[Bruce Nevin 2018-09-01_12:22:44 ET]
This journal is more mainstream than the issue of phonology lab reports where it appeared before:
Katseff, Shira; John Houde; & Keith Johnson (2012) Partial compensation for altered auditory feedback: A tradeoff with somatosensory feedback? Language and speech 55.2:295-308. http://www.linguistics.berkeley.edu/~kjohnson/papers/Katseff_Houde_Johnson_2012.pdf
In general, linguists are not all that much involved with the idea that stimuli cause responses, though of course they swim amid those assumptions. Everything comes back to the judgments of native speakers, whether two utterances are ‘the same’ or different (contrast), whether a given utterance is normal or only in restricted contexts or not accepted as part of the language at all, etc. – so the focus is on perceptions. This often involves disturbing controlled perceptions (though they do not call it that) in order to elicit those judgments.
That said, conventional linguists are benighted in a different way that I’ll sketch in a minute.
There’s lots of stuff that I haven’t looked at in psycholinguistics and related cogsci. I don’t have ready access to the psycholx journals, e.g.
Cognition
Journal of Memory and Language
*Language, Cognition, and Neuroscience *
Also under the general rubric of experimental linguistics.
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199772810/obo-9780199772810-0112.xml
I only get two journals in the field, Language (the LSA journal) and the International Journal of American Linguistics (which mostly concerns indigenous languages of the Americas). I’ll look through the former for some reports of experimental work. I’m sure there is some qualified stuff, but pulling it out from under overbearing presuppositions is not easy.
So, with the implicit caveat that according to standards of the field I don’t know what I’m talking about, here’s a sketch of how ‘mainstream linguistics’ is confused with presuppositions.
In the CogSci triad of S and R mediated by cognitive processes, linguists are thought to provide the primo evidence about the cognitive processes, a window into the real “nature of mind”. Generative linguistics performs the ‘down the hall’ function for cog psych and cog psych returns the favor, so each has supported the other through their entire history. (Bill talked about the ‘down the hall’ phenomenon, where the guy you’re talking to realizes he has nothing but handwaving for some parts of his theorizing, ‘but that’s not really my specialization, Fred down the hall can explain that part to you. Just go talk to him’. So you go talk to Fred, but he, too, has some handwaving bits where he sends you off to others down the hall, etc.) There have been schisms in Generative linguistics and even apostasy, cognitive linguistics socalled being the main rival, and then there is empirical work with large corpora. Psycholinguists of any stripe assume functional modularity of brain/mind in a way which is directly inherited from Chomsky’s fundamental error of generating an abstract ‘syntactic structure’ (the syntactic component) and then figuring out how to connect words to that structure (the lexicon), with meanings connected to those words on the one hand (the semantic component) and sounds connected to those words on the other (the phonological component). Jerrold Katz and others promoted notions of modularity in the 60s and later. Current ideas about modularity are typified in slides 13-17 from Maria Polinsky’s presentation on research methods in experimental linguistics, where she identifies two “big questions”, Big Q1 and Big Q2.
http://paris2016.mariapolinsky.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tutorial-Psycholingx.pdf
Here are screenshots of these slides, in attached files named Modularity1.jpg … Modularity5.jpg.
···
On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:19 PM Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:
[Bruce Nevin 2018-09-01_12:11:29 ET]
It’s not in a high-impact journal, but the experimental work by Shira Katseff and John Houde that we’ve discussed before is an example that I have reformulated as a proposed PCT model.
On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 1:22 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:
[Rick Marken 2018-08-28_10:21:39]
Martin Taylor (2018.08.28.07.12)–
RM:Â I am preparing a talk for the IAPCT conference on PCT research
methods. I would like to include some examples of PCT research in the
talk. I have a few examples that I will include but I would like to
get as many as possible. So I’m writing to ask for references to some
good examples of such research.
MT: You have the 1999 PCT issue of IJHCS to which you contributed. I’m not
at home and I don’t have access to it at the moment, but I think you
will find about eight references there, covering a wide range of topics
from Bill and (?)Tom’s demonstration of perceptual control to control of
self-image and the design of interfaces for pilots.
RM: I should have been more specific. I’m looking for suggestions for research articles that are in relatively high impact psychological journals, such as JEP:HPP and Psychological Science. that describe research that, intentionally or not, can serve as a good example of how to do PCT research. I’m familiar with the research articles published by the “usual suspects” – people who are or have been on CSGNet, have come to CSG meetings in the past, etc. What I’m looking for are articles in high impact journals that are not done by “fans” of PCT but that seem to be reasonable examples of PCT research, even if not done on the basis of an understanding of PCT.Â
RM: By the way, I don’t intend to do a critical review of any of this research. I am only looking for (and will only include in my talk) examples of research that can be used show how PCT type research can be used to study different kinds of purposeful behavior.Â
Best
Rick
–
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery
