[Chris Cherpas (originally, 951211.0918; now 951219.1212 PT -
my outgoing internet email was not working for a week)]
[re: > Bill Powers (951210.2145 MST)]
BP:
Here is a rat on a simple fixed ratio schedule. At first it does not
press the barQuestion 1.
Every now and then, the apparatus delivers a pellet of food. It is said
that these deliveries are "contingent" on the pressing of the lever. I
ask, therefore, what you mean by "contingent," and how you would go
about proving that the deliveries are "contingent" on the contact
closures. There are two steps to this proof: first, defining
"contingent" so it has an unequivocal meaning, and second, proving (with
experimental evidence, not just logically or by appeal to common sense)
that the evidence fits the definition.
cc:
The contingency has already been stated: FR. No food is delivered until
a fixed number of bar presses occur. Food delivery is contingent on x
number of bar presses. Now, you want me to prove with experimental
evidence that food is indeed delivered after x number of bar presses,
not just logically or appealling to common sense? Is this one of those
zen trick questions? I suppose we could experimentally prove this by
disconnecting the wires attached to the control mechanisms which deliver
reinforcement, change the computer program from FR to EXT, etc.; of
course, you don't need a rat to test whether the contingency is FR --
the experimenter can directly test out the equipment. Note: you can have
a contingency of FR1,000,000, in which case, the equipment would deliver
a food pellet after a million bar presses (contingency), but, in that case,
a rat will never be delivered food for exhibiting behavior satisfying
the contingency, because he'll never get to a million presses (so no rft).
BP:
Question 2.
As time passes, we observe that both the frequency of pellet delivery
and the frequency of lever-pressing increase, and that eventually both
frequencies come to a steady-state average value. It is said that a
pellet delivery "increases the probability" of a press, and that after
the steady state is reached, the continuing deliveries of pellets
"maintain" a steady frequency of pressing. I ask first that the concepts
of "increasing the probability" of a press and "maintaining" the
behavior be defined, and then (as in question 1), that a proof be
offered giving experimental evidence that there is in fact an effect of
the pellet deliveries on a "probability of pressing" or an effect that
"maintains" the pressing.
cc:
After the first pellet delivery or so, the rate of bar pressing is likely
to skyrocket. In terms of your question, it means the behavior will
increase in probability -- i.e., relative to the probability prior to receiving
the first pellet. Most everything after that is likely to be "maintenance,"
which you can prove by changing the contingency -- for example, to EXT.
I think in either case, the experimental design would be a version
of A-B-A: take away what looks to have caused the change, reintroduce
it, take it away, reintroduce it, etc. If not convinced, you could
then introduce something other than a food pellet, like a pellet of
shit, and see if it has the same effect -- probably not.
Did you need experimental evidence for this or just a method for
how one could get experimental evidence?
[re: > Bill Powers (951210.1725)]
BP:
In Killeen's paper to which I've been referring (Economics, ecologics,
and mechanics), we find this:Ecologics frames behavior as nested sets of systems or action
patterns, and motivation as regulation -- the defense of setpoints
within those system states.That is Killeen's representation of control theory, evidently. It is
mush.We were told
about this paper by someone who read it, but I don't know whether the
motivation was to reveal another case of mush, or whether the person
recommending it thought it had some serious content.
cc:
I brought the list's attention to this article because it's one of the
few places where control theory is referenced in a JEAB article. I thought
it would be of interest to make you aware of EAB work which makes potential
contact with PCT work. I appreciate your critique, although I regret any
discomfort or illness you experienced along the way. In future, I will
try to refrain from suggesting that anyone read anything of this kind...
On the other hand, instead of trying to find articles in JEAB which mention
control theory, it might be better to pitch you an article which represents
the way I tend to view reinforcement, at least quantitatively:
Vaughan, W. (1982). "Choice and the Rescorla-Wagner Model" in Commons,
Herrnstein, & Rachlin (eds.) _Quantitative Analyses of Behavior,
Volume II: Matching and Maximizing Accounts." ISBN 0-88410-739-6.
Reinforcement has been viewed as strengthening behavior in terms
of a monotonically increasing, negatively accelerated function since a long
time ago; your positive acceleration, runaway, interpretation indicates that
you do not actually study reinforcement before you pontificate on the subject
-- Skinner tended to insulate himself too. The qualitative statement,
"reinforcement increases the probability of behavior" stands with ease, both
by definition and by more empirically validated facts than the PCT research
program has produced within the same period of time (of course, many more
people work in EAB than in PCT). I am interested in seeing how
to integrate EAB and PCT because I see value in both. The formal similarity
between Bill's dB/dt = k1*(Co - C) and Vaughan's adaptation of Rescorla-
Wagner is intriguing. I suggest finding parallels here, not incommensurables.
Ironically, while EAB is being portrayed around here as part of The
Establishment, those within EAB do not see themselves as such at all
-- EABers feel THEY are the outsiders (but not relative to PCT, which
they've largely never heard of before). These two outcast/maverick
groups really _should_ join forces!
Again, the EAB tradition (a la Skinner) is to pretty much ignore what everybody
else is doing while building up an experimental/applied/interpretive
base purely within the behavior analytic framework.
BTW, the issue of intermittent reinforcement producing stronger behavior
is bogus and has not been a concern within EAB since before 1938. A choice
procedure makes it clear that intermittent is not stronger than continuous
rft. Also, a *choice* procedure lets you look at rft value in a more linear
way, instead of as negatively accelerated -- as you add rft more to one side,
but not the other side, the distribution shifts accordingly -- matching.
The matching law is the best known construct (but _not_ the only) in EAB for
quantifying rft value.
BP:
What reason is there for assuming that a reinforcer has any effect at
all on the behavior that produces it?
A reinforcer by definition has an effect on the behavior producing it.
Beyond that, have you ever trained a dog to do tricks, and when the
dog does it, you say, "good dog," and give the dog a treat? If you
have, you'll know the reason. But to pursue it further, you could
instead give the dog a piece of shit and see how well it performs the
trick in the future. Bill, are you sincerely saying you don't know
why anyone would think that certain consequences of behavior make them
more likely in the future? Or are you restricting your quest to understanding
what experimental procedures/methods would be used to prove that a certain
consequence was reinforcing?
Regards,
cc
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cc: [more recent notes...]