Responding to welcomes - Jeff

Hello again,

I am pleased that my introduction got such a response. Being ignored would
have been the ultimate insult. I did not feel unduly rebuffed, but, of
course, I will respond back. My response centers around themes, not
necessarily individuals. Specifically, I consider the following issues: self-
regulation, modeling, some theorists in my field, and some minor issues:

Self-regulation:

Forgive my ignorance, but I think Tom Bourbon and Bill Powers think that the
difference between self-regulation models and PCT is that PCT is about
controlling perceptions and self-regulation is about controlling behavior.
This is no doubt because the promoters of many self-regulation models _say_
they are about regulating behavior. However, if the model incorporates a test
of the difference between a perceived state and a desired state, the result of
which drives behavior, then the model is describing the control of
perceptions. If the modeler says the model describes how individuals control
behavior, they either don't realize their error or they are trying to reach a
certain audience. But the model still describes the control of perceptions.
D. Ford's Living Systems Framework is that type of model. I am still trying
to get a handle on the consequences of the error for those models. So, to
answer Marken's (940606.1800) post, yes there are others that describe the CSG
loop.

Modelling:

A major theme in the responses to my introduction was the role of modelling as
a test of PCT and the other models I mentioned (indirectly through
proponents - e.g., Locke, Bandura). I think something that people on this net
understand that many in psychology do not understand is that the ultimate goal
of science is to create a comprehensive model of the phenomenon they study.
(Don't misunderstand me here. That goal will never be achieved. Indeed, the
science should be constantly refining, filling in gaps, and occasionally
rejecting the model - if one is to believe Kuhn - which I do.), But
psychology, burned by previous attempts at grand theories and comprised of
individual, autonomous control systems is leery of such models. As I
understand it, this is not unique to psychology. Other sciences have gone or
are going through similar periods (the pre-paradigm or pre-paradigm shift
period, Mary Powers 940607). As a result, grand theories are eschewed for
mini-theories. Mini-theories, because of their reliance on exogenous
variables, do not lend themselves to modeling. That is, they won't work
because importance relationships and variables are left out of the model -
usually feedback relationships. Nor do the architects of these theories
understand how to model or what it can do for them. Further, these theories
are empirical generalizations of relationships between latent variables, not
structural models of underlying architecture (Powers, 1973). The question,
that we might answer differently, is whether these mini-theories are of any
scientific value. (Practical value is a related, but separate question). I
think they are because I think there are gaps in PCT that have been addressed,
certainly not resolved, by these mini-theories. More on these gaps later.

But the previous argument is mostly on an intellectually level. The reality
of rejection letters and lack of collaborative spirit from the powers-that-be
is painful, dispiriting, and financially and occupationally challenging. I
apologize for raising any of those feelings. I have numerous colleagues with
less than kind rejection letters based on the same reasons that many of you
alluded to. On the other hand, I know others who have had little trouble on
that score. Of course, their work is probably not completely in line with the
"core." Most notably, they do not require a working model as a requirement
for their work (there is also an emerging appreciation for which journals are
"friendly" and which are not). Herein lies one of my concerns with the
solipsism among the netters. Marken (940606) says "PCT is tested by comparing
the performance of working models to actual behavior. In order to compare
alternative theories to PCT we often have to translate verbal descriptions
into working models." This requirement confounds the test of a theory with
the theory. Marken is applying his criteria for a theory on the other's
theory. I do not condemn the criteria, merely the blind application. If
empirical data is always required, Einstein's GTR would never have lasted the
20 (?) years before it could be tested.

Now I realize that these mini-theories are not GTR. Indeed, many are very
problematic. But I try to separate the chafe from the wheat. Carver &
Scheier's self-awareness construct was clearly wanting, but they exposed many
to control mechanisms that had not known them before. To quote Bill P.
(940607) "Now that more people are coming around to the view that behavior is
purposive, goal-directed, intentional, etc., it is at least a little easier to
start explaining what PCT is about." No doubt there are errors in the views
perpetuated by the non-PCT models, but it is a step. Further, theories like
Carver & Scheier's deal with many social processes which PCT does not deal
with as throughly. Identifying the discrepancies between these models and
PCT, and developing empirical tests the results of which both parties can take
as evidence one way or another is, I believe, a reasonable next step. And let
me be perfectly clear, I think sometimes they have a point and PCT needs to
incorporate it.

The problem with Marken's approach is that they don't buy/understand the data
you use. Most don't understand modeling and/or don't trust its results. The
rigorous requirements, central to your understanding of science, are seen as
too rigorous for a science in it's infancy. You say it need not be that way
and I TEND to agree, but one must lead, not force the transition. (Some will
never change, leave them behind). Where I do not agree, perhaps because I was
raised as one of them, is at the higher-level processes. Here I will talk
about gaps. (I suspect I will learn of my ignorance, but that is one reason
for being here.)

Gaps & theorists in my field

First, as Bill P. said in his intro to Living Control Systems, there is no
content. What are the intrinsic signals and where do they come from? What
are, if not the higher-order references signals, likely candidates and where
do they come from? How are actions choosen and how does reorganization
proceed? I see stabs at the first question on this net (biological needs) but
another type of intrinsic signal is probably system efficiency variables. The
recent discussion of uncertainty is one such variable. You are absolutely
right to attempt to figure out how the organism could perceive uncertainty and
reject it if it can't (but beware, just cause you cannot figure it out does
not mean it doesn't exist). The point is that another perspective has inform
the guess that uncertainty is a reference signal.

My reading of your literature and posts is that the identification of higher-
order reference signals is truly a gap (although I fear I misunderstand the
posts here). Many in psychology are seeking to study candidates for reference
signal, including Little, Deci & Ryan, Emmons, Pervin (See edited books by
Pervins, 1989, _Goal Concepts in Personality and Social Psychology_, and Ford
& Ford's, 1987, _Human's as Self-Constructing Living Systems.). These are
self-regulation theorists, and like I said above, I don't care what they think
they are doing, I find what they are doing useful and interesting and I think
some of you should too.

To the third question, dealing with reorganization (and other matters like
stress and leadership) are people in my field. Proponents of PCT-like models
(forgive them their transgressions), including Tsui & Ashford (e.g., Journal
of Management, 1994), Edwards (e.g., Academy of Management Review, 1992),
Cropanzano, James, & Cetera (Research in Organizational Behavior, 1993), Lord
& Levy (Applied Psychology: An international review, 1994) and Manz (Academy
of Management Review, 1986) to name a few. Other interesting thinkers include
the Germany action theorists (Kuhl, Hechausen) and others (Vallacher &
Wegner). Many or most of these authors or theories may have already been read
and rejected. I do not agree with everything _any_ of them say. But herein
lies the challenge: finding which loops conflict, proposing alternatives, and
testing the them.

Marken (940606) says you have rejected social control. Well, I am not exactly
sure what is meant by social control, but my impression from earlier threads
(and B:CP) is that you rejected social influence. I find this very
problematic. Marken (same post) says you have rejected "information about the
cause of variation in perception." Again, I don't know exactly what Marken
means by that phrase, but I get the impression from my readings that PCT
eschews attributions and other beliefs (like self-efficacy) as relevant. This
I find very problematic. Now I even find that the DME is not part of PCT.
You mean that all conscience thought is irrelevant? This is VERY problematic.
Reorganization is not simply random. A model that shows that it could be
(e.g., E. coli, which some of you have contented) does not make it so. But I
think I must be misunderstanding you here, too. Planning and thinking is part
of PCT. Figuring out how that planning and thinking translates into choosing
and doing is where contemporary psychology can help. PCT has been tested in
only "limited circumstances" (Marken, 940606), where it has not been tested
improvements can be articulated and empirical tests constructed (hopefully).

Finally, in reference to Vallacher and Wegner, apparently Bill P. thinks they
are using PCT, just not acknowledging it. So Marken, when you say

Yes. It looks very interesting. Let's discuss the Vallacher & Wegner
model, by all means. But, before we get started, I've got to know: if
their model produces no quantitative results, if it predicts average
behavior over subjects or over trials, if it doesn't work at all, do I
still have to like it and not criticize it in order to have a "healthy
debate'? If so, then we can save a lot of time since I can give you my
evaluation...

This is what I mean by unhealthy debate.

Some minor issues:

I has largely responding to Dag's post when I warned of solipsism. That post
was meant for those outside the net. So my comments regarding presentation
were legitimate. I did, however, appreciate the distinction between messages
on the net and messages to the outside world. It is call impression
management and the research in it has some interesting points for PCT to
consider (although they do seem to miss the point that one can only attempt to
manage the perceptions of impressions).

Some mentioned I should send my recent paper to them and others for comment.
I appreciate that, copies are on their way. One comment: The paper argues
for the adoption of a PCT-like model as a paradigm for organizational
behavior. The impetus for the argument came from a recent article in my field
calling for a paradigm. Just before I finished my article a third article
appeared condemning the paradigm approach because it lead to elitism and gate-
keeping. This is a problematic argument because we have elitism and gate-
keeping now, as you know. I think that once PCT come to it's own (and it
looks like I am betting my career that it will), the new gate-keepers will be
you people. Now do you understand my fear regarding solipsism as it appears
on the net.

Regarding the non-optimizing reference signal. I realize now that it was not
a well-thought-out question. Nor is it worth considering further, I can deal
with it. Thank you Bill P. for at least trying to address the question.
Marken, your comment was very helpful, NOT! :slight_smile:

Regarding my "primary reference signal." (promoting interdisciplinary
collaboration). Bill P. (940607.0200) took me too literally. Promoting
interdisciplinary collaboration is an espoused, higher-order, professional,
self-concept, reference signal (EHOPSCRS). Why I really do what I do is
beyond me (although attempting to find out is important to me). My EHOPSCRS
identifies a niche that I hope to convince others needs filling and that I can
help fill. And yes Bill, cross-discipline collaboration may be easier than
within, as my religion analogy was attempting to say. It may be harder as the
modeling issue shows (social sciences does not use the methods of physical
sciences).

I do need to get the demo's and simulations. I have Marken's Lotus program,
which was when I found out about CSG_net (I also heard about it from Lord). I
did not understand it then and I don't think it worked when I tried it since.
(Rick, you might remember, I am the one who had Quattro Pro, it worked fine on
that version, but I have since updated and I think that may be the problem).

Prologue:

There are some very ridiculous criticism to PCT out there. Clearly, the
behavior we observe among the dominant coalition is based somewhat on the
error they anticipate when their life's work is rendered as superfluous by PCT
(e.g., Locke). Another is the mistaken implications associated with the word
"control." I think its tendency to be overplayed and the connotation it
evokes has caused many to misunderstand PCT, which has evoked a strong counter
response from PCTers that is also misinterpreted (for example, I think I have
mis-interpreted your social control posts). But the negative PR factor is a
real problem. I cannot see the average citizen accepting the theory as they
have accepted the general theory of relativity simply because of the name.
Call this superficial, but I now refer to my work a part of living systems
theory (of course, it is not core PCT, so you probably appreciate that -
although I do cite PCT references often).

In conclusion, there are many roles to be played here. To evoke the religous
analogy again (understanding that science seeks data more emphatically than
religion, but it is so appropriate). The high priests will attempt to
maintain the purity of their belief system, as well they should. The clergy
will attempt to bring the message to the people, even if the message loses
some purity by incorporating local beliefs. But eventually, some of those
local beliefs bubble up to the high priests, who, seeing their merit,
incorporate them into their the religion's belief system. Conflict and
acromony will mark the way, but such is the nature of social interaction.
Shall we get on with it?

Later,

Jeff

P.S. It was Cliff Joslyn who made many of the same arguments I am making, only
he is in ST/Cyb and I am in psychology. Also, he is more literate than I
in your methods. Cliff, if you are out there, I think we are kindred
spirits.

[Martin Taylor 940613 14:40]

Jeff Vancouver, (apparently Mon, 13 Jun 1994 11:05:50 -0400)

A very nice posting, that should cause substantial disturbance some
readers. There are a few things with which I might disagree, but they
are lost in the wealth of comments with which I do agree.

One main disagreement:

Now I even find that the DME is not part of PCT.
You mean that all conscience thought is irrelevant?

To my mind, these two sentences are unrelated. The question does not
follow from the statement at all, so far as I can see.

Consciousness is not considered, one way or the other, in what I have
called "core," "classical," or "conventional" PCT. But several people,
including Bill Powers, Bob Clark, and I, have speculated about it. I side
with the Powers' in saying that the DME seems to require a mechanism that
is essentially a duplicate control hierarchy, and therefore an indefinite
recursion of explanation; for what is it that allows the DME to choose
what decisions it is to make? A DDME? Mind you, Bob Clark has many times
argued that this is a wrong understanding of the DME, but I have not yet
properly understood his position.

For me, decisions seem to be a property of the program level (which I'm not
so sure can be identified with the perception of conditional relationships,
despite my acceptance of that idea when Marken posted it). If so, they are
unrelated to consciousness except as a side effect of what I speculate
consciousness "really ;-)" is--a state of possible switching among which
perceptual signals are to be controlled. The perceptions that are, and
the perceptions that may be, controlled are in consciousness. None else.

Anyway, to reject the DME is not to reject the notion of consciousness.

Another point:

Reorganization is not simply random. A model that shows that it could be
(e.g., E. coli, which some of you have contented) does not make it so. But I
think I must be misunderstanding you here, too.

I think you are. Last year I presented a taxonomy of possible loci of
learning in a control hierarchy. If I remember, there were 12 kinds. Some
involve topologically continuous neighbourhoods, in which gradient search
is possible (and thus not necessarily random), and some involve spaces
without topological continuity (and thus necessarily random). For
example, in its simplest possible form, the perceptual-sensory connections
in a control hierarchy are exactly those of a multilayer perceptron
(perhaps a TDNN), and ANY learning algorithm that applies to an MLP or TDNN
would apply to learning what to perceive. That's non-random, usually.

But the main point of control is CONTROL, and failure to control means
that perceptual signals grow when they should shrink, and vice-versa.
To change this is to change the sign of the loop gain, a discontinuous
step. And to change the sign of any one link might well throw other
loops out of control that use the same link. There's no way for the
hierarchy to know which sets of link signs lead to stability with the
present condition of the real outer world, and when the outer world
changes, the appropriate sets of signs may change. That's part of the
job of higher-level control systems--they have perceptual signals that
include conditional aspects of the outer world (see for example J.G.Taylor's
experiments in the 1950's and 60's on conditioning to inverting and other
distorting spectacles--there's a spectacular (!) movie of Seymour Papert
falling many times off a bicycle that illustrates that development of
higher control systems). Changes have to be random, though the rough
location in the network where they occur may well be non-random.

Some may think that PCT is a religion requiring high priests (or offering
the opportunity for them to take their places). I don't think that's a
useful view. It's a useful way of looking at the living world. It may
even be true. But then, so may some of our "laws" of physics. Nobody will
ever know. Meanwhile (i.e. forever), we use the best tools we have, as
they are suited for the problems that interest us. For much of psychology,
PCT is the best tool I know. Which is why I spend a lot of my limited
effort trying to do what I can with it and for it.

Martin

Tom Bourbon [940615.1322]

Re: Message Mon, 13 Jun 1994 11:05:50 -0400,
Jeff Vancouver <jeffv@XP.PSYCH.NYU.EDU>

Jeff, a friendly suggestion. It would facilitate our replies to your posts
if you were to use the more-or-less "standard" csg-l header -- like mine at
the top of this reply.

        Name [yr-mo-day.local time of composition]

Back to your reply to our replies to your self-introduction. In particular,
back to some of your comments related to what you called "gaps" and to
reorganization.

Gaps & theorists in my field

. . . How are actions choosen and how does reorganization
proceed? I see stabs at the first question on this net (biological needs) but
another type of intrinsic signal is probably system efficiency variables. The
recent discussion of uncertainty is one such variable. You are absolutely
right to attempt to figure out how the organism could perceive uncertainty and
reject it if it can't (but beware, just cause you cannot figure it out does
not mean it doesn't exist). The point is that another perspective has inform
the guess that uncertainty is a reference signal.

