I’ll answer you privately. If anybody else is interested for this answer, he/she may conatct me.
···
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN [mailto:pyeranos@ucla.edu]
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 11:55 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Richards & Glasersfeld, 1979: The control of perception and the construction of reality
[from philip]
RM: I think where we might be having a disconnect is in what we mean by “exists in the environment”. When I say that a control system controls an “aspect of the environment” I am not saying that it is controlling something that necessarily exists in the environment. It is controlling a function of variables that, per the models of physics and chemistry, exist in the environment.
PY: This one always gets me. Why is there always a disclaimer which says, “The perception you are controlling may not exist in the environment.”? Are we talking about the name of the perception, as it relates to concepts in physics? Like for instance, phlogiston…you may think phlogiston is involved in burning a substance, but it’s actually not because there’s no such thing as phlogiston. If that’s the case, you don’t need PCT to understand that what you’re referring to doesn’t exist. Remember, people with no conception of the models of physics and chemistry are controlling perceptions every day.
PY: Anyway, we are repeatedly getting caught up trying to specify that something exists here but not there, that something is controlled here but not there. Here’s how I see it. There is some perceptual signal in the system, a recording of some aspect of the environmental state. If this aspect of the environment doesn’t actually exist, then this aspect is considered an illusion - it is false.
HB: There is no need for anything to be controlled in environment as PCT is not »supporting« the concept that anything is »controlled« outside. PCT is supporting the concept that something is AFFECTED outside by output. Not controlled
PY: I don’t get it. You need to give an example of this. What is an example of a perceptual signal which is controlled, but the corresponding environmental correlate is not controlled? If you can give me just one example of this, I’ll believe you.
On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 5:53 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:
I think I’m going through this with you for 20th or more time.
From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2015 6:05 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Richards & Glasersfeld, 1979: The control of perception and the construction of reality
[From Rick Marken (2015.09.15.0905]
On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 2:38 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:
RM: Yes, something is controlled “outside” when we control perceptions.
RM: The controlled perceptual variable is the perceptual aspect of the environment that is controlled by the control loop. It is constructed from the sensory effects of environmental stimulation.
HB : Do I understand right UPPER TEXT, that there is something controlled outside (by the control loop) – probably some »aspect of environment« or »contrrolled quantity« that is »emiting environmental stimulation« to sensors and thus through transformation in INPUT FUNCTION »controlled perceptual variable« is constructed. Do we talk here about perceptual signal – the only »controlled variable« inn control loop ?
RM: In English “perceptually” is an adverb, a word that “modifies” a verb, telling how the action of the verb is carried out. In this case, “controlled” is a verb and “perceptually” tells how a “variable” is “controlled”. So the term PCV describes a variable that is controlled perceptually. There is nothing in PCT about control being done “perceptually” so there is no such thing as a PCV in PCT. A controlled perceptual variable (CPV) is a variable that is controlled by a control loop.
If I understand right that »PCV« tells how perceptually »variable« is controlled, and »CPV« how »perceptual variable is controlled«.
As you said »CPV« is constructed from sensory effects of environmental stimulations which are deriving from »controlled variable« or controlled quantity« in environment so it seems like definition how »controlled perceptual variable« is controlled.
And what by the way is that in control loop, that is »controlling aspect of environment« or controlled quantity« in outer environment probably produces »CPV«? Behavior, output ? As there is nothing else what I can see in PCT control loop that could control »controlled variable« or »controlled quantity« or »controlled aspect« in outer environment. Do you see anything else ? So it seems logically that you want to introduce »behavior is control«, because you need something that is controlling all that in outer environment. Otherway every farytail about something is controlled in outer environment is useless, if there is no »controller«. How could be anything controlled in outer environment if there is no »controller« ? Did I missed something ?
Bill P.
OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects in the immediate environment of the system…/span>
HB :
It’s seems that you are no lucky enough. Bill talked about »SET OF EFFECTS« on environment not about »Control of environment«….
RM : The CPV is the central feature of PCT. So that’s the difference between PCV and CPV. A PCV does not exist in PCT; a CPV is the central feature of PCT.
HB :
Can you provide any evidence that »CPV« is the core concept of PCT ? I would need at least 95% of citations in Bill’s literature (as this is core concept, I assume it must be everywhere), so that we could scientifically confirm that »CPV« is the core concept of PCT. But I have a bad feeling that »CPV« is the core concept of RCT.
RM: If nothing outside is controlled how can it be of “secondary importance”. How important can something be if it does’t exist?
HB :
External environment is affected by internal control through output. And these effects through output (behavior) are of »secondary« or »supporting« importance. The primary effects are done inside organism, so whatever effects are done through external environment are supporting to primary effects of internal control.
There is no need for anything to be controlled in environment as PCT is not »supporting« the concept that anything is »controlled« outside. PCT is supporting the concept that something is AFFECTED outside by output. Not controlled.
Bill P. at all – includingg Rick Marken - (50th Anniversary, 2011) :
Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms. At the core concept of the theory is the obervation that living things control perceived environment by means of their behavior. Consequently, the phenomen of control takes center stage in PCT, with observable behavior playing an important but supporting role.
HB : Do you understand what I meant with »secondary importance« ? But maybe you are right. It’s maybe better to call it »supporting importance« J.
What does it mean to you the title of the Bill’s book : »Behavior : the control of perception« ?
RM: I think where we might be having a disconnect is in what we mean by “exists in the environment”. When I say that a control system controls an “aspect of the environment” I am not saying that it is controlling something that necessarily exists in the environment. It is controlling a function of variables that, per the models of physics and chemistry, exist in the environment.
HB :
I don’t understand what you mean by »function of variables« ? Models of physics and chemistry which exist in environment have some functions ? Which ? Or you meant just effects of physical variables on sensors ?
As there is really a lot of text, I will devide it into some parts. So this is the end of part one.
Best,
Boris
From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 12, 2015 9:40 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Richards & Glasersfeld, 1979: The control of perception and the construction of reality
[From Rick Marken (2015.09.12.1240)]
Paul Silverman sent this to me personally rather than to CSGNet as he intended. So here’s what Paul wrote and my reply:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 8:22 AM, Silverman, Paul S paul.silverman@mso.umt.edu wrote:
PS: Rick, long ago I was involved with Ernst’s radical constructivism (and the preparation of this article) as I was a graduate student working with him. While it is certainly epistemologically possible to propose that the physical world out there is well-defined by sciences such as physics and chemistry, this is not at all necessary.
RM: PCT doesn’t propose that the physical world out there is “well-defined” by physics and chemistry. It proposes that that models of physics and chemistry, which are all we know of the physical world out there, can be used as the environment component of the PCT model of behavior. We will never know how well the models of physics and chemistry “define” what is "really’ out there because we can’t look on the other side of our senses to see what (if anything) is really out there. All we know and will ever know are our perceptions. But the models of physics and chemistry have been so spectacularly successful (in terms of allowing us to predict with quantitative precision how our perceptions will vary in relationship to other perceptions – for example, how a ball will accelerate as it rolls down an inclined plane) that we feel quite confident using those models as “the environment” in our models of the behavior of living systems.
PS: In fact, those sciences and their theories are the based on the perceptual and concept constructs
RM: I think this is only half the story. Science is based on perceiving but it is also based on acting (the other half of the control loop) to see how those actions affect our perceptions.The models of science are not based on observing (perceiving) alone. They are based on acting to manipulate variables (perceptions), such as the inclination of the inclined plane, to see if those manipulations have the expected effect on other perceptions, such as the rate of movement of a ball going down the plane. The “expected effect” of actions on perceptions is based on a model – such as Newton’s laws of motion. If the effect of actions on perceptions is not what is predicted by the model, then the model has to be revised.
RM: Powers wanted to build a model of (our perception of) the behavior of living systems that was as precise and successful in its predictions as the models of (our perception of) the behavior of non-living systems – the models of physics and chemistry. In order to do this he had to include the models of physics and chemistry as the environment component of the model of living systems. So far Powers’ model of the behavior of living systems has succeeded as spectacularly as have the models of the behavior of non-living systems.
PS: which flow from Bill’s basic proposal that all we initially detect are inputs that are either “off� or “on� and which slowly are given meanings as their hierarchies build in development.
RM: I don’t quite understand this. I think you may be referring to the outputs of our sensors – the level 1 “intensity” perceptions – as the “inputs that are either “offâ€? or “onâ€?” (actually they are assumed to vary continuously with the level of external stimulation). And I think what you call the “meanings” given to these inputs are the perceptions constructed from them by the hierarchy – perceptions of sensations, configurations, transitions, relationships, programs, system concepts, etc. And this is all a correct description of the PCT model of perception.
RM: So PCT does say that we “give meaning” to our sensory input by constructing a hierarchy of more and more complex perceptual variables from these inputs. But the idea that this “flows out” of the PCT model is not correct. The constructivist model of perception in PCT is something that is put into the PCT model, not something that flows out it. This is the main flaw in the Richards and von Glasersfeld R&vG) paper. In that paper, R &vG argue that a constructivist model of perception follows from the PCT concept of acting to bring perceptions into a match with reference specifications for those perceptions. They take this to mean that a control system acts to construct perceptual invariances. But PCT has nothing to do with “constructing perceptions that are invariant”. PCT is about bringing perceptual variables to reference states which may be (and often are) variable rather than invariant. The control loop doesn’t “construct” the perception that is controlled. Rather, it acts on the aspect of the environment that corresponds to the perceptual variable under control in such a way that the perception is brought into a match with the reference for that perception.
RM: PCT does assume that the controlled perceptual variable is constructed from the sensory effects of environmental variables. But that wasn’t a necessary assumption. The model would work even if it were assumed that perception is a map of entities that are “really” out there. But that would have required using a different model of the environment than the models of physics and chemistry. That models has no sensations, configurations, programs, systems concepts, etc in it.
RM: The constructivist model of perception in PCT implies that there are many different ways of perceiving the same environment so that there are many different perceptual aspects of the environment that an organism might be controlling when we see it “behaving” in various ways. So we have to have a model of the environment in order to test which aspect(s) of this environment is (are) being controlled when we try to figure out what the organism is “doing” (controlling). This, of course, is the “test for the controlled variable” and, in order to do the test you have to have a good model of the environment and a model of the organism that assumes that controlled variables are constructed from the sensory effects of this environment.
RM: The bottom line is that the “constructivist” model of perception in PCT is not quite the same as the constructivist model of perception in the R & vG paper, and a constructivist model of perception doesn’t “flow out” of PCT. But it is proposed by PCT and the evidence is that it is the right proposal.
Best
Rick
Paul
Paul S Silverman, Ph.D.
Developmental Psychology and Clinical Psychology Programs and
Chair, Interdisciplinary Human and Family Development Minor
Psychology Department
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59812
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On Sep 10, 2015, at 8:06 AM, Richard Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edumailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:
[From Rick Marken (2015.09.10.0710)]
[From MK (2015.09.09.0215)]
Richards J. & Glasersfeld E. von (1979) The control of perception and
the construction of reality. Dialectica 33(1): 37–58.
RM: I don’t think they quite get PCT. Yes, tthe perceptual model in PCT is “constructivist” but they give the impression this means that perception is “constructed” out of whole cloth. This is not the PCT epistemology, which assumes that there is an environment on the “other side” of our perceptions – the environment described by our current models of physics and chemistry – and that those perceptions are “constructed” from the sensory effects of the variables described in the physics/chemistry model.
Best
Rick
Summary. This paper explicates a Constructivist Epistemology which
underlies cybernetic models of perceiving and knowing. We focus on the
recent work of W. T. Powers (Behavior: The Control of Perception,
Chicago: Aldine, 1973). Powers’ model consists of hierarchially
arranged negative feedback systems, is based on the claim that living
organisms behave to control perceptions, and thus suggests that
organisms construct their experiential world. We argue that this
provides a basis for a modified scientific scepticism, a scepticism
with a positive dimension gained by adding the notion of cognitive
construction. From this perspective, knowing and perceiving pertain to
the construction of invariances in the living organism’s experience.
Free PDF: http://www.vonglasersfeld.com/055<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.vonglasersfeld.com_055&d=AwMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=v8CnvCHlY6YyPO7CTUSPG1-jxDwp_CVupqiTxkBlVH8&s=oYqse3KLZN8BWo_oS23xCnYHAxCKDYo4TnkMUWanHjY&e=>
M
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Richard S. Marken
www.mindreadings.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=AwMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=v8CnvCHlY6YyPO7CTUSPG1-jxDwp_CVupqiTxkBlVH8&s=uHM4s0VsqgaWzc-wq_2y8-7RZdBl8Cc6VyKUPafcY9A&e=>
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Richard S. Marken
www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
–
Richard S. Marken
www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble