Qualia

MartinT · March 5, 2018, 4:51am

[Martin Taylor 2018.03.04.23.22]

Very occasionally on CSGnet, the word "qualia" is mentioned. If I understand the word correctly, it refers to the conscious experience of some perception, such as "redness". Since conscious experience is not treated within PCT, at not in any way that is generally agreed, I wonder if it might not be at the heart of an issue that has come up: whether "the taste of lemonade" is in the environment. I have been on one side of this argument, saying that it must exist in the environment, arguing that I can alter the constituents of a solution so that another person will say that it has or has not "the taste of lemonade" as one of its properties. Others have said that "Yes you can do that, but the actual taste is not 'out there'. Only the property of being able to evoke that taste in different people is actually in the environment."

If the conscious experience of drinking that liquid is (or is not) "the taste of lemonade", then PCT says nothing about whether anything corresponding to the taste existing in the environment in the way that the relative location of two objects may do. The argument has been at cross purposes, because PCT says nothing about conscious experiences and their relationship to control. Indeed over the years, there have been occasional papers reporting a timing problem, in that action for controlling at least some perceptions begins before the experience becomes conscious. I don't know how you would do a PCT study to validate those reports, but at least they are suggestive that there may be a problem.

···

========

I bring up this subject now because of Alex's question about sickness seemed to tie in with my own experience with the qualia of taste. Almost a year ago, rather suddenly things that had tasted sweet began to taste bitter. Sugar on the tongue tasted (and still tastes) very bitter. That's qualia, The substance still is sensed by the taste buds, but it produces a different conscious experience. However, if something has a combination of normally bitter with normally sweet, such as coffee with sugar, quite often I do taste sweet along with bitter. As a result I cannot rely on my tasting things I cook if I want to serve them to guests, unless I use a tried and true recipe. I cannot say that the taste of anything as I experience it will be labelled similarly by anyone else. A solution that has "the taste of lemonade" to most people probably will not, to me.

The point of mentioning this on CSGnet is to re-emphasise the importance of distinguishing between the operation of the control hierarchy and the experience we have when consciously controlling anything. What you see (hear, taste, feel) may not be what you get. Nor may control.

By the way, my doctor and an ENT specialist have suggested taking various vitamin and mineral supplements, but none of them have had any effect over the year. Nor have any of the suggestions on the Web that don't seem like hocus-pocus. (I haven't tried any that do). If anyone has heard of a related problem that has had a solution, I'd like to know of it, because I have had a lifelong sweet tooth, and now I can't enjoy the foods I have always most liked.

Martin

bnhpct · March 5, 2018, 2:45pm

[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-05_09:42:34 ET]

Interesting! Such things can be induced by hypnosis; perhaps they can be restored likewise.

Eriksonian hypnosis is a dialog with capacities outside the person’s conscious awareness. If there were some function within you concerned with avoiding the pernicious cycle of hypoglycemia followed by diabetes this reversal of qualia would be an effective means of controlling that variable at zero. Are not alcoholics sometimes given a substance that gives alcohol a disgusting taste?

This is rampant speculation, of course. Cum grano salis. Unless the salt has lost its savour …

···

On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 11:51 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2018.03.04.23.22]

Very occasionally on CSGnet, the word “qualia” is mentioned. If I understand the word correctly, it refers to the conscious experience of some perception, such as “redness”. Since conscious experience is not treated within PCT, at not in any way that is generally agreed, I wonder if it might not be at the heart of an issue that has come up: whether “the taste of lemonade” is in the environment. I have been on one side of this argument, saying that it must exist in the environment, arguing that I can alter the constituents of a solution so that another person will say that it has or has not “the taste of lemonade” as one of its properties. Others have said that “Yes you can do that, but the actual taste is not ‘out there’. Only the property of being able to evoke that taste in different people is actually in the environment.”

If the conscious experience of drinking that liquid is (or is not) “the taste of lemonade”, then PCT says nothing about whether anything corresponding to the taste existing in the environment in the way that the relative location of two objects may do. The argument has been at cross purposes, because PCT says nothing about conscious experiences and their relationship to control. Indeed over the years, there have been occasional papers reporting a timing problem, in that action for controlling at least some perceptions begins before the experience becomes conscious. I don’t know how you would do a PCT study to validate those reports, but at least they are suggestive that there may be a problem.

========

I bring up this subject now because of Alex’s question about sickness seemed to tie in with my own experience with the qualia of taste. Almost a year ago, rather suddenly things that had tasted sweet began to taste bitter. Sugar on the tongue tasted (and still tastes) very bitter. That’s qualia, The substance still is sensed by the taste buds, but it produces a different conscious experience. However, if something has a combination of normally bitter with normally sweet, such as coffee with sugar, quite often I do taste sweet along with bitter. As a result I cannot rely on my tasting things I cook if I want to serve them to guests, unless I use a tried and true recipe. I cannot say that the taste of anything as I experience it will be labelled similarly by anyone else. A solution that has “the taste of lemonade” to most people probably will not, to me.

The point of mentioning this on CSGnet is to re-emphasise the importance of distinguishing between the operation of the control hierarchy and the experience we have when consciously controlling anything. What you see (hear, taste, feel) may not be what you get. Nor may control.

By the way, my doctor and an ENT specialist have suggested taking various vitamin and mineral supplements, but none of them have had any effect over the year. Nor have any of the suggestions on the Web that don’t seem like hocus-pocus. (I haven’t tried any that do). If anyone has heard of a related problem that has had a solution, I’d like to know of it, because I have had a lifelong sweet tooth, and now I can’t enjoy the foods I have always most liked.

Martin

rupert · March 6, 2018, 6:22pm

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.06 18.25)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.04.23.22]

I think we’ve been here before, but are you taking the position that
all perceptions, of which taste is one, exist in the environment? In the case of random dot stereograms, in what sense could the
dolphin (say) or the perception of the dolphin be said to be in the
environment? You can perceive or not perceive the dolphin simply by
changing the focus of the eye’s; nothing in the environment changes.
This indicates to me that it is something internal that is being
controlled. Doesn’t that demonstrate that the perception is ‘in here’, as it is
not the environment has changed, but something inside?
Regards,
Rupert

···

  Very
occasionally on CSGnet, the word “qualia” is mentioned. If I
understand the word correctly, it refers to the conscious
experience of some perception, such as “redness”. Since conscious
experience is not treated within PCT, at not in any way that is
generally agreed, I wonder if it might not be at the heart of an
issue that has come up: whether “the taste of lemonade” is in the
environment. I have been on one side of this argument, saying that
it must exist in the environment, arguing that I can alter the
constituents of a solution so that another person will say that it
has or has not “the taste of lemonade” as one of its properties.
Others have said that “Yes you can do that, but the actual taste
is not ‘out there’. Only the property of being able to evoke that
taste in different people is actually in the environment.”

  I
bring up this subject now because of Alex’s question about
sickness seemed to tie in with my own experience with the qualia
of taste. Almost a year ago, rather suddenly things that had
tasted sweet began to taste bitter. Sugar on the tongue tasted
(and still tastes) very bitter. That’s qualia, The substance still
is sensed by the taste buds, but it produces a different conscious
experience.

MartinT · March 6, 2018, 7:58pm

[Martin Taylor 2018.03.06.14.21]

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.06 18.25)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.04.23.22]

Very occasionally on CSGnet, the word "qualia" is mentioned. If I understand the word correctly, it refers to the conscious experience of some perception, such as "redness". Since conscious experience is not treated within PCT, at not in any way that is generally agreed, I wonder if it might not be at the heart of an issue that has come up: whether "the taste of lemonade" is in the environment. I have been on one side of this argument, saying that it must exist in the environment, arguing that I can alter the constituents of a solution so that another person will say that it has or has not "the taste of lemonade" as one of its properties. Others have said that "Yes you can do that, but the actual taste is not 'out there'. Only the property of being able to evoke that taste in different people is actually in the environment."

I think we've been here before, but are you taking the position that all perceptions, of which taste is one, exist in the environment?

I was actually going in an orthogonal direction, using my experience to dissociate conscious qualia from controlled perceptions. I tried to make clear in the quoted paragraph that this dissociation might resolve what seemed at the time to be two opposed views, but may actually have been talking about two quite different things.

In the case of random dot stereograms, in what sense could the dolphin (say) or the perception of the dolphin be said to be in the environment? You can perceive or not perceive the dolphin simply by changing the focus of the eye's; nothing in the environment changes. This indicates to me that it is something internal that is being controlled.

I don't see anything being controlled in that situation, any more than it is when you look at or look away from something to see or not see it. Certainly the reference for where to look depends on whether you want to see it or not, but that has no bearing on whether it is there or not. Nelson's putting the telescope to his blind eye did not influence what flags were being displayed. The same kind of thing happens at many levels of perception, and I don't think any of them bears on the real reality of the environment.

In the specific case of a dot stereogram, someone controlled for the dots to be arranged with specific relationships between the "random" arrays presented to the two eyes. So what would be in your environment. Certainly not a real swimming dolphin, any more than there is a dolphin when you look at a photograph of one. What there is, is a set of relationships among sensory variables that produces the effect of there being a picture of a dolphin. That set of relationships can be asserted to be in the environment, but it is no more there than are the dots in each display, or more importantly the reference values in the person who wanted to show you the picture.

I bring up this subject now because of Alex's question about sickness seemed to tie in with my own experience with the qualia of taste. Almost a year ago, rather suddenly things that had tasted sweet began to taste bitter. Sugar on the tongue tasted (and still tastes) very bitter. That's qualia, The substance still is sensed by the taste buds, but it produces a different conscious experience.

Doesn't that demonstrate that the perception is 'in here', as it is not the environment has changed, but something inside?

That's my point. The qualia, conscious perceptions such as the quality of being red or of being democratic, are not in the perceptual hierarchy, so the question of whether conscious perceptions are of things "out there" is not relevant to the question of whether our perceptual hierarchy tends to reorganize to produce perceptions of patterns that are out there. That point is emphasized if you accept the often posited notion that conscious perceptions are related to failures or difficulties in the control of perceptions being controlled at that moment.

On that, my current position (which may disagree with some things I have said over the years) is that reorganization tends to improve control, and it builds on structures determined for the individual by evolution. If the ancestors had controlled perceptions that did not conform to the real reality of their local environments, they would have been less likely to produce descendants than would similar entities whose controlled perceptions did correspond to aspects of real reality. So your built-in perceptual functions are highly likely to correspond to properties of the environment that are really "out these." (Aside: that probability is higher, the fewer offspring any one parent of the species has on average, because for a stable population size, only one per parent can survive, and most populations don't change dramatically within one or two generations, even allowing for the Lotke-Volterra relationships among some predator-prey species).

The same is true of perceptual functions reorganized within the individual's lifetime that build on the evolved ones. In the process of reorganization, we may well have periods in which we construct perceptions that do not correspond to real reality, but we will not be able to control those perceptions as well as we control those that do, which implies that perceptual functions that stick around are likely to correspond to things that are "out there." Perceptual functions that produce poorly controlled perceptions are likely to be transient, though they will exist, with a greater likelihood of existing at any moment the higher you go in the hierarchy.

Bottom line, the nearer in the hierarchy are the perceptions to the sensors, the more likely they are to correspond to something "out there", though none are guaranteed to do so at all times. The experiences of conscious perception are irrelevant to this question.

Martin

···

Regards,
Rupert

rsmarken · March 8, 2018, 5:11pm

[Rick Marken 2018-03-08_09:11:16]

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.06 18.25)]

RY: In the case of random dot stereograms, in what sense could the dolphin (say) or the perception of the dolphin be said to be in the environment? You can perceive or not perceive the dolphin simply by changing the focus of the eye's; nothing in the environment changes. This indicates to me that it is something internal that is being controlled.

RM: The perception of a figure (such as a dolphin) in a random dot stereogram is, like all perceptions, a function of variables in the environment, which are the images presented to each eye. In the case of the stereogram, the environmental variables of which the perception is a function are the degrees of binocular disparity between corresponding points in each image. The perception exists only in a system (such as a human being or properly programmed computer) that has the functional ability to "compute" this perception; in this case, the ability to compute the degree of disparity between corresponding points in the two images of the stereogram . But the perception can exist only if the appropriate environmental variables are present, in this case the two random dot images with the appropriate disparities.
RM: By the way, if you have an interest in explorations of perception using random dot stereograms I highly recommend the book "Foundations of Cyclopean Perception" by Bela Julesz, one of my favorite books in grad school.Â
Best
Rick

···

--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.â?
Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

rupert · March 11, 2018, 2:09pm

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.11 14.10)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.06.14.21]

Well, we vary our focus (muscle tensions) until we see the “object”
and maintain that state to continue perceiving what we see. It seems
a classic case of perceptual control to me. The only difference
perhaps is that the perception is binary rather than continuous. In
this case no environmental variables are changing or being
manipulated. So, it, also seems to me, is a clear demonstration that
perceptions are internal.
Noone is questioning the reality of the environment, but the reality
of perceptions. I.e. perceptions are only internal, though they may
be based upon external constituents.
Ok, I think we are in agreement then. But that doesn’t seem to tally
with your statement above regarding taste," I have been on one side
of this argument, saying that it must exist in the environment".
Yes, but they are still just perceptions. They exist only in the
brain. They are of a very different nature to what is in the
environment. Without brains perceptions do not exist. Perceptions
may exist when the thing to which they supposedly correspond does
not; as demonstrated by the RDS’s, or the face on Mars, or the Ames
room. One of the great implications that I take from PCT, in
contrast to other theories on perception, is that perception is not
about finding and extracting information that already exists in the
environment but perceptions are new perspectives on the world, that
the organism controls, in order to counteract disturbances to its
survival.
We are in agreement; I think.
Rupert

···

    [From Rupert Young (2018.03.06 18.25)]




    (Martin Taylor 2018.03.04.23.22]
      Very occasionally on CSGnet, the word
“qualia” is mentioned. If I understand the word correctly, it
refers to the conscious experience of some perception, such as
“redness”. Since conscious experience is not treated within
PCT, at not in any way that is generally agreed, I wonder if
it might not be at the heart of an issue that has come up:
whether “the taste of lemonade” is in the environment. I have
been on one side of this argument, saying that it must exist
in the environment, arguing that I can alter the constituents
of a solution so that another person will say that it has or
has not “the taste of lemonade” as one of its properties.
Others have said that “Yes you can do that, but the actual
taste is not ‘out there’. Only the property of being able to
evoke that taste in different people is actually in the
environment.”
    I think we've been here before, but are you taking the position
that all perceptions, of which taste is one, exist in the
environment?
  I was actually going in an orthogonal direction, using my
experience to dissociate conscious qualia from controlled
perceptions. I tried to make clear in the quoted paragraph that
this dissociation might resolve what seemed at the time to be two
opposed views, but may actually have been talking about two quite
different things.
    In the case of random dot stereograms, in what sense could the
dolphin (say) or the perception of the dolphin be said to be in
the environment? You can perceive or not perceive the dolphin
simply by changing the focus of the eye’s; nothing in the
environment changes. This indicates to me that it is something
internal that is being controlled.
  I don't see anything being controlled in that situation, any more
than it is when you look at or look away from something to see or
not see it.

  Certainly
the reference for where to look depends on whether you want to see
it or not, but that has no bearing on whether it is there or not.
Nelson’s putting the telescope to his blind eye did not influence
what flags were being displayed. The same kind of thing happens at
many levels of perception, and I don’t think any of them bears on
the real reality of the environment.

  In
the specific case of a dot stereogram, someone controlled for the
dots to be arranged with specific relationships between the
“random” arrays presented to the two eyes. So what would be in
your environment. Certainly not a real swimming dolphin, any more
than there is a dolphin when you look at a photograph of one. What
there is, is a set of relationships among sensory variables that
produces the effect of there being a picture of a dolphin. That
set of relationships can be asserted to be in the environment, but
it is no more there than are the dots in each display, or more
importantly the reference values in the person who wanted to show
you the picture.
      I bring up this subject now because of
Alex’s question about sickness seemed to tie in with my own
experience with the qualia of taste. Almost a year ago, rather
suddenly things that had tasted sweet began to taste bitter.
Sugar on the tongue tasted (and still tastes) very bitter.
That’s qualia, The substance still is sensed by the taste
buds, but it produces a different conscious experience.
    Doesn't that demonstrate that the perception is 'in here', as it
is not the environment has changed, but something inside?
  That's my point.

