scientific conflict

CSGnet Archive CSG2000
1

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.26.1832 EDT)]

Rick Marken (2000.10.18.1020)--
> The _only_ solution to interpersonal conflict may be conflict
> avoidance.

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.18.1604 EDT) --

> I suggest a study of _Getting to Yes: Negotiating agreement
> without giving in_, by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard
> Negotiation Project, for insight into and examples of going up a
> level in interpersonal conflicts.

From Rick Marken (2000.10.18.1400) --

Yes. Negotiation is, indeed, one way to solve interpersonal
conflict without avoiding it. Very good point. Though I don't
see how negotiation can work without both parties "giving in",
at least to some extent. Could you give a quick example of a
negotiated agreement where neither party "gives in"?

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.18.1955 EDT)--
[The example of Tom and the Insurance Adjuster. This is the description of an actual interaction, by the way, not a made-up story.]

Rick Marken (2000.10.18.1400)--

When I suggested that the only solution to interpersonal conflict
may be conflict avoidance, I was thinking of cases of inter-
personal conflict where the conflicting goals seem to be non-
negotiable; scientific conflicts, for example, such as the one
where the goal of one party was to hear the other agree that
the sun moves around a stationary earth while the goal of the
other party is to hear the first agree that the earth moves
around a stationary sun. Do Fisher and Ury suggest methods
Galileo could have used to to get the Pope to "Yes. The earth
moves around the sun"? I think the only way for Galileo and/or
the Pope to have solved that conflict was to have avoided it
(as Galileo eventually did).

I agree that a conflict of theories or paradigms in science is not a matter for negotiation. That is in part because a conflict between theories or paradigms is not an interpersonal conflict. However, to the extent that interpersonal conflicts are involved in a scientific conflict (conflicts over resources, prestige, students, etc.), those conflicts may be amenable to negotiation. A good first step to resolving a scientific conflict would be to identify any interpersonal conflicts that may be contributing heat to the fire and then to try to resolve them on their own merits, independent of the scientific issues involved in the conflict of theories etc.

The conflict between Galileo and the church was not a scientific conflict. No one pretended that church dogma was a theory or paradigm or finding of science. This is the most obvious of several reasons that Galileo's conflict with the Church is a poor analogy for explaining PCT's limited recognition.

However, the interpersonal conflicts in which Galileo was embroiled, which led to his loss of patronage in an era when patronage was all, could very well provide instructive analogies.

2

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.26.2015)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.26.1832 EDT)

I agree that a conflict of theories or paradigms in science
is not a matter for negotiation. That is in part because a
conflict between theories or paradigms is not an interpersonal
conflict.

I shouldn't, but I can't resist.

So you are saying that a scientific conflict -- "a conflict between
theories or paradigms" -- is not an interpersonal conflict. I
presume you would agree that a scientific conflict is not an
intrapersonal conflict either (Galileo's problem was not that he was
fighting with _himself_ about the relative merits of the Ptolomeic
and Copernican models). So if scientific conflicts are neither
interpersonal nor intrapersonal conflicts, what are they? Please
illustrate with a PCT diagram.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
mindreadings.com

3

i.kurtzer (2000.10.27.0015)

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.26.2015)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.26.1832 EDT)

> I agree that a conflict of theories or paradigms in science
> is not a matter for negotiation. That is in part because a
> conflict between theories or paradigms is not an interpersonal
> conflict.

I shouldn't, but I can't resist.

That might tell you something.

So you are saying that a scientific conflict -- "a conflict between
theories or paradigms" -- is not an interpersonal conflict. I
presume you would agree that a scientific conflict is not an
intrapersonal conflict either (Galileo's problem was not that he was
fighting with _himself_ about the relative merits of the Ptolomeic
and Copernican models). So if scientific conflicts are neither
interpersonal nor intrapersonal conflicts, what are they? Please
illustrate with a PCT diagram.

I'm assuming that Bruce means that scientific conflicts are about fact, how
important are they,
their possible relations, types of inference, reliability, and the rest of
the constellation of things
that we presume are relevant to the argument. Presumably, coveting an
orator's wife (or husband)
is not relevant to the argument directly, but it is relevant to the persons,
and so can have any number
of potential affects on the argument such as dropping it from disgust or
loss of credibility.
I'm sure this also can be represented diagramatically.

i.

4

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.27.0047 EDT)]

Rick Marken (2000.10.26.2015)

if scientific conflicts are neither
interpersonal nor intrapersonal conflicts, what are they?

Good one. What standing does a scientific theory have apart from the individuals who develop it, refine it, and use it to organize their work?

PCT is a better theory of behavior than the various linear-causation theories. If everyone who knew about and understood PCT were to die tomorrow, and only some forgotten books and computer files remained of it, would PCT still be a better theory, or not?

I said that scientific conflicts are not interpersonal conflicts because of a belief that science has some standing independent of the people involved in it, but it is something of an unexamined belief, and I'm not sure how well I could defend that it if it were challenged -- if, for example, you answered that PCT would cease to be a better theory than behaviorism, etc. But I would be surprised if you said that.

I suspect it's a pseudo-problem. The issue is to separate the personal issues from the scientific issues, and of course it is characteristic of science to do exactly that. A commitment to "objective criteria" for resolving scientific issues is a core characteristic of science. So, accepting (arguendo) that scientific conflicts are indeed interpersonal conflicts, it's pretty clear that the science part of such conflicts would be relatively easy to resolve if only the personal part of the conflicts didn't get in the way. You have said the same yourself, in explaining how "conventional psychologists" ignore, distort, and otherwise resist PCT because of their personal investment in career, funding, having to acknowledge that a lifetime of hard work was wasted, etc.

If the science part of scientific conflicts is a matter of negotiation, it is "principled negotiation" very rigorously conducted, with extremely well defined "objective criteria" (standards of evidence, accepted practices, etc.). Eventually, agreements are reached; though they continue to be subject to challenge and renegotiation and may be supplanted by subsequent agreements.

I think this puts the distinction on a proper footing.

         Thanks,

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 08:12 PM 10/26/2000 -0800, Rick Marken wrote:

5

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.1027.0650)]

Rick Marken (2000.10.26.2015)]

I shouldn't, but I can't resist.

Try harder. I know it seems impossible, but I'm sure you can do it.

BG

6

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.1027.1022)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.27.0047 EDT)

I think this puts the distinction on a proper footing.

Could be. But an even sounder footing might be achieved by agreeing that
the term "scientific conflicts" is too ill-defined to be of much use.
Scientists argue, but scientific models don't. At least as far as I am aware.

BG

7

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.27.0910)]

i.kurtzer (2000.10.27.0015)

I'm assuming that Bruce means that scientific conflicts are
about fact...

But what kind of conflicts are they if they are neither
interpersonal or intrapersonal?

I'm sure this also can be represented diagramatically.

Great. Let's see the diagram.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com

8

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.27.1058 EDT)

....However nicely we dice the word meanings, the important thing is to
separate the people from the problem. By resolving contradictions between
theories on their own merits we can hope that they will correspond more and
more accurately to reality. Conflicts between the people who control
perceptions of the veracity of those theories obscure and hinder that
process, and that is why it might be beneficial to identify them and deal
with them on their own terms, emphasizing that they are a different sort of
problem. Studies like that of the Harvard Negotiation Project might be
helpful in this part of the problem. Lumping the two parts of the problem
together tends to lock the parties into position-based conflict.

Hear! Hear! :wink:

···

--
William J. Curry
Capticom, Inc.
capticom@landmarknet.net

9

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.27.1050)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.27.1058 EDT)--

However nicely we dice the word meanings, the important
thing is to separate the people from the problem.

How do you get the problems out of the people?

By resolving contradictions between theories on their own
merits we can hope that they will correspond more and
more accurately to reality.

Aren't people doing this "resolving"? Isn't the _problem_ the
"contradictions between theories"? So now we have people resolving
the problems. But I thought we were going to keep the people and
the problems separate? I think a diagram would help.

Conflicts between the people who control perceptions of the
veracity of those theories obscure and hinder that process,

Do you mean that _other_ conflicts, besides the conflict over the
veracity of the conflicting theories, obscure and hinder the
process of resolving the conflict between people in terms of the
theories. If so, I agree. Personal conflicts can certainly get in
the way of solving scientific conflicts. But suppose there are
no personal conflicts between the parties controlling perceptions
of the veracity of conflicting theories (as is the case of me
and my conventional psychologist friends). Why aren't those conflicts
solved by now? Why aren't my friends agreeing that PCT is the
bees' knees; or why am I not agreeing that S-R is the best by far?
I think the problem is that my friends and I just have a scientific
disagreement and that's just the way it goes. Conflict is conflict.
Some conflicts are just not negotiable. That's why god invented
avoidance; just say "bye".

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com

10

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.27.1000)]

Me:

if scientific conflicts are neither interpersonal nor
intrapersonal conflicts, what are they?

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.27.0047 EDT) --

I said that scientific conflicts are not interpersonal conflicts
because of a belief that science has some standing independent
of the people involved in it,

Science exists only in the brains of people: no people, no science.

So, accepting (arguendo) that scientific conflicts are indeed
interpersonal conflicts, it's pretty clear that the science
part of such conflicts would be relatively easy to resolve if
only the personal part of the conflicts didn't get in the way.

