[From: Bruce Nevin (Thu 920418 08:03:40)]
Bill (920612.1300) --
The discussion of "same" perception under symmetric reflections bears in
a perhaps interesting way on my metalanguage concerns.
If a perceptual function sees something as "the same" when it's turned
over, I don't think it reports it as "the same." It simply goes on
reporting it without any change. OTHER perceptual functions might see
changes: apparent size, velocity, . . .
Underlying the notion "same" is the notion of an individual, perduring
through time. The timeline of an individual comprises a history in
memory (plus imagination) and a future projected in imagination. This
timeline extends on either temporal "side" of the present. The present
of course comprises real-time perceptual input plus imagination.
Some perceptions remain the same along this timeline, for example, the
category perceptions <pet> and <cat>. (I am using <, > for nonverbal
perceptions and reserving " for words.) What does this mean? Well,
suppose there is just one ECS that functions as a cat recognizer.
Signals from this one ECS provide input to a number of other ECSs. Some
of them are in the present ("Miaow!", staring eyes, rubbing against
chair). Some are in memory (childhood memory of adult saying "Yes, it's
time to feed you, isn't it?" to a cat, memories of oneself saying
similar things, memories of cats stopping this assertion of dependency
and running to eat). Some are in imagination (she'll go on doing this
until I stop writing and go feed her). All of this could be the basis
for discourse about the present situation. In such discourse, most
repetitions of the word "cat" having the same referent can be reduced to
things like pronouns or to zero.
We can suppose that the business of providing input to another ECS is
equivalent (graphically) to a line in a graph, a mesh or net, where the
vertices or nodes are words associated with each such ECS. (We have
some rough suggestions of what "associated with" might mean.) Different
ECS nodes may change the level or manner of their participation in such
a mesh over time, where the three levels or manners I know about are
real time, memory, and the imagination loop. We believe we can
tell the difference--for example, when something expected actually
occurs, or when an occurrence turns out to be familiar (the "same"
association of "miaou" perception with <cat> perception).
In this way of representing things, how is it that the ECS for <cat> or
the word "cat" can have two or more different referents? There must be
several distinct meshes of associated perceptions. These may intersect
almost entirely (after all, most cats are alike in most respects). We
then pay attention most to those attributes (associated perceptions)
that differentiate them. The ECS for <cat> and the ECS for "cat" and
that for <tail> and <miaow> and a host of other perceptions just go on
reporting their perceptions without change. But perhaps some of them
differ as to the level or manner of their input. For example, say the
ECS for <tail> is in real time for one cat and in imagination for a
second, because his tail is presently out of your sight, in memory for a
third who lost her tail in an accident, and inactive (as a
distinguishing attribute) for cat #4, a manx. Can we maintain this
degree of discrimination?
An alternative is an indefinite number of ECSs for <tail>, etc.
Now what about a category like <cat> or <tail>? The basis for
categorization is analogy. A category perception looks like the outcome
of an analytical process abstracting attributes common to exemplars.
What if we start with one or more exemplars, where an exemplar is an
associative network or mesh as sketched above? An analogical process
would check current perceptions for fit with the mesh established for
familiar exemplars. A remembered attribute becomes the basis for
imagination. When in doubt, we explicitly test imagined attributes,
especially those attributes that distinguish one category from another
(or one remembered individual from others). When not in doubt, we
implicitly test some imagined attributes (though not necessarily those
that are crucial for distinctions) simply by projecting a future
timeline for the present individual and acting on those predictions.
Language comes in as a set of associative hooks for categories
established by previous generations. The categories and the verbal
hooks for them are explicitly taught to children, and children are eager
to learn them because the categories facilitate control and more
importantly because the words help the children to elicit the
cooperation of others in accomplishing their aims.
The nonlinear mesh sketched here provides a base for linearizing
alternative discourses about the subject matter of the mesh. In my
1969 MA thesis I called this periphrasis, as distinct from paraphrase
within the sentence. I think this view is quite congenial with yours,
Penni.
Gotta quit for now.
Bruce
bn@bbn.com