I've no objection to that if you remove "continuous" and perhaps
“analog”, depending on what you mean by “analog”.
The prior discussion just happened to be about the distinction
between conscious experience and perceptions that were the products
of perceptual functions previously reorganized into the control
hierarchy, so the extension to engineered control systems wasn’t at
all relevant, unless you think they have conscious experiences.
Martin
···
[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]
MT: I hope this is true. But
we should test that proposition. Allow me to
paraphrase my current thinking in a few points,
ordered as best I can according to the probability
you would agree with them.
1. The word "perception" always and only refers to
something internal to an organism.
RY: A jolly good overview with which I wholly
agree and is in line with my own thoughts.
RM: Since we now have systems that do a pretty good job
of perceiving speech and imagery it seems that defining
“perception” as something in organisms is a bit last
century.
RY: Though how does
your previous statement that “taste” (which is a
perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the
others?
RM: Why not just define perception the way it's defined
in B:CP: A signal inside a system that is a continuous
analog of a sate of affairs outside the system.
RY: Though how does your previous statement that "taste" (which is a perception) is 'out there' fit with this point, and the others?
RM: Why not just define perception the way it's defined in B:CP: A signal inside a system that is a continuous analog of a sate of affairs outside the system.
RY: That's ok as far as it goes, for some cases, but I don't think it reflects the whole picture. As RDS's show you can have a perception for something that doesn't exist; there is no external analog. There is no shape in the environment that corresponds to the perception, though there are the basic constituents which form the perception, via the perceptual function (which is internal). All perceptions are illusions!
 RM: They are not illusions; they are analogs of aspects of the reality that exists "out there"; the reality that described by the models of physics and chemistry. Even the perceptions that we consider to be illusions are not, themselves, illusions. They are illusions to the extent that they differ from what we we "know", on different grounds, to be out there. For example, in the Ames room illusion, we perceive a person to be growing or shrinking as they walk from one corner to another. This is what we perceive; we consider it to be an illusion because we know, on other grounds, that the person is not actually shrinking or growing.Â
RM: But on second thought, given this definition of illusion, perhaps it is correct to say that all perceptions are illusions, at least to the extent that perceptions differ from what we know from physics and chemistry to be what is actually going on "out there". So the taste of lemonade could be called an illusion since, per chemistry, there is no unitary entity out there that corresponds to this perception; what is actually out there is concentrations of different types of molecules. Same is true for this table top here, which looks like a solid entity but which I kn ow from physics and chemistry to also by a tightly bound collection of atoms that are mainly empty space.Â
RM: But on third thought, I think I would prefer to reserve the term "perceptual illusion" for perceptions that conflict with what we know based on other perceptions rather than physical models. The reason is that perceptions defined as illusions in the latter way are adaptive; perceptions defined as illusions in the former way are not. The Ames room, size change perception is defined as an illusion in the formerway; because it conflicts with what we know based on other perceptions. We can see that people only change size when they are in the Ames room. If the outside world were organized as it is in the Ames room -- with linear perspective consistently conflicting with actual distance -- we would be having this illusion all the time. This would be maladaptive since we would never be sure whether an approaching object was large or small. However, perceiving collections of atoms as a solid entity, like the table top, seems perfectly adaptive; you know what will happen if you set something on it (it won't drop through), for example.Â
RM: So I'm in favor of sticking with the definition of perception as an analog of a states of affair "out there" and referring to perceptions as "illusions" when we can perceive them only under special circumstance, where the perception differs from what we see in all other circumstances.
Best
Rick
···
So instead of saying just one kind of system --organisms -- have perceptions west that any system (like a robot) can have perceptions as long as the system is capable of deriving signal that is a continuous analog of a state of affairs outside the system. So what is "out there" is the state of affairs that is the basis (or "argument") of the system function that produces the signal that is an analog of that state of affairs.
No intention to be robotist, so agree, subject to what I said above.
Regards,
Rupert
--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery
Between two of the same species the genetics are about identical. My ion channel behaves about the same as yours but a dogs might be different
···
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1448 ET)]
Â
How likely is it that the genetics will be identical?
Â
Fred Nickols
Â
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 2:41 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
Â
Because I said the genetics are identical
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1349 ET)]
Â
How do you know it’s the same sensation, Philip?
