[From Rick Marken (2010.09.20.1100)]
Martin Taylor and I were having an offline discussion about the revolutionary nature of PCT and how this might affect the way we should present PCT to an audience of conventional psychologists. Martin suggested moving this discussion to CSGNet so here it is. I think I will start by reprinting the last section of my 2009 “Revolution” paper. This represents my point of view on the revolutionary nature of PCT, and since it was published in an APA journal it shows how I think we should present PCT to an audience of conventional psychologists:
···
How to Have a Revolution
The
closed-loop revolution in psychology will be truly revolutionary, which
means that it will require a radical change in how scientific psychology is practiced and taught. One might hope that it would be possible to make an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary transition from an open to a closed-loop psychology, thus minimizing the discomfort
that would result from such a revolution. However, it is impossible to gradually change from one paradigm to another. There is no compromise possible between an open and closed-loop view of organisms, just as none
is possible between round-earthers and flat-earthers. One either uses causal methodology, assuming an open-loop system, or the test for the controlled variable, assuming a closed-loop system. There are no conceptual or methodological steps in between.
The move to closed-loop psychology, when it happens, will be like starting psychology all over again, based on a new foundation: the closed-loop control model of behavioral organization. If, while pursuing
the new psychology, we find useful or suggestive results obtained from the old one, so much the better. Nevertheless, the focus must be on doing a new kind of research that is appropriate for the study of closed-loop control systems. This research would be aimed at mapping out
the perceptual variables that individual organisms control.
And here is the last thing Martin had to say about it along with my replies now:
MT: Actually two intertwined points, either of which could serve thesame purpose.
1. Assuming what you say is true:( "PCT is not an increment to ourexisting understanding of behavior; it is a complete break with
it"), to say so up front seems almost designed to get a potential
reader to set the paper aside without asking why he should go to all
the trouble of forgetting what he already knows in order to see
whether some speculative alternative might actually turn out to live
up to its advertised promise. Why should anyone be “willing to drop
the old baggage” before understanding the alternative?
RM: I agree. I wouldn’t say it “up front”; I would only say it after explaining, in some detail, what is revolutionary about PCT. The section of my paper that is quoted above comes from the very end of the paper, after I’ve explained how PCT differs from causal models of behavior. So, of course, I would not start off by saying PCT is revolutionary; I would explain why it is and then say it is. But I think it’s important to say it is revolutionary – a real paradigm shift – so people know what they are dealing with.
MT: 2. When someone learns something that does contradict something theyalready know, they have to decide for themselves which one is
correct, if either, or whether the apparent contradiction can be
reconciled.
RM: Of course. That’s what I had to do.
MT: They know, for example, that over the last century S-Rexperiments have yielded consistent (or what they have considered to
be consistent) results, so a priori the S-R background is likely to
be the one that prevails. If, however, they learn that PCT encompasses their experimental
paradigm and explains (a) why rigid experimental controls allow the
apparent consistency of results, (b) why the results aren’t as
consistent as most experimenters would like, (c) why it is so hard
to extrapolate lab results into the natural world
RM: Actually, I don’t think PCT can really say much of particular value about your points a and c. Point a is certainly not unique to PCT, anyway. The standard view would be that control eliminates extraneous causes that would increase variability; PCT would say that control eliminates extraneous disturbances to the controlled variable and this reduces variability in the compensating output. So PCT really doesn’t contribute anything here other than a different interpretation of an observation (increased S-R consistency with increased control of extraneous variables).
Point c is one I've never heard of before. I can't believe PCT would say anything about why it is hard
to extrapolate lab results into the natural world; in PCT we extrapolate lab results, like the results of tracking studies, to the natural world all the time. Heck, the lab is part of the natural world, too, isn’t it? What PCT does do, I think, is show why it is impossible to extrapolate the results of S-R studies to actual living systems. It’s because the results of these studies tell us almost nothing about what organisms actually do, which is control perceived aspects of their environment; PCT shows that behavioral research that ignores controlled variables tell you little about the behavior of organisms.
As to point b, PCT does suggest several possible reasons why the results of conventional experiments are so noisy. I mention a couple of these in the “Revolution” paper.
MT: then the breakwith S-R conceptions should be natural and, importantly, so painless
that they should look back and ask themselves why they ever thought
S-R was a viable conceptual basis for theory, and ask themselves
also when it was that they stopped thinking so. A similar argument
applies to cognitive approaches.
RM: That sounds good. But if they break from S-R theory what are they going to break to? If it’s to PCT then they will have to realize that their S-R based research tells them virtually nothing about the central feature of control behavior: controlled variables. So they are going to have to drop not only their S-R based theories but also their S-R based approach to studying beahvior. If instead they keep doing S-R based research then, I would argue (as I did in the “Revolution” paper) that the reason they broke so painlessly from S-R conceptions of behavior is because they never really broke from it at all, except in terms of the terminology they use to describe behavior.
MT: The "revolution" doesn't have to include storming the Bastille. Youdon’t have to chop off the King’s head.
RM: It’s a mental, not a physical revolution that has to occur. There is no violence involved. No one is forcing anyone to believe one way or another. All I’m saying is that the mental change that is required in order to move from a causal to a control concept of behavior is revolutionary. It won’t happen unless one just drops the old (mental) causal baggage. Or so it seems to me.
Best
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com