It's not clear to me at all. In fact, this is precisely what
is in dispute. Please show me, using the PCT model, why it's
"pretty clear" that the science part of interpersonal conflicts
would be relatively easy to resolve if only the personal part of
the conflicts didn't get in the way. My experience is that the
"personal part" has virtually nothing to do with it. A least two
of my best friends are conventional psychologists; I love these
guys and we have no personal conflicts. But they don't buy PCT
and I don't buy their models. The scientific conflict is not a
problem because we avoid it; I don't try to convince them that
PCT is right and they don't try to convince me that their view
is right. So here we have a persistent scientific conflict with
no personal conflict.

Avoidance seems to me the only way to avoid the violent
debates that characterize non-negotiable interpersonal
conflicts, like scientific conflicts. Avoidance doesn't
resolve the conflict; the parties still want the same
perception (of a model of behavior, say) in different states.
They just don't fight over it any more.

You have said the same yourself, in explaining how "conventional
psychologists" ignore, distort, and otherwise resist PCT because
of their personal investment in career, funding, having to
acknowledge that a lifetime of hard work was wasted, etc.

This has nothing to do with "personal" vs "scientific" conflict.
It has to do with why individual parties to a scientific
conflict _might_ maintain a reference (like S-R) for a particular
scientific perception in the face of evidence. Personal goals
_within different individuals_ can lead them to set different
references for scientific perceptions. But there is not necessarily
any conflict between the personal goals that led there individuals
to set conflicting scientific goals. For example, both people may
have the personal goal of seeking truth; this personal goal leads
one person to set a reference for "scientific model of behavior"
at "S-R"; it leads another to set a reference for "scientific
model of behavior" at "PCT". So the parties agree on personal
goals; but they still have a conflict in terms of one scientific
goals.

If the science part of scientific conflicts is a matter of
negotiation, it is "principled negotiation" very rigorously
conducted

I'd like to see how "principled negotiation" works in terms of the
PCT model of conflict.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com

11

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.27.1058 EDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.1027.1022)--

an even sounder footing might be achieved by agreeing that
the term "scientific conflicts" is too ill-defined to be of much use.
Scientists argue, but scientific models don't. At least as far as I am aware.

Yes. One theory might contradict another, but since the theories themselves are not control systems they cannot conflict in the control-theoretic sense of the word.

However nicely we dice the word meanings, the important thing is to separate the people from the problem. By resolving contradictions between theories on their own merits we can hope that they will correspond more and more accurately to reality. Conflicts between the people who control perceptions of the veracity of those theories obscure and hinder that process, and that is why it might be beneficial to identify them and deal with them on their own terms, emphasizing that they are a different sort of problem. Studies like that of the Harvard Negotiation Project might be helpful in this part of the problem. Lumping the two parts of the problem together tends to lock the parties into position-based conflict.

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 10:22 AM 10/27/2000 -0400, Bruce Gregory wrote:

12

[From Bill Powers (2000.10.27.1519 MDT)}

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.26.2015)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.26.1832 EDT)

I agree that a conflict of theories or paradigms in science
is not a matter for negotiation. That is in part because a
conflict between theories or paradigms is not an interpersonal
conflict.

I shouldn't, but I can't resist.

So you are saying that a scientific conflict -- "a conflict between
theories or paradigms" -- is not an interpersonal conflict. I
presume you would agree that a scientific conflict is not an
intrapersonal conflict either (Galileo's problem was not that he was
fighting with _himself_ about the relative merits of the Ptolomeic
and Copernican models). So if scientific conflicts are neither
interpersonal nor intrapersonal conflicts, what are they? Please
illustrate with a PCT diagram.

I would say that a "conflict between theories or paradigms" (a scientific
conflict) is an intrapersonal conflict. In principle, logic and data are
used to settle disagreements between theories, so it doesn't matter who is
considering the correctness of a given theory or paradigm. The persons
involved are interchangeable, assuming they use the same logic and data. It
is just as if a single person were considering first one, then the other
theory. If both theories can't be true at the same time, then there is a
conflict and it must be resolved in sonme useful way -- by finding data or
logic to refute one, or going up a level and changing the terms of the
conflict to make it irrelevant. It doesn't matter who finds the resolution.

Best,

Bill P.

13

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.1028.1206)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.28.1147 EDT) <-- EST tomorrow

The best avenue for
change might be to insinuate a mild-mannered meme, some premise that seems
innocuous and therefore avoids interpersonal conflicts over methodology,
practices, forms of presentation, resources, positions, careers, etc. Then
once that is established to work outward from there on the logical
ramifications, which lead to PCT.

In my experience, this forum is not friendly to "mild-mannered memes." They
tend to be treated as challenges to orthodoxy.