Â
Fred Nickols
Â
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:45 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Qualia
Â
FN: We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person.Â
Â
This is like saying Newton’s laws don’t apply equally for different people, which is not true. A muscular force acting against an object will generate the same reaction force for different people. Regarding the taste of lemonade, a sour molecule will generate the same sensation (given identical genetics) for different people. Consider the molecule miraculin (it makes sour taste sweet). Miraculin changes the weights of the inputs causing the taste to be a personal variable (not “out thereâ€?). You can add whatever sour thing you want to make it taste like lemonade, but it will never taste like lemonade. You have no atenfel that you can apply to the drink. Unless that thing is a molecule that counters the effect of miraculin. Martin, you mentioned you cannot taste sweet/sour like you used to. This is a change in the weights of your perceptual functions (some of these weights have become 0). The taste of lemonade is a perception. It is something internal to an organism.Â
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]
Â
Hmm. Let me get in on this one.
Â
Suppose there are three glasses on a table in front of us, Rupert. One is filled with light yellow liquid, one is filled with orange liquid and one is filled with a white liquid. We each take a sip from each glass and we agree that the light yellow one is lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and the white one is milk.
Â
We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person. We agree on what each is and we can speculate that whatever they taste like to us they taste much the same to the other person. My taste is in me and your taste is in you. The lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are out there. Where is taste? As a concept or construct, it’s out there, too. As a sensory perception, it’s in you and it’s in me.
Â
At least that’s what I think.
Â
Now let’s see what Martin has to say.
Â
Fred Nickols
Â
From: Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 12:57 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
Â
[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]
(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]
I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.
The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.
A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that “taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the others?
Regards,
Rupert
Perceptions are variable.
In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.
We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.
Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
   5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
   5b. data from memory of past perceptions
   5c. data from imagination.
   5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).
The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.
The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.
I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.
(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.
I hope that you agree with at least some of this.
Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.
Philip, was there not a period when you took the trouble to put a
date-stamp ID on your one-liners? Might that recur?
I wonder what level of similarity might be close enough to be called
“identical”. Would you say that a short fat Frenchman was
sufficiently identical to a tall thin African? My wife apparently is
not sufficiently identical to me, because we have never been able to
agree whether some things are “green” or “blue”. I have a check
shirt she calls “red” that I call “yellow” (it’s not orange, but
when you look closely at the pattern I see no yellow in it and I do
see red)… On a circle cruise once, we were near the home harbour
and she was looking for the lighthouse. I pointed out the brilliant
red spot on the horizon that was its roof, but only after careful
search she asked whether I meant that dull brown spot. On the same
cruise I was admiring the rich deep blue shades in the water, but
she said it was all just black. As for taste, I’m quite sure we
never agreed on the qualia even before my problem. She tasted as
“neutral” food that I called really sour. At the other extreme, even identical twins have different life
experiences. I wonder if any of the twin studies have been able to
compare two that were raised in quite different cultures in respect
to the spectrum of tastes to which they were exposed in childhood.
Martin
···
On 2018/03/12 4:27 PM, PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN wrote:
Between
two of the same species the genetics are about identical. My ion
channel behaves about the same as yours but a dogs might be
different
On
Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols <fred@nickols.us >
wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1448
ET)]
Â
How likely is it that the genetics will
be identical?
Â
Fred Nickols
Â
From:
PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 2:41 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
Â
Because I said
the genetics are identical
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols <fred@nickols.us> wrote:
[From
Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1349 ET)]
Â
How do
you know it’s the same sensation, Philip?
Â
Fred
Nickols
Â
From:
PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:45 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Qualia
Â
FN: We have no way of
knowing what any of the three tastes like to the
other person.Â
Â
This is like saying
Newton’s laws don’t apply equally for different
people, which is not true. A muscular force
acting against an object will generate the same
reaction force for different people. Regarding
the taste of lemonade, a sour molecule will
generate the same sensation (given identical
genetics) for different people. Consider the
molecule miraculin (it makes sour taste sweet).
Miraculin changes the weights of the inputs
causing the taste to be a personal variable (not
“out there�). You can add whatever sour thing
you want to make it taste like lemonade, but it
will never taste like lemonade. You have no
atenfel that you can apply to the drink. Unless
that thing is a molecule that counters the
effect of miraculin. Martin, you mentioned you
cannot taste sweet/sour like you used to. This
is a change in the weights of your perceptual
functions (some of these weights have become 0).
The taste of lemonade is a perception. It is
something internal to an organism.Â
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols <fred@nickols.us >
wrote:
[From
Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]
Â
Hmm.Â
Let me get in on this one.
Â
Suppose
there are three glasses on a table in front
of us, Rupert. One is filled with light
yellow liquid, one is filled with orange
liquid and one is filled with a white
liquid. We each take a sip from each glass
and we agree that the light yellow one is
lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and
the white one is milk.
Â
We
have no way of knowing what any of the three
tastes like to the other person. We agree
on what each is and we can speculate that
whatever they taste like to us they taste
much the same to the other person. My taste
is in me and your taste is in you. The
lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are
out there. Where is taste? As a concept or
construct, it’s out there, too. As a
sensory perception, it’s in you and it’s in
me.
Â
At
least that’s what I think.
Â
Now
let’s see what Martin has to say.
Â
Fred
Nickols
Â
From:
Rupert Young <rupert@perceptualrobots.com > Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018
12:57 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
Â
[From Rupert
Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]
(Martin
Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]
I hope this is
true. But we should test that proposition.
Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking
in a few points, ordered as best I can
according to the probability you would
agree with them.
1. The word "perception" always and only
refers to something internal to an
organism.
A jolly good overview with which I wholly
agree and is in line with my own thoughts.
Though how does your previous statement that
“taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out
there’ fit with this point, and the others?
Regards,
Rupert
2.
Perceptions are variable.
3. In the Powers hierarchical version of
Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the
variations of perceptions can be captured
in scalar variables.
4. We are talking within the confines of
HPCT, using terms that can be identified
with concepts from HPCT rather than with
concepts that the same words might evoke
in everyday usage.
5. Perceptions have possible sources that
can usefully be divided into three
categories that are exhaustive:
   5a. data directly from the senses,
possibly after much transformation
   5b. data from memory of past
perceptions
   5c. data from imagination.
   5d. “Noise” (variations within the
organism that have no direct relation with
any of the above, such as resting state
neural firings).
6. The question at issue is whether any
particular perception corresponds to a
variable in the external environment
outside the organism, no matter the
source(s) of its data.
7. The question raised in (6) is
ambiguous, as it could relate to that
nature of the variable or to the current
value of the variable. The former is
determined by the perceptual functions
that produce the perceptions, while the
latter is the value of the perception at
any one moment.
I hope those are all agreed, and on that
basis this is what I currently think.
(A) The processes of evolution and
reorganization have two contrasting
effects: (a) continual experiments with
novel perceptual functions, and (b)
continual elimination of perceptual
functions that fail the test of being
controllable through actions on real
reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation
rate of perceptual functions has on
average slightly exceeded the elimination
rate, leading to the increasing complexity
of the most complex perceptual control
structures within living species. The
perceptual functions that persist longest
across evolutionary time tend to be those
that correspond to stable features of the
environment such as the gravitational
constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour
of the sun, the transmission of energy by
way of vibration, or the chemical
affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual
functions come and go more quickly, but
novel ones seem to be built much quicker
than failing ones are eliminated. The
result is that at the higher levels, where
the perceptual functions are less likely
to have been produced by evolution, an
increasingly large number of perceptual
functions will fail to correspond to
anything in real reality, and fail to be
eliminated because they are seldom tested
in action, and nor do they conflict with
other similarly high-level perceptions
when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear
when the sensors are turned away. The
memory of them serves as their perceptual
values when they are not “in sight”. For
example, though I am not in the room, I
still perceive that my kitchen has a patio
door that opens onto a deck, and if I
wanted, I could control that perception by
phoning a contractor to replace it with a
blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less
accurate as time goes by since they were
last refreshed from sensory data, at
different rates for different perception,
but generally more slowly the higher the
level in the perceptual hierarchy. The
perceptual function retains whatever
“tested-by-controlling” validity it had
initially, but the value becomes more
uncertain as a representative of the
current state of affairs in the real
world.
I hope that you agree with at least some
of this.
Probably the subject line should be
changed, because we are no longer talking
about qualia, which I brought up largely
to offer an example of dissociation that
serves to highlight the distinction
between conscious perceptual experience
and perceptions in the control hierarchy.
Genes that code for ion channels vary less in a population than genes that code for height or vision because only a mutation in an ion channel might lead to death before birth or reproduction.Â
Philip, was there not a period when you took the trouble to put a
date-stamp ID on your one-liners? Might that recur?
On 2018/03/12 4:27 PM, PHILIP JERAIR > YERANOSIAN wrote:
Between
two of the same species the genetics are about identical. My ion
channel behaves about the same as yours but a dogs might be
different
I wonder what level of similarity might be close enough to be called
“identical”. Would you say that a short fat Frenchman was
sufficiently identical to a tall thin African? My wife apparently is
not sufficiently identical to me, because we have never been able to
agree whether some things are “green” or “blue”. I have a check
shirt she calls “red” that I call “yellow” (it’s not orange, but
when you look closely at the pattern I see no yellow in it and I do
see red)… On a circle cruise once, we were near the home harbour
and she was looking for the lighthouse. I pointed out the brilliant
red spot on the horizon that was its roof, but only after careful
search she asked whether I meant that dull brown spot. On the same
cruise I was admiring the rich deep blue shades in the water, but
she said it was all just black. As for taste, I’m quite sure we
never agreed on the qualia even before my problem. She tasted as
“neutral” food that I called really sour.
At the other extreme, even identical twins have different life
experiences. I wonder if any of the twin studies have been able to
compare two that were raised in quite different cultures in respect
to the spectrum of tastes to which they were exposed in childhood.
Martin
On
Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols <fred@nickols.us >
wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1448
ET)]
Â
How likely is it that the genetics will
be identical?
Â
Fred Nickols
Â
From:
PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 2:41 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
Â
Because I said
the genetics are identical
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols <fred@nickols.us> wrote:
[From
Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1349 ET)]
Â
How do
you know it’s the same sensation, Philip?
Â
Fred
Nickols
Â
From:
PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:45 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Qualia
Â
FN: We have no way of
knowing what any of the three tastes like to the
other person.Â
Â
This is like saying
Newton’s laws don’t apply equally for different
people, which is not true. A muscular force
acting against an object will generate the same
reaction force for different people. Regarding
the taste of lemonade, a sour molecule will
generate the same sensation (given identical
genetics) for different people. Consider the
molecule miraculin (it makes sour taste sweet).
Miraculin changes the weights of the inputs
causing the taste to be a personal variable (not
“out there�). You can add whatever sour thing
you want to make it taste like lemonade, but it
will never taste like lemonade. You have no
atenfel that you can apply to the drink. Unless
that thing is a molecule that counters the
effect of miraculin. Martin, you mentioned you
cannot taste sweet/sour like you used to. This
is a change in the weights of your perceptual
functions (some of these weights have become 0).
The taste of lemonade is a perception. It is
something internal to an organism.Â
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols <fred@nickols.us > > > > > wrote:
[From
Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]
Â
Hmm.Â
Let me get in on this one.
Â
Suppose
there are three glasses on a table in front
of us, Rupert. One is filled with light
yellow liquid, one is filled with orange
liquid and one is filled with a white
liquid. We each take a sip from each glass
and we agree that the light yellow one is
lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and
the white one is milk.
Â
We
have no way of knowing what any of the three
tastes like to the other person. We agree
on what each is and we can speculate that
whatever they taste like to us they taste
much the same to the other person. My taste
is in me and your taste is in you. The
lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are
out there. Where is taste? As a concept or
construct, it’s out there, too. As a
sensory perception, it’s in you and it’s in
me.
Â
At
least that’s what I think.
Â
Now
let’s see what Martin has to say.
Â
Fred
Nickols
Â
From:
Rupert Young <rupert@perceptualrobots.com > Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018
12:57 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
Â
[From Rupert
Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]
(Martin
Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]
I hope this is
true. But we should test that proposition.
Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking
in a few points, ordered as best I can
according to the probability you would
agree with them.
1. The word "perception" always and only
refers to something internal to an
organism.
A jolly good overview with which I wholly
agree and is in line with my own thoughts.
Though how does your previous statement that
“taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out
there’ fit with this point, and the others?
Regards,
Rupert
2.
Perceptions are variable.
3. In the Powers hierarchical version of
Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the
variations of perceptions can be captured
in scalar variables.
4. We are talking within the confines of
HPCT, using terms that can be identified
with concepts from HPCT rather than with
concepts that the same words might evoke
in everyday usage.
5. Perceptions have possible sources that
can usefully be divided into three
categories that are exhaustive:
   5a. data directly from the senses,
possibly after much transformation
   5b. data from memory of past
perceptions
   5c. data from imagination.
   5d. “Noise” (variations within the
organism that have no direct relation with
any of the above, such as resting state
neural firings).
6. The question at issue is whether any
particular perception corresponds to a
variable in the external environment
outside the organism, no matter the
source(s) of its data.
7. The question raised in (6) is
ambiguous, as it could relate to that
nature of the variable or to the current
value of the variable. The former is
determined by the perceptual functions
that produce the perceptions, while the
latter is the value of the perception at
any one moment.
I hope those are all agreed, and on that
basis this is what I currently think.
(A) The processes of evolution and
reorganization have two contrasting
effects: (a) continual experiments with
novel perceptual functions, and (b)
continual elimination of perceptual
functions that fail the test of being
controllable through actions on real
reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation
rate of perceptual functions has on
average slightly exceeded the elimination
rate, leading to the increasing complexity
of the most complex perceptual control
structures within living species. The
perceptual functions that persist longest
across evolutionary time tend to be those
that correspond to stable features of the
environment such as the gravitational
constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour
of the sun, the transmission of energy by
way of vibration, or the chemical
affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual
functions come and go more quickly, but
novel ones seem to be built much quicker
than failing ones are eliminated. The
result is that at the higher levels, where
the perceptual functions are less likely
to have been produced by evolution, an
increasingly large number of perceptual
functions will fail to correspond to
anything in real reality, and fail to be
eliminated because they are seldom tested
in action, and nor do they conflict with
other similarly high-level perceptions
when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear
when the sensors are turned away. The
memory of them serves as their perceptual
values when they are not “in sight”. For
example, though I am not in the room, I
still perceive that my kitchen has a patio
door that opens onto a deck, and if I
wanted, I could control that perception by
phoning a contractor to replace it with a
blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less
accurate as time goes by since they were
last refreshed from sensory data, at
different rates for different perception,
but generally more slowly the higher the
level in the perceptual hierarchy. The
perceptual function retains whatever
“tested-by-controlling” validity it had
initially, but the value becomes more
uncertain as a representative of the
current state of affairs in the real
world.
I hope that you agree with at least some
of this.
Probably the subject line should be
changed, because we are no longer talking
about qualia, which I brought up largely
to offer an example of dissociation that
serves to highlight the distinction
between conscious perceptual experience
and perceptions in the control hierarchy.
Perception is always in the perceiver. Every perceiver has her or its own perceptions independently from the possibility
that they may be similar or even identical with the perceptions of some other perceiver.
Basic (lowest) level perceptions can be analogs of something outside the perceiver, or rather they are analogs of the
effects that something causes in the perceiver. (If I perceive a stone, my perception is not the analog of the stone but the analog of the happened effect of the stone to my sense organs.)
Low level perceptions are probably more fixed genetically than higher level ones but even there can be some individual
variance. Instead the higher level perceptions are more and more idiosyncratic based on the life history and reorganization. The input function which changes the external effect to internal perception can have many forms and reorganization can alter the form.
Higher level input function can combine lower level functions many ways.
It is not reasonable to identify perceptions with illusions, it makes the concept of illusion useless. Some kind of perceptions
are clearly illusions while some others are not (at least so clearly).
Eetu
···
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN [mailto:pyeranos@ucla.edu] Sent: 13. maaliskuuta 2018 0:28 To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
[philip 2018.03.12]
Genes that code for ion channels vary less in a population than genes that code for height or vision because only a mutation in an ion channel might lead to death before birth or reproduction.
Philip, was there not a period when you took the trouble to put a date-stamp ID on your one-liners? Might that recur?
On 2018/03/12 4:27 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN wrote:
Between two of the same species the genetics are about identical. My ion channel behaves about the same as yours but a dogs might be different
I wonder what level of similarity might be close enough to be called “identical”. Would you say that a short fat Frenchman was sufficiently identical to a tall thin African? My wife apparently is not sufficiently identical to me, because we have never been
able to agree whether some things are “green” or “blue”. I have a check shirt she calls “red” that I call “yellow” (it’s not orange, but when you look closely at the pattern I see no yellow in it and I do see red)… On a circle cruise once, we were near the
home harbour and she was looking for the lighthouse. I pointed out the brilliant red spot on the horizon that was its roof, but only after careful search she asked whether I meant that dull brown spot. On the same cruise I was admiring the rich deep blue shades
in the water, but she said it was all just black. As for taste, I’m quite sure we never agreed on the qualia even before my problem. She tasted as “neutral” food that I called really sour.
At the other extreme, even identical twins have different life experiences. I wonder if any of the twin studies have been able to compare two that were raised in quite different cultures in respect to the spectrum of tastes to which they were exposed in childhood.
Martin
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1448 ET)]
How likely is it that the genetics will be identical?
Fred Nickols
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 2:41 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
Because I said the genetics are identical
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1349 ET)]
How do you know it’s the same sensation, Philip?
Fred Nickols
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:45 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Qualia
FN: We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person.
This is like saying Newton’s laws don’t apply equally for different people, which is not true. A muscular force acting against an object will generate the same reaction force for different people. Regarding the taste
of lemonade, a sour molecule will generate the same sensation (given identical genetics) for different people. Consider the molecule miraculin (it makes sour taste sweet). Miraculin changes the weights of the inputs causing the taste to be a personal variable
(not “out there�). You can add whatever sour thing you want to make it taste like lemonade, but it will never taste like lemonade. You have no atenfel that you can apply to the drink. Unless that thing is a molecule that counters the effect of miraculin. Martin,
you mentioned you cannot taste sweet/sour like you used to. This is a change in the weights of your perceptual functions (some of these weights have become 0). The taste of lemonade is a perception. It is something internal to an organism.
On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:
[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]
Hmm. Let me get in on this one.
Suppose there are three glasses on a table in front of us, Rupert. One is filled with light yellow liquid, one is filled with orange liquid and one is filled with a white liquid. We each take a sip from each glass and we agree that the
light yellow one is lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and the white one is milk.
We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person. We agree on what each is and we can speculate that whatever they taste like to us they taste much the same to the other person. My taste is in me and your
taste is in you. The lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are out there. Where is taste? As a concept or construct, it’s out there, too. As a sensory perception, it’s in you and it’s in me.
At least that’s what I think.
Now let’s see what Martin has to say.
Fred Nickols
From: Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 12:57 PM To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu Subject: Re: Qualia
[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]
(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]
I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.
The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.
A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that “taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the others?
Regards,
Rupert
Perceptions are variable.
In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.
We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.
Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
5b. data from memory of past perceptions
5c. data from imagination.
5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).
The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.
The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception
at any one moment.
I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.
(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real
reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions
that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical
affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been
produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions
when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens
onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function
retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.
I hope that you agree with at least some of this.
Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the
control hierarchy.
Eetu, I think you have to be careful to distinguish the content of a
message from the communication channel through which it passes. The
stone creates various effects in the environment by its presence
that differ from the way the region would be if the stone wasn’t
there. Photons have different paths, sound vibrations are reflected
that would have gone straight through, different chemical emanations
might fill the air, and so forth. Some of these effects are
communicated to many places and have their own effects. There is a whole chain of effects taking different paths through the
air, the sensors, and the nervous system, before at some point they
coalesce into a perception of some property of the stone. Nowhere
but there, between the stone and the perception, is there any single
“analogue” of the stone or of the property that is eventually
perceived. The electromagnetic reflections and so forth, the
chemical effects on the sensors of the sound vibrations, all of
these are just differences between what they would be if the stone
was not there and what they are because the stone is there. They are
just a communication channel that enables the detection of that
constellation of differences.
Certainly, if you monitor any communication channel, you can analyze
the signals passing along it, but they have no meaning until they
are all once again restructured in the receiver into some form that
is meaningful to the receiver. In the example case, the receiver is
the set of perceptual functions, just one of which is tuned to
determine whether the structure of the signal fits the property of
the stone and can determine whether it was at the origination of the
signal, and to what extent. Only there is there any interpretation
of the content of the message that originated when the stone made a
difference to the electromagnetic and acoustic and chemical events
in its surroundings. Other interpretations – other observations a.k.a. messages – are
made by other perceptual functions. Together, they constitute the
perception of the stone, if one can call such a complex set of
outputs of many perceptual functions (including the raw sensor
outputs) “a” perception. All of them depend on there being a
difference in what they would output when the stone is there,
compared to what they would report if it wasn’t.
Martin
···
On 2018/03/13 5:55 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen
wrote:
[Eetu
Pikkarainen 2018-03-13_09:33:24 UTC]
Some clearage of my thoughts:
Perception is always in the perceiver. Every
perceiver has her or its own perceptions independently from
the possibility that they may be similar or even identical
with the perceptions of some other perceiver.
Basic (lowest) level perceptions can be analogs
of something outside the perceiver, or rather they are
analogs of the effects that something causes in the
perceiver. (If I perceive a stone, my perception is not the
analog of the stone but the analog of the happened effect of
the stone to my sense organs.)