  The
same is true of perceptual functions reorganized within the
individual’s lifetime that build on the evolved ones. In the
process of reorganization, we may well have periods in which we
construct perceptions that do not correspond to real reality, but
we will not be able to control those perceptions as well as we
control those that do, which implies that perceptual functions
that stick around are likely to correspond to things that are “out
there.” Perceptual functions that produce poorly controlled
perceptions are likely to be transient, though they will exist,
with a greater likelihood of existing at any moment the higher you
go in the hierarchy.

  Bottom
line, the nearer in the hierarchy are the perceptions to the
sensors, the more likely they are to correspond to something “out
there”, though none are guaranteed to do so at all times. The
experiences of conscious perception are irrelevant to this
question.

MartinT · March 11, 2018, 9:38pm

[Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.11 14.10)]

...

Bottom line, the nearer in the hierarchy are the perceptions to the sensors, the more likely they are to correspond to something "out there", though none are guaranteed to do so at all times. The experiences of conscious perception are irrelevant to this question.

We are in agreement; I think.

Rupert

I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.

1. The word "perception" always and only refers to something internal to an organism.
2. Perceptions are variable.
3. In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.
4. We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.
5. Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
5b. data from memory of past perceptions
5c. data from imagination.
5d. "Noise" (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).
6. The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.
7. The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.

I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.

(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not "in sight". For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever "tested-by-controlling" validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.

I hope that you agree with at least some of this.

Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.

Martin

PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO · March 12, 2018, 1:26am

Provide me a PCT explanation of two things:

How is DNA made
How did eukaryoticity begin

···

On Sunday, March 11, 2018, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.11 14.10)]

…

Bottom line, the nearer in the hierarchy are the perceptions to the sensors, the more likely they are to correspond to something “out there”, though none are guaranteed to do so at all times. The experiences of conscious perception are irrelevant to this question.

We are in agreement; I think.

Rupert

I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.

The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.

Perceptions are variable.

In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.

We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.

Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:

5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation

5b. data from memory of past perceptions

5c. data from imagination.

5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).

The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.

The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.

I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.

(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.

(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.

(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.

(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.

(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.

I hope that you agree with at least some of this.

Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.

Martin

MartinT · March 12, 2018, 3:30am

[Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.23.15]

What brings PCT into those questions? I guess if you are a theist it

might, because the God who was responsible would have been
controlling its perceptions, but from a scientific viewpoint, I’d be
interested if you could fit either of those things into a PCT frame.
Insofar as control is a signature of life, and those are aspects of
life, I can imagine a possible reason why you might ask, but not
everything in life is a control loop. Some of it is just chemistry
and physics.
As for eucaryoticity, my notion is that it is an ordinary example of
evolution. Two independent kinds of entity had mutually beneficial
side-effect loops – mutual symbiotes – and the benefits were
greater if they were within the same membrane, so if that happened
by chance it would have a survival benefit and the ones that could
pass on the common-membrane arrangement to their descendants would
have a good chance of surviving into the long future.
But that’s nothing to do with PCT, except for the fact that the
mutually beneficial side-effects loops are byproducts of control,
and the benefits are in the enhancement of the control operations of
both partners.We can see similar effects in the benefits of the
symbiotic relations among specialized trades in a society. At least
until recently, the benefits were greater the closer the ones
getting the benefits lived to the ones generating them. A network of
such “closer-the-better” links will tend to evolve into formal
organizations, close communities, and towns.
Martin

···

On 2018/03/11 9:26 PM, PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN wrote:

  Provide
me a PCT explanation of two things:

How is DNA made

How did eukaryoticity begin

    On Sunday, March 11, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net        >
wrote:
      [Martin
Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]
[From Rupert Young (2018.03.11 14.10)]
        ...
          Bottom line, the nearer in the hierarchy are the
perceptions to the sensors, the more likely they are to
correspond to something “out there”, though none are
guaranteed to do so at all times. The experiences of
conscious perception are irrelevant to this question.
        We are in agreement; I think.



        Rupert
      I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition.
Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points,
ordered as best I can according to the probability you would
agree with them.
      1. The word "perception" always and only refers to something
internal to an organism.
      2. Perceptions are variable.

      3. In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control
Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured
in scalar variables.
      4. We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms
that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than
with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday
usage.
      5. Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be
divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
          5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much
transformation
          5b. data from memory of past perceptions

          5c. data from imagination.

          5d. "Noise" (variations within the organism that have no
direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state
neural firings).
      6. The question at issue is whether any particular perception
corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside
the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.
      7. The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate
to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the
variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions
that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of
the perception at any one moment.
      I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I
currently think.
      (A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two
contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel
perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of
perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable
through actions on real reality.
      (B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual
functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination
rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex
perceptual control structures within living species. The
perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary
time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of
the environment such as the gravitational constant,
atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission
of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of
different elements.
      (C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and
go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker
than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the
higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely
to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large
number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to
anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because
they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict
with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of
either of is attempted.
      (D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are
turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual
values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am
not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio
door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control
that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a
blank wall.
      (E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time
goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at
different rates for different perception, but generally more
slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The
perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling”
validity it had initially, but the value becomes more
uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs
in the real world.
      I hope that you agree with at least some of this.



      Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no
longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to
offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the
distinction between conscious perceptual experience and
perceptions in the control hierarchy.
      Martin

rupert · March 12, 2018, 4:56pm

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with
my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that
“taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point,
and the others?
Regards,
Rupert

···

  I
hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me
to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best
I can according to the probability you would agree with them.
  1. The word "perception" always and only refers to something
internal to an organism.

  2.
Perceptions are variable.
  3. In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory
(HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar
variables.
  4. We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that
can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with
concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.
  5. Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided
into three categories that are exhaustive:
      5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much
transformation
      5b. data from memory of past perceptions


      5c. data from imagination.


      5d. "Noise" (variations within the organism that have no
direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state
neural firings).
  6. The question at issue is whether any particular perception
corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the
organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.
  7. The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to
that nature of the variable or to the current value of the
variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions
that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the
perception at any one moment.
  I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I
currently think.
  (A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two
contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel
perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual
functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions
on real reality.
  (B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual
functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate,
leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex
perceptual control structures within living species. The
perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time
tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the
environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric
pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way
of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
  (C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go
more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than
failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher
levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have
been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of
perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real
reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested
in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly
high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
  (D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned
away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when
they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room,
I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto
a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by
phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
  (E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by
since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different
rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the
higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual
function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had
initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a
representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.
  I hope that you agree with at least some of this.




  Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no
longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer
an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the
distinction between conscious perceptual experience and
perceptions in the control hierarchy.
  Martin

FredNickols · March 12, 2018, 5:17pm

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]

Hmm. Let me get in on this one.

Suppose there are three glasses on a table in front of us, Rupert. One is filled with light yellow liquid, one is filled with orange liquid and one is filled with a white liquid. We each take a sip from each glass and we agree that the light yellow one is lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and the white one is milk.

We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person. We agree on what each is and we can speculate that whatever they taste like to us they taste much the same to the other person. My taste is in me and your taste is in you. The lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are out there. Where is taste? As a concept or construct, it’s out there, too. As a sensory perception, it’s in you and it’s in me.

At least that’s what I think.

Now let’s see what Martin has to say.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 12:57 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Qualia

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.

The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.

A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that “taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the others?

Regards,
Rupert

Perceptions are variable.

In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.

We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.

Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
5b. data from memory of past perceptions
5c. data from imagination.
5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).

The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.

The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.

I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.

(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.

I hope that you agree with at least some of this.

Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.

Martin

MartinT · March 12, 2018, 5:28pm

[Martin Taylor 2018.03.12.13.08]

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]
    I
hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me
to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as
best I can according to the probability you would agree with
them.
    1. The word "perception" always and only refers to something
internal to an organism.
  A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line
with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that
“taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this
point, and the others?

As with everything I have ever done as a scientist, when the

evidence or further thought suggests that a position I held was
wrong, I stop supporting that position. I may not actively deny it
until the question comes up explicitly, but it then tends to go away
like any other perception whose control is not working. In this
case, the new evidence was my experience that although my
“sweetness” sensors still seem to be reporting when I present them
with sugar or something sweet, the conscious experience is
different. In earlier discussions, I had not distinguished between
the qualium (?) of “the taste of lemonade” and the controllable
properties of the liquid that influence the conscious experience.
That failure to separate the conscious experience from the
controllable perception was wrong (or that’s my current opinion).

Now, despite the conscious experience of that liquid changing, I

think I could still control the properties of the liquid so that
other people would have their usual conscious experience of
“lemonadiness” when drinking it. Since the conscious experience is
what I call “taste”, I had to contradict what I had earlier claimed,
that the “taste” was “out there”.

That's all there is to my "conversion", a normal correction that all

scientists must do from time to time, whether they like it or not.

      [From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313

ET)]

        Now let’s
see what Martin has to say.

  Fred, does this answer you?

Martin

···

  Regards,

  Rupert
    2.
Perceptions are variable.
    3. In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control
Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in
scalar variables.
    4. We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that
can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with
concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.
    5. Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be
divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
        5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much
transformation
        5b. data from memory of past perceptions

        5c. data from imagination.

        5d. "Noise" (variations within the organism that have no
direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state
neural firings).
    6. The question at issue is whether any particular perception
corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside
the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.
    7. The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate
to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the
variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions
that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of
the perception at any one moment.
    I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I
currently think.
    (A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two
contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel
perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of
perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable
through actions on real reality.
    (B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual
functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate,
leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex
perceptual control structures within living species. The
perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary
time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the
environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric
pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by
way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different
elements.
    (C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go
more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than
failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher
levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have
been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of
perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real
reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom
tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly
high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
    (D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are
turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual
values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am
not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio
door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control
that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a
blank wall.
    (E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes
by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at
different rates for different perception, but generally more
slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The
perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling”
validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain
as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real
world.
    I hope that you agree with at least some of this.



    Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no
longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer
an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the
distinction between conscious perceptual experience and
perceptions in the control hierarchy.
    Martin

rsmarken · March 12, 2018, 5:36pm

[From Rick Marken (2018.03.12.1045)]

···

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

  MT: I
hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me
to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best
I can according to the probability you would agree with them.
  1. The word "perception" always and only refers to something
internal to an organism.
RY: A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with
my own thoughts.

RM: Since we now have systems that do a pretty good job of perceiving speech and imagery it seems that defining “perception” as something in organisms is a bit last century.Â

RY: Though how does your previous statement that
“taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point,
and the others?

RM: Why not just define perception the way it’s defined in B:CP: A signal inside a system that is a continuous analog of a sate of affairs outside the system. So instead of saying just one kind of system --organisms – have perceptions west that any system (like a robot) can have perceptions as long as the system is capable of deriving signal that is a continuous analog of a state of affairs outside the system. So what is “out there” is the state of affairs that is the basis (or “argument”) of the system function that produces the signal that is an analog of that state of affairs.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

  2.
Perceptions are variable.
  3. In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory
(HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar
variables.
  4. We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that
can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with
concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.
  5. Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided
into three categories that are exhaustive:
  Â Â Â  5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much
transformation
  Â Â Â  5b. data from memory of past perceptions


  Â Â Â  5c. data from imagination.


  Â Â Â  5d. "Noise" (variations within the organism that have no
direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state
neural firings).
  6. The question at issue is whether any particular perception
corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the
organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.
  7. The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to
that nature of the variable or to the current value of the
variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions
that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the
perception at any one moment.
  I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I
currently think.
  (A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two
contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel
perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual
functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions
on real reality.
  (B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual
functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate,
leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex
perceptual control structures within living species. The
perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time
tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the
environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric
pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way
of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
  (C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go
more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than
failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher
levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have
been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of
perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real
reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested
in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly
high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
  (D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned
away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when
they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room,
I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto
a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by
phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
  (E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by
since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different
rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the
higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual
function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had
initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a
representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.
  I hope that you agree with at least some of this.




  Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no
longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer
an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the
distinction between conscious perceptual experience and
perceptions in the control hierarchy.
  Martin

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.â€?
Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

FredNickols · March 12, 2018, 5:41pm

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1341 ET)]

I think so, Martin.

Fred

···

From: Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:29 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Qualia

[Martin Taylor 2018.03.12.13.08]

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.

The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.

A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that “taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the others?

As with everything I have ever done as a scientist, when the evidence or further thought suggests that a position I held was wrong, I stop supporting that position. I may not actively deny it until the question comes up explicitly, but it then tends to go away like any other perception whose control is not working. In this case, the new evidence was my experience that although my “sweetness” sensors still seem to be reporting when I present them with sugar or something sweet, the conscious experience is different. In earlier discussions, I had not distinguished between the qualium (?) of “the taste of lemonade” and the controllable properties of the liquid that influence the conscious experience. That failure to separate the conscious experience from the controllable perception was wrong (or that’s my current opinion).

Now, despite the conscious experience of that liquid changing, I think I could still control the properties of the liquid so that other people would have their usual conscious experience of “lemonadiness” when drinking it. Since the conscious experience is what I call “taste”, I had to contradict what I had earlier claimed, that the “taste” was “out there”.

That’s all there is to my “conversion”, a normal correction that all scientists must do from time to time, whether they like it or not.

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]

Now let’s see what Martin has to say.

Fred, does this answer you?

Martin

Regards,
Rupert

Perceptions are variable.

In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.

We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.

Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
5b. data from memory of past perceptions
5c. data from imagination.
5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).

The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.

The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.

I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.

(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.

I hope that you agree with at least some of this.

Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.

Martin

PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO · March 12, 2018, 5:45pm

FN: We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person.Â

This is like saying Newtonâs laws donât apply equally for different people, which is not true. A muscular force acting against an object will generate the same reaction force for different people. Regarding the taste of lemonade, a sour molecule will generate the same sensation (given identical genetics) for different people. Consider the molecule miraculin (it makes sour taste sweet). Miraculin changes the weights of the inputs causing the taste to be a personal variable (not âout thereâ?). You can add whatever sour thing you want to make it taste like lemonade, but it will never taste like lemonade. You have no atenfel that you can apply to the drink. Unless that thing is a molecule that counters the effect of miraculin. Martin, you mentioned you cannot taste sweet/sour like you used to. This is a change in the weights of your perceptual functions (some of these weights have become 0). The taste of lemonade is a perception. It is something internal to an organism.Â

···

On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]

Â

Hmm.Â Let me get in on this one.

Â

Suppose there are three glasses on a table in front of us, Rupert.Â One is filled with light yellow liquid, one is filled with orange liquid and one is filled with a white liquid.Â We each take a sip from each glass and we agree that the light yellow one is lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and the white one is milk.

Â

We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person.Â We agree on what each is and we can speculate that whatever they taste like to us they taste much the same to the other person.Â My taste is in me and your taste is in you.Â The lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are out there.Â Where is taste?Â As a concept or construct, itâs out there, too.Â As a sensory perception, itâs in you and itâs in me.

Â

At least thatâs what I think.

Â

Now letâs see what Martin has to say.

Â

Fred Nickols

Â

From: Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 12:57 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Qualia

Â

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.

The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.

A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that “taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the others?

Regards,
Rupert

Perceptions are variable.

In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.

We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.

Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
Â Â Â 5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
Â Â Â 5b. data from memory of past perceptions
Â Â Â 5c. data from imagination.
Â Â Â 5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).

The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.

The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.

I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.

(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.

I hope that you agree with at least some of this.

Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.

