Question About Feedback Functions

Actually, you do have to know something about the components of the path from Qo to Qi in order to quantify the relationship between those variables. For example, in my ball catching model I had to know something about the optics connecting a fly ball to the fielder’s eye to know how the fielder’s movements (Qo) affect the image of the ball on the fielders (Qi). You don’t have to know everything about the path from Qo to Qi in irder to properly quantify the relationship between those variables – for example, I didn’t have to know the temperture and humidity of the air in the stadium where the fielder is making the catch – just the relevant ones.

So what are you investigating when you investigate environmental feedback paths? What do you find out by knowing something about these paths?

This is a little confusing so let me see if this is an example of what you are talking about: I control my perception of driving by pressing on the accelerator (Qo) to accelerate myself (Qi). So the car is the path that connects Qo to Qi and one of the components of that path is the starter. I walk out one morning and the car doesn’t start; it can’t implement the feedback function that connects my accelerator ro movement of the car. I call AAA and they identify the problem as a component of the feedback path that implements that function. Amazingly, they are able to control the condition of that component of the feedback path, bringing it to its reference state – they fix the starter. I get back in the car and start driving (controlling for moving). Is that an example of what you described above?

Thank you both Bruce and Rick, this detail is really helpful and I’m very happy with this explanation.

Hi again Bruce and Rick, I think what I’m worried about now, sorry, is that we have nothing in our close loop that provides the mathematical properties of the environment itself and it’s various potential feedback paths. All we have is the feedback function for a specific control variable but what we don’t have is that landscape of elements of the environment from which the feedback function is adopted. Going back to the example of the hammer, I can imagine a person rifling through a toolbox looking for a hammer and that to do this it will require a hierarchy control variables and the corresponding feedback functions to do so. However, we don’t have the toolbox itself and the tools in the model. Is that right? I’m also think of this in relation to body morphology which again provides feedback functions but where is the body itself that provides a potential for these feedback functions? I hope this hasn’t straight too much fun example of algorithms but I do think it is related. Bruce, I am aware this is where the concepts of atenfels and molenfels come in, but where are they in the closed loop?
Hope to hear from you on this one too!
Warren.

Yes.

You used your membership in AAA to implement control of the driver of a tow truck or repair truck coming to your car. You used your phone and the cellular network to implement ‘call AAA’ and to enable a conversation in which you invoked certain contractual agreements with AAA. Fortunately, the cellular network was functioning properly, thanks to some unknown number of people maintaining its functionality. Fortunately, your cell phone was charged thanks to ‘the electricity’ being ‘on’ in your house. What happens when you’re reading at night and the power goes out? Do you control a perception that someone will fix it? These are all in the environment along with much else that is necessary for that sequence to happen (you call AAA, they send a driver, the driver verifies your membership, diagnoses and fixes the problem). You won’t notice that you’re controlling a perception of the power being on, or the cellular network functioning, or AAA honoring the terms of your membership, until the power or the network fails, or AAA can’t find your record. Your capacity to resist disturbances to your control of these things by yourself is limited, but fortunately many other people are also controlling them, and some of them have access to means for implementing control which are inaccessible or unknown to you, and they have perceptual input functions and output functions that you have not created (for starters, think of the mechanic in that truck, his toolbox, and his skills, knowledge, and reference values recoverable from memory, a.k.a. ‘training and experience’).

You trust that a lot of things just work, and you trust that when they don’t somebody will fix them.

Here’s a pertinent essay by Bruce Schneier that I may have posted back in 2023 or 2024. It begins with a simple sentence. “Today, I trusted a lot.”

They are in the environment. They are what the loop is closed through in the environment.

Most of what we concern ourselves is sequences of control loops, sequences of sequences, some familiar from reiteration over time (a.k.a. habits), but even they are subject to ad hoc change if the perceptual inputs or the environmental means of implementing the usual next control loop are not available. I talked about sequences and planning in Manchester.

Hi Bruce,

I know they are in the environment! But where are they in the diagram?

Don’t worry. It’s all taken care of by that little line connecting output to CV. By the way, since the CV is a perceptual aspect of the environment, a relevant part of the line connecting output to CV – that is, a relevant part of the feedback function – is in the neural network that produces that perception. That is, the perceptual function must be considered part of the feedback function, as demonstrated in this paper.

They are in that line connecting output to CV and are best ignored. Espectially since they are only causing you worry.

Trust is an implicit aspect of ALL control. What we trust is that the feedback connections to the perceptions we control are RELIABLE. Of course, we don’t think of it that way as we go about the business of life. We just implicitly trust that what we do will RELIABLY produce the results we want: when I throw the switch to turn on the lights I trust that the light will come on; when I call AAA for help I trust that a mechanic will show up.

While trust is implicit in all controlling, I think we are more aware of the importance of trust when the feedback connection to the results we want are made up of other control systems: we are more aware of the trust involved in getting the mechanic to show than in getting the lights to turn on. I think that this difference in awareness comes from the fact that we know that there is a fundamental difference between living systems, like the mechanic, and non-living systems, like electric circuits. The difference is that the circuit implements a feedback function that is a causal link between output (switch) and input (light) while the mechanic implements a feedback function that is a purposive link between output (call AAA) and input (showing up); a link that has its own purposes.

Both causal and purposive feedback functions are unreliable to some extent. But we can control the reliability of causal feedback functions (it’s call reliability engineering) much more “reliably” than that of purposive ones.

So there is nothing in our PCT models that represents the relative accessibility of these pathways, their connectedness to one another, and their objective physical properties?

I think PCT does a pretty good job of representing the physical properties of feedback pathways but I don’t know what you mean by their “relative accessability” or “connectedness to one another”. Could you give me an example of the “relative accessability” and “connectedness” of a feedback path that should be represented in PCT models?

Hi Rick,
I’m thinking of the physical environment as modelled in the ball catching scenarios, or Bill’s little man demo, but this is quite modest compared to the actual physical environment; in a room it is the objects, their relative orientation and relationship with one another; in the digital world it is the connectedness between devices and the individuals using them. It’s the physical properties of a room that affect its acoustics, and its capacity to resist movement or crumble with great enough force. It’s the fractal structure of a tree or a building that forms its strength, its beauty or its use as a shelter. It’s the properties of water in the ocean and the movement of a wave as a surfer rides it, the air currents and their connectedness to the weather system….
I can see how elements of each of these environmental systems can be disturbances or feedback functions relative to an agent with respect to specific CVs; but where is the model of the environment itself independent of any specific agent - not as an internalised model within the agent - but as part of the environment in the PCT diagram? I think this is what Kent, Martin and Bruce used the terms attenfels and mollenfels for, but it still begs the question of where are they in the diagram along with the maths that approximates to their objective structure, dynamics and connectedness. Especially when thousands of agents potentially share the same objective environment…

Does that make any more sense?

Warren, such matters are not represented at all in the standard PCT block diagrams. That is why collective control is incomprehensible for Rick. To stay within the model as developed for control by an individual autonomous agent, collective control must be reduced to mutual disturbance of such agents by one another. Actual control of public aspects of the environment for the sake of their capacity to facilitate the private perceptual control interests of the several agents requires thinking through the problems of a PCT model in new ways. That project continues to be unacceptable to Rick.

He might ‘get it’ eventually or never. Either outcome is no test of the validity of that project. He is not the gatekeeper.

The Strait of Hormuz is a segment in a great many environmental feedback pathways for a great many humans. Model that.

Or if that’s too much, consider a pickup softball game involving a score of kids in which the only bat belongs to the second baseman and the only ball belongs to the batter who declined a pitch and the pitcher is telling him he’s out, so he proposes to take his ball home. Model control of the location of the ball.