Concerning perceptions of "uncertainty." In light of recent discussions on
the net, it would be inappropriate for _us_ (PCT modelers) to try to figure
out how the organism could perceive uncertainty; to do that would be for us
to presuppose that the organism _does_ perceive uncertainty and that we
should test _our_ understanding of what _others_ mean when they say
organisms perceive it. I believe the process should work differently. Those
who say organisms perceive and control uncertainty bear the burden of
performing The Test For The Controlled Variable, then showing us that, yes
indeed, organisms control uncertainty. Were _we_ to do the testing, then we
would be subject to the oft heard criticism recently leveled by Bill Leach
(to whom I replied yesterday) that we are guilty of constructing straw
versions of the ideas and models proposed by other people, then shooting
them down unfairly. No more of that for me. From no on, I expect people
who propose new and different "models" and "controlled variables" to do the
dirty work of identifying, quantifying, testing, and modeling. Then if
their models and variables fail, the credit falls where it belongs, not on
us. And if the proposers are not willing to go to that trouble, they can
go talk to someone else. (I've finally learned to stop testing other
people's ideas.) Up to now, I have not seen "another perspective inform a
guess that uncertainty is a reference signal," but I _have_ seen an
_assertion_, by advocates of another position, that it is. I'm still
waiting to see them perform "the test" and the modeling.

My reading of your literature and posts is that the identification of higher-
order reference signals is truly a gap (although I fear I misunderstand the
posts here). Many in psychology are seeking to study candidates for reference
signal, including Little, Deci & Ryan, Emmons, Pervin (See edited books by
Pervins, 1989, _Goal Concepts in Personality and Social Psychology_, and Ford
& Ford's, 1987, _Human's as Self-Constructing Living Systems.). These are
self-regulation theorists, and like I said above, I don't care what they think
they are doing, I find what they are doing useful and interesting and I think
some of you should too.

But I _don't_ find their work useful and interesting, which in no way
implies that _you_ should not or could not. I've tried to take it
seriously, as an "applied" version of PCT, but I can't. For one thing, I
don't see them studying "candidates for reference signals." Rather, I see
them performing research in the tradition of lineal cause-effect, in order
to test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between two sets
of scores, one of which (they assert) is a measure of "self efficacy" or
"self acceptance" or some other "self" construct. I've never seen the
self-regulation people talk about and test for the presence of controlled
variables, a test that, if successful, might support an assumption that
reference signals are at work. On the other hand, while reading their work
I've _often_ found myself thinking, "If only they had tested for controlled
variables. If only they had not abandoned the PCT model after the first
few pages of the article." And so on.

To the third question, dealing with reorganization (and other matters like
stress and leadership) are people in my field. Proponents of PCT-like models
(forgive them their transgressions), including Tsui & Ashford (e.g., Journal
of Management, 1994), Edwards (e.g., Academy of Management Review, 1992),
Cropanzano, James, & Cetera (Research in Organizational Behavior, 1993), Lord
& Levy (Applied Psychology: An international review, 1994) and Manz (Academy
of Management Review, 1986) to name a few. Other interesting thinkers include
the Germany action theorists (Kuhl, Hechausen) and others (Vallacher &
Wegner). Many or most of these authors or theories may have already been read
and rejected. I do not agree with everything _any_ of them say. But herein
lies the challenge: finding which loops conflict, proposing alternatives, and
testing the them.

Purportedly, they and we are all talking about the phenomenon of control.
Incontrovertibly, we have a model of control that works, but they do not.
Who should look more closely at whose work? (I don't say this to assert a
kind of superiority or pureness, but to show you how I think science
_should_ work. I'm describing my system-level preferences and intentions
for how science is done. I learned some time ago that my system-level
ideas about science are out of whack. :slight_smile: )

Marken (940606) says you have rejected social control. Well, I am not exactly
sure what is meant by social control, but my impression from earlier threads
(and B:CP) is that you rejected social influence. I find this very
problematic.

Indeed, that would be problematic; but no PCT modeler has ever rejected the
idea that one person's actions can affect variables controlled by another
and that, consequently, the results of one person's actions can act as
disturbances the effects of which are cancelled by the actions of a second
person. We _have_ rejected the idea that a "society" is an agent -- a
control system that acts purposively to control the actions of a given
individual person.
. . .

You mean that all conscience thought is irrelevant? This is VERY problematic.
Reorganization is not simply random. A model that shows that it could be
(e.g., E. coli, which some of you have contented) does not make it so. But I
think I must be misunderstanding you here, too. Planning and thinking is part
of PCT. Figuring out how that planning and thinking translates into choosing
and doing is where contemporary psychology can help. PCT has been tested in
only "limited circumstances" (Marken, 940606), where it has not been tested
improvements can be articulated and empirical tests constructed (hopefully).

Rick already addressed your concerns that over the idea that PCT (that is to
say, PCT modelers) says conscious thought is irrelevant. I second his
remarks to you, in which he said there was no need to worry about that
point. I do want to say a few things about your remarks on reorganization.

You have _asserted_ that reorganization "is not simply random." Fine. You
can assert anything you wish, but I believe you might have misread our
discussions about reorganization. Never did any PCT modeler say that
reorganization is simply random. I believe we have said that, for a human
who is functioning more or less normally, when present strategies fail to
produce the intended results, the person may engage in a formal
program-level search for alternative strategies. The person, for example,
might follow a widely-known (perhaps commercially promoted) technique to
"brain storm" for new strategies, or might rely on techniques and procedures
learned through personal experiences. (When I use words like "procedures,
programs, and strategies," I refer to logic-level "actions" that occur when
the person attempts to control perceptions at other levels; not to
programmed actions.) These program-level attempts at control often include
formal "if-then" branching decision trees.

Before program-level control is established (in general, or for a particular
perception), or when that level of control fails, or when an instance of
perceptual control simply is not programmatic, what do we do? And how do we
account for changes in the control behavior of creatures that show no
evidence of a program level? Those are some of the instances in which we
have suggested that a random ("E. coli") process of reorganization might
occur. Further, we have developed several ways to model such a process and
have shown, in simulations of our models, that "ecoli reorganization" can
work in a number of applications. From that start, we are willing to
speculate (not assert as an establisged fact) that the mechanisms modeled
in ecoli reorganization might serve as an explanation for reorganization in
many other circumstances. As always, those speculations are subject to
confirmation, or to rejection, whenever thay are put to the test.

(In some of my recent modeling of various interactions between two control
systems [which can mean between two people], I use an "ecoli reorganization
procedure" in the model for one of the systems. The modeling is difficult
to describe in a few words -- I'll demonstrate it in Wales next week and
write about it in Martin Taylor's issue of IJMMS. I use the ecoli procedure
to make one of the interacting models "adaptive," in that it randomly -- and
I assume "unconsciously" -- changes its own gain, or its own reference
signal, or the sign of its own feedback loop -- all as part of its "attempt"
to control of its perceptions of the other system.)

We do not contend that ecoli reorganization explains all changes in control
behavior. As you say, the uttering of such contentions would not in itself
make them so; that is one reason we never utter them. But it is also true
that ecoli reorganization _does_ work in the instances where we have shown
it to work -- a fact that will not go away just because some people assert
that it should. (Not that _you_ are making that assertion now, but
assertions very much like it have come up in the past.)

Some mentioned I should send my recent paper to them and others for comment.
I appreciate that, copies are on their way. One comment: The paper argues
for the adoption of a PCT-like model as a paradigm for organizational
behavior.

If I was not on the original list to receivce a copy, please add my name.
I'd like to see it. :slight_smile:
. . .

In conclusion, there are many roles to be played here. To evoke the religous
analogy again (understanding that science seeks data more emphatically than
religion, but it is so appropriate). The high priests will attempt to
maintain the purity of their belief system, as well they should. The clergy
will attempt to bring the message to the people, even if the message loses
some purity by incorporating local beliefs. But eventually, some of those
local beliefs bubble up to the high priests, who, seeing their merit,
incorporate them into their the religion's belief system.

Ouch! I know you are using the analogy to religion in the loose sense, but
whenever I see it applied to PCT, I cringe. It too easily supports the idea
that PCT modelers are "high priests" defending a belief-based "faith," with
a social hierarchy trailing away beneath them -- a hierarchy of clergy,
acolytes, unwashed believers and (I suppose) heathens, heretics, and other
rotten types. I don't like that image at all! I'd rather see _everyone_
jump in over their heads and play the game of PCT science for all it's
worth.

Conflict and
acromony will mark the way, but such is the nature of social interaction.
Shall we get on with it?

Come on in! I think there will be far less conflict and acromony that you
expect. :slight_smile:

Later,

Tom