorganization system at
work, please tell me how it did this in your case.

I tried to keep the bike upright and moving the way I wanted it to. The system
kept trying until it hit on the correct organization. Needless to say I was
unaware of the details. Certainly they could be studied and might provide
valuable data on the speed with which reorganization takes lay at lower levels
of the system.

<I don't think you
would say that the process overwhelmed your mind and your comparators,
but then again you might.>

Yes, I would indeed. Seems to happen to me all the time.

My life is simpler than yours, I suspect.

I know I

should not drink alcohol according to my beliefs and system
understanding of the consequences for a diabetic, but I occasionally
have a self-purpose that sets those references aside. I don't think
that is reorganization according to HPCT.

Quite right. reorganization would occur if something upset and replaced your
'self-purpose.' A conversion on the road to Damascus, if you like.

  It may be that I just want

more to be part of the toast to the bride and groom.

<Self-purpose, I would think, is a system level
perception that functions in exactly the same way as other system level
perceptions (in my case "let the evidence decide") to maintain intrinsic
variables at their reference levels. How do you think it is different?>

I think this is inconsistent with HPCT.

We obviuosly have different understandings of HPCT.

  I have belief and system

references for drinking or not drinking alcohol. My human spirit
considers which I want to control for when it comes time to toast the
bride and groom.

I would say that a system level perception establishes the reference drinking
a toast to the bride and groom.

This is not done at the system level of awareness and

control but above the system level

What evidence leads you to make this claim? It certainly seems to be at the
system level (or lower) as I understand HPCT.

and it is not done randomly in my

experience.

No, there is nothing random abot the way system level perceptions control
lower level perceptions in HPCT.

What about your experience for such conflicting system choices?

I am not sure what you mean. Drinking and not drinking are not in my
understanding system level alternatives. You can make a rule that you will not
drink except under the following circumstances... But rules exist at the level
of programs, not system concepts. At least in my understanding of HPCT.

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2003.05.21 16:40 EDT)]

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.16.1347 MDT)]

The point of experimental science
is not to prove that your belief or proposal is valid. It's to show that
despite a sincere and thorough attempt to invalidate it under circumstances
where it could be wrong, you still can't prove it's wrong, and so are
forced to accept it for a while longer. This sounds awfully noble, but
after a person has used this approach for a while, it becomes second nature
to greet any new idea by looking for a test that would show it's wrong, if
it is wrong. That's basically what an experiment is: an attempt to prove
some idea wrong. Especially one's own idea. PCT experiments are set up
almost without thinking so that if the normal assumptions don't hold true
this time, the experiment will immediately show an anomalous result. We
check the reference level because once in a while, the person doing that
task turns out to be trying to do something very different, so the
experiment fails. If we didn't check the reference level (and other things)
we might never realize that this person was not doing the same task that
all the other subjects were doing.

The rhetoric of science popularization is almost always confused on this point. In the public media, experimenters are described as having set out to prove that some theory or some hypothesis was true, and announcing their success. In that view, you use the theory to predict something, and then you demonstrate that the prediction is true.

In this popular view, for example, Einstein used his theory of relativity to calculate perihelion shift of Mercury differently than other theories, and subsequent occultation of a star by mercury (observable only during a total eclipse) confirmed his prediction. But turning that around, Einstein was exposing what proponents of other theories would say was a vulnerability of relativity. Relativity predicts that gravity bends space, that therefore light follows the bend in space, and if you look past a massive object at a star its apparent image will be displaced with respect to the center of that mass, as though it had gone through the edge of a lens. According to established views, these were preposterous ideas -- Bent space and a gravity lens! What will this young Albert think of next!

So you look for something that contradicts normal expectations in the field, which your theory predicts, hang it out there in public as a potential show-stopper for your theory, and let nature decide. The point being not to prove your point, but to find out what gives. Whatever it is.

         /Bruce Nevin

···

At 04:59 PM 5/16/2003, Bill Powers wrote:

[Bruce_Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (960910.0845 EST)]

Bill Powers (960909.1945 MDT) --

Simon says

When we think of a clock, for example, in terms of purpose, we may use the
child's definition: "a clock is to tell time."

This is actually a shorthand; it's a way of omitting the person whose
purpose is being discussed. Stated in full, the sentence is "a clock is for
someone who wants to know the time to see what the time is." By talking
about the clock without mentioning the person, however, it's possible to
give the impression that clocks "have" a purpose independent of any person.

Exactly so, but I hasten to add that Simon is not guilty of this: he is
speaking of artifacts: (usually) objects produced to serve _human_ purposes:

  The thesis is that certain phenomena are "artificial" in a very specific
  sense: They are as they are because of a system's being molded, by goals
  or purposes, to the environment in which it lives. [Simon, 1969, p. ix]

He is thus perfectly at liberty to talk about the clock whose (human)
purpose is "to tell time." That the same clock can serve other human
purposes (and even serve them simultaneously, as when the clock serves not
only to tell time, but the decorate the mantle) simply means that it has
characteristics that suit it to those other purposes. If the clock is to
serve those purposes, its characteristics must be selected to meet certain
requirements imposed by the environment (which includes the human observer):
to serve as a mantle clock, the clock must be neither too large to fit on
the mantle and be supported by it, nor too ugly to be displayed in such a way.

The reason Simon is dealing with purpose in this way is that he is speaking
to a group of engineers and engineering students (at MIT) about the process
of design. When we undertake to design something, we have a purpose (or
perhaps several purposes) in mind for that something; the resulting
something we design is, according to Simon's definition, an artifact.

So, too, Simon notes, are living things, whose features have been selected
over the long course of evolution to serve certain purposes in the life of
the organism.

Simon is arguing in this little book that such "artifacts," though obeying
the usual natural laws, have characteristics that set them apart from things
that are not artifacts; as such, there can exist branches of enquiry and
knowledge about artifacts: the "sciences of the artificial."

Now this is me talking: Control systems, whether designed by engineers or
found in living organisms, meet Simon's definition of the artifact. As
such, what is true _in general_ of artifacts will be true of control systems.

Regards,

Bruce

[Richard_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (960910.0830)]

Bruce Abbott (960910.0845 EST)--

he [Simon] is speaking of artifacts: (usually) objects produced to
serve _human_ purposes:

The thesis is that certain phenomena are "artificial" in a very specific
sense: They are as they are because of a system's being molded, by goals
or purposes, to the environment in which it lives. [Simon, 1969, p. ix]

I find this statement confusing. I think my confusion turns mainly on the
referent of "system". Does "system" refer to the agent that is responsible
for the fact that the "artificial" phenomena (artifacts) "are as the are"? If
so, then Simon is saying that artifacts exist because this agent (system) is
molded, by goals and purposes (where are they?), to the environment. The
artifacts themselves are not molded to serve a purpose; the artifacts exist
because the fashioning agent (system) was molded to fit the environment. This
doesn't sound like PCT to me; it sounds more like complete nonsense.

On the other hand, the "system" Simon speaks of might be the artifact itself.
In this case, the phrase "...because of a system's being molded" must be a
grammatical error; Simon must have meant to say "...because the system is
molded". Of course, he would also have to change the phrase "...to the
environment in which it lives" into "...to suit the inner purposes of the
agent making the artifact". With these small changes, I can see that Simon's
concept of an artifact is perfectly consistent with the PCT concept of a
controlled variable: "artifacts (systems) are as they are because they are
molded to suit the inner purposes [reference signals] of the agent making the
artifacts".

You're right. Simon's "Sciences of the Artificial" clearly anticipates
"Behavior: The control of perception". I suppose he just had to say things
the way he did so that people wouldn't ignore him the way they ignore us.
But I guess you would expect that kind of cleverness from a Nobel laureate;-)

Best

Rick

[Bruce_Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (960910.1400 EST)]

The design engineer, to paraphrase, has a purpose in mind which is made
easier to achieve by using the device that's being designed. So the designer
X of the artifact Y shapes the features of Y to serve X's purposes. I note
that in many cases, "selection" is as good a term as "design," as when a
primitive person selects a rock with a sharp edge to serve the person's
purpose of cutting things, or a modern person selects a TV program to watch.

You also say that some X selects the features Y of living systems to serve
certain purposes in the life of the living system Y. The assertion of an X
is disguised by changing to the passive voice (the features "have been
selected"), so the selector is not mentioned (Skinner used this method a
lot). But is that a parallel analogy? If X designs or selects features of Y,
is it not the purposes of X that are served rather than the purposes of Y?
It isn't that which is designed or selected (the artifact or the living
system) which has purposes that are served; it is the designer or selector
whose purposes are served. So what is this, a proof of the existence of God?
An attribution of purposiveness to natural selection?

No, no, no, no, you miss the point. Simon is not making the Argument from
Design. Natural selection does not involve a Natural Selector, i.e., Mother
Nature or God, as you well know (and that fact necessitates the passive
voice -- there is no one doing the selecting). But with respect to the end
product, it might as well have. The end product is an organism whose
structures and organization serve specific functions in the life of the
organism, i.e., have identifiable purposes. The main purposes of a bird's
wing are to provide the lift and thrust necessary for powered flight
(although they serve other purposes as well).

In the same sense, the purpose of an elementary control unit is to control:
to keep its perceptual signal close to its reference signal despite
disturbances acting on the former. Yet different mechanisms may be employed
to serve the same purpose: to keep a clock's hands in synchony with actual
local time, I may devise a control system to protect the clock's mechanism
from disturbance or simply mount the clock where those disturbances cannot
reach it. However, only the control system could be said to operate so as
to achieve its own inner purpose, i.e., to have a goal and actively pursue
it. The bird's wing is not trying to fly, the passively isolated clock is
not trying to keep good time, but the regulated clock's control system is
indeed trying to keep its perceptual variable near the reference value. To
have a purpose is not the same as to behave purposefully.

Regards,

Bruce

[Bruce_Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (960910.2100 EST)]

Bill Powers (960910.1415 MDT)

Simon didn't _mean_ to be arguing from design, but that is the form his
argument took. Can you fix up Simon's argument so the parallel holds true?
If there is a purpose for Y, then Y is employed to realize that purpose. In
the case where there is no agent X, there is nothing employing Y, and
nothing to have a purpose regarding the use of Y. How can you make Simon's
argument NOT come out to be an argument from design?

The point Simon is making is that the processes of evolution result in a
match between certain requirements of the animal (or other living thing),
its structure, and the environment in which those structures must operate.
Early physiologists were most puzzled by many of the organs and other
structures they found, and sought to identify their functions in the life of
the animal. They eventually discovered that a major purpose of the
circulatory system is to deliver oxygen and nutrients to the tissues and
carry away waste products, for example. You are arguing that because there
was no Agent X -- no designer -- to create the animal's structure that its
circulatory system has no purpose, no function in the life of the animal.
I'm afraid I can't agree.

Our problem here is that a pun is involved. The word "purpose" refers to a
reference signal in a control system. It also refers to the (or rather, a)
use to which something could be put.

A pun? I don't follow.

I would prefer NOT to use "purpose" to refer to a reference signal; it seems
wrong to say that the purpose of my thermostat is 72 degrees Faherenheit.
The purpose of the heating system is to bring the room up to the
thermostat's reference temperature (currently 72 degrees F) and keep it
there against disturbances. Seventy-two degrees is the goal, not the purpose.

You may have many _uses_ for your leg -- to stand on, to prop up a sheet of
wallboard while you sink the first nail, to support a tray in your lap --
but these are not necessarily isomorphic with what appears to be its main
purpose in the lives of human beings, which has mainly to do with
locomotion. Your leg happens to have features that suit it more or less to
these other uses -- you can use it for other purposes -- but it also seems
to have a purpose that explains why it is designed as it is, rather than
some other way. The characteristics of a hammer make it well-suited for
hammering, even though you might use a hammer to keep your papers from
blowing away. Its characteristics have been shaped by the purpose for which
it was intended to be used.

The main purposes of a bird's wing are to provide the lift and thrust
necessary for powered flight (although they serve other purposes as well).

That's a good example of what I mean. I am quite sure, considering the
knowledge we share, that you do not mean that there is a reference signal in
the bird's wing that specifies a purpose to be achieved. What you mean is
that if the bird intends to fly, the wing can be put to that use. If the
bird wants to splash water on itself in a birdbath, the wing can be put to
that use, too.

I (and Simon) mean more than that. The wing can be put to use in flying,
not simply because the bird wants to fly, but because the process of
evolution has resulted in a wing that is extremely well suited to that
purpose. The shape, the surfacing (feathers), the articulation of the
joints, the positioning, power, contractile speed, and fatigue-resistance of
the muscles all contribute to that purpose. Yes, the bird can also give
itself a bath by means of those wings, but if that were the purpose of wings
then surely something more efficient would have developed by now to serve
that purpose -- handy scoops, perhaps. For Simon the defining
characteristic of an artifact is that its structure has been _shaped_ by
purpose -- by the requirements of a designer or of an organism.

I claim that there is no use inherent in any object, in the absence of
organisms. The idea that purpose inheres in objects is simply indefensible.
No matter what purpose you claim an object has, it is always possible to
find a different purpose for the same object. That is because purposes are
in the uses of objects, not in the objects. What is the purpose of the Moon?
To cause tides? I'm sure that you would reject that idea. But how is it
different from saying that the purpose of a wing is to power flight?

I think I just answered that question. Yes, I would reject the idea that
the purpose of the Moon is to cause tides. The properties of the moon were
not selected (and natural selection is a form of selection) for that
purpose, so far as anyone can tell. Yet the purpose of a wing is to power
flight (and provide lift and control of flight) precisely because the
requirements of flight have resulted in the wing having certain properties
that make it perfectly suited to that use. And for that reason the wings of
insects, bats, and birds share certain features in common, despite the fact
that flight arose independently in these three groups.

Regards,

Bruce

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (960911.0800 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (960910.2100 EST)--

I would prefer NOT to use "purpose" to refer to a reference signal; it seems
wrong to say that the purpose of my thermostat is 72 degrees Faherenheit.
The purpose of the heating system is to bring the room up to the
thermostat's reference temperature (currently 72 degrees F) and keep it
there against disturbances. Seventy-two degrees is the goal, not the >purpose.

I'll accept that more explicit version of what I was saying. It still
requires that there be a reference signal and a control system that varies
its actions to bring the temperature of the room to the intended level. If
you leave out the control system aspect of the thermostat, it's pretty hard
to define the purpose that the thermostat is carrying out by looking just at
the thermostat. You have to back off and ask what the designer or user of
the thermostat was trying to accomplish -- to maintain a comfortable skin
temperature without continually having to turn the furnace on and off by
hand. THAT meaning of purpose ALWAYS involves a closed-loop control system.

You say you don't understand why I say that the other usage of purpose
involves a "pun." A pun is based on the fact that there are words in any
language that sound the same and look the same when written, but which refer
to quite different concepts. If you say that a hammer "has a purpose" in and
of itself, the closed-loop meaning would imply that inside the hammer there
is a reference signal and a control system devoted to bringing some effect
of the hammer on its environment to the state specified by the reference
signal. That is obviously not what is meant when we say that a hammer has a
purpose. We don't mean that the hammer literally "has" a purpose -- that is,
contains an internal specification for something that is to to result from
its actions on its environment. We mean that the hammer is suited for use by
some control system to bring an effect of using it to a reference state
specified by the other control system. You may say "a hammer is to drive and
remove nails," but you can watch a hammer for several hours in a row and it
will never be caught driving or removing a nail -- unless a control system
which intends to drive or remove a nail picks up the hammer and uses it for
that purpose.

Once you understand the control-system concept behind purposive behavior,
you can see that the other usage is really an oblique reference to a control
system. If I point to a rock on the ground and ask you what its purpose is,
you can't answer the question until you know who put it there and why. If I
tell you that it's one of four markers for a game of field hockey, you will
then know the purpose of the rock -- the purpose of its size, of the fact
that it's white, and of its placement in relation to other rocks. But that
purpose doesn't belong to the rock; it belongs to whoever used the rock to
mark out a playing field. Without reference to that person, the rock has no
purpose -- it is just a rock, with whatever properties it has.

I (and Simon) mean more than that. The wing can be put to use in flying,
not simply because the bird wants to fly, but because the process of
evolution has resulted in a wing that is extremely well suited to that
purpose.

The wing may be extremely well suited for use in flying, but the purpose of
flying belongs to the bird, not the wing. If the bird is dead, the wing will
never produce flying (or any of the other uses to which it could be put by
control systems in the bird). The wing is just part of the environmental
feedback function through which the flying control system brings about the
consequence of flying.

I would reject the idea that the purpose of the Moon is to cause tides.

The >properties of the moon were not selected (and natural selection is a
form of >selection) for that purpose, so far as anyone can tell.

"Natural selection" and "selection for a purpose" involve another pun, this
time on the word "selection." Selection can result from a passive
operation, as when a sieve selects large rocks out of a mixture of large and
small rocks (until it's clogged with large rocks). Or it can involve
selection for a purpose, an active process that involves examining the
rocks, determining their relative usefulness for a predefined end (such as
marking out a field hockey arena), and picking them up if they suit or
discarding them if they don't. In the case of the sieve, there is no
predefined end: either a rock is small enough to fall through a hole, or it
isn't. There is no perception, no judgment, no goal involved. As Rick Marken
pointed out, evolution works like a sieve, not like a human rock-picker.
Organisms that get through the holes survive; the rest perish. The sieve
doesn't care which happens.

When you speak of evolution involving "selection for a purpose" you imply
that the purpose is known beforehand and that selection is based on
furthering that purpose. No matter how many disclaimers you attach to such a
statement, you can't get away from the implication that natural selection
has a goal -- the goal, for example, of producing a wing that is designed as
well as possible (or at least sufficiently well) for flying. You create an
entity that is just as mysterious as God, one which selects wings in order
to achieve the pre-defined end of flying.

You might ask yourself how much sense the term purpose makes if the purpose
cannot be known until after the processes that bring it about have already
occurred.

A different way of looking at natural selection is that _organisms_ do all
the selecting. They select their own environments, and if possible and
necessary alter them. They alter, if necessary, their own physical structure
through a process of random mutation and systematic selection from the
results. It is in the interests of living systems to continue living;
non-living aspects of the environment have no interests and do not care
whether any organism or species survives. This concept of natural selection
does raise some interesting "how" questions, but they are not unanswerable
if we understand control systems.

···

-------------------------------------
I suppose that by the time you were growing up, General Semantics had passed
out of favor. As an adolescent, I fell for it in its heyday, and learned a
great deal from it. One of the most influential books I read was "The
Tyranny of Words," by (I think) Stuart Chase. I can't recall a single bit of
that book, but what I took away from it was a strong sense of the meanings
to which words are supposed to point: the difference between verbal maps and
perceptual territories. The main problem with words like selection and
purpose is that we learn them when we're young, mostly from the contexts in
which they're used; they aren't defined in terms of meanings, but only in
terms of associations with other words. It doesn't occur to us that if the
same word is used in two different contexts, it may bring in totally
different meanings in the two contexts. We may think we're talking about the
same thing when we have actually changed the subject completely.

One of the things I learned from General Semantics is that the biggest
problems arise in connection with the simplest words. One of the words is
"have." When I say that a thermostat "has" a purpose, do I mean that it
contains an inner definition of a purpose (the reference temperature) which
it then achieves all by itself? Or do I mean that in the context of another
system, the thermostat can be used for an extraneous purpose, a purpose that
the other system "has" _for the thermostat_? As we learn language, we don't
learn to make distinctions like that. This is why verbal reasoning is so
treacherous. Most verbal reasoning relies on private associations, not on
communicable meanings or formal and consistent definitions in terms of
non-words.

Best,

Bill P.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Bruce_Gregory9]

[From Bruce Gregory (960911.1330 EDT)]

(Bill Powers 960911.0800 MDT)

A different way of looking at natural selection is that _organisms_ do all
the selecting. They select their own environments, and if possible and
necessary alter them. They alter, if necessary, their own physical structure
through a process of random mutation and systematic selection from the
results. It is in the interests of living systems to continue living;
non-living aspects of the environment have no interests and do not care
whether any organism or species survives. This concept of natural selection
does raise some interesting "how" questions, but they are not unanswerable
if we understand control systems.

Very nice.

One of the most influential books I read was "The
Tyranny of Words," by (I think) Stuart Chase.

Indeed it was. I just checked it out of the library.

I can't recall a single bit of
that book, but what I took away from it was a strong sense of the meanings
to which words are supposed to point: the difference between verbal maps and
perceptual territories. The main problem with words like selection and
purpose is that we learn them when we're young, mostly from the contexts in
which they're used; they aren't defined in terms of meanings, but only in
terms of associations with other words. It doesn't occur to us that if the
same word is used in two different contexts, it may bring in totally
different meanings in the two contexts. We may think we're talking about the
same thing when we have actually changed the subject completely.

Most verbal reasoning relies on private associations, not on
communicable meanings or formal and consistent definitions in terms of
non-words.

A beautiful post. The last statement summarizes brilliantly why
teaching is almost impossible. (Fortunately, learning is not...)

Bruce

[Bruce_Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (960911.1515 EST)]

Dave Spence (11 Sep 1996 08:19:44) --

The notion of purpose implies meaning, we precieve a meaning in the
structure or actions of a system. This perception (an ongoing system
initself) is anthropomorphic. We are hardwired to expect notions of
meaning. When you discus the meaning of the purpose of a birds wing, what
you are asking is what do we percieve is the best function of a wing.
Suppose, for simplicity sake you are verry fond of scuba diving and and are
an amature naturalist. While investigating some islands you discover for
the first time a penguin. You may be led to believe that best adaptation of
a wing is to swim fast. We must be verry carefull not to attach any more
meaning than pure functionality. To say any function has a purpose is not
necessary; it simply has a function.

In this context the terms "purpose" and "function" are synonomous. The
illustration of the penguin is relevant, in that the inference with respect
to the penguin's wing would be correct. It would be incorrect to state that
this inference applies to all bird-wings, but so what? Contrary to your
assertion, I am NOT asking what do we perceive is the best function of _a_
wing, but of the wing of a particular bird.

Furthermore, what the best function of a wing is, is not a matter of what we
perceive (although what we _think_ is its best function certainly is).
Wings have been serving their "best" functions for a long time and have done
so regardless of what human beings think about these functions. The wing's
function has been determined in large measure by the requirements of the
environment; certain elements of its structure reflect those requirements.

       Natural selection (often misunderstood) does not have a direction or
intentions (2 meanings); rather it operates under three principles of self
organizing systems (seperate from such meanings as purpose, reason, or plan).

Yes, I am fully aware of that. In an earlier post I tried to make Simon's
position on this clear: the result of the process is that certain
structures/systems exist whose features have been shaped so as to serve a
specific purpose (function) or purposes in the life of the organism. The
result is that these properties exist AS IF they had been purposely
(intentionally) designed.

Bill Powers (960911.0800 MDT) --

. . . If
you leave out the control system aspect of the thermostat, it's pretty hard
to define the purpose that the thermostat is carrying out by looking just at
the thermostat. You have to back off and ask what the designer or user of
the thermostat was trying to accomplish -- to maintain a comfortable skin
temperature without continually having to turn the furnace on and off by
hand.

But what if the thermostat and its associated control-system mechanisms
exist through the process of evolution? Are we no no longer in a position
to ask what the purpose of the thermostat is? Can we not observe what it
does and infer the role that it plays in the life of the animal?

THAT meaning of purpose ALWAYS involves a closed-loop control system.

Yes, I agree -- it's the only system that can be said to have an intention
or goal.

You say you don't understand why I say that the other usage of purpose
involves a "pun." A pun is based on the fact that there are words in any
language that sound the same and look the same when written, but which refer
to quite different concepts.

But Bill, a pun involves purposely (intentionally) conflating the meanings
in a given context, and this is not what is being done here. Simon is not
ascribing purpose to the object; what he is saying is that when an object's
characteristics are what they are because of a selective process, (design or
evolution) then one can legitimately speak in terms of the purpose or
function of its elements. However, I do agree with you that the term
"purpose" has more than one meaning, and that those meanings can easily be
confused in this context. Perhaps we would do better to eliminate the term
entirely from this discussion and substitute "function" (as Dave Spence
suggests) for what Simon means by the term and "intention" for its meaning
within PCT. Only control systems have intentions (goals they attempt to
satisfy).

It is this functional aspect of purpose that has caused so much trouble
within science. Aristotle's four causes included the final: a thing is what
it is so as to serve a specific function (or functions) in the life of the
organism. This doctrine was rejected as teleological on grounds that an
effect cannot bring about its own cause. Darwin's theory of evolution
resolved the problem by showing how structures perfectly suited to specific
functions in the life of the organism can arise through the action of a
purposeless (nonintentional) mechanism, or in ther words, through the
scientifically acceptable method of efficient causation.

The wing may be extremely well suited for use in flying, but the purpose of
flying belongs to the bird, not the wing. If the bird is dead, the wing will
never produce flying (or any of the other uses to which it could be put by
control systems in the bird). The wing is just part of the environmental
feedback function through which the flying control system brings about the
consequence of flying.

The intention is dead, but the function of the wing is still there, even
though it no longer functions. But of course, to understand what it's for,
it can be very helpful to know what the living bird _does_ with it.

When you speak of evolution involving "selection for a purpose" you imply
that the purpose is known beforehand and that selection is based on
furthering that purpose. No matter how many disclaimers you attach to such a
statement, you can't get away from the implication that natural selection
has a goal -- the goal, for example, of producing a wing that is designed as
well as possible (or at least sufficiently well) for flying. You create an
entity that is just as mysterious as God, one which selects wings in order
to achieve the pre-defined end of flying.

I've dealt with this above in my reply to Dave Spence. The implication
arises from using "purpose" to mean "intention" rather than "function." It
is not "selection FOR a purpose," rather, because of selection, structures
arise that serve a purpose (function) in the life of the organism.

You might ask yourself how much sense the term purpose makes if the purpose
cannot be known until after the processes that bring it about have already
occurred.

It makes no sense if you define "purpose" as "intention," but is perfectly
sensible if you define "purpose" as "function." When I say that the purpose
of a control system is to bring its perceptual variable close to reference
and keep it there, I am talking about its function. I can also talk about
the function of each part of that system: the purpose of the sensor is to
convert the input quantity to a perceptual signal, for example. But if I
ask what the control system is trying to do, it is intending to bring its
perceptual variable near the reference and hold it there. How do I know?
Because any attempt to thwart that intention is met with an opposing action.
Note that in this example the intention of the control system as a whole and
its function are intimately related -- it intends to carry out its function.
This is not true of the wing or of the sensor.

Now that we're on the same wavelength (I think), what connection (if any) do
you see between an artifact (as Simon defines the term) the purpose for
which the artifact was created (its intended use) and the environment in
which that artifact must function? To keep the discussion simple, let's
restrict ourselves for the present to things created by human design.

Regards,

Bruce

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (960911.1840 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (960911.1515 EST) --

But what if the thermostat and its associated control-system mechanisms
exist through the process of evolution? Are we no no longer in a position
to ask what the purpose of the thermostat is? Can we not observe what it
does and infer the role that it plays in the life of the animal?

The root of our problem lies one layer deeper (higher?) than the discussion
has gone so far. Why do we want to say that a thermostat, taken as a whole
rather than analyzed as a control system, has _either_ a purpose or a
function? What is wrong with just describing what the thermostat does?
Similarly for the wing of a bird. We know that the wing of a particular bird
has certain aerodynamic characteristics: lift, drag, aspect ratio,
adjustable flight feathers, strength, weight, loading per square inch, and
so on. It is an object with physical characteristics. When placed into
motion through the air, it generates certain forces. When flexed or warped
in moving air, it generates different forces. One can go on from this
engineering standpoint and generate a whole list of properties of a specific
bird's wing in all its various configurations, never making a controversial
statement, never implying in the slightest that the wing was shaped IN ORDER
TO have these properties. What is wrong with merely stating the properties
of the wing under various conditions? That, plus a description of all the
control systems that use the wing for taking off, soaring, maneuvering, and
landing (etc.), tells us all there is to know about the wing.

It is this functional aspect of purpose that has caused so much trouble
within science. Aristotle's four causes included the final: a thing is what
it is so as to serve a specific function (or functions) in the life of the
organism. This doctrine was rejected as teleological on grounds that an
effect cannot bring about its own cause. Darwin's theory of evolution
resolved the problem by showing how structures perfectly suited to specific
functions in the life of the organism can arise through the action of a
purposeless (nonintentional) mechanism, or in ther words, through the
scientifically acceptable method of efficient causation.

Darwin's theory didn't solve the problem; it buried it under heaps of words.
What solved the problem was feedback control theory, which shows how a
teleological system works. Aristotle's "final cause" is precisely the kind
of cause that a reference signal is: it specifies a state of affairs
different from the one that now exists, which is then brought into being
through a control process. The final cause of a painting is the image or
idea in the artist's mind, which he then causes to appear on the canvas. The
possibility of this kind of causation was rejected -- a major blunder in the
history of science -- for the simple reason that nobody knew what kind of
physical system could embody it.

When you say that natural selection produces "structures perfectly suited to
specific functions in the life of the organism," I think you completely
reverse the causal connection. We do not begin with an organism with a
particular kind of life, to which the shapes of the structures in the
organism are then adapted through natural selection. The life of the
organism adapts to take the best possible advantage of the structures with
which it begins. If it has wings, it flies. If it has hands with fingers
that can bend convergently, it grasps. How "perfectly" do the wings of a
seagull suit the function of diving at 200 miles per hour after a flying
prey? How "perfectly" do the wings of an albatross, or Gooney Bird, suit the
function of taking off from land?

The physical form of an organism, like its environment, is simply the hand
it is dealt. It uses its form and its environment as best it can learn to
do, and when it has done its best, we see that it has got as much out of its
equipment as one could reasonably expect. The properties of its physical
equipment determine what effects can be produced by sending signals to
muscles. The hierarchy of reference signals inside the organism determines
which effects, among those that can be produced, are in fact produced, and
the associated control systems determine how reliably they are produced.

Given the properties of a specific bird's wing, we can see that the behavior
of the bird lies within the range of effects that are possible to control
with that type of wing. The seagull with its long narrow wings cannot dive
and twist while chasing bugs; the swift with its stubby curved wings cannot
soar. Both birds are limited to the kinds of control that can be
accomplished with the wings they have. And that is the kind of control they
learn, or to some degree inherit. There's nothing "perfect" going on here,
and it is no evolutionary marvel that the life of the bird fits the shape of
its wings.

Best,

Bill P.

[Richard_Marken1]

[From Rick Marken (960911.2150)]

Bruce Abbott (960911.1705 EST)--

What I did say is that the _main_ purposes of the wing
are to provide lift, thrust, and control (during flight)

OK. How do we know that these are the _main_ purposes"
of a wing and what does knowing this tell us about the
nature of behavior -- or anything, for that matter?

Objects whose characteristics have been shaped in this
way [by passive selection] can be described in ways that
objects not so shaped cannot be. We can ask of them,
what does this or that feature contribute to the function
it serves, given the environment in which it must operate?

I think I see what you are getting at. But this approach to
evaluating the function of morphological features of
organisms seems to be a way to avoid talking about
the fact that organisms have internal purposes. It is
these internal purposes that make it interesting to ask
how some "feature contributes to the function it serves".

Wings are interesting because (as Bill noted) they are
part of the feedback path connecting the bird to various
controlled perceptions (speed, attitude and direction of
flight, for example). The shape of the wing determines
the range of environmental disturbances to these variables
over which the bird can maintain control, the effiency
of control, etc. All these are interesting things to know;
but they can only know them once we know what perceptual
variables the bird controls; only when we know this can
be know how the wing might even influence these variables.
Speculations about whether a particular morphological
feature of an organism was "selected" are just a way of
dodging the fact that what you want to know is how a
feature contributes to the organism's ability to
carry out its purposes (PCT sense).

What is the end these features help these animals to
attain, the purpose of these features?

In order to know this, you have to know the internal
purposes (PCT sense) of the animals.

If you're going to insist that there is no scientific way to
discover the answer, then you'll have to explain how
biologists have been able to figure out those purposes for
so many biological structures.

The scientific way to discover the purpose (function) of
a biological structure requires that you first
scientifically determine the purpose (PCT sense) of
the organism of which it is a part. The scientific
way to determine the organism's purposes is with
The Test for the controlled varable.

Biologists have been able to figure out the purposes
(functions) of so many biological structures for
the same reason that psycholgists have been able
to figure out the causes of so many behaviors:
because so many people have been willing to
believe Nobel laureates and other important
sounding trendy types who study biological functions as
though they had purposes (functions) and who study
behavior as though it had causes.

Me:

So when an object's characteristics are not the result of
design or evolution they have no function?

Bruce Abbott (960911.1850 EST) --

The characteristics you describe _are_ the result of
evolution, so they do have function. Salt is tasty (in small
amounts) because salt is required by the human body

I meant to refer only to the chemical composition of salt;
the chemical characteristics of NaCl are not the result
of evolution; but NaCl does have a function because
people have the purpose of maintaiing a certain level
of salinity in their tissues.

Ocean breezes are not cool, they just have a certain
temperature.

Correct. And the temperture of ocean breezes is not
something that evolved. But, as you note, these breezes
can function to cool a person whose purpose is to
cool off.

By the way, aren't we straying a bit from the original
topic. You said Simon had ideas consistent with PCT.
Where are they?

Best

Rick

[Bruce_Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (960912.1255 EST)]

Rick Marken (960911.2150) --

Bruce Abbott (960911.1705 EST)

What I did say is that the _main_ purposes of the wing
are to provide lift, thrust, and control (during flight)

OK. How do we know that these are the _main_ purposes"
of a wing and what does knowing this tell us about the
nature of behavior -- or anything, for that matter?

We observe what the bird does with it and try through experiment to deduce
how the properties of the wing relate to those uses. I think we would find
that the structure of the wing -- its shape, surfacing, and articulation,
for example, mainly reflects the requirements of flight. For other
structures that the bird doesn't seem to "do" anything with, we can perform
experiments to discover what the properties of these structures are, what
the requirements of the organism are (for survival, reproduction, etc.) and
then determine how these properties and requirements relate.

Objects whose characteristics have been shaped in this
way [by passive selection] can be described in ways that
objects not so shaped cannot be. We can ask of them,
what does this or that feature contribute to the function
it serves, given the environment in which it must operate?

I think I see what you are getting at.

Great!

But this approach to
evaluating the function of morphological features of
organisms seems to be a way to avoid talking about
the fact that organisms have internal purposes. It is
these internal purposes that make it interesting to ask
how some "feature contributes to the function it serves".

Instead of attributing nefarious intentions to others, why not begin with
the premise that this approach _may_ lead to something worth thinking about,
and approach the discussion from that perspective? A little receptiveness
can be a good thing! I promise not to say anything harmful to PCT.

Wings are interesting because (as Bill noted) they are
part of the feedback path connecting the bird to various
controlled perceptions (speed, attitude and direction of
flight, for example). The shape of the wing determines
the range of environmental disturbances to these variables
over which the bird can maintain control, the effiency
of control, etc. All these are interesting things to know;
but they can only know them once we know what perceptual
variables the bird controls; only when we know this can
be know how the wing might even influence these variables.
Speculations about whether a particular morphological
feature of an organism was "selected" are just a way of
dodging the fact that what you want to know is how a
feature contributes to the organism's ability to
carry out its purposes (PCT sense).

It is not "just a way of avoiding" anything. We're working toward an
analysis of artifacts as artifacts, not toward a discussion of PCT (yet).
Many properties of organisms serve some function without being parts of a
control system. The turtle's shell is not a control system, yet it serves
the function of protecting the turtle against harm. (But note that that the
turtle also has control systems that contribute to its protection.) So what
we're talking about here includes control systems (active regulation) but
also includes passive means of achieving certain end-states (i.e., remaining
alive). Possession of a hard shell by the turtle means that active
(control) systems don't have to work as hard, as the inner systems are
shielded from certain forms of disturbance and thus do not have to
counteract them.

The scientific way to discover the purpose (function) of
a biological structure requires that you first
scientifically determine the purpose (PCT sense) of
the organism of which it is a part. The scientific
way to determine the organism's purposes is with
The Test for the controlled varable.

Or so you believe. I don't, although I agree that knowing that the
organism's purposes are (PCT sense, what it is trying to accomplish) is a
big help in trying to understand the purpose (function) of some biological
structures. Tell me how knowing that the turtle has the purpose (intention)
of protecting itself from harm helps me to understand the function of its
hard shell.

Biologists have been able to figure out the purposes
(functions) of so many biological structures for
the same reason that psycholgists have been able
to figure out the causes of so many behaviors:
because so many people have been willing to
believe Nobel laureates and other important
sounding trendy types who study biological functions as
though they had purposes (functions) and who study
behavior as though it had causes.

That's so obviously absurd I can hardly keep myself from bursting out in
laughter. The reason biologists understand the functions of so many
biological structures is that they believe Nobel laureates? Thanks for the
moment of merriment! You _were_ joking, right?

And by the way, behavior _does_ have causes. They lurk within the loop of
circular, circular, now what was that phrase? Circular _causation_?
Disturbances cause behavior, as do changes in inner reference values (which
themselves change in response to disturbances to the controlled variables of
higher systems. I thought you knew that. (;->

Regards,

Bruce