Well, you could help me comprehend it a bit if you would explain Warren’s comment above. He seems to be saying that there is no model of the environment itself, independent of the agent, in the PCT diagram. And he also seems to be saying that the model of the environment in PCT is an internalized model within the agent. Is that right?

Help me out here. How can there be any model of the environment that is infependent of any specific agent. Models don’t create themselves. As for “collective control” I prefer “cooperative control.”

I think this is easiest to understand in terms of a PCT model of a tracking task. The model represents the mathematical relationships between the variables in the task. In a tracking task, the disturbance is an environmental variable that acts independently of the actions of the agent. And the feedback function is made up of the physical laws that are independent of the agent and connect the agents actions to the aspect of the environment under control. The other variables in the model are all properties of the agent; the perceptual variable, output variable, reference variable and controlled variable.

This model of the tracking task is the basic model of how all control works; a control system acts (by moving the mouse) on an external environment (computer display) to make otherwise independently varying aspects of that environment (disturbance driven cursor) depend on its actions in a way that is intended by the system (keep cursor in a reference state).

In B:CP the words “environmental function” and “environment function” occur four times, exclusively in the appendix.

k_e is not a variable, it is a constant. "The k-constants shown represent a linear approximation to the actual input-output relationships of the various functions involved. Thus for the input function, the constant ki relates the perceptual signal p to the input quantity q_i : P = k_i q_i " (p. 285; all page references here are to B:CP [2005]).

So k_e is a static quantity that “represents a linear approximation to the actual
input-output relationship” of the output quantity q_o to the input quantity q_i :
q_i = k_e q_o + k_d d

k_e is not something directly perceived in the environment, but k_e as a quantity controlled by the investigatory corresponds to some aspect of the environment. That aspect of the environment (whose effect is measured and quantified as k_e) is a one-segment environmental feedback path. It is the environmental feedback path through which the the effect which is measured and quantified as q_o traverses and becomes the effect upon the pertinent sensors, which are measured and quantified as q_i.

To answer again Warren’s prior question, the numerical value k_e is not present as such in the environment. It is a perception controlled by the person who measures it. The effect of q_o on q_i “is computable from knowledge of the environment function k_e which is observable” (p. 290). But k_e is in fact not directly observable. It can only be determined by measuring q_o and q_i and calculating the difference between them. Let’s look a bit more closely at how the formulae set that up.

“ki has units of signal units per physical unit, and ko has units of (other) physical units per signal unit. The environmental function ke has units of input per unit of output and the disturbance function kd has units of input per unit of disturbance” (p. 286).

So these constants have the property of transforming the ‘signal units’ of q_o into “physical units” and then transforming those “physical units” back into “signal units”, in addition to their quantitative function of stepping the large signal outputs to effectors into the signal inputs to receptors, which is typically a relatively quite small quantity unless push comes literally to shove.

But I believe that in practice—that is, in built and functioning models—a static value of k_e is found heuristically or perhaps given the value 1 (direct transfer of q_o to q_i). If anyone can show where models incorporate measurements in physical units, with k_o transforming signal units into those physical units and k_i transforming those physical units back inti signal units, then this challeng will have been refuted. Have at it.

Henry Yin and his students have measured signal units, but only at higher levels, not at the actual outputs directly at the individual motor fibers or the actual inputs directly from piezoelectric or photonic sensors. Arriving at a combination of e.g. all the motor nerve signals and ocular nerve signals involved in a tracking task surely has never been done so as to arrive at values of q_o and q_i in ‘signal units’.

As regards actual modeling practice these constants are idealizations which are important for any mapping from epistemic to ontological claims, but rather than actual measurements of properties of the environment they are inferred as a kind of mathematical fictions, imaginary perceptions controlled in the brains of modelers. Sometimes.

k_e is stipulated to be static in its influence upon the effect that q_o has upon q_i. So as regards the environment the formulae hold for laboratory conditions in which variability in that segment of the environment is controlled so as not to vary.

Isn’t it interesting that the disturbance d is not multiplied by k_e, even though the influence of the disturbance on q_i is also mediated through the environment. Instead, d is multiplied by a different constant, k_d. This k_d can therefore only be another environment function. So there are two functions representing properties of the environment mediating the influence of a variable upon q_i.

“The environmental function ke has units of input per unit of output and the disturbance function kd has units of input per unit of disturbance.” (p. 286).

Let’s make that more explicit, given the earlier account of what those units are.

“The environmental function ke has units of input [in signal units] per unit of output [in physical units] and the disturbance function kd has units of input [in physical units] per unit of disturbance [in physical units].” (p. 286).

The physical units for k_e and k_d must be the same, or else we could not "assume q_o and d to be linearly additive in their effects on the input quantity q_j so that
q_i = k_e q_o + k_d d "
(p. 286).

Somewhat different terms are used in Figure 5.2 on p.6:

In this representation, an important part is played by “physical laws”. Physical laws are quantitative relationships between measured aspects of physical phenomena which, at the specified scale of observation are currently understood by physicists (and others who understand them or merely believe them) to be inviolate. They are mathematical representations of rather abstract perceptions which can be placed in such relationship to present physical phenomena as to enable reliable predictions about them. They function as environmental feedback paths in the brain-internal environment of the higher-level control loops which employ them, but concepts and principles are not actually physically present in the environment among the “remote physical phenomena” depicted here.

Using the | character to represent the application of mathematical formulae to perceptions that the experimenter controls by measuring them in the environment (that’s how they become quantities):
k_o = “proximal results of muscle tension” | physical laws
k_i = k_e | “proximal physical stimuli”

k_e (here called “remote physical phenomena”) can only be more physical laws accounting for any difference between the output of (“proximal results of muscle tension” | physical laws) and the input of (k_e | “proximal physical stimuli”). True, it is also the locus at which the disturbance enters the loop, but it would be quite sensible, and simpler, to assign the physical laws entirely to the left and/or right of that entry point, set k_e=1, making it the only actual constant among the k family (except in strictly controlled laboratory conditions as noted).

Clearly, “physical laws” also intervene between “Cause of disturbance” and “remote physical phenomena”, though that is unstated.

Physical units persist through the physical laws and proximal physical stimuli on the left side of the diagram. The model term k_i is necessarily located in the input function. Recall the formulae for q_i and for p. This is entirely in physical units:

q_i = k_e q_o + k_d d

This transforms physical units to signal units:
p = k_i q_i

There is nothing in the environment that can do that; k_i is necessarily a property of the input function.

OK, so we have two segments of the environment which enable transmission of physical influences to receptors in the (peripheral) input function, where they are transformed from (k_e q_o + k_d d) physical units to (ki q_i) signal units. If the measurements that would yield values of k_e and k_d are never made in practice (my challenge above), then in practice the environment is ignored, and the effective formula is entirely in ‘signal units’

q_i = q_o + d

Wait a minute. You say d is in the environment? Then it must be in physical units. Well, yes, but d is only noticed as as an effect upon q_i. There is no measurement in physical terms and conversion from physical units to signal units. What? you say. But in a tracking model d is a variable quantity expressed as xy coordinates in the model. Yes indeed, in the same xy coordinate units as the perceptual signal p. I invite you to consider the relation of map to territory.

We should note that k_d is not a constant (except at the digital-computer fictional time t). It is a variable, and by obvious inference so is k_e. From p. 49:

The disturbance always calls for a response, even though as the organism moves about and as the environment changes, greatly different responses may occur as the effects of a given disturbance on the controlled quantity change.

Back to those two segments of the actual physical environment, one through which the control loop is closed from outputs measured in the aggregate as q_o to perceptual inputs to sensors measured in the aggregate as q_i, the other aggregating diverse paths through which unpredictable disturbances may affect the controlled input q_i. In experimental conditions which have been typical for building models, the investigator controls their perception of d to one path and one variable value. I will not belabor the problem that the aggregation of many into one is purely conceptual and not actual practice. Simplifying assumptions are necessary if one is to proceed at all. From p. 23:

The level of detail one accepts as basic must be consistent with the
level of detail in the phenomena to be described in these basic terms.
One can always, for other purposes, analyze further. If we wish to describe
the activity of the nervous system that correlates with the phenomena
of direct experience, and constitutes the inner component of
such behaviors as walking, talking, and execution of action patterns in
general, then it would be inappropriate to begin with an individual
neural impulse. No one neural impulse has any discernible relationship
to observations (objective or subjective) of behavior. Even if we
knew where all neural impulses were at any given instant, the listing of
their locations would convey only meaningless detail, like a halftone
photograph viewed under a microscope. If we want understanding of
relationships, we must keep the level of detail consistent and comprehensible,
inside and outside the organism.

The notion of p as a rate of firing is the same kind of necessary fiction. From p. 24:

As the basic measure of nervous-system activity, therefore, I choose to
use neural current, defined as the number of impulses passing through a
> cross section of all parallel redundant fibers in a given bundle per unit time.
The appropriateness of this measure depends on the maximum neural
current normally expected to occur in a given bundle of fibers. If the
maximum in a bundle of 50 fibers is 200 impulses per second in each
fiber, the maximum neural current will be 10,000 impulses per second,
and statistical variations will not be important at any level of neural
current in proportion to the whole normal range of operation (they
will be roughly 1 percent of the maximum, or less).

The use of neural current is appropriate, for example, in considering
the stimulation of a whole muscle, especially in terms of the forces
thereby developed on the tendons and thus on the bones. The impulses
going to the muscle arrive via hundreds of individual pathways,
each terminating on one tiny contractile fiber, but the net force developed
depends on all these parallel events, not on anyone of them. The
individual random twitches are averaged out.

The only quantity inside the nervous system that correlates with
the net force exerted by, say, the biceps muscle is the neural current
obtained by counting all the impulses reaching that muscle per unit
time. That is essentially the same as counting the impulses passing a
cross section of all the parallel motor-nerve fibers running from the
spinal cord to the biceps muscle. I am doing nothing more here than
formalizing a measure that is commonly used in neurology and physiology,
even if not instrumented with just this definition in mind.

Setting aside this necessary fogging of detail, let us return to the environmental referents of (q_o k_e) and d as the investigator’s controlled perceptions quantified aspects of the environment. They refer to realities in the environment. The subject control systems can also perceive these segments of the environment, and they can control their perceptions of them.

It is quite usual for a living control system to control their perception of that segment of the environment which transmits disturbances to their control, and they commonly follow that path of influence to its distal end to control a perception of the source of those disturbances.

It is also quite usual for a living control system to perceive a difference in the effectiveness of two environmental segments for reliably transmitting their q_o influences through the environment to their q_i controlled input, and to abandon one in favor of the other.

It is quite usual for a living control system to resist disturbances to the effectiveness or reliability of an environmental segment in transmitting their q_o influences through the environment to their q_i controlled input.

It is quite usual for control systems living in the same environment to use the same segments of the environment as means for transmitting their respective q_o influences through the environment to their respective q_i controlled inputs.

The aggregate effect of individuals’ resistance to disturbances to the effectiveness or reliability of an environmental segment in transmitting their respective q_o influences through the environment to their respective q_i controlled inputs is a very important aspect of collective control. On our mastery of this capability rests our survival as a species. Disclosing and enabling this mastery is in my opinion the most important task for PCT.

So do I, Fred, but it is not the only form of collective control.

I already understood that, Rick, but thanks for the example. I will give more thought to my question.

Sorry. I guess I didn’t understand your question.

Joe and I agree to roll the cue ball back and forth across the pool table a total of 10 times. We do so.

Is that not an example of cooperative or collaborative control?