From[Bill Williams 22 July 2004 1:00 PM CST]
[From Richard Kennaway (2004.07.21.1337 BST)]
From[Bill Williams 20 July 2004 11:40 PM CST]
I am inclined to permit Bill Powers to define what amounts
to in my view
as a "house brand" of sophistology.
You are not in a position to "permit" Bill Powers anything.
Because Bill Powers initiated the use of the PCT caption, it is my view that his exposition of PCT and its applications deserves more attention than some other statement as to what PCT happens to be. If I wish to grant special recognition to the particular way in which Bill Powers wishes to do his sophistology I am, in my perception, in a position to do so.
Bill Powers seems to think that his
conclusion that "all that we can know is what we perceive"
leads to some
neccesary epistomologically neccesary conclusions do not appear to me
to be conclusions that are based upon an inescapable chain
of reasonaing starting with the principles of control theory.
It's difficult enough to follow your somewhat diffuse writing
already, without obfuscating things even more by an editing >process so sloppy as to produce gibberish.
The question of who is generating "gibberish" is a matter of, as is true of all questions, at least according to PCT (as I understand it) a matter of, and only a matter of, perception. This method of constructing a sophistology is a foundationalist approach-- it begins with a some assertions such as the "all we can know is what we perceive" and proceeds to conclusions. Another way of approaching the problem of how to construct a sophistology is to adopt a consequentialist approach and ask what happens, "What are the consequences that result when one adopts this or that initial assumption?"
From my standpoint, beginning with the problems encountered in economics generated by the attempt to explain the economy starting from the assumption that the principle of agency can be defined in terms of the principle of maximization, control theory seems potentially to present some distinct advantages. For one control theory provides an analysis that explains anomolous pheneomena such as the Giffen paradox, the Keynesian description of labor's choice to strike, the Keynesian propensity to consume, Veblen's conspicious consumption, and many others.
My own inclination has been to avoid sophistology and present a control theory analysis of anomolies. However, I have been repeatedly told by Bill Powers that there is a conflict between the principles of PCT and what in a very ideosyncratic way the Keynesian system is a part of an economic orthodoxy. Out of this rejection by Powers of all prior efforts-- including the efforts of a number of heterodox traditions -- has arisen an extended discussion of many issues, including the foundations of PCT.
As a result of these discussion, I have reached the conclusion that PCT does not provide an adaquate basis for a revision or reconstrution of economic theory. It appears to me, and many other people as well, that the starting point that "all there is, is perception" -- if it is adhered to consistently is either a dead end, or if consistency is relaxed, leads to an inconsistent development in which it turns out there is a lot more than can be supported by the initial foundation of "all there is, is perception."
Now, Bruce Nevin has developed an argument which he thinks is consistent with PCT ( I have my doubts concerning his perception of consistency-- which provoked my comment that I have thought that it would be better to "permit" Bill Powers to define PCT as he wishes. ). I also have doubts about Bruce's use of the caption "shared references." I would prefer the caption "agreement." It is my opinion that a revision of economics can be carried out using control theory from the position expressed by Bruce Nevin. However, Nevin's postion NCT is not that exponates of PCT approve of. As a matter of logic I can see no reason to prefer PCT over NCT. As a matter of consequences-- especially in regard to the "permissiblity" of concepts neccesary for linguistic or economic theory Bruce's NCT would allow, and even argue that _both_ the "collectivist" and "individualist" conceptions of agency should be discarded. I have never been a collectivist. Marxian and other collectivist doctrines have never appealed to me. However, the doctrines of individualism are equally defective. When considered in context-- say in either in linguistics or economics the consequences of the defects of collectivism and individualism become evident. In particular the failure of an orthodox individualist economics to cope with the Great Crash and the following depression amounts to a massive object lesson. I regard the failure of communication with regard to economics between Bill Powers and myself as a micro lesson leading that leads to the same conclusion. And, the conclusion? That the PCT sophistology is a bad epistomology.
Instead, the primiary consistentcy expressed by the PCT
sophistology would appear to be a matter of limitations that render
it incapable of generating results in social
theory.
At least that's a sentence, but it makes little more sense.
But, remember according to PCT, "All perceptions are perceptions." The idea that one perception could make "more sense" than another perception. And this requires the introduction of some criteria that is capable of organizing and evaluating perception. And, this requires a flying leap into axiology.
This may be the way things are customarily carried on in >macroeconomics, but it will not do if economists aspire to sit at >the scientific table (a point similar to one you made quite >eloquently at the Boston PCT
meeting).
Among the arguments that I attempted to make at Boston ( and I thought it was a CSG meeting rather than a PCT meeting ) was that useful work in economics requires a sustained effort. My approach to introducing control theory into economics startes by taking the orthodox standpoint as a norm. Then it can be shown that the economic phenomena do not conform to the orthodox norm. Then I demonstrate using control theory models how the anomolous phenomena can be accounted for using control theory models. Such an approach does not require an elaborate sophistology.
However, these control theory models, somehow or other when they are inserted into a Keynesian system are as Bill Powers has frequenly said, a "disaster" because they employ what Bill Powers claims are fraudulant arguments.
I am beginning to think that evolutionary theory and control theory
might provide a way out of the impass represented by PCT.
Evolutionary
theory begins with a population--thus it does not allow for
the solipcism
and individualism that appears to be a basic axiom of PCT.
You harp on this "solipsism".
I also harp on collectivism. Both are, in my view, so defective that it is important to understand why they are defective. I do not wish to see control theory identified with a new version of neo-classical economics. And, this is a genuine danger.
Unless this is another word, like
"individual", which you are redefining in some way to be >explained to
the inquirer only by vaguely waving a hand at an entire school of
thought recorded in a shelfful of books, it means
>one
Your list is not exhaustive.
of these:
The belief that oneself alone exists.
The belief that one creates all of reality oneself.
The belief that while the rest of reality and other people exist,
one self (the holder of the theory) is the only conscious being.
> The belief that the self is the only thing that can be known.
The belief that the self is the only thing that we can be certain of.
Nobody here is proposing any of these.
The slogan, which Rick Marken recently recomended be discarded, that "All that one can know is what one perceives" would seem to fit these version. Contrary to what you say, the PCT sophistology does appear to assert these assumptions. Then, because not much can be accomplished starting from such assumptions, the axiomatic barrier is relaxed physics and chemistry are admitted to represent reality.
consider these versions:
The belief that one's perceptions alone exist.
The belief that all of reality is created out of one's perceptions.
I have perceptions, but none of you zombies do.
The belief that one's perceptions are all that can be known.
The belief that one's perceptions are all that we can be certain of.
Nobody here is proposing any of the first three.
Perhaps one of the difficulties has been that the PCT sophistology has never been expounded systematically.
I don't believe anyone's proposing the fourth, although you are >at great pains to attribute the belief to them.
I won't attempt to document textually why I have concluded that this fourth version has been a charactteristic feature of PCT, but it has appeared to me that an even more primitive version is the basic axiom of PCT-- "all there is, is perception." I am not at all sure what being "certain" of a perception might mean in terms of a system in which "all there is, is perception."
That is, nobody is in any serious doubt about the existence of
an external reality and of other people in it.
Again, I think what my be required is a sustained exposition of the PCT sophistology. I don't entirely agree with the way that Bruce Nevin has developed his arguments, however, Bruce does, it appears to me, identified implicit assumptions and inconsistencies in PCT.
I believe Bill Powers would agree with the last. But the word >for
that position is not "solipsism". If you want a boo word for it (and
I suspect you would consider this a boo word), the word is
"empiricism", although that word covers as wide a range of >beliefs as
solipsism. It is fallacious to call a thing by a word and then >react
to it as if it were identical to everything else called by the >same word.
I think your argument is an excellent one. Lets consistently apply it to the use of the term "perception."
So what of this "empiricism"? If anyone has a way to obtain
knowledge of external reality more certain than our perceptionsof
it, I'd like to hear of it.
For social theory the doctrine of pragmatism may provide a better starting point than empiricism." Rather than starting with the question of how do we know an inherently unknowable unaccessible "exeternal reality"-- which is not a question with which I have any real interest, pragmatism asks what are the problems, and how can we solve them. This is a different approach than empiricism, the approach is not one that fits into the classical modes of epistomology. It combines considerations of value theory and logic. It discards the classical questions about the nature of a "really real reality." Perhaps you've heard of the school of C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey? Some people are of the opinion that pragmaticism offers a better approach, especially to problems of social theory, than does positivism.
But even that's just a sideshow that you choose to confuse with > the main act.
Of course, what the "main act" happens to be is a question of perception. I reject the notion that my purpose has been to "confuse" the situation.
The point is not that our perceptions are absolutely certain, >while all else is but shadows and fog. Nobody here is proposing >that either.
I thought the entire point was that perceptions are all that exists so that there isn't any question about anything else.
Things aren't in perception, things aren't anywhere other than
in perception-- how could they be. What PCT seems to be reduced to if, if, if, if, it is expressed consistently is perception, and
only perception.
The primary significance of the dictum that all our knowledge of >the
world is an interpretation of our perceptions is not that the
existence of some sort of external reality and other people in it >is
in any serious doubt, but that one must distinguish the >perceptions
one has from the things that give rise to them.
In a consistent exposition of PCT sophistology I don't see that there is any occasion for difficulty. "All there is, is perception." No problem here, perfectly consistent-- as far as it goes, unless you consider that it doesn't go anywhere to be a problem.
These are always two distinct things, and the connection between >them cannot be taken for granted: that relationship is the crux
of the matter.
In your perception this epistomological issue-- the distinction between perceptual objects and reality is as you say, "the crux of the matter."
I in contrast can not imagine a more useless question.
Let me give an example of what I think is a useful idea. In orthodox economic theory demand curves must slope downward. The principle of maximization demonstrates, if you accept utility theory, why demand curves slope downward. Then how is one to explain the Giffen paradox? Control theory, because it allows for a multilevel structure of valuation provides the means to explain the Giffen type behavior. In contrast to the principle of maximization, I find control theory to be a very useful idea.
Unless you can show me otherwise, I don't see that the question that you identify as "the crux of the matter" has the capacity to do anything that is of any interest to me in my attempt to reconstruct economics using control theory. Rather, it looks to me like a revisitation of issues and methods of classical philosophy.
And, it looks like a revisitation from the side that generated or at least has been associated with orthodox economics.
The pitfall of confusing the two is especially prone to happen >when trying to understand the behaviour of living creatures, >since we appear to be hardwired to build mental models of their >motivations without realising that that is what we are doing.
You can speak for yourself if you wish, you have my permition.
Instead, we often imagine that we can see these motivations >actually present in the other person (or rat, or whatever), in >the same way that we unconsciously impute the colours that we see >to the objects that give rise to our visual perceptions. But the >models we make are in our heads: they can be wrong, as is amply >borne out by everyday experience.
See a motivation? But of course not.
The Hilary Putnam quote says no more than that people working
together can often arrive at better knowledge of the world than >if they work separately.
Not to be sneered at I think.
This trivial observation is not relevant to the issue:
First it isn't a trival observation. Not when the world is dominated by an individualistic doctrine.
And, you are mistaken when you say that the observation is
"not relevant." It may appear to be "not relevant" to you
because you regard individualism as an unproblematic doctrine.
You say,
social interactions do not provide a new source of certain
knowledge, and are not privileged over all the other ways in >which one may attempt to gain reliable knowledge.
First, no knowledge that is as you say, "certain."
Second, while social knowledge may not be "privileged" over other types of human knowledge it is the only kind there is. Remeber I am choosing the principle that there is no such thing as an individual as a basic axiom.
Also, there is no reference there to those other ways (which
might be summarised as going and looking); perhaps the context >supplies this lack, but if not, his doctrine might be called >"collective solipsism".
Interesting point. You are right, so far there hasn't been an explicit reference to "going and looking" and beyond that poking at it. Unless one considers the descriptions of "the test" as providing such a description. Consider however, John Dewey's 1938 _Logic: the theory of inquiry_ does this sort of description at length. Or, Dewey and Bently 1949 _The KNowing and the Known_ Rather than "collective solipsism" which seems almost like a self-characterature, there are much better ways to formulate human agency. Bruce Nevin's discussion of this issues seems to me to provide, on the whole and for the most part, a start in the right direction.
I in my view Bill Powers' PCT sophistology has the same relationship to control theory that Newtonianistic philosophy had to Newtonian physics, and Social Darwinism had to Darwinian biology.
There is a lot to do, useful stuff in my view, that could be done in applying control theory to fields such as linguistics and economics. I just recently realized that there is a supply side counterpart to the Giffen case (which is a problem on the demand side). At least in my perception, the process of expanding the effort to reconstruct economics in terms of a control theory conception of agency is succeeding.
Did the use of a PCT sophistology make any contribution to this realization? Not as far as I can tell. Neither did my notions concerning concerning pragmatics. Not at least directly. Rather what was involved seems to have been a far more mundane process of reading economic history, and evolutionary theory (C.E. Darlington 1969 _Evolution of Man and Society_) combined with reflecting upon anomolies in econmic theory.
Bill Williams