Requisite Variety (was Re: PCT and libertarian free will)

[Martin Taylor 2015.04.17. 09.54]

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.15.1750)]

Actually, it is. Let me see if I can answer your question to your

satisfaction.

First we describe the tracking task. Let's take the simplest one, a

pursuit task in which the subject uses a mouse to move a visible
cursor so that it lines up with a disturbed target. The subject can
perceive differences as small as one pixel between the two
left-right positions.

In the usual tracking task, the subject can move the mouse so that

the cursor can be placed to one pixel accuracy, and the cursor
location can be altered 60 times per second. There is requisite
variety all around the loop, to permit perfect control, so the only
limit on the actual control is the subject’s ability to perform the
task. That limit is determined by several factors, among which is
the loop transport lag. But we ignore that, and consider a
ridiculous extreme case in the other direction – or rather, a
parallel set of extreme cases, in which somewhere in the loop there
may be insufficient variety. In each of these illustrative cases,
the conditions are normal except for the change indicated.

···

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015 at 2:35 PM,
Nicolas M. Kirchberger oberon.nmk@gmail.com
wrote:

              NK: The law of requisite variety explains why

libertarianism is the best system to allow people to
maximize their perception control abilities.

          RM: Could you explain the law of requisite variety in

terms of a simple control task, like the tracking task.
The law of requisite variety is not a concept that is part
of PCT or control theory, for that matter.

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.17.1100)]

···

Martin Taylor (2015.04.17. 09.54)–

MT: Actually, it is. Let me see if I can answer your question to your

satisfaction.

RM: Actually, I still have no idea what the law means in terms of the variables in a control loop. I don’t think this law has anything to do with PCT becuase I have never seen any need to take this law into account when I build models of or do research on control systems. And Powers never mentions this law in his descriptions of PCT. Actually, I do think Powers referred to the law of requisite variety in discussions on the CSGNet so someone who can look through the archives might like to see what he had to say about it (and about Ashby as well). As I recall Bill criticized both the law of requisite variety (and Ashby’s whole approach to control theory) in his usual diplomatic way. But I would like to see what Bill actually did say about it.

Best

Rick

First we describe the tracking task. Let's take the simplest one, a

pursuit task in which the subject uses a mouse to move a visible
cursor so that it lines up with a disturbed target. The subject can
perceive differences as small as one pixel between the two
left-right positions.

In the usual tracking task, the subject can move the mouse so that

the cursor can be placed to one pixel accuracy, and the cursor
location can be altered 60 times per second. There is requisite
variety all around the loop, to permit perfect control, so the only
limit on the actual control is the subject’s ability to perform the
task. That limit is determined by several factors, among which is
the loop transport lag. But we ignore that, and consider a
ridiculous extreme case in the other direction – or rather, a
parallel set of extreme cases, in which somewhere in the loop there
may be insufficient variety. In each of these illustrative cases,
the conditions are normal except for the change indicated.

---------

Case 1: The mouse does not influence the cursor. In other words,

there is zero variety available from the output to the environmental
variable, the cursor. We call this “open-loop”.

Case 2: The mouse moves the cursor normally, but the subject cannot

see what it did until two minutes later. If the disturbance changes
by only a pixel every few minutes, control could be perfect, but if
the disturbance influence changes by a few pixels per second, there
is no control, and the situation is effectively open-loop, though
the loop is actually closed. There is requisite variety in the
spatial domain, but not in the temporal domain. The limit in this
case is in the path from the display to the controlled perception.

Case 3: The mouse moves the cursor and the perception is immediate,

but the mouse can only move the cursor to places separated by 10
pixels (e.g. to pixel …120, 130, 140, … from the edge of the
screen). The output variety is reduced by a factor of 10. The
subject could do nothing about an error that might be as much as 5
pixels. Control still occurs and is fast, but control is not as good
as it would be if the output had requisite variety.

Case 4: Exactly as in case 3, except that the disturbance now only

moves the target in 10 pixel increments, to locations …, 120, 130,
140,… from the screen edge. Control can be perfect, within the
limitations of the subject’s ability. The output variety hasn’t
changed, but the reduced variety of the disturbance has changed the
variety that is requisite around the loop. (If the target moves to,
say, …122, 132, 142,… There will be irreducible but constant
error. This is not a question of “requisite variety”, because the
error enforced by the offset doesn’t change).

Case 5: Everything as normal, except that the mouse is sampled and

moves the cursor only once per two seconds instead of 60 times per
second, to a new location determined in the normal way by how much
the mouse moved between sample moments. The disturbance moves the
target smoothly, as normal, and the subject perceives the
cursor-target difference normally, but control is poor because the
cursor only moves in a series of two-second-long steps. There is
insufficient variety in the temporal domain.

Case 6: Same as case 5, except that the disturbance moves the target

only once in ten seconds, with the steps synchronized with the mouse
sample moments. Control can be perfect, within the limits of the
subject’s ability. The variety around the loop is the same as in
case 5, but the requirement is less. There is requisite variety all
around the loop.

------



I hope these extreme cases give an idea about what is meant by

“requisite variety” in the context of simple tracking. At a much
more complex level, a novice chess player does not have sufficient
variety in her perceptions of winning and losing positions on the
board to win against a chess master who has been learning these
positions for a couple of decades and has dozens if not hundreds of
them in mind. “Requisite variety” applies to any and every part of a
control loop, but what is “requisite” depends on how good control
must be and on the variety in the disturbance. In case 3, for
example, if control is good enough with error as high as 6 pixels,
then the loop has “requisite variety”, but it doesn’t if pixel-level
control is wanted.

Nicholas has been writing as though "requisite variety" referred to

the number of different environmental feedback pathways through
which the control unit’s output might influence the environmental
variable. That kind of variety is important when we use PCT in
social analysis, because the more ways you can influence your
perception, the less likely it is that someone else’s side-effects
will block your ability to control. To be useful, however, each of
these different environmental paths of influence must individually
allow “requisite variety” of the Ashby kind.

Martin

              NK: The law of requisite variety explains why

libertarianism is the best system to allow people to
maximize their perception control abilities.

          RM: Could you explain the law of requisite variety in

terms of a simple control task, like the tracking task.
The law of requisite variety is not a concept that is part
of PCT or control theory, for that matter.

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.17.1150)]

RM: Here’s a pointer to a post from 1993 in the CSGNet Archives where Powers discusses the Law of Requisite Variety (LRV):

http://www.pctresources.com/CSGnet/Files/CSGnet_Threads/Questions_PCT.pdf

RM: I think it’s worth it to read the whole post but here’s the specific section on the LRV:

BP: c. What happens to Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety?

BP: I don’t use it, although it’s implicit in control theory. Variety is defined
by Ashby as follows:

“The word variety, in relation to a set of distinguishable elements, will be
used to mean either (1) the number of distinct elements, or (2) the logarithm
to the base 2 of the number, the context indicating the sense used.” (p.126 of
introduction to cybernetics).

BP: The Law of Requisite Variety states that the output of a regulator must have
at least as much variety as the disturbance, if the result is to be regulation of some variable. That is to say, the output must have at least as many
discriminable states as the disturbance has.

BP: **In terms of control theory, we would say that if a controlled variable is to
be maintained exactly at a reference level, the output of the system must be
at all times quantitatively equal and opposite to the magnitude of the
disturbing variable, both measured in terms of effect on the controlled
variable. **

BP: **Note that the control-theoretic statement goes much farther than the LRV goes.
It says that not only must the output have AS MANY discriminable states as the
disturbance, but that these states must have the correct quantitative
magnitudes, and they must occur in pairs: one specific output state for each
state of the disturbing variable. The output and disturbing states must be
quantitatively equal, and of opposite signs. So the LRV, while it states a
weak necessary condition, by no means states a sufficient condition for
control or regulation to exist. **

RM: The bolded text is my emphasis to show that Bill took the LRV to mean that the system output, o, must have as many states as the disturbance; that is, the range of variation (variety) int he states of o must equal that of d. As Bill goes on to note, however, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for control because “these states [of o and d] must have the correct quantitative magnitudes, and they must occur in pairs: one specific output state for each state of the disturbing variable.” That is, there is control only to the extent that o = -d. So the LRV is simply a statement of something that is already implicit in the two basic laws of control:

p = r (1)

o = -d (2)

RM: So I was giving too much credit to the LRV in my initial post where I said that it was just a re-statement of the fact that,in order to have control, o must equal -d (equation 2) In fact, the LRV just says that the range of variation of o must equal that of d; it leaves out the very important fact that, in order for there to be control, each value of o must also be equal and opposite to the the value of d to which it corresponds. A pretty important miss, I’d say.

Best

Rick

···

On Fri, Apr 17, 2015 at 11:03 AM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.17.1100)]


Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Martin Taylor (2015.04.17. 09.54)–

MT: Actually, it is. Let me see if I can answer your question to your

satisfaction.

RM: Actually, I still have no idea what the law means in terms of the variables in a control loop. I don’t think this law has anything to do with PCT becuase I have never seen any need to take this law into account when I build models of or do research on control systems. And Powers never mentions this law in his descriptions of PCT. Actually, I do think Powers referred to the law of requisite variety in discussions on the CSGNet so someone who can look through the archives might like to see what he had to say about it (and about Ashby as well). As I recall Bill criticized both the law of requisite variety (and Ashby’s whole approach to control theory) in his usual diplomatic way. But I would like to see what Bill actually did say about it.

Best

Rick

First we describe the tracking task. Let's take the simplest one, a

pursuit task in which the subject uses a mouse to move a visible
cursor so that it lines up with a disturbed target. The subject can
perceive differences as small as one pixel between the two
left-right positions.

In the usual tracking task, the subject can move the mouse so that

the cursor can be placed to one pixel accuracy, and the cursor
location can be altered 60 times per second. There is requisite
variety all around the loop, to permit perfect control, so the only
limit on the actual control is the subject’s ability to perform the
task. That limit is determined by several factors, among which is
the loop transport lag. But we ignore that, and consider a
ridiculous extreme case in the other direction – or rather, a
parallel set of extreme cases, in which somewhere in the loop there
may be insufficient variety. In each of these illustrative cases,
the conditions are normal except for the change indicated.

---------

Case 1: The mouse does not influence the cursor. In other words,

there is zero variety available from the output to the environmental
variable, the cursor. We call this “open-loop”.

Case 2: The mouse moves the cursor normally, but the subject cannot

see what it did until two minutes later. If the disturbance changes
by only a pixel every few minutes, control could be perfect, but if
the disturbance influence changes by a few pixels per second, there
is no control, and the situation is effectively open-loop, though
the loop is actually closed. There is requisite variety in the
spatial domain, but not in the temporal domain. The limit in this
case is in the path from the display to the controlled perception.

Case 3: The mouse moves the cursor and the perception is immediate,

but the mouse can only move the cursor to places separated by 10
pixels (e.g. to pixel …120, 130, 140, … from the edge of the
screen). The output variety is reduced by a factor of 10. The
subject could do nothing about an error that might be as much as 5
pixels. Control still occurs and is fast, but control is not as good
as it would be if the output had requisite variety.

Case 4: Exactly as in case 3, except that the disturbance now only

moves the target in 10 pixel increments, to locations …, 120, 130,
140,… from the screen edge. Control can be perfect, within the
limitations of the subject’s ability. The output variety hasn’t
changed, but the reduced variety of the disturbance has changed the
variety that is requisite around the loop. (If the target moves to,
say, …122, 132, 142,… There will be irreducible but constant
error. This is not a question of “requisite variety”, because the
error enforced by the offset doesn’t change).

Case 5: Everything as normal, except that the mouse is sampled and

moves the cursor only once per two seconds instead of 60 times per
second, to a new location determined in the normal way by how much
the mouse moved between sample moments. The disturbance moves the
target smoothly, as normal, and the subject perceives the
cursor-target difference normally, but control is poor because the
cursor only moves in a series of two-second-long steps. There is
insufficient variety in the temporal domain.

Case 6: Same as case 5, except that the disturbance moves the target

only once in ten seconds, with the steps synchronized with the mouse
sample moments. Control can be perfect, within the limits of the
subject’s ability. The variety around the loop is the same as in
case 5, but the requirement is less. There is requisite variety all
around the loop.

------



I hope these extreme cases give an idea about what is meant by

“requisite variety” in the context of simple tracking. At a much
more complex level, a novice chess player does not have sufficient
variety in her perceptions of winning and losing positions on the
board to win against a chess master who has been learning these
positions for a couple of decades and has dozens if not hundreds of
them in mind. “Requisite variety” applies to any and every part of a
control loop, but what is “requisite” depends on how good control
must be and on the variety in the disturbance. In case 3, for
example, if control is good enough with error as high as 6 pixels,
then the loop has “requisite variety”, but it doesn’t if pixel-level
control is wanted.

Nicholas has been writing as though "requisite variety" referred to

the number of different environmental feedback pathways through
which the control unit’s output might influence the environmental
variable. That kind of variety is important when we use PCT in
social analysis, because the more ways you can influence your
perception, the less likely it is that someone else’s side-effects
will block your ability to control. To be useful, however, each of
these different environmental paths of influence must individually
allow “requisite variety” of the Ashby kind.

Martin

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

              NK: The law of requisite variety explains why

libertarianism is the best system to allow people to
maximize their perception control abilities.

          RM: Could you explain the law of requisite variety in

terms of a simple control task, like the tracking task.
The law of requisite variety is not a concept that is part
of PCT or control theory, for that matter.

[Martin Taylor 2015.04.17.14.16]

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.17.1100)]

I'm sorry. I thought my examples would have made it very clear.

Let’s put it into even simpler terms.

You can't control more finely than you can see. You can't control

more finely than you can set your output. You can’t control faster
than you can change your output. If you don’t require control finer
than these limits, and if teh disturbance changes no more finely
than you can see or se your output, and no faster than you can
change your perception and your output, then you have “requisite
variety”. Otherwise, you don’t.

Have another look at my 6 cases. Maybe you will get some idea of

what the law means.

No, of course. You always make sure that you have requisite variety

when you set up up your experiments. Powers, for example, advocated
using a game controller joystick rather than a mouse, because one
can control the cursor more precisely with a joystick. You usually
make control more or less difficult by changing the characteristics
of the disturbance, not by compromising the ability of the subject
to see or to influence the cursor, because it seems self-evident
that if you set up a situation in which your subjects couldn’t
possibly control better than X, they won’t control better than X.
Then modelling the tracking behaviour will not tell you anything
about the subject. All you will get, if you get anything sensible
from the modelling, will be information about the parts of the loop
that limit the subject’s ability to control. You want those limits
to be within the subject, or there’s no point doing the modelling.

No, he didn't. And he didn't need to, because he was interested in

the usual control system dynamical analyses more than in situations
in which perception or output influence was compromised. He wanted
to learn how people and other living things control. But his
direction of interest need not blind us to other ways of looking at
the same control situation.

My memory is that he criticized Ashby's ideas on control in the same

terms as I would do, namely that Ashby said that you had to observe
the source of the disturbance and predict what it would do in order
to be prepared with an exact countermeasure. Ashby, in the paper to
which Nicolas gave a link, said:

···
            Martin Taylor

(2015.04.17. 09.54)–

            MT: Actually, it is. Let me see if I can answer your

question to your satisfaction.

          RM: Actually, I still have no idea what the law means

in terms of the variables in a control loop.

                          NK: The law of requisite variety

explains why libertarianism is the best
system to allow people to maximize their
perception control abilities.

                      RM: Could you explain the law of requisite

variety in terms of a simple control task,
like the tracking task. The law of requisite
variety is not a concept that is part of PCT
or control theory, for that matter.

          I don't think this law has anything to do with PCT

becuase I have never seen any need to take this law into
account when I build models of or do research on control
systems.

          And Powers never mentions this law in his descriptions

of PCT.

          Actually, I do think Powers referred to the law of

requisite variety in discussions on the CSGNet so someone
who can look through the archives might like to see what
he had to say about it (and about Ashby as well). As I
recall Bill criticized both the law of requisite variety
(and Ashby’s whole approach to control theory) in his
usual diplomatic way. But I would like to see what Bill
actually did say about it.

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.17.1155)]

···

Martin Taylor (2015.04.17.14.16)–

MT: Bill's mistake, I think, was in throwing the real baby (the law of

requisite variety) out with all the dreck-filled bathwater.

RM: Bill made no mistake. As you can see from Bill’s discussion of the LRV in my previous post, there is no baby there. It’s just bathwater;-)

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Martin Taylor 2015.04.17.15.06]

Two points based on the passage you quote.    (1) Bill didn't actually throw away the idea of the law of

requisite variety as I said earlier. He said it is inherent in
perceptual control. My memory was wrong on that score. (2) Bill was partially inaccurate in his description (at least as
you quote it), because he ignored Ashby’s partitioning of the space
of requisite variety into regions that represent and regions that do
not represent good control. If you include the whole thing, what you
get is pretty much a restatement of the requirements for good
perceptual control.
Martin

···

On 2015/04/17 2:55 PM, Richard Marken
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

rsmarken@gmail.com

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.17.1155)]

            Martin Taylor

(2015.04.17.14.16)–

            MT: Bill's mistake, I think, was in throwing the real

baby (the law of requisite variety) out with all the
dreck-filled bathwater.

          RM: Bill made no mistake. As you can see from Bill's

discussion of the LRV in my previous post, there is no
baby there. It’s just bathwater;-)

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.17.1245)]

···

Martin Taylor (2015.04.17.15.06)–

MT: Two points based on the passage you quote.

   (1) Bill didn't actually throw away the idea of the law of

requisite variety as I said earlier. He said it is inherent in
perceptual control. My memory was wrong on that score.

RM: To the extent that Bill actually “threw out” the idea of the LRV (he really just ignored it) he threw out the idea that the LRV is a law of control. The law of control is o = -d and PCT explains why that law is observed.

MT:    (2) Bill was partially inaccurate in his description (at least as

you quote it), because he ignored Ashby’s partitioning of the space
of requisite variety into regions that represent and regions that do
not represent good control. If you include the whole thing, what you
get is pretty much a restatement of the requirements for good
perceptual control.

RM: I don’t it at all… But assuming that that’s true then the LRV is simply a statement of the law of control that says o = -d. If that’s what the LRV really says then it didn’t seem to get through to those who think the LRV is some kind of existence theorem for “freedom”. There is nothing “free” about the fact that output must be negatively related to disturbance(s) to a controlled variable in order for there to be control. If you “freely” choose to produce an output that is not equal to -d there will be no control. I think that once you have PCT you can very comfortably live without the LRV. Well, I can. But if you like it, well, there’s no accounting for taste (actually, there is, isn’t there;-)

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

          RM: Bill made no mistake. As you can see from Bill's

discussion of the LRV in my previous post, there is no
baby there. It’s just bathwater;-)

[Marin Taylor 2015.04.17.17.35]

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.17.1245)]

No, he threw out the idea that control happens by predicting what

the multitudinous sources of disturbance will do to the
environmental variable if not opposed by a carefully calculated
counter-influence.

o = -d is actually what Ashby correctly said could not occur in

perceptual control. That’s what would happen if control were
perfect, and it was for that reason that Ashby discounted perceptual
control. That’s one of the things we always have to make sure people
trying to learn PCT must understand. Error never vanishes except in
passing between positive and negative in the process of getting p to
approximate r as closely as possible under the circumstances.

Even if it were possible for o to equal -d consistently, PCT

wouldn’t be explaining why it happens. Particular organizations of
the control loop allow one to compute how closely it is
approximated, but “PCT” merely is the theory that what we do is
control perceptions, not outputs or actions. It’s powerful enough
that way (my chapter for LCS IV is very long, and it just follows a
little of the trail of what that one statement implies). You don’t
have to add impossibilities as “the law of control” to make it seem
important. It just is.

Actually, it sets up limiting conditions. Ashby points out that the

unattainable ideal is o = -d, and says that because perceptual
control can’t reach the ideal, and in theory a perfect predictor of
disturbances could, one should prefer the perfect predictor as a
model for control.

Even though it posits an ideal limit, the law of requisite variety

could help in real situations. It may suggest, for example, where it
might be a good idea to use devices to augment your perception or
your precision or range of power to influence the environmental
variable. Limiting conditions don’t tell you what you actually do.
If you have requisite variety all round the exterior part of the
loop, any deviation from o = -d is a reflection of your internal
structure.

True.

Sure. I don't think I mention it in my chapter, but after this

discussion, I might.

So can I, but when people bring it up as an argument for or against

something, it’s as well to get it right so you know what they are
talking about and whether they are using it properly. I imagine that
there are conditions in which using the law of requisite variety is
the easiest way to solve a problem. The way I look at it, a
carpenter could work but would be pretty restricted if he had in his
toolbox only one saw, one screwdriver, and one hammer.

But then, you want to use only one tool, the Test for the Controlled

Variable, and you can do useful things with that. The law of
requisite variety doesn’t seem to interact with that tool, any more
than a theodolite interacts with a hammer.

Martin
···
            Martin Taylor

(2015.04.17.15.06)–

MT: Two points based on the passage you quote.

               (1) Bill didn't actually throw away the idea of the

law of requisite variety as I said earlier. He said it
is inherent in perceptual control. My memory was wrong
on that score.

          RM: To the extent that Bill actually "threw out" the

idea of the LRV (he really just ignored it) he threw out
the idea that the LRV is a law of control. The law of
control is o = -d and PCT explains why that law is
observed.

                        RM: Bill made no mistake. As you can see

from Bill’s discussion of the LRV in my
previous post, there is no baby there. It’s
just bathwater;-)

            MT:    (2) Bill was

partially inaccurate in his description (at least as you
quote it), because he ignored Ashby’s partitioning of
the space of requisite variety into regions that
represent and regions that do not represent good
control. If you include the whole thing, what you get is
pretty much a restatement of the requirements for good
perceptual control.

          RM: I don't it at all.. But assuming that that's true

then the LRV is simply a statement of the law of control
that says o = -d.

          If that's what the LRV really says then it didn't seem

to get through to those who think the LRV is some kind of
existence theorem for “freedom”.

          There is nothing "free" about the fact that output must

be negatively related to disturbance(s) to a controlled
variable in order for there to be control. If you “freely”
choose to produce an output that is not equal to -d there
will be no control. I think that once you have PCT you can
very comfortably live without the LRV.

Well, I can.

Thanks Martin!

···

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015 at 2:35 PM,
Nicolas M. Kirchberger oberon.nmk@gmail.com
wrote:

              NK: The law of requisite variety explains why

libertarianism is the best system to allow people to
maximize their perception control abilities.

          RM: Could you explain the law of requisite variety in

terms of a simple control task, like the tracking task.
The law of requisite variety is not a concept that is part
of PCT or control theory, for that matter.

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.18.1045)]

···

Marin Taylor (2015.04.17.17.35)–

MT: No, he threw out the idea that control happens by predicting what

the multitudinous sources of disturbance will do to the
environmental variable if not opposed by a carefully calculated
counter-influence.

RM: Yes,Bill showed that too. Actually, what he showed is that the unpredictability (and undetectability) of disturbance variables made it impossible to control by basing output on a prediction or, for that matter, on detection of these variables. Bill showed that the observed relationship between o and d (o = -d) is not a result of d being a response to o; it is a result of the system continuously acting to keep error (r-p) equal to zero.

MT: o = -d is actually what Ashby correctly said could not occur in

perceptual control. That’s what would happen if control were
perfect, and it was for that reason that Ashby discounted perceptual
control. That’s one of the things we always have to make sure people
trying to learn PCT must understand. Error never vanishes except in
passing between positive and negative in the process of getting p to
approximate r as closely as possible under the circumstances.

RM: That hardly seems like an important point. o = -d describes control with infinite loop gain. Actual control can get so close to this ideal that it is really of no consequence that o never really equals -d. Bill certainly didn’t think it was important to express this relationship using an “approximately equals” (~) rather than an “equals” (=) sign. For example, check out the output-disturbance equation at the top of p. 146 in LCS I: q.o = g-1[q.i*-h(q.d)]. This is exactly the same as o = -d with somewhat different notation: q.o = o, q.i = r = 0, q.d = d, g-1 = 1 and h = 1. Anyone who is at all familiar with PCT would understand that o = -d is a description of the relationship between o and d in an ideal control system. Expressed as a correlation, the correlation between o and d for this control system is -1.0. In reality, we know that the actual relationship between o and d that we observe in our tracking tasks is “only” -.99. So clearly, o = -d captures the actual observed relationship between o and d even when control is not perfect.

MT: Even if it were possible for o to equal -d consistently, PCT

wouldn’t be explaining why it happens.

RM: Of course it would. It explains it as the control system having infinite loop gain.

MT: Particular organizations of

the control loop allow one to compute how closely it is
approximated, but “PCT” merely is the theory that what we do is
control perceptions, not outputs or actions. It’s powerful enough
that way (my chapter for LCS IV is very long, and it just follows a
little of the trail of what that one statement implies). You don’t
have to add impossibilities as “the law of control” to make it seem
important. It just is.

RM: PCT IS control theory. So it’s a theory of not only what we control but how we control it and why. If what you say here is an indication of what you say in your paper in LCS IV then it’s a good thing (for you) that I’m not an editor.

MT: Actually, it sets up limiting conditions.

RM: The LRV sets up only one limiting condition which is that the range of o must equal the range of d for there to be good control. As Bill said in his post, this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The other far more important (because it is far more common) limiting condition is that o but be negatively correlated with d. Both of these conditions are implicit in the PCT description of the necessary and sufficient relationship between o and d needed for control: o ~ -d (using the “approximately equal” sign to keep the red herrings away).

MT: Even though it posits an ideal limit, the law of requisite variety

could help in real situations.

RM: It can help no more than knowing that o ~ -d. The LRV is really unnecessary and, because it leaves out the important fact that o must also be negatively correlated with d, quite misleading, as witness it’s misuse by Nicolas.

MT: It may suggest, for example, where it

might be a good idea to use devices to augment your perception or
your precision or range of power to influence the environmental
variable.

RM: To the extent that the LRV can do this, PCT sans LRV can do it, and do it better (as Annie Oakley would say).

MT: The way I look at it, a

carpenter could work but would be pretty restricted if he had in his
toolbox only one saw, one screwdriver, and one hammer.

RM: But the LRV is not a different tool than any already in the PCT toolbox.

MT: But then, you want to use only one tool, the Test for the Controlled

Variable, and you can do useful things with that. The law of
requisite variety doesn’t seem to interact with that tool, any more
than a theodolite interacts with a hammer.

RM: These vague analogies are really kind of annoying. I emphasize the TCV because the concept of the controlled variable is the most important contribution that PCT makes to our understanding of how behavior works. PCT shows that behavior is control and that it is organized around the control of perceptual aspects of an organism’s external and internal environment. Therefore, the most important goal of research based on an understanding of behavior as control is determining what perceptual variables organisms control, how they control them and why.

RM: The TCV is not a tool in itself; it is a goal of research. And achieving that goal requires the use of all the “tools” in the PCT research toolbox – which includes the methods of experimental science and an understanding of how to build working (dynamic) models of control systems.

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

          RM: To the extent that Bill actually "threw out" the

idea of the LRV (he really just ignored it) he threw out
the idea that the LRV is a law of control. The law of
control is o = -d and PCT explains why that law is
observed.

          RM:...the LRV is simply a statement of the law of control

that says o = -d.

[Martin Taylor 2015.04.18.14.04]

[From Rick Marken (2015.04.18.1045)]

I don't see the point of quoting and responding to what you imagine I wrote, so I won't. Selective quotation and misrepresentation may be good politics, but it isn't good science.

Martin