Sequence control

[Marken_Richard_S1]

[From Rick Marken (940527.1500)]

Tom Bourbon (940527.1350) --

We are about to use this sequential control task with some neurological
patients. The clinicians say it seems to have face validity, in that
suchpatients often have difficulty remembering and performing sequences
of "actions." (The clinicians are beginning to learn that the problem might
be one of perceptions, not actions.)

Geez. I'd love to have these patients try the sequence control task that I
described at the CSG meeting last year. The nice thing about that task is
that the sequence is controlled by a non-sequential action (pressing the
mouse button). I think it would be a pretty convincing demonstration that the
problem is perceptual (they can't perceive the sequence) if they are unable
to control the sequence by pressing the mouse to resist disturbances to the
sequence. It would be exen more convincing if you could show that they CAN
control a different perception, like the position of a line, using the SAME
ACTION (pressing the mouse button).

If you were running this stuff on a Mac I could write and send the programs
to you by Tuesday (what a fun vacation!). But, no, you have to use that
archaic PC architecture. Maybe Bill could write up a version real quick. I'd
love to see this done.

Best

Rick

[rupert]

[From Rupert Young (2013.07.08 2050 BST)]

I thought people might find this article of interest.

Mindscapes: First man to hear people before they speak

Synchronising the perception of the sound of words with the visual movement of the lips, seems like a good candidate for control of a sequence (?) variable. Perhaps by varying the delay in the visual processing.

···

--

Regards,
Rupert

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2013.07.09.0745)]

[Rupert Young (2013.07.08 2050 BST)]

I thought people might find this article of interest.

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23813-mindscapes-first-man-to-hear-people-before-they-speak.html?full=true#.UdsYdzs4t8E

Synchronising the perception of the sound of words with the visual movement of the lips, seems like a good candidate for control of a sequence (?) variable. Perhaps by varying the delay in the visual processing.

RM: What struck me as interesting is that the delay in the (proprioceptive) perception of his own mouth movements relative to the perception of his own speech did not create any problems for him with speaking. It seems to me that this is evidence against motor theories of speech production (maybe our linguistic expert, Bruce Nevin, can comment on this). We know that a delay in the feedback of one’s speech sound perception makes speaking difficult or impossible. But apparently a delay in the feedback of the the proprioceptive perceptoin of the movements that produce speech – which this fellow seems to have – has no effect on the ability to speak. The fellow found the proprioceptive delay disconcerting but not an impediment to speech. Interesting.

Best

Rick

Bruce Nevin should have some

···

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Abbott_Bruce]

[From Bruce Abbott (991101.1940 EST)]

Rick Marken (991101.1410) --

Context, schmontext. It's an S-R model, boobala.

No it ain't, pookie. You might want to say that again though, on the theory
that what you say three times is true . . .

A control
model does this by controlling a _perception_ of a sequence
of tasks; this would not necessarily involve producing a
sequence of behaviors (what you call "control tasks").

Great, then I'll ask you the same question I asked Bruce Gregory: How does
a sequence-control system "know" when to switch from controlling one
perception (by means of one control system) to controlling an entirely
different perception (by means of a different control system)?

[No fair getting help from Uncle Bill . . .]

Waiting to be enlightened

Bruce A.

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (991101.2200)]

Me:

A control model does this by controlling a _perception_ of a
sequence of tasks; this would not necessarily involve producing
a sequence of behaviors (what you call "control tasks").

Bruce Abbott (991101.1940 EST)--

Great, then I'll ask you the same question I asked Bruce Gregory:
How does a sequence-control system "know" when to switch from
controlling one perception (by means of one control system) to
controlling an entirely different perception (by means of a
different control system)?

A sequence control system doesn't have to "know" when to
switch from controlling one perception to controlling another
because it doesn't switch from controlling one perception to
controlling another: it is _always_ controlling the same
perception; a sequence perception. If you can understand this,
you will understand control of perceptions, including perceptions
like sequences and programs, that a defined over time.

A sequence control system (like all perceptual control
systems) controls a unidimensional signal that is the
perceptual signal. In a sequence control system the
intensity of this signal indicates the degree to which
the sequence is present in lower level perceptions.
Examples of perceptual functions that can produce a signal
whose intensity represents the degree to which a sequence
is occurring can be found in Uncle Bill's B:CP p. 144.

The output function that turns error into system outputs
that influence the intensity of the sequence perception
signal in a sequence perception control system may
be very simple (as in the case of my "Hierarchy of
Perception and Control" demo where the output function
need do nothing more than press a button to reduce error
to zero) or very complex (as in the case of a system that
has to do different things to influence the occurance of
each element of the sequence).

Just remember that behavior is the control of _perception_.
What the system has to _do_ (what output variables it has
be able to vary) in order to bring a perception (like a
sequence) to a reference state and maintain it there is
an interesting modeling problem, but should not divert
your attention from the fact that the system is organized
around the control of the perceptual signal. That is, the
behavior of the system is organizaed around control of
a perceptual signal that represents (via the perceptual
function) something about the external environment (the
controlled variable). The _instantaneous_ intensity of
this signal can represent the state of variables that vary
over space (like sensations and configurations) and over
time (like transitions, events, sequences and programs).

I hope you can see now that just because you can see
a rat carrying out a sequence of "control tasks" doesn't
mean that the rat is controlling a sequence perception.
And a rat who actually _is_ controlling a sequence
perception may be doing so without actually carrying
out a sequence of "control tasks" (for example, if Chris
Cherpas' rats were controlling a sequence of colors, they
were doing it without carrying out the same sequence of
tasks (pecks) each time the perceptual sequence was produced.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[Abbott_Bruce]

[From Bruce Abbott (991101.1800 EST)]

Rick Marken (991101.2200) --

A control model does this by controlling a _perception_ of a
sequence of tasks; this would not necessarily involve producing
a sequence of behaviors (what you call "control tasks").

Bruce Abbott (991101.1940 EST)

Great, then I'll ask you the same question I asked Bruce Gregory:
How does a sequence-control system "know" when to switch from
controlling one perception (by means of one control system) to
controlling an entirely different perception (by means of a
different control system)?

A sequence control system doesn't have to "know" when to
switch from controlling one perception to controlling another
because it doesn't switch from controlling one perception to
controlling another: it is _always_ controlling the same
perception; a sequence perception. If you can understand this,
you will understand control of perceptions, including perceptions
like sequences and programs, that a defined over time.

A sequence control system (like all perceptual control
systems) controls a unidimensional signal that is the
perceptual signal. In a sequence control system the
intensity of this signal indicates the degree to which
the sequence is present in lower level perceptions.
Examples of perceptual functions that can produce a signal
whose intensity represents the degree to which a sequence
is occurring can be found in Uncle Bill's B:CP p. 144.

I think you have in mind something like your demo in which particular
sequences of changes in, say, the shape of an object take place, and these
sequences change from time to time. By responding appropriately, you are
able to change the sequence currently being shown back to a particular one
specified as the reference sequence. According to theory, you have
constructed (somehow) a sequence perceiver that outputs a signal whose
intensity is proportional to the "degree to which the sequence is present."
If I understand Bill's sequence-perceiving mechanism correctly, it is
basically a set of flip-flops that must be set in sequence by the arrivals,
in proper sequence, of input signals representing the presence of the
required state of each separate perception in the sequence. As each
flip-flop in the series turns on, this event indicates that the required
goal-state associated with that flip flop, plus the required goal-states
associated with all previous flip-flops in the series, have occurred, and
occurred in the required order. Evidently there would be an output signal
that would remain at a given intensity so long as each perception in the
sequence occurred according to the sequence specified. If the specified
perceptual inputs did not occur in proper order, the output signal's
intensity would change, creating a mismatch between the intensity of the
sequence perceptual signal and its reference and initiating some sort of
corrective action (e.g., pressing a button to change the sequence,
observing the sequence again, and repeating until the specified sequence
appears -- the e. coli strategy).

Such a mechanism can be made to work, but I rather doubt that it represents
how I actually go about the task. When I pay attention to what I'm doing
while performing such a task, it seems to me that I perceive, say the circle
(first element in the sequence) and then look for the square (second element
in the sequence), and so on. I don't get the impression that I'm perceiving
a signal whose intensity varies with the order in which these occur. At
each step I perceive a match between what I expect and what I see, or I
perceive a mismatch. What I expect to appear next seems to be the result of
a process that has linked a set of reference specifications together in
memory, so that when I see one, this perception produces the recall of the next.

Now let's look at a different situation. You are attempting to _produce_ a
particular sequence of perceptions, not just _observe_ a sequence and decide
whether it matches a specified sequence. It is no longer a matter of just
watching perceptions come in, one after the other, and then taking action if
the observed sequence fails to maintain a given level of output from a
sequence-perceiver. Now, in the current model, you need more than just a
sequence perceiver. You need a whole series of control systems each
organized to produce a particular perception that is required as part of the
sequence, and these must be organized so that they come into play in the
required order. Even the nature of the perception to be controlled may
differ across the sequence. Appropriate actions must be initiated as
required to bring each of these perceputal inputs to its reference state in
sequence order, first one, then the next, then the next after that. As each
act is completed, the sequence-perceiver must not only ratchet to the next
input in the series, it must deactivate the current control system and
activate the next.

I hope you can see now that just because you can see
a rat carrying out a sequence of "control tasks" doesn't
mean that the rat is controlling a sequence perception.

Rick, are you even _aware_ that this whole discussion began with my
attempting to show how a rat could produce a specific sequence of
perceptions without controlling a sequence perception? Your comment
indicates that you are not.

And a rat who actually _is_ controlling a sequence
perception may be doing so without actually carrying
out a sequence of "control tasks" (for example, if Chris
Cherpas' rats were controlling a sequence of colors, they
were doing it without carrying out the same sequence of
tasks (pecks) each time the perceptual sequence was produced.

The study Chris described used pigeons, not rats. (Rats cannot perceive
colors.) His description of the procedure was somewhat vague -- it is not
clear to me what the requirement was for "pecking on a color" once that
color was made to appear, or what would induce the pigeon to return to the
changeover key to select another color. What if the task involved selecting
blue, then green, then red, before reinforcement would be delivered? The
pigeon would have to set a reference for blue at the start, then green,
given that blue was present, then red, given that green was present. Each
color provides the retrieval cue for remembering the next color to produce,
and it is then a mere matter of matching the color showing on the key to the
remembered color.

Rick, you suggest that under my proposal the "sequence of tasks" would have
to be the same right down to the individual keypecks, and that the pigeons
in this experiment were violating this requirement. But my proposal imposes
no such requirement. The actions produced to bring about each reference
state in the sequence can vary as necessary, as they are the actions of
control systems. Completion of the first control task produces a cue which
determines which new control task should now be selected (in this case,
which color should now be produced on the color key).

Regards,

Bruce A.

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (991103.0830)]

Me:

A sequence control system (like all perceptual control
systems) controls a unidimensional signal that is the
perceptual signal.

Bruce Abbott (991101.1800 EST) --

I think you have in mind something like your demo in which
particular sequences of changes in, say, the shape of an
object take place, and these sequences change from time to time.

Yes. My demo shows that that a sequence can be controlled; the
measure "% on Sequence" is a measure of control, similar to
the stability factor (see LCS p. 161). I just did the demo at
the "Slow" rate. When I control the sequence I get a "% on
Sequence" = .9; when I just push the button at random times I
get a "% on Sequence" = .5. I think the chances of getting a
"% on Sequence" measure above .8 when you are not controlling
the sequence is quite low. So I conclude that the sequence
variable (it's a variable with two states: 1) large, medium,
small and 2) small, medium. large) is a controlled variable.

The only model that can control a variable (like the position
of a cursor or the state of a sequence) is a control model.
In order to control a variable, a control model must be able
to perceive the state of the controlled variable: a cursor
position control system controls a perception of cursor position;
a sequence control model controls a perception of sequence. The
perceptual representation of the controlled variable must exist
as a signal in the control system. Once you know that a variable
is under control, then there is simply no other way to model
this process except with a control system that controls a
unidimensional signal that provides an analog of the state
of the controlled variable (a sequence in this case).

When I pay attention to what I'm doing while performing such
[sequence control] a task, it seems to me that I perceive, say
the circle (first element in the sequence) and then look for
the square (second element in the sequence), and so on. I don't
get the impression that I'm perceiving a signal whose intensity
varies with the order in which these occur.

One of the reasons I first started doing research on human
control processes was to test to see whether I was doing
what the control model said I was doing or whether I was doing
what it _seemed_ to me that I was doing. For example, in a
simple cursor position control task, it _seems_ to me (and
most other people) that I perceive a deviation of the cursor
from the target and then respond to this deviation appropriately;
if the cursor deviates to the left I move the mouse to the right;
if the cursor deviates to the right, I move the mouse to the
left; if the cursor is aligned with the target I do nothing. So
it _seems_ to me (and most everyone else) that control is an S-R
process; deviations (S) seem to cause the appropriate control
actions (R).

Control theory says that control is a closed loop (not an
S-R) process. What this means is that, when control is good,
there can actually be _no relationship_ at all between cursor
deviations (S) and control actions (R). And when you look
at the data from a control task -- when the subject has good
control of the cursor -- what you find is that there is, indeed,
_no relationship_ between cursor deviations (S) and control
actions (R). You can see this for yourself by running the
"Nature of Control" demo. I just did it and found a correlation
between cursor position and control action (C-M) = -.057. I was
controlling cursor position extremely well (stability = 16.0)
but there was almost relationship at all between deviations of
the cursor from the target and my control actions (mouse
movements).

So it might _seem_ like a control task is S-R; but the model
(and the data) say it's not. This is true regardless of the
type of variable you are controlling because this is the way
control _works_; it's not S-R whether you are controlling
the position of a cursor, the rate of movement of a limb,
the size of a configuration, the sequence of letters in
a word or a program of activities. If a variable is controlled,
then it's control of input, not S-R. That's what all these
simple little PCT experiment (that you ignore) show.

The point of all this is to explain that I (and Bill, of
course) have gone to a lot of trouble to develop experiments
that can help people understand that how behavior _seems_
to work can have nothing to do with how it works. There is
clearly no way to get people to understand the simple but
clear message of all of these experiments. But the fact that
all these experiments exist means that I can point people to
them rather than try to answer all their delusional S-R
rantings; especially when those rantings come from people
who have had access to this data for years but prefer (for
obvious reasons) to ignore it.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken