[From Bill Powers (991117.0200 MDT)]
Bruce Abbott (991116.1720 EST)--
Well I haven't read Ed's book and have had only the descriptions offered on
CSGnet to go on. I'm glad that from your point of view, what actually goes
on is quite like my description.
Since my observations concern differences between what Ed Ford says in his
book and what is actually done in RTP schools, it seems to me that you
might need to read his book to evaluate what I say.
... If I pull the bottom
can from a stack of soup cans and the cans all tumble down, would you say
that I am the cause of the removal of the first can but that the stock clerk
who arranged the stack is the cause of the rest of the cans crashing down?
I would say you are the cause of the removal of the first can, and that the
tumbling of the remainder was caused by that removal, although it was
probably not your intention -- your "choice" -- to cause the rest to tumble.
The stock clerk, of course, is the cause of setting up a stack of cans in
such a way that if a bottom can is removed, the stack will fall. The clerk
at least shares any responsibility.
That is not, however, sufficiently like the case we're describing. When the
stock clerk has left the scene, the physical nature of the stack determines
what will ensue when a bottom can is removed; the fall of the stack is
physically caused by the can removal. But when we're talking about a social
rule the enforcement of which requires the active participation of the
adult, the situation is entirely different. A proper parallel would be for
the stock clerk to say, "If you remove this particular can, I will knock
the stack down. And because you know that, if you remove that can it will
be your choice if the stack falls down." This is just like saying "I am
making a rule that if you disrupt a second time after having been
cautioned, I will send you to the RTC. So if you disrupt a second time, it
will have been your choice to go to the RTC." That conclusion is unwarranted.
I'd say that the clerk set up the _conditions_ such that my removing the
bottom would have that consequence, but as to them actually crashing down,
that's _my_ doing. Similarly, the adult arranges the consequences for
misbehavior of the child and explains those consequences to the child, but
it is the child's actions that bring about those consequences, and in that
specific sense the child is responsible for their occurrence.
The parallel is flawed because the adult not only "arranges" the
consequences, but acts to make sure they occur. It is perfectly clear, in
that situation, that if it were not for the intentional actions of the
adult, those consequences would not be mandatory. They are artificial
consequences. If the child disrupts and chooses NOT to go to the RTC, it is
the adult who sees to it that the child ends up in the RTC anyway. That is
why it is a sham for the adult to claim that the child really has a choice.
If you have a choice you must be able to carry it out.
I believe that being dishonest with children is an effective way to lose
their love and respect. The subject of social rules -- who makes them and
how they are enforced -- is a very delicate one; it can easily be
mishandled. I think it's possible to introduce rules and rule enforcement
without taking the implacable view that Ed Ford takes, which is that
obeying the rules -- any rules, made by any adult -- is non-negotiable and
will be enforced by any means necessary. That approach may be effective in
suppressing dissent, but it does not teach children to deal with rules
effectively -- especially when _they_ become the adults.
O.K., this is close to what I had in mind.
Right, but it is not what Ed says in his book. I think you have to read the
book.
The idea that these contingencies are not the reason for the success of
RTP,
and that some hidden element, provided in some mysterious way by trained
PCTers, strikes me as incredible.
I guess you really don't understand what the "hidden element" is.
I understand what you _think_ the "hidden element" is.
Of course you do: it is abandoning the desire to control the child's
behavior by force, and starting to negotiate instead of bully the child.
Read Chapter 17 again. I recognize that you can control a person's behavior
by getting control of something the person needs, taking it away from the
person and then giving it back only if the person does what you want. If
you know that a child wants to be with his or her friends, you can use that
knowledge to control the child by taking the child away from the friends.
First you cause distress; then you kindly offer to remove the distress if
the child will obey you. But you can't pretend that you never did the first
part of the process; even if you deny it to yourself, the child you did it
to knows what you did.
A fancy name like "contingency" or "reinforcer" doesn't change what is
done. You have to be enough stronger than the other person, or smarter or
older, to get control of and withhold what the person needs in the first
place, so you can give it as a means of controlling the person. And you
constantly have to be vigilant and keep the person from getting back
control of the needed thing. This is the old way of orqanizing schools, by
using rewards and punishments to force a student to obey the rules.
You believe that this is the natural, normal, and technically effective way
to deal with children. You admire the RTP approach because you see it
making the contingencies plain and being consistent about maintaining them.
According to your beliefs, this should lead to effective control of the
children's behavior. Since you believe that control of their behavior is
what is desired, you assume that this management of contingencies accounts
for the success of the RTP program. But all you're telling me is that your
faith in reward and punishment is such that you can't believe that RTP does
not succeed because of them. In a similar way, you tell me that you can't
believe that a properly-conducted behavior-mod approach could fail. Yet if
you didn't believe that controlling children's behavior is a good thing to
do, you could not sustain any of those beliefs.
None of the elements of RTP that I have outlined above _should be_
incompatible with PCT (although as characterized in this forum it is always
depicted as incompatible).
What is incompatible is using force and the threat of force to control the
behavior of children. If you try to use rewards and punishments to control
the behavior of another human being of any age, conflict is inevitable. The
problem in schools is not insufficient conflict, but too much conflict
between children and adults. What you see as effective about Ed's program
is precisely what I see as a source of conflict rather than a cure for it.
From my,
probably unique, perspective I can see how certain principles from behavior
analysis and others from control theory can be unified into a coherent
theory of behavior with considerable power. I know why you believe that
these principles are incompatible and I think I understand why this belief
is incorrect. Unfortunately, I haven't had much success in convincing you
of this.
You haven't tried. All you have done is tell me that your interpretation
makes sense to you. You have never countered my argument that reward and
punishment rely fundamentally on the possession and, if necessary,
application of superior force.
It is all too easy for you to simply explain this conflict away by
assuming that I am a victim of my own past and, like the "old school" of
Kuhnian lore, will simply have to retire or pass away to make way for the
new.
If that were my only objection you would be right. But none of my
objections to the behavior-mod approach (which simply assumes the right of
one person to control another's behavior) refers to you or your past. You
seem to think that by showing that the behavior-mod approach can actually
modify behavior, you have shown that this is a good thing to do. I say it
is a very bad way to do things; children, like anyone else, need to be able
to vary their behavior freely to achieve what they want. If there are
consequences of that behavior -- real, not made-up consequences -- that the
child doesn't like, the child has to be free to try other behaviors that
will not only fix what the child doesn't like, but also continue to
maintain the kinds of experiences the child does like. An adult who
prescribes the behavior of the child and then brings to bear all the
influences he can find to make the child behave that way is not helping the
child become a skillful adult.
What isn't readily apparent from my interactions on CSGnet is that I am even
more troubled by many of the standard assumptions/conclusions of many EABers
in particular and research psychologists in general. I agree with you that
the whole damned field is a sorry mess, and is unlikely to improve any time
soon.
Yes, and I liked your example. But how do you know that what you call a
"unification" of PCT and other principles is not simply a way to avoid
giving up that last bit of belief in the whole scheme of behaviorism?
From my perspective (having been exposed to PCT), this is sheer nonsense,
just as wrong as the counterclaim that the past consequences of behavior
have nothing to do with the organism's future behavior. It is clear to me
that organisms are intentional and will work to change their environments as
necessary (if possible!) to produce what they want to perceive. And it is
equally clear to me that the organism is highly sensitive to its
environment-as-perceived, and will be altered by its experience with that
environment in ways that can be predicted from a knowledge of the
contingencies and of the organism's likes and dislikes (which can be
assessed).
Of course, but why do you think that last statement is not already part of
the scheme of PCT? "Contingencies" are simply the effects our actions have,
through the environment, on our perceptions. What matters is not only what
those effects are, but what we want them to be -- our reference signals. To
know our "likes and dislikes" is to have deduced what perceptions we are
controlling and what our reference levels for them are. And to understand
that, one has to realize that reference signals, likes and dislikes, are
not the permanent things that such terms suggest, but highly variable
reference settings, which vary so as to keep still higher-level perceptions
in the states we prefer.
The final break with behaviorism can come only with the realization that
"behavior", in the sense of what we see other organisms doing, is not what
is important. Despite the basic assumption of reinforcement theory, which
is that the reinforcement draws forth "the" behavior that produces it,
there is no one action that will normally produce a given result. Behavior
may well have to change in order to produce the same reinforcement, in a
world that is not deliberately set up to avoid that ambiguity. Thus there
is nothing to reinforce, and reinforcement theory cannot explain what we
observe. In the laboratory, where repeating a reinforcement can be done
only by repeating the behavior that produced it, an illusion of causality
is created. But in a natural environment where nothing is protected against
disturbances, that illusion is quickly shattered when we see _different_
behaviors producing _the same_ reinforcement. And not accidentally
different behaviors: the differences are precisely the ones required, given
environmental circumstances, to see to it that the same result repeats.
In the PCT view it is not environmental events that cause changes in the
organism, but mechanisms in the organism that are specifically organized to
create change, and without which external events would have no effects on
the organism's behavior. The problem I see continuing in your approach,
despite your clear grasp of most PCT principles, is that you are still
willing to accept an _apparent_ cause as the _real_ cause. So if a stimulus
occurs and there is a response to it, you do not follow up by asking _what
is the mechanism_? You just take it at face value: the stimulus must have
had some effect that made a response appropriate to the stimulus occur.
I continue to believe in the maxim that it is better to debate an issue
without settling it, than to settle an issue without debating it.
I think we have satisfied that requirement several times over. We're down
to matters of faith now. When your only argument is "I just can't believe
...", you have run out of arguments. It is only belief that stands in the
way. So belief is what has to go.
Best,
Bill P.