Martin

Â

rupert · March 12, 2018, 5:46pm

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.45)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.12.13.08]

Thanks very much for the clarification. Order has now been restored
to the universe! (Or my perception of it anyway).
Regards,
Rupert

···

  As
with everything I have ever done as a scientist, when the evidence
or further thought suggests that a position I held was wrong, I
stop supporting that position. I may not actively deny it until
the question comes up explicitly, but it then tends to go away
like any other perception whose control is not working. In this
case, the new evidence was my experience that although my
“sweetness” sensors still seem to be reporting when I present them
with sugar or something sweet, the conscious experience is
different. In earlier discussions, I had not distinguished between
the qualium (?) of “the taste of lemonade” and the controllable
properties of the liquid that influence the conscious experience.
That failure to separate the conscious experience from the
controllable perception was wrong (or that’s my current opinion).
  Now, despite the conscious experience of that liquid changing, I
think I could still control the properties of the liquid so that
other people would have their usual conscious experience of
“lemonadiness” when drinking it. Since the conscious experience is
what I call “taste”, I had to contradict what I had earlier
claimed, that the “taste” was “out there”.
  That's all there is to my "conversion", a normal correction that
all scientists must do from time to time, whether they like it or
not.

FredNickols · March 12, 2018, 5:49pm

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1349 ET)]

How do you know itâ€™s the same sensation, Philip?

Fred Nickols

···

From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:45 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Qualia

FN: We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person.

This is like saying Newtonâ€™s laws donâ€™t apply equally for different people, which is not true. A muscular force acting against an object will generate the same reaction force for different people. Regarding the taste of lemonade, a sour molecule will generate the same sensation (given identical genetics) for different people. Consider the molecule miraculin (it makes sour taste sweet). Miraculin changes the weights of the inputs causing the taste to be a personal variable (not â€œout thereâ€?). You can add whatever sour thing you want to make it taste like lemonade, but it will never taste like lemonade. You have no atenfel that you can apply to the drink. Unless that thing is a molecule that counters the effect of miraculin. Martin, you mentioned you cannot taste sweet/sour like you used to. This is a change in the weights of your perceptual functions (some of these weights have become 0). The taste of lemonade is a perception. It is something internal to an organism.

On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]

Hmm. Let me get in on this one.

Suppose there are three glasses on a table in front of us, Rupert. One is filled with light yellow liquid, one is filled with orange liquid and one is filled with a white liquid. We each take a sip from each glass and we agree that the light yellow one is lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and the white one is milk.

We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person. We agree on what each is and we can speculate that whatever they taste like to us they taste much the same to the other person. My taste is in me and your taste is in you. The lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are out there. Where is taste? As a concept or construct, itâ€™s out there, too. As a sensory perception, itâ€™s in you and itâ€™s in me.

At least thatâ€™s what I think.

Now letâ€™s see what Martin has to say.

Fred Nickols

From: Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 12:57 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Qualia

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.

The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.

A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that “taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the others?

Regards,
Rupert

Perceptions are variable.

In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.

We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.

Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
5b. data from memory of past perceptions
5c. data from imagination.
5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).

The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.

The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.

I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.

(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.

I hope that you agree with at least some of this.

Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.

Martin

rupert · March 12, 2018, 6:04pm

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 18.05)]

(Rick Marken (2018.03.12.1045)]

That’s ok as far as it goes, for some cases, but I don’t think it
reflects the whole picture. As RDS’s show you can have a perception
for something that doesn’t exist; there is no external analog. There
is no shape in the environment that corresponds to the perception,
though there are the basic constituents which form the perception,
via the perceptual function (which is internal). All perceptions are
illusions!
No intention to be robotist, so agree, subject to what I said above.
Regards,
Rupert

···

            RY: Though how does
your previous statement that “taste” (which is a
perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the
others?

          RM: Why not just define perception the way it's defined
in B:CP: A signal inside a system that is a continuous
analog of a sate of affairs outside the system.

          So instead of saying just one kind of system
–organisms – have perceptions west that any system (like
a robot) can have perceptions as long as the system is
capable of deriving signal that is a continuous analog of
a state of affairs outside the system. So what is “out
there” is the state of affairs that is the basis (or
“argument”) of the system function that produces the
signal that is an analog of that state of affairs.

PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO · March 12, 2018, 6:41pm

Because I said the genetics are identical

···

On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1349 ET)]

Â

How do you know itâ€™s the same sensation, Philip?

Â

Fred Nickols

Â

From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:45 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Qualia

Â

FN: We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person.Â

Â

This is like saying Newtonâ€™s laws donâ€™t apply equally for different people, which is not true. A muscular force acting against an object will generate the same reaction force for different people. Regarding the taste of lemonade, a sour molecule will generate the same sensation (given identical genetics) for different people. Consider the molecule miraculin (it makes sour taste sweet). Miraculin changes the weights of the inputs causing the taste to be a personal variable (not â€œout thereâ€?). You can add whatever sour thing you want to make it taste like lemonade, but it will never taste like lemonade. You have no atenfel that you can apply to the drink. Unless that thing is a molecule that counters the effect of miraculin. Martin, you mentioned you cannot taste sweet/sour like you used to. This is a change in the weights of your perceptual functions (some of these weights have become 0). The taste of lemonade is a perception. It is something internal to an organism.Â

On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]

Â

Hmm.Â Let me get in on this one.

Â

Suppose there are three glasses on a table in front of us, Rupert.Â One is filled with light yellow liquid, one is filled with orange liquid and one is filled with a white liquid.Â We each take a sip from each glass and we agree that the light yellow one is lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and the white one is milk.

Â

We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person.Â We agree on what each is and we can speculate that whatever they taste like to us they taste much the same to the other person.Â My taste is in me and your taste is in you.Â The lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are out there.Â Where is taste?Â As a concept or construct, itâ€™s out there, too.Â As a sensory perception, itâ€™s in you and itâ€™s in me.

Â

At least thatâ€™s what I think.

Â

Now letâ€™s see what Martin has to say.

Â

Fred Nickols

Â

From: Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 12:57 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Qualia

Â

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.

The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.

A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that “taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the others?

Regards,
Rupert

Perceptions are variable.

In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.

We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.

Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
Â Â Â 5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
Â Â Â 5b. data from memory of past perceptions
Â Â Â 5c. data from imagination.
Â Â Â 5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).

The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.

The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.

I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.

(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.

I hope that you agree with at least some of this.

Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.

Martin

Â

FredNickols · March 12, 2018, 6:49pm

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1448 ET)]

How likely is it that the genetics will be identical?

Fred Nickols

···

From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 2:41 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Qualia

Because I said the genetics are identical

On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1349 ET)]

How do you know itâ€™s the same sensation, Philip?

Fred Nickols

From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:45 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Qualia

FN: We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person.

This is like saying Newtonâ€™s laws donâ€™t apply equally for different people, which is not true. A muscular force acting against an object will generate the same reaction force for different people. Regarding the taste of lemonade, a sour molecule will generate the same sensation (given identical genetics) for different people. Consider the molecule miraculin (it makes sour taste sweet). Miraculin changes the weights of the inputs causing the taste to be a personal variable (not â€œout thereâ€?). You can add whatever sour thing you want to make it taste like lemonade, but it will never taste like lemonade. You have no atenfel that you can apply to the drink. Unless that thing is a molecule that counters the effect of miraculin. Martin, you mentioned you cannot taste sweet/sour like you used to. This is a change in the weights of your perceptual functions (some of these weights have become 0). The taste of lemonade is a perception. It is something internal to an organism.

On Monday, March 12, 2018, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2018.03.12.1313 ET)]

Hmm. Let me get in on this one.

Suppose there are three glasses on a table in front of us, Rupert. One is filled with light yellow liquid, one is filled with orange liquid and one is filled with a white liquid. We each take a sip from each glass and we agree that the light yellow one is lemonade, the orange one is orange juice and the white one is milk.

We have no way of knowing what any of the three tastes like to the other person. We agree on what each is and we can speculate that whatever they taste like to us they taste much the same to the other person. My taste is in me and your taste is in you. The lemonade, the orange juice and the milk are out there. Where is taste? As a concept or construct, itâ€™s out there, too. As a sensory perception, itâ€™s in you and itâ€™s in me.

At least thatâ€™s what I think.

Now letâ€™s see what Martin has to say.

Fred Nickols

From: Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 12:57 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Qualia

[From Rupert Young (2018.03.12 17.00)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.03.11.12.43]

I hope this is true. But we should test that proposition. Allow me to paraphrase my current thinking in a few points, ordered as best I can according to the probability you would agree with them.

The word “perception” always and only refers to something internal to an organism.

A jolly good overview with which I wholly agree and is in line with my own thoughts. Though how does your previous statement that “taste” (which is a perception) is ‘out there’ fit with this point, and the others?

Regards,
Rupert

Perceptions are variable.

In the Powers hierarchical version of Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT), the variations of perceptions can be captured in scalar variables.

We are talking within the confines of HPCT, using terms that can be identified with concepts from HPCT rather than with concepts that the same words might evoke in everyday usage.

Perceptions have possible sources that can usefully be divided into three categories that are exhaustive:
5a. data directly from the senses, possibly after much transformation
5b. data from memory of past perceptions
5c. data from imagination.
5d. “Noise” (variations within the organism that have no direct relation with any of the above, such as resting state neural firings).

The question at issue is whether any particular perception corresponds to a variable in the external environment outside the organism, no matter the source(s) of its data.

The question raised in (6) is ambiguous, as it could relate to that nature of the variable or to the current value of the variable. The former is determined by the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions, while the latter is the value of the perception at any one moment.

I hope those are all agreed, and on that basis this is what I currently think.

(A) The processes of evolution and reorganization have two contrasting effects: (a) continual experiments with novel perceptual functions, and (b) continual elimination of perceptual functions that fail the test of being controllable through actions on real reality.
(B) Over evolutionary time, the creation rate of perceptual functions has on average slightly exceeded the elimination rate, leading to the increasing complexity of the most complex perceptual control structures within living species. The perceptual functions that persist longest across evolutionary time tend to be those that correspond to stable features of the environment such as the gravitational constant, atmospheric pressure, the colour of the sun, the transmission of energy by way of vibration, or the chemical affinities of different elements.
(C) Over individual lifetimes, perceptual functions come and go more quickly, but novel ones seem to be built much quicker than failing ones are eliminated. The result is that at the higher levels, where the perceptual functions are less likely to have been produced by evolution, an increasingly large number of perceptual functions will fail to correspond to anything in real reality, and fail to be eliminated because they are seldom tested in action, and nor do they conflict with other similarly high-level perceptions when control of either of is attempted.
(D) Perceptual values do not disappear when the sensors are turned away. The memory of them serves as their perceptual values when they are not “in sight”. For example, though I am not in the room, I still perceive that my kitchen has a patio door that opens onto a deck, and if I wanted, I could control that perception by phoning a contractor to replace it with a blank wall.
(E) Perceptual value memories become less accurate as time goes by since they were last refreshed from sensory data, at different rates for different perception, but generally more slowly the higher the level in the perceptual hierarchy. The perceptual function retains whatever “tested-by-controlling” validity it had initially, but the value becomes more uncertain as a representative of the current state of affairs in the real world.

I hope that you agree with at least some of this.

Probably the subject line should be changed, because we are no longer talking about qualia, which I brought up largely to offer an example of dissociation that serves to highlight the distinction between conscious perceptual experience and perceptions in the control hierarchy.

Martin