BG

14

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.28.1147 EDT) <-- EST tomorrow ]

Bill Powers (2000.10.27.1519 MDT)--

I would say that a "conflict between theories or paradigms" (a scientific
conflict) is an intrapersonal conflict. In principle, logic and data are
used to settle disagreements between theories, so it doesn't matter who is
considering the correctness of a given theory or paradigm. The persons
involved are interchangeable, assuming they use the same logic and data.

Of course! Duh! <Slap on side of head.> And that's why it looks like the findings of science and mathematics are objective realities, really "out there" independent of scientists and mathematicians. It may be that logic is immutable and eternal and necessary (though that cannot be proven -- Goedel, Tarsky, and others have disclosed some of the metalanguage problems), but logic does not find truth, it only preserves it. The truth of a logical deduction is utterly dependent upon the truth of its premises. And there are no theory-free data.

It is just as if a single person were considering first one, then
the other theory. If both theories can't be true at the same time,
then there is a conflict and it must be resolved in some useful way
-- by finding data or logic to refute one, or going up a level and
changing the terms of the conflict to make it irrelevant. It doesn't
matter who finds the resolution.

But it is necessary to consider first one, and then the other theory, each from the ground up in its own terms, each time fully investing yourself in the beliefs and disbeliefs that inform the theory. This is really hard to do. And the purpose for doing it can make it even harder to do. The purpose for doing it is to resolve the conflict. You have to accept prolonged error, defer resolution of the conflict, and in particular you have to set aside quite reasonable avenues of reconciling the conflict by interpreting one theory in terms appropriate for the other. Otherwise, each side says to the other "you don't understand, you're not really talking about my theory."

Science is not just theory, it is a body of accepted practices and methods, expected form of results and ways of presenting them. One must demonstrate fluency in these to be accepted as a member of the community, vs. one of the fringe pseudo-science kooks of the world. Attacking the practices and methods can't get very far.

Because after all we are not talking about just a resolution in one scientist, what we want is a resolution in science. Although the scientific conflict is an intrapersonal conflict, the resolution in science is an interpersonal process. Trivially: each scientist individually for many scientists.

By understanding linear-causation theories thoroughly in their own terms, one might uncover some fundamental premises that are so taken for granted that to talk about them seems a distraction from what's really important. But for the same reason a challenge at that level of the logic, an inconsistency or falsehood at a far remove from practices and methods, would be less of a disturbance and therefore less resisted. It should be more effective to plant that kind of insidious seed rather than to hack away at limbs and branches. But to do so requires that you fully invest yourself in the beliefs and disbeliefs that inform those theories that you despise. This is what I face in respect to Generative Linguistics. Yetch! A tough recipe to swallow.

Scientific conflict routinely involves relatively small and superficial differences, like the change in understanding of the role of T-cells that is reflected in the span of immunology literature analyzed in _The Form of Information in Science: Analysis of an immunology sublanguage_ (Harris, Gottfried, Ryckman, Mattick, Daladier, Harris, & Harris: Kluwer, 1989). PCT introduces large differences at a fundamental level. The best avenue for change might be to insinuate a mild-mannered meme, some premise that seems innocuous and therefore avoids interpersonal conflicts over methodology, practices, forms of presentation, resources, positions, careers, etc. Then once that is established to work outward from there on the logical ramifications, which lead to PCT.

What would those core premisses be for linear-causation theories? Bruce Abbott, please, do you have any insight?

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 03:26 PM 10/27/2000 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:

15

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.29.0003 EDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.1028.1206)--

In my experience, this forum is not friendly to "mild-mannered memes."
They tend to be treated as challenges to orthodoxy.

If one were coming the other way -- an advocate of linear causation trying to plant a seed of inconsistency at the root of PCT -- such resistance would show that one had not pursued the matter deeply enough to find something that seems inconsequential and innocuous, which seems obviously true, yet which has ramifications that might later be discovered to be inconsistent with the theory. Fortunately, it would be the other way around, a subversive advocate of PCT infiltrating the ranks of an established field and planting seemingly harmless seeds whose ramifications lead at some later time to PCT. I say fortunately, because I think that a practitioner in an established field would be less defensive and prickly. When your field is well established, it takes a lot to pose an existential threat.

But such subversion requires that you fully invest yourself in the beliefs and disbeliefs that inform those theories that you despise, to house yourself in them as it were, confident of your ability to revert to PCT unscathed. That requires great confidence without the social scaffolding of an established field.

Even to communicate effectively may require this. Maybe like a teller of parables, coming down to the shore, leaning over the fisherman's shoulder, pointing along the taut net, "You're pretty good at catching fish," and moving out from there.

This is not what I'm doing. I'm just observing that a frontal assault hasn't been remarkably productive, speculating why, and imagining possible alternatives.

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 12:05 PM 10/28/2000 -0400, Bruce Gregory wrote: