Sheepdog and flock behavior

Bob_Hintz · September 12, 2014, 9:35pm

So when the sheep observes the alteration in the distance between them caused by the dog’s movement, there will come a point where the management of that distance takes priority over the management of the perception of hunger or achieving contact with some tasty looking grass. Â MOL is appropriate when the switch keeps alternating back and forth because priority cannot be established in any satisfactory manner for any specified length of time or circumstance. Â There might be such a distance (like the ass between two bales of hay who starves to death) but the dog would have to stand still at the distance just as the grass stands still. Â Otherwise there does not seem to be any conflict, just a change in priority. Â Might it be appropriate to talk about influencing the priority of another’s reference conditions rather than talking about influencing their behavior? Â Boris has one video which shows a sheep head butting a dog who is clearing not harming the sheep. Â They appear to be playing. Â The sheep turns toward the dog as it approaches and put its head down, the dog contacts the head and slides to one side, but does not grab anything while the sheep spins orient its head toward the dog and then they separate and do the whole thing over again. Â This might be an example of co-reorganization (protocols?) of these two particular animals and their history of interaction with each other.

It seems to me that if I want to get you to do something in particular, I will have to be able to influence what reference condition currently has priority in your hierarchy. Â This means that I must have some conception of your hierarchy, its contents, how they are prioritized, and what changes in perception influence that process prioritization. Being a member of a group and sharing a language makes this at least possible some of the time. Â If I see my spouse going toward the kitchen and say “can you bring me a beer?” and she says, “sure”. Â There is no other observable change in her behavior. Â Moments later, she sets a beer down next to me and I say, “thanks” as she walks back to a chair in the living room. Â Have I controlled her behavior or did I simply give her an opportunity to change the priority of some reference condition that she already had built into her hierarchy? Â When I share information about myself, am I disturbing her? Â She could have said, “No, I’m on my way to Jan’s” and I would know that she did not change her priorities and I would know what I needed to do if I wanted a beer. Â The fact that she told me where she was going, might have been a change in her priorities, how would anyone other than her know if that was the case? Â Each of us has some awareness of the sequences of reference conditions that we are engaged in controlling. Â

The discussion of controlling our perception of the behavior of others has led to some serious thinking (good old armchair) about what kind of model a self-conscious control system might need to have about another self-conscious control system in order in order to succeed at intentionally controlling some variables together. Â

Thanks to one and all - I have also some ideas how to use youtube as part of a research process,

Thanks, Boris

bob

···

On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 12:40 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.12.1041)]

  On 2014/09/12 12:28 PM, Bob Hintz

wrote:

bob hintz - 2014.09.12

      I think Boris has collected some nice video references
here. Â He also raises another issue. Â When a sheep is eating
(controlling for internal perceptions of nutrition by chomping
clumps of grass, chewing and swallowing) its observable
behavior is different than when it is controlling the distance
between itself and the dog. Â

Martin Taylor (2014.09.12.12.46)
MT: You are talking about conflict between different control systems.

RM: Excellent post Martin!!

BestÂ

Rick

The conflict occurs when two control systems want to set one
perceptual variable (location on the field) to two different places.
The “eating” set of control systems wants to be where the grass is
lush, while the “safety” set of control systems wants to be away
from the dog. How conflicts get resolved is a generic question in
PCT with probably several different answers. Indeed, that’s what MOL
is about.
From the outside, conflict resolution looks like choice or decision,
and maybe that’s actually what happens. Maybe one control system
turns its gain down to zero and lets the other one win. Maybe some
switch disconnects one and allows the other to control. Maybe they
both keep providing output but there’s a system nonlinearity
somewhere that allows one of them to dominate. There are several
possibilities. In any particular case, I suppose that it would be
possible to model the effects of different possible ways a conflict
is resolved. Kent McClelland would be a good one to ask about this.
But we can’t tell in the case of the sheep.
If you were out in the jungle picking berries to stave off hunger
and you thought you heard a tiger, would you imagine you would keep
on picking berries? If not, what perceptions would you imagine
yourself to now be controlling that you were not controlling before
you thought you heard the tiger? And why?
Martin

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author ofÂ Â Doing Research on Purpose.Â
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

      On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Boris

Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net
wrote:

Hi Rick,

Â

                RM: Exactly, the dog controls the
behavior of the sheep by disturbing a variable that
the sheep control by grouping themselves closer
together. Boris disagrees and says that the sheep
are not being controlled by the dog, which is
demonstrably wrong. Without the dog there, the gaps
between the sheep would on average be quite wide.

Â

HB

:

                First
of all nobody can control any behavior. Neither dog
or sheep. Both control their own perception.

Â

                So
if I see right your Â»attack on meÂ« that I’m wrong,
you are trying to say that dog and sheep are
controlling for the same perception : the gap
between sheep and so it seems to you that dog
controls the behavior of sheep. And that’s by your
oppinion proof that sheeps are controlled by dog. Or
in other words : because sheeps behave as dog wants,
sheeps are controlled. Did I missed something ?

Â

                The
problem here is that sheep could control the
perception of the gap between sheep, for safety as
you said. But when you say safety what does it mean.
If we say just control for safety we don’t know what
is really controlled. I asssume that safety could be
higher order perception, composed of at least two
lower level controlled perceptions : distance
between ship and distance between dog and sheep.
Both controlled perceptions are contributing to
safety, specialy the last one.

Â

                But
sheep do control at least one more life-important
perception : eating grass. When they control such a
perception they spread on great teritory seeking for
better grass, not seeking for control of gap between
them. That’s what owners of sheep wants. So owner
train a dog to group sheep so not to be spread
arround.

Â

                Sheeps
are not controlling only for the gap between sheep,
they control for their life-important perception.
The owner of course also control that sheep could
eat best grass. Dog and people who trained dog, do
control for sheep being togetheras as much as
possible to eat grass, but also not to lose any of
sheep.

Â

                So
I think you are right that dog control for Â»the gap
between sheepÂ« as that’s what owner wants. But I
think you are not right that dog controls the
behavior of sheep by controlling the gap among them.
Â Sheep can control for different perception among
which is also perception of grouping together for
safety. But behavior of sheep is not determined with
presence of the dog, but depends from sheep’s
internal control by which relevant behavior (output)
for the sheep’s control of perception is
established. Â

Â

                Sheep
beside very important control of eating grass,
control also perception for the distance to the
predator (in our case it’s dog). Â It’s probably some
inborn survival behavior. So sheep control for the
perception of distance to dog. Here is video, which
show how group of sheeps are moving in accordance
with distance to the dog. When dogs are at safe
diastance (probably low Â»errorÂ« in sheep control)
sheeps are not moving. When distance minimize sheep
move (run) away from dog. But the distance is
varying in accordance to control of sheep and dog.
When sheep control differently – run away from
group, than we can see that sheep in control of
their perception. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJUVULU7GDM

Â

                So
we can conclude that there are many Â»survivial
behaviorsÂ« or sheep can control for different
perceptions. One of them and very important is : the
gap between dog (predator) and sheep. With output
sheep will control perception of being enough far
from dog. We can say that sheep controls the
distance to the dog (predator) and varying distance
will in some proportion (not linear) cause Â»errorsÂ«
in control. The closer dog is, more Â»errorÂ« and more
distance to the dog is produced,Â less Â»errorÂ« no
activity or perception of eating grass is
controlled.

                Dog's
controlled perception is : the more the sheep are
together – less Â»errorÂ«, the more theey are appart –
more Â»errorÂ«. So again varying distance, varying
Â»errorÂ« of dog control. Also seen in video when one
sheep ran away from group. Dogs ran after it.

Â

                So
both : dog and sheep are controllig what they are
supposed to control.

Â

                Now
Rick you can make simulation of both LCS each
controling for own perception – varying percepttion
of distance. We have only to establish, how these
diferent controls with different goals are
coordinated. I would say that dog run in different
directions trying to change the distance to sheep so
to move sheep in wanted direction.

Â

                In
this way sheep is stil controlling for distance and
less Â»errorÂ« in the direction of group of other
sheep mean that is more possibility for sheep to
move to the group. So in this case sheep is tending
to encrease the gap to the dog and dog somehow
enable that.Â But this is not always the case.

Â

                So
I concluded that dog behavior is not always
implaying sheep behavior to increase distance to the
dog only by running away. It can be also different.
In next video you can see that sheeps choose another
behavior, which has something to do with the dog,
but in opposite direction. Instead of increasing the
gap to the dog, with running away, they choose the
control of perception of moving the dog away. So
they attack dog. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY_7U56R0AM

Â

                Your
term Rick about controling other living being
somehow sounds to me as S-R logic. Dog behavior
(stimulus, disturbance) to sheep perceptual input,
and then directly to sheep behavior is somehow
determined sheep behavior by it’s input
(environment). It’s denying Bill’s aymetry of
control : LCS can control environment, and
environment can’t control LCS.

Â

                By
your control of behavior of others can happen in the
opposite Â way. Â So it sounds like absolutely
determined behavior by environment : sheep input
(dogs behavior) - sheep output (induced behavior by
dog behavior). Nothing in between. No process inside
Â»controlledÂ« LCS counts, no references, no
reorganization, just stream from input to output
(control of others).

Â

                LCS
are already controlling, so nobody can overtake that
control. Sheep all the time control their
perception. Â Dogs all the time control their
percpetion.

Â

                I
didn’t find any example to show how sheep can attack
alone sheep dog, not just ran away form the dog, but
I found this video, which shows how sheep attacked
wolf, when he comes to close.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F29dMtxXCkE

Â

                If
we think that sheep are inocent little animals
harmly eating grass, we can made a hudge mistake :
here is video which show how nasty can be sheep
attack.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJrlo2VuUR8

Â

                Maybe
this video will help to see, how sheep control the
distance to dog (predator) :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXkHDiuadTI

Â

                And
maybe one more video which shows that dog is not
controlling the behavior of the ram.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cluHOW_EnAQ

Â

                And
maybe the last video that shows that perceptual
control is choosen in the ram not in environment and
can be very unpredictable and dangerous.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jgjk3DsN7c

Â

                All
in all I think that there is enough proof that dogs
are not controlling behavior of the sheep, but sheep
control it’s own perception that it chooses Â and dog
control it’s perception that it chooses. But neither
of them can control behavior. Nor own, neither
others. As far as I understand there is no such a
thing in PCT. Â

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From:
csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu
[mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu ]
On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 2:45 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

Â

                    [From Rick Marken

(2014.09.08.1545)]

Â

                      Kent McClelland

(2014.09.07.2050)

Â

                      KM: I see that my name has
come up in this exchange, so I’ll see if I can
say anything to help move it along. As I look
at what you’ve written, I don’t see much in
either person’s position to disagree with, but
you seem to be at an impasse. The difficulty
seems to be semantic, revolving around what it
means to control another person’s behavior,
which Rick says can be done and Boris says
can’t. In my view, you’re both partly right.

Â

                        RM: I think it's more
than semantic. I think the difficulty turns
on knowing what control is, in fact, not
in theory. Once you know what control is
then there is no controversy at all:
behavior can be controlled. That’s what we
are seeing with the sheepdogs (the dogs
controlling the gaps between the sheep) and
with the E and S in the rubber band demo (E
controlling the finger position of S). A
variable (the gap, the finger position) is
being kept in a pre-selected state (0 gap,
finger on target dot), protected from
disturbance (autonomously produced changes
in the closeness of the sheep to one
another, the closeness of the finger to the
target dot) by varying actions appropriately
(moving towards or away from the sheep,
increasing or reducing the pull on the
rubber band) .

Â

                        KM: The problem, as I see
it, is that a person’s behavior (or that of
any living control system with hierarchical
control of perceptions) is never just one
thing. A person controls lots of different
perceptions simultaneously, at different
perceptual levels. And when a person
observes another person’s physical actions,
the observer can see “behaviors” at a lot of
different perceptual levels.

Â

                        RM: Yes, but this is true
of all of our experience, not just our
experience of other people’s behavior. We
control perceptual variables of many
different types (hypothetically 11 different
types of perceptual variable). I don’t see
what this has to do with whether or not
people can control other people’s behavior.

Â

                          KM:
Because a person controls lots of
different things at once, under the right
circumstances another person can control
SOME of these behaviors (as the controller
perceives them), but not ALL of them, at
least not all of them simultaneously. The
trick in controlling a particular behavior
by another person (call it behavior A) is
to get the person to focus on controlling
behavior B, and then to remove all the
other ways for the person to keep
controlling behavior B except by doing
behavior A.

Â

                        RM: Yes, this is all I
claimed was true: people can control the
behavior of other people. Of course, they
can only control some of these behaviors
– the one’s that correct for disturbances
to the variable the controllee is
controlling. This is why I gave the example
of controlling the position of S’s finger in
the rubber band demo. Since S must vary the
position of the finger in order to
compensate for E- produced disturbances to
the position of the knot, Â the variable S is
controlling, E can control S’s finger
position by disturbing the position of the
knot. S’s finger position is the only aspect
of S’s behavior that E can control in this
situation. But that aspect of S’s behavior
can certainly be controlled.

                        KM: That's the classic pattern for

manipulation of a person’s behavior.

Â

                        RM: Right! This is how
you can manipulate (control) another
Â person’s behavior.Â

Â

                        KM: The pattern also

applies to the dog and sheep example.

Â

                        RM: Exactly, the dog
controls the behavior of the sheep by
disturbing a variable that the sheep control
by grouping themselves closer together.
Boris disagrees and says that the sheep are
not being controlled by the dog, which is
demonstrably wrong. Without the dog there,
the gaps between the sheep would on average
be quite wide.

Â

                        KM: Thus, the control of
one person’s behavior by another person can
and does happen

Â

RM: Â My point exactly. Â

Â

                      > RM: One example: When
I give a cashier $10 for a $5 item I am
controlling for the cashier giving me $5
change. The cashier is also controlling for me
paying $5 for the item. Typically, we both get
the behaviors from each other than we want: a
nice example of mutual control, and no one
gets hurt (or oppressed). This kind of agreed
on mutual control is the basis of
civilization.
                        KM: Martin Taylor, in the chapter he's
writing for the LCS IV book edited by Warren
Mansell (a preliminary draft of which I’ve
been lucky enough to see), calls this kind
of exchange transaction a “protocol,”

Â

                      RM: I looked at Martin's
reply and what he describes as a “protocol” is
not the same as the mutual controlling that
occurs in the customer/cashier interaction.Â

Â

                      KM: and, if I understand
his concept correctly, protocols provide a way
for two people acting together to control two
different perceptions. The side-effects of one
person’s behavior in controlling his or her
own perception allow the other person to
control a different perception (and
vice-versa). In your example, the cashier
controls the perception of completing a sale
by getting your money and giving you the item
and $5 change, while you control the
perception of buying the item by handing over
the money and getting the item and change
back.

Â

                        RM: The difference
between the customer/cashier interaction and
the interaction between two control systems
described by Martin is that there is no
control of one control system by another in
the situation Martin describes. In the
customer/cashier situation, successful
control by each control system requires
successful control of Â each control system’s
behavior by the other control system. In
Martin’s “protocol”, shown below, Alan’s
ability to control PA does not depend on
controlling Beth’s behavior and vice versa.
Â The actions Alan uses to control PA are a
disturbance to PB which Beth will oppose
along with any other disturbances to PB, and
vice versa. Â But Alan’s ability to control
PA does not depend on his controlling Beth’s
behavior. INdeed, Alan can control PA just
fine whether Beth is controlling PB or not.Â

Â

                      This is quite different
from the customer/cashier situation. The
customer is controlling for paying the exact
cost for the product; the cashier is
controlling for collecting the exact payment.
If the product costs $5 and the customer hands
$10 to the cashier, the customer will achieve
the “pay the exact cost” goal only if the
cashier returns the exact change. So the
customer is controlling for the cashier
returning $5. Â The cashier is also controlling
for collecting the cost of the customer’s item
and so will allow the customer to leave with
the product only after payment has been
received. If the cashier were not controlling
for getting only the exact amount for the
product the customer would not successfully
control for getting the correct change
behavior from the cashier; if the customer
were not controlling for paying for the
product the cashier would not successfully
control for getting paid by the customer.Â

Â

                          KM: I don't think I
would describe this exchange situation as
control of another person’s behavior

Â

                          RM: Apparently Bob
Hintz doesn’t think so either. Â But,
again, I think it can be easily
demonstrated that both the customer and
cashier are, in fact , controlling
each other’s behavior by introducing
disturbances to the hypothetical behavior
variables that are being controlled. For
example, have the cashier give the
customer $4 rather $5 dollars in change –
a disturbance to the customer’s perception
of the cashier returning the correct
change. I think you will see the customer
take action – like arguing with the
cashier – to bring the cashier’s behavior
to the desired state: handing over the $5
change. Similarly, have the customer hand
the cashier $4 rather than $5. I think you
will see the cashier take action – like
calling over the manager – to bring the
customer’s behavior to the desired state:
pay for the product. So the customer is
controlling for the “returning correct
change” behavior of the cashier and the
cashier is controlling for the “paying for
the product” behavior of the customer.Â

Â

                          KM: unless you were
buying the item from someone who had a
monopoly, and the only way for you to get
the item (behavior B) would be to pay the
asking price (behavior A). Even then, you
could refuse to buy the item or just get
something else, unless the item were
something you couldn’t live without.

Â

                          RM: I hope my little
explanation shows that this is not
necessary. The customer and cashier are
controlling each other’s behavior but it
doesn’t look like they are controlling
each other’s behavior (and they certainly
don’t feel like they are controlling each
other) until one or the other doesn’t
behave as desired. Â This is the way it is
with all our controlling, though, isn’t
it? We don’t feel like we are controlling
when we walk down the street or talk on
the phone or swim in the lake – that is,
we don’t notice our controlling until we
start to lose it .Skillful control does’t
feel like anything special; it just feels
like we are doing things. Â And
this is true of skillful controlling of
our own limbs, of the physical
consequences of limb movements (like
walking and swimming) and interpersonal
consequences of these limb movements (like
getting change from a cashier). Â

Â

                          RM: I think I
understand why people don’t want to
believe that they can be controlled and
why they do want to believe that they
never control other people. It fits with
our idea that we are “free” and “good”.
But I think it’s better to recognize when
we are controlling, especially when we are
controlling (and being controlled by)
other control systems. Understanding how
to recognize this is, I think, one of the
most important things to learn from PCT.
It’s only when you know that you are
controlling (and being controlled) that
you can adjust your own controlling to
reduce inter (and intra) personal conflict
and work to organize society in a way that
allows controllers to do their controlling
with the least amount of conflict and the
greatest amount of cooperation with other
controllers. Making believe that we can’t
be controlled or that we are not
controlled by and/or don’t control other
controllers is not the road to a better
world, I think.

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

                          Hope these thoughts help you to clarify

the questions you were discussing.

                          Best,

                          Kent

                            On Sep 7, 2014, at 12:54 PM, Richard
Marken wrote:
                            > [From Rick Marken
(2014.09.07.1100)]
                            >

                            > <boris.hartman@masicom.net                                >
wrote:
                            >

                            >

                            > BH : I don't think that dogs were
controlling gaps by Â»controlling sheeps
behaviorÂ«. Sheeps were controlling their
behavior on the bases of disturbances
dog produced to sheep perceptual
control.
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Yes, the sheep were controlling
a perception (I called it safety) to
which the approach of the dog was a
disturbance. The sheep compensated for
this disturbance by moving closer to
other sheep. This is the behavior that
the dog wanted to see (were controlling
for) because it closed the gaps that
were a disturbance to the perception the
dog was controlling. So the dog was able
to control the behavior of the sheep,
getting them to bunch closer together,
because the sheep were controlling for
safety by bunching together.
                            >

                            > RM : So any model of this behavior
would have to model the dogs’ “gap”
control system and the sheep’s safety
control system. Such a simulation would
show that control systems can both
control andÂ be controlled.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > BH : Well this is a good idea to
make simultaneous simulation. Did you
try it ?
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Not yet.

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > BH: But this is the n-th time that
we are trying to solve the problem how
LCS can be “controlled”. In the book :
Making sense of behavior Bill talks
about “attempts of control” not
“control”…
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > BH: Maybe Kent could explain what's
wrong with your position about Â»LCS can
be controlled".
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Yes, I think that's a good
idea, though I would be surprised if
Kent thought that there is something
wrong with my “position”. My position is
simply that people can clearly control
the behavior other people and their own
behavior can be controlled as well. This
is an observable fact that is explained
by PCT. I leave the explanation as an
exercise.
                            >

                            > RM : It can also be easily
demonstrated with humans using the
rubber band demo; the E in this
experiment can control the finger
position of the S once S has agreed to
control the position of the knot.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > BH : Yes. Watch your wording in
rubber band demo. “Once S has agreed” or
as Kent said “S chooses”. . So it’s
obviously that S agreed to be
controlled.
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Not quite. S has agreed to
control a particular perception (the
location of the knot relative to the
dot, in this case).Â S has not agreed to
be controlled; indeed, S is typically
unaware of being controlled after
agreeing to control that perception.
                            >

                            > HB : Aplying distrubance to a
Â»controlled variableÂ« does not mean that
control is established. It seems that
Kent and I agree that disturbances are
aplyed to perceptual control and target
person chooses.
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: I would be interested to hear
what Kent has to say about that. I would
be very surprised if he agreed with your
analysis.
                            >

                            >

                            > RM : Nor does control theory show
that controlling organisms (particularly
humans) is necessarily a bad thing to
do.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > BH : Now you are exaggerating Rick.
You can’t control organisms. I’d really
like to see how you are doing that in
everyday life ?
                            >

                            >

                          > RM: One example: When I
give a cashier $10 for a $5 item I am
controlling for the cashier giving me $5
change. The cashier is also controlling
for me paying $5 for the item. Typically,
we both get the behaviors from each other
than we want: a nice example of mutual
control, and no one gets hurt (or
oppressed). This kind of agreed on mutual
control is the basis of civilization.
                          >


                            >Â  RM : What control
theory does show is that arbitrary
control, particularly of humans by other
humans, will almost certainly lead to
conflict. Arbitrary control is exerting
control without considering the fact
that living control systems are
controlling many variables at the same
time and when you arbitrarily decide to
have a person do something (by
disturbing a controlling variable) what
you have them do may conflict with other
things they are controlling.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > HB : It makes some sense, but I
don’t understand what you meant by
Â»arbitrary controlÂ« ?
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: It means controlling without
taking a persons wants and needs (the
references for the many different
perceptions that the person is
controlling for) into account. In
non-PCT terms, it is controlling another
person without respecting that person’s
humanity (and autonomy).
                            >

                            > BH: If you are thinking like this
one : Â»Controlle behavior match my
wanted perception of behvior and thus it
is Â»controlledÂ« it’s wrong.
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: That's exactly how I am
thinking. And I think you are wrong
about this being wrong.
                            >

                            > BH: You have PCT which helps you
understand what’s happening inside
organisms. Human control and behavior
are quite unpredictable, because the
references are formed inside organism,
where most of control is done.
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Once you have correctly
identified a controlled variable
behavior (the actions that protect that
variable from disturbance) can be
predicted with very high accuracy. See
the “Basic Control demo” at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html
to see what I mean.
                            >

                            > BH: Just observable Â»factsÂ« of
behavioral event are not prove that
people control each other. Although it’s
not excluded. The controller’s behavior
is just a disturbance to controlee
perceptual control. From what happens in
controlee comparator (error) will
probably decide whether controlee
behavior will resemble to something
controller wanted or not. But never
behavior of controlee will be just exact
Â»copyÂ« of controller’s wanted behavior,
because controlee is in control.
                            >

                            >

                            >Â  RM: It may not be an "exact" copy
of what the controller wants, but it can
be very close (like within 1% of the
desired value).
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Anyway, this behavior --
managing flocks – is a very interesting
demonstration of controlling a
perception (of gaps between sheep) via
disturbance of a perception being
controlled by the control systems that
are being controlled.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > BH: This one makes some PCT sense.
J
                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Well, that's progress!

                            >

                            > Best

                            >

                            > Rick

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > But as usual I'm living space for
not understanding something right. And
as always, sorry for my language.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > Best,

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > Boris

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu
                            [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu                                ]
On Behalf Of Richard Marken
                            > Sent: Sunday, August 31, 2014 3:23
AM
                            > To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

                            > Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock
behavior
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > [From Rick Marken
(2014.08.30.1820)]
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > [From Bruce Abbott (2014.08.30.0820
EDT)]
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > Researchers have investigated how
sheepdogs manage their flocks by fitting
both the dogs and the sheep with highly
accurate GPS devices, allowing the
researchers to track their movements.Â
The research is presented in a BBC
article at http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28936251
.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Great find, Bruce!Â  There are
two things that make this report
particularly interesting to me. The
first is the quote by Andrew King, which
is a great description of the PCT
approach to research. To paraphrase
King: in order to understand the
behavior of organisms you have to try to
look at their behavior from the point of
view of the organism (behaving system)
Itself. I make this same point in the
chapter onÂ “Looking at Behavior through
Control Theory Glasses” in “Doing
Research on Purpose” (why hasn’t that
become a best seller yet?). I do it in
the section on trying to understand the
apparent “fixed action pattern” of the
greylag goose. The goose is seen to
continue to make the movements that
would pull an egg back into its nest
even when the egg is no longer present.
Looking at an organism’s behavior from
the organism’s perspective helps you
come up with good ideas about what
perceptual variables the organism is
controlling (the first step in the Test
for the Controlled Variable). By looking
at the goose’s egg rolling behavior from
the goose’s perspective I was able to
come up with the hypothesis that the
goose is trying to control the pressure
of the egg against the back of its bill
and when the egg is removed the
continued efforts to move the
non-existent egg into the nest (the
apparent fixed action pattern) is just
the efforts of the pressure control
system to restore the pressure of the
egg against the back of the bill. By
looking at the sheepdogs herding
behavior from the dogs’ perspective King
came up with the reasonable hypothesis
that the dogs were controlling their
perception of the gaps between patches
of white (the sheep), trying to keep
those gaps at zero.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > RM: The other thing that's
interesting about this report is that
the dogs were clearly controlling their
perception of the gaps by controlling
the behavior of the sheep. And they did
this by becoming a disturbance to a
perception that the sheep control by
getting closer to other sheep: the
perception of safety. So any model of
this behavior would have to model the
dogs’ “gap” control system and the
sheep’s safety control system. Such a
simulation would show that control
systems can both control andÂ be
controlled. This kind of simulation
would help dispel what I think is a
common misconception about the control
theory model of organisms –
particularly humans. It is a
misconception that I myself labored
under until just a few years ago. It is
the idea that because organisms are
autonomous control systems – autonomous
in the sense that they set their own
references for the states of their own
perception – they cannot be controlled.
But autonomous control systems can be
controlled, as is demonstrated by the
sheepdogs controlling the sheep. It can
also be easily demonstrated with humans
using the rubber band demo; the E in
this experiment can control the finger
position of the S once S has agreed to
control the position of the knot. And
thanks to Bruce Abbott I demonstrated to
myself that E can still exert this
control even if S continuously – and
autonomously – varies his or her
reference for the position of the knot.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > RM: Control theory doesn't say that
organisms (particularly humans) can’t be
controlled; indeed, it shows that they
can be controlled, mainly by disturbance
to a controlled variable. Nor does
control theory show that controlling
organisms (particularly humans) is
necessarily a bad thing to do. What
control theory does show is that
arbitrary control, particularly of
humans by other humans, will almost
certainly lead to conflict. Arbitrary
control is exerting control without
considering the fact that living control
systems are controlling many variables
at the same time and when you
arbitrarily decide to have a person do
something (by disturbing a controlling
variable) what you have them do may
conflict with other things they are
controlling. So to take an example that
Bill used (somewhere), if E decides to
place S’s finger against a hot soldering
iron while controlling Ss finger
position in the rubber band game that
will clearly lconflict with another goal
S has (not getting burned).
Non-arbitrary control is control that is
done with the consent (often implicit
but sometimes explicit) of the would-be
controllee. Non- arbitrary control is, I
think, essential when humans control
other humans. To see why, think about
what happens when people are arbitrarily
controlled (herded) in the same way that
the sheep were. Hint: They don’t like
it. Why do you think not?
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >Â  RM: Anyway, this behavior --
managing flocks – is a very interesting
demonstration of controlling a
perception (of gaps between sheep) via
disturbance of a perception being
controlled by the control systems that
are being controlled.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > Best

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > Rick

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > The researchers found that the
behavior could be described by two
simple rules, but more interesting from
a PCT perspective, they found that to
understand the behavior they needed to
view the action from the animalâ€™s
perspectives.Â According to researcher
Dr. Andrew King:
                            >

                            > "At the beginning we had lots of
different ideas. We started out looking
from a birds eye view, but then we
realised we needed to see what the dog
sees. It sees white, fluffy things. If
there are gaps between them or the gaps
get bigger, the dogs needs to bring them
together."
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > According to Dr King, sheepdogs are
making the most of the “selfish herd
theory” to bring the animals close
together and move them where they want.
                            >

                            > "One of the things that sheep are
really good at is responding to a threat
by working with their neighbours. It’s
the selfish herd theory: put something
between the threat and you. Individuals
try to minimise the chance of anything
happening to them, so they move towards
the centre of a group."
                            >

                            > The article continues as follows:

                            >

                            > A colleague, Dr Daniel Strombom
from Uppsala University in Sweden, used
the GPS data from the collars to develop
computer simulations. This enabled them
to develop a mathematical shepherding
model.
                            >

                            > The algorithm displays the same
weaving pattern exhibited by sheepdogs.
It helps to solve what has been called
the ‘the shepherding problem’: how one
agent can control a large number of
unwilling agents.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > Iâ€™d be interested to know whether
the computer algorithm models each
individualâ€™s control systems or operates
by some other method.
                            >

                            >

                            >

                            > Bruce

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

                            >

–

                          >

                          > Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

                          > Author ofÂ  Doing Research on Purpose.

                          >

                          > Now available from Amazon or Barnes

& Noble

                          >

                          >

                          >

                          >

                          > --

                          > Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

                          > Author ofÂ  Doing Research on Purpose.

                          > Now available from Amazon or Barnes

& Noble

Â

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author ofÂ Â Doing
Research on Purpose.Â

                        Now available from Amazon

or Barnes & Noble

rsmarken · September 12, 2014, 10:10pm

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.12.1510)]

···

On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 8:31 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

HB :

First of all nobody can control any behavior. Neither dog or sheep. Both control their own perception.

RM: Yes, but they are controlling their perceptions of what? In the case of the dogs, it seems likely that they are controlling their perception of the position of the sheep relative to a target location in the field.Â

Â

Â HB:Â So if I see right your Â»attack on meÂ« that I’m wrong, you are trying to say that dog and sheep are controlling for the same perception : the gap between sheep and so it seems to you that dog controls the behavior of sheep. And that’s by your oppinion proof that sheeps are controlled by dog. Or in other words : because sheeps behave as dog wants, sheeps are controlled. Did I missed something ?

RM: Yes, you missed the fact that my “proof” (actually, “evidence” is a better word) that the sheep are controlled by the dogs had nothing to do with guesses about what perceptions the dogs and sheep are controlling. The evidence of control is that a variable aspect of the sheep behavior – their position on the ground – Â is being maintained at a specific value – the target position in the field – and protected from disturbances – such as sheep wandering away from the target position – by the actions of the dogs. This control can be seen very clearly in the first video. What we are seeing fits the definition of control. The dogs are clearly controlling the behavior of the sheep. The dogs are the one’s keeping the sheep in the target position. Take ke away the dogs (the controllers) and you take away control. The sheep will be randomly arrayed all over the field; the variable that the dogs were controlling is no longer under control. Â

RM: Again, I am not saying that the dogs are controlling the behavior of the sheep in theory; they are controlling them in fact. Control of sheep behavior by the dogs is an observable fact. PCT explains that fact; it doesn’t explain it away.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Â

The problem here is that sheep could control the perception of the gap between sheep, for safety as you said. But when you say safety what does it mean. If we say just control for safety we don’t know what is really controlled. I asssume that safety could be higher order perception, composed of at least two lower level controlled perceptions : distance between ship and distance between dog and sheep. Both controlled perceptions are contributing to safety, specialy the last one.

Â

But sheep do control at least one more life-important perception : eating grass. When they control such a perception they spread on great teritory seeking for better grass, not seeking for control of gap between them. That’s what owners of sheep wants. So owner train a dog to group sheep so not to be spread arround.

Â

Sheeps are not controlling only for the gap between sheep, they control for their life-important perception. The owner of course also control that sheep could eat best grass. Dog and people who trained dog, do control for sheep being togetheras as much as possible to eat grass, but also not to lose any of sheep.

Â

So I think you are right that dog control for Â»the gap between sheepÂ« as that’s what owner wants. But I think you are not right that dog controls the behavior of sheep by controlling the gap among them. Â Sheep can control for different perception among which is also perception of grouping together for safety. But behavior of sheep is not determined with presence of the dog, but depends from sheep’s internal control by which relevant behavior (output) for the sheep’s control of perception is established. Â

Â

Sheep beside very important control of eating grass, control also perception for the distance to the predator (in our case it’s dog). Â It’s probably some inborn survival behavior. So sheep control for the perception of distance to dog. Here is video, which show how group of sheeps are moving in accordance with distance to the dog. When dogs are at safe diastance (probably low Â»errorÂ« in sheep control) sheeps are not moving. When distance minimize sheep move (run) away from dog. But the distance is varying in accordance to control of sheep and dog. When sheep control differently – run awayy from group, than we can see that sheep in control of their perception. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJUVULU7GDM

Â

So we can conclude that there are many Â»survivial behaviorsÂ« or sheep can control for different perceptions. One of them and very important is : the gap between dog (predator) and sheep. With output sheep will control perception of being enough far from dog. We can say that sheep controls the distance to the dog (predator) and varying distance will in some proportion (not linear) cause Â»errorsÂ« in control. The closer dog is, more Â»errorÂ« and more distance to the dog is produced,Â less Â»errorÂ« no activity or perception of eating grass is controlled.

Dog’s controlled perception is : the more the sheep are together – less Â»errorÂ«, thhe more they are appart – more Â»errorÂ«. So again varying ddistance, varying Â»errorÂ« of dog control. Also seen in video when one sheep ran away from group. Dogs ran after it.

Â

So both : dog and sheep are controllig what they are supposed to control.

Â

Now Rick you can make simulation of both LCS each controling for own perception – varying perception of distance. We have only to establish, how these diferent controls with different goals are coordinated. I would say that dog run in different directions trying to change the distance to sheep so to move sheep in wanted direction.

Â

In this way sheep is stil controlling for distance and less Â»errorÂ« in the direction of group of other sheep mean that is more possibility for sheep to move to the group. So in this case sheep is tending to encrease the gap to the dog and dog somehow enable that.Â But this is not always the case.

Â

So I concluded that dog behavior is not always implaying sheep behavior to increase distance to the dog only by running away. It can be also different. In next video you can see that sheeps choose another behavior, which has something to do with the dog, but in opposite direction. Instead of increasing the gap to the dog, with running away, they choose the control of perception of moving the dog away. So they attack dog. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY_7U56R0AM

Â

Your term Rick about controling other living being somehow sounds to me as S-R logic. Dog behavior (stimulus, disturbance) to sheep perceptual input, and then directly to sheep behavior is somehow determined sheep behavior by it’s input (environment). It’s denying Bill’s aymetry of control : LCS can control environment, and environment can’t control LCS.

Â

By your control of behavior of others can happen in the opposite Â way. Â So it sounds like absolutely determined behavior by environment : sheep input (dogs behavior) - sheep output (induced behavior by dog behavior). Nothing in between. No process inside Â»controlledÂ« LCS counts, no references, no reorganization, just stream from input to output (control of others).

Â

LCS are already controlling, so nobody can overtake that control. Sheep all the time control their perception. Â Dogs all the time control their percpetion.

Â

I didn’t find any example to show how sheep can attack alone sheep dog, not just ran away form the dog, but I found this video, which shows how sheep attacked wolf, when he comes to close.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F29dMtxXCkE

Â

If we think that sheep are inocent little animals harmly eating grass, we can made a hudge mistake : here is video which show how nasty can be sheep attack.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJrlo2VuUR8

Â

Maybe this video will help to see, how sheep control the distance to dog (predator) :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXkHDiuadTI

Â

And maybe one more video which shows that dog is not controlling the behavior of the ram.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cluHOW_EnAQ

Â

And maybe the last video that shows that perceptual control is choosen in the ram not in environment and can be very unpredictable and dangerous.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jgjk3DsN7c

Â

All in all I think that there is enough proof that dogs are not controlling behavior of the sheep, but sheep control it’s own perception that it chooses Â and dog control it’s perception that it chooses. But neither of them can control behavior. Nor own, neither others. As far as I understand there is no such a thing in PCT. Â

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author ofÂ Â Doing Research on Purpose.Â
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

_Boris_Hartman · September 13, 2014, 8:50am

Hi Rick,

you are clearly defending your stand point of Â»dog controlling sheep behaviorÂ« as osbervable fact, not theoretical as PCT predicts. I’m also sorry to notice that PCT is not explaining that fact, your explanation is away from PCT. I’m sorry about that.

S*o I decided, that I’ll try not to interfear in your beleif temporary, and I’ll wait that LCS IV come out, as Martin said. I assume that you contributed to that book. But now as I see clearly how you understand wrong some points of PCT, I’ll wait to see, what you wrote. But I can imagine what could be wrong with you contribution. So let us get surprised…

Best,

Boris

Â Â Â Â Â Â

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 12:10 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.12.1510)]

On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 8:31 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

HB :

First of all nobody can control any behavior. Neither dog or sheep. Both control their own perception.

RM: Yes, but they are controlling their perceptions of what? In the case of the dogs, it seems likely that they are controlling their perception of the position of the sheep relative to a target location in the field.

HB: So if I see right your Â»attack on meÂ« that I’m wrong, you are trying to say that dog and sheep are controlling for the same perception : the gap between sheep and so it seems to you that dog controls the behavior of sheep. And that’s by your oppinion proof that sheeps are controlled by dog. Or in other words : because sheeps behave as dog wants, sheeps are controlled. Did I missed something ?

RM: Yes, you missed the fact that my “proof” (actually, “evidence” is a better word) that the sheep are controlled by the dogs had nothing to do with guesses about what perceptions the dogs and sheep are controlling. The evidence of control is that a variable aspect of the sheep behavior – their position on the ground – is being maintained at a specific value – the target position in the field – and protected from disturbances – such as sheep wandering away from the target position – by the actions of the dogs. This control can be seen very clearly in the first video. What we are seeing fits the definition of control. The dogs are clearly controlling the behavior of the sheep. The dogs are the one’s keeping the sheep in the target position. Take ke away the dogs (the controllers) and you take away control. The sheep will be randomly arrayed all over the field; the variable that the dogs were controlling is no longer under control.

RM: Again, I am not saying that the dogs are controlling the behavior of the sheep in theory; they are controlling them in fact. Control of sheep behavior by the dogs is an observable fact. PCT explains that fact; it doesn’t explain it away.

Best

Rick

The problem here is that sheep could control the perception of the gap between sheep, for safety as you said. But when you say safety what does it mean. If we say just control for safety we don’t know what is really controlled. I asssume that safety could be higher order perception, composed of at least two lower level controlled perceptions : distance between ship and distance between dog and sheep. Both controlled perceptions are contributing to safety, specialy the last one.

But sheep do control at least one more life-important perception : eating grass. When they control such a perception they spread on great teritory seeking for better grass, not seeking for control of gap between them. That’s what owners of sheep wants. So owner train a dog to group sheep so not to be spread arround.

Sheeps are not controlling only for the gap between sheep, they control for their life-important perception. The owner of course also control that sheep could eat best grass. Dog and people who trained dog, do control for sheep being togetheras as much as possible to eat grass, but also not to lose any of sheep.

So I think you are right that dog control for Â»the gap between sheepÂ« as that’s what owner wants. But I think you are not right that dog controls the behavior of sheep by controlling the gap among them. Sheep can control for different perception among which is also perception of grouping together for safety. But behavior of sheep is not determined with presence of the dog, but depends from sheep’s internal control by which relevant behavior (output) for the sheep’s control of perception is established.

Sheep beside very important control of eating grass, control also perception for the distance to the predator (in our case it’s dog). It’s probably some inborn survival behavior. So sheep control for the perception of distance to dog. Here is video, which show how group of sheeps are moving in accordance with distance to the dog. When dogs are at safe diastance (probably low Â»errorÂ« in sheep control) sheeps are not moving. When distance minimize sheep move (run) away from dog. But the distance is varying in accordance to control of sheep and dog. When sheep control differently – run away from group, than we can see that sheep in control of their perception.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJUVULU7GDM

So we can conclude that there are many Â»survivial behaviorsÂ« or sheep can control for different perceptions. One of them and very important is : the gap between dog (predator) and sheep. With output sheep will control perception of being enough far from dog. We can say that sheep controls the distance to the dog (predator) and varying distance will in some proportion (not linear) cause Â»errorsÂ« in control. The closer dog is, more Â»errorÂ« and more distance to the dog is produced, less Â»errorÂ« no activity or perception of eating grass is controlled.

Dog’s controlled perception is : the more the sheep are together – less Â»errorÂ«, the more they are appart – €“ more Â»errorÂ«. So again varying distance, varying Â»errorÂ« of dog control. Also seen in video when one sheep ran away from group. Dogs ran after it.

So both : dog and sheep are controllig what they are supposed to control.

Now Rick you can make simulation of both LCS each controling for own perception – varying perception of distance. We have only to establish, how these diferent controls with different goals are coordinated. I would say that dog run in different directions trying to change the distance to sheep so to move sheep in wanted direction.

In this way sheep is stil controlling for distance and less Â»errorÂ« in the direction of group of other sheep mean that is more possibility for sheep to move to the group. So in this case sheep is tending to encrease the gap to the dog and dog somehow enable that. But this is not always the case.

So I concluded that dog behavior is not always implaying sheep behavior to increase distance to the dog only by running away. It can be also different. In next video you can see that sheeps choose another behavior, which has something to do with the dog, but in opposite direction. Instead of increasing the gap to the dog, with running away, they choose the control of perception of moving the dog away. So they attack dog.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY_7U56R0AM

Your term Rick about controling other living being somehow sounds to me as S-R logic. Dog behavior (stimulus, disturbance) to sheep perceptual input, and then directly to sheep behavior is somehow determined sheep behavior by it’s input (environment). It’s denying Bill’s aymetry of control : LCS can control environment, and environment can’t control LCS.

By your control of behavior of others can happen in the opposite way. So it sounds like absolutely determined behavior by environment : sheep input (dogs behavior) - sheep output (induced behavior by dog behavior). Nothing in between. No process inside Â»controlledÂ« LCS counts, no references, no reorganization, just stream from input to output (control of others).

LCS are already controlling, so nobody can overtake that control. Sheep all the time control their perception. Dogs all the time control their percpetion.

I didn’t find any example to show how sheep can attack alone sheep dog, not just ran away form the dog, but I found this video, which shows how sheep attacked wolf, when he comes to close.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F29dMtxXCkE

If we think that sheep are inocent little animals harmly eating grass, we can made a hudge mistake : here is video which show how nasty can be sheep attack.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJrlo2VuUR8

Maybe this video will help to see, how sheep control the distance to dog (predator) :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXkHDiuadTI

And maybe one more video which shows that dog is not controlling the behavior of the ram.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cluHOW_EnAQ

And maybe the last video that shows that perceptual control is choosen in the ram not in environment and can be very unpredictable and dangerous.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jgjk3DsN7c

All in all I think that there is enough proof that dogs are not controlling behavior of the sheep, but sheep control it’s own perception that it chooses and dog control it’s perception that it chooses. But neither of them can control behavior. Nor own, neither others. As far as I understand there is no such a thing in PCT.

Best,

Boris

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

_Boris_Hartman · September 13, 2014, 8:56am

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.08.1545)]

Kent McClelland (2014.09.07.2050)

KM: I see that my name has come up in this exchange, so I’ll see if I can say anything to help move it along. As I look at what you’ve written, I don’t see much in either person’s position to disagree with, but you seem to be at an impasse. The difficulty seems to be semantic, revolving around what it means to control another person’s behavior, which Rick says can be done and Boris says can’t. In my view, you’re both partly right.

RM: I think it’s more than semantic. I think the difficulty turns on knowing what control is, in fact, not in theory. Once you know what control is then there is no controversy at all: behavior can be controlled. That’s what we are seeing with the sheepdogs (the dogs controlling the gaps between the sheep) and with the E and S in the rubber band demo (E controlling the finger position of S). A variable (the gap, the finger position) is being kept in a pre-selected state (0 gap, finger on target dot), protected from disturbance (autonomously produced changes in the closeness of the sheep to one another, the closeness of the finger to the target dot) by varying actions appropriately (moving towards or away from the sheep, increasing or reducing the pull on the rubber band) .

KM: The problem, as I see it, is that a person’s behavior (or that of any living control system with hierarchical control of perceptions) is never just one thing. A person controls lots of different perceptions simultaneously, at different perceptual levels. And when a person observes another person’s physical actions, the observer can see “behaviors” at a lot of different perceptual levels.

RM: Yes, but this is true of all of our experience, not just our experience of other people’s behavior. We control perceptual variables of many different types (hypothetically 11 different types of perceptual variable). I don’t see what this has to do with whether or not people can control other people’s behavior.

KM: Because a person controls lots of different things at once, under the right circumstances another person can control SOME of these behaviors (as the controller perceives them), but not ALL of them, at least not all of them simultaneously. The trick in controlling a particular behavior by another person (call it behavior A) is to get the person to focus on controlling behavior B, and then to remove all the other ways for the person to keep controlling behavior B except by doing behavior A.

RM: Yes, this is all I claimed was true: people can control the behavior of other people. Of course, they can only control some of these behaviors – the one’s that correct for disturbances to the variable the controllee is controlling. This is why I gave the example of controlling the position of S’s finger in the rubber band demo. Since S must vary the position of the finger in order to compensate for E- produced disturbances to the position of the knot, the variable S is controlling, E can control S’s finger position by disturbing the position of the knot. S’s finger position is the only aspect of S’s behavior that E can control in this situation. But that aspect of S’s behavior can certainly be controlled.

KM: That’s the classic pattern for manipulation of a person’s behavior.

RM: Right! This is how you can manipulate (control) another person’s behavior.

KM: The pattern also applies to the dog and sheep example.

RM: Exactly, the dog controls the behavior of the sheep by disturbing a variable that the sheep control by grouping themselves closer together. Boris disagrees and says that the sheep are not being controlled by the dog, which is demonstrably wrong. Without the dog there, the gaps between the sheep would on average be quite wide.

KM: Thus, the control of one person’s behavior by another person can and does happen

RM: My point exactly.

RM: One example: When I give a cashier $10 for a $5 item I am controlling for the cashier giving me $5 change. The cashier is also controlling for me paying $5 for the item. Typically, we both get the behaviors from each other than we want: a nice example of mutual control, and no one gets hurt (or oppressed). This kind of agreed on mutual control is the basis of civilization.

KM: Martin Taylor, in the chapter he’s writing for the LCS IV book edited by Warren Mansell (a preliminary draft of which I’ve been lucky enough to see), calls this kind of exchange transaction a “protocol,”

RM: I looked at Martin’s reply and what he describes as a “protocol” is not the same as the mutual controlling that occurs in the customer/cashier interaction.

KM: and, if I understand his concept correctly, protocols provide a way for two people acting together to control two different perceptions. The side-effects of one person’s behavior in controlling his or her own perception allow the other person to control a different perception (and vice-versa). In your example, the cashier controls the perception of completing a sale by getting your money and giving you the item and $5 change, while you control the perception of buying the item by handing over the money and getting the item and change back.

RM: The difference between the customer/cashier interaction and the interaction between two control systems described by Martin is that there is no control of one control system by another in the situation Martin describes. In the customer/cashier situation, successful control by each control system requires successful control of each control system’s behavior by the other control system. In Martin’s “protocol”, shown below, Alan’s ability to control PA does not depend on controlling Beth’s behavior and vice versa. The actions Alan uses to control PA are a disturbance to PB which Beth will oppose along with any other disturbances to PB, and vice versa. But Alan’s ability to control PA does not depend on his controlling Beth’s behavior. INdeed, Alan can control PA just fine whether Beth is controlling PB or not.

This is quite different from the customer/cashier situation. The customer is controlling for paying the exact cost for the product; the cashier is controlling for collecting the exact payment. If the product costs $5 and the customer hands $10 to the cashier, the customer will achieve the “pay the exact cost” goal only if the cashier returns the exact change. So the customer is controlling for the cashier returning $5. The cashier is also controlling for collecting the cost of the customer’s item and so will allow the customer to leave with the product only after payment has been received. If the cashier were not controlling for getting only the exact amount for the product the customer would not successfully control for getting the correct change behavior from the cashier; if the customer were not controlling for paying for the product the cashier would not successfully control for getting paid by the customer.

KM: I don’t think I would describe this exchange situation as control of another person’s behavior

RM: Apparently Bob Hintz doesn’t think so either. But, again, I think it can be easily demonstrated that both the customer and cashier are, in fact, controlling each other’s behavior by introducing disturbances to the hypothetical behavior variables that are being controlled. For example, have the cashier give the customer $4 rather $5 dollars in change – a disturbance to the customer’s perception of the cashier returning the correct change. I think you will see the customer take action – like arguing with the cashier – to bring the cashier’s behavior to the desired state: handing over the $5 change. Similarly, have the customer hand the cashier $4 rather than $5. I think you will see the cashier take action – like calling over the manager – to bring the customer’s behavior to the desired state: pay for the product. So the customer is controlling for the “returning correct change” behavior of the cashier and the cashier is controlling for the “paying for the product” behavior of the customer.

KM: unless you were buying the item from someone who had a monopoly, and the only way for you to get the item (behavior B) would be to pay the asking price (behavior A). Even then, you could refuse to buy the item or just get something else, unless the item were something you couldn’t live without.

RM: I hope my little explanation shows that this is not necessary. The customer and cashier are controlling each other’s behavior but it doesn’t look like they are controlling each other’s behavior (and they certainly don’t feel like they are controlling each other) until one or the other doesn’t behave as desired. This is the way it is with all our controlling, though, isn’t it? We don’t feel like we are controlling when we walk down the street or talk on the phone or swim in the lake – that is, we don’t notice our controlling until we start to lose it .Skillful control does’t feel like anything special; it just feels like we are doing things. And this is true of skillful controlling of our own limbs, of the physical consequences of limb movements (like walking and swimming) and interpersonal consequences of these limb movements (like getting change from a cashier).

RM: I think I understand why people don’t want to believe that they can be controlled and why they do want to believe that they never control other people. It fits with our idea that we are “free” and “good”. But I think it’s better to recognize when we are controlling, especially when we are controlling (and being controlled by) other control systems. Understanding how to recognize this is, I think, one of the most important things to learn from PCT. It’s only when you know that you are controlling (and being controlled) that you can adjust your own controlling to reduce inter (and intra) personal conflict and work to organize society in a way that allows controllers to do their controlling with the least amount of conflict and the greatest amount of cooperation with other controllers. Making believe that we can’t be controlled or that we are not controlled by and/or don’t control other controllers is not the road to a better world, I think.

Best

Rick

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Bob Hintz
Sent: Friday, September 12, 2014 6:28 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

Hi Bob,

bob hintz - 2014.09.12

BH :

I think Boris has collected some nice video references here. He also raises another issue. When a sheep is eating (controlling for internal perceptions of nutrition by chomping clumps of grass, chewing and swallowing) its observable behavior is different than when it is controlling the distance between itself and the dog. How does the sheep switch reference signals? Is there an internal perception device that monitors the degree of error in various control units so that choices are made regarding when danger takes precedence over hunger (ordinary talk for different control units?).

HB :

Superb thinking …. Thanks for contribution… Maybe I I judged wrong, maybe Social Psychology and Social Pedagogigs are not so far apart and maybe we could easily find ground for some nice chat …

Best,

Boris

On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Hi Rick,

RM: Exactly, the dog controls the behavior of the sheep by disturbing a variable that the sheep control by grouping themselves closer together. Boris disagrees and says that the sheep are not being controlled by the dog, which is demonstrably wrong. Without the dog there, the gaps between the sheep would on average be quite wide.

HB :

First of all nobody can control any behavior. Neither dog or sheep. Both control their own perception.

So if I see right your Â»attack on meÂ« that I’m wrong, you are trying to say that dog and sheep are controlling for the same perception : the gap between sheep and so it seems to you that dog controls the behavior of sheep. And that’s by your oppinion proof that sheeps are controlled by dog. Or in other words : because sheeps behave as dog wants, sheeps are controlled. Did I missed something ?

The problem here is that sheep could control the perception of the gap between sheep, for safety as you said. But when you say safety what does it mean. If we say just control for safety we don’t know what is really controlled. I asssume that safety could be higher order perception, composed of at least two lower level controlled perceptions : distance between ship and distance between dog and sheep. Both controlled perceptions are contributing to safety, specialy the last one.

But sheep do control at least one more life-important perception : eating grass. When they control such a perception they spread on great teritory seeking for better grass, not seeking for control of gap between them. That’s what owners of sheep wants. So owner train a dog to group sheep so not to be spread arround.

Sheeps are not controlling only for the gap between sheep, they control for their life-important perception. The owner of course also control that sheep could eat best grass. Dog and people who trained dog, do control for sheep being togetheras as much as possible to eat grass, but also not to lose any of sheep.

So I think you are right that dog control for Â»the gap between sheepÂ« as that’s what owner wants. But I think you are not right that dog controls the behavior of sheep by controlling the gap among them. Sheep can control for different perception among which is also perception of grouping together for safety. But behavior of sheep is not determined with presence of the dog, but depends from sheep’s internal control by which relevant behavior (output) for the sheep’s control of perception is established.

Sheep beside very important control of eating grass, control also perception for the distance to the predator (in our case it’s dog). It’s probably some inborn survival behavior. So sheep control for the perception of distance to dog. Here is video, which show how group of sheeps are moving in accordance with distance to the dog. When dogs are at safe diastance (probably low Â»errorÂ« in sheep control) sheeps are not moving. When distance minimize sheep move (run) away from dog. But the distance is varying in accordance to control of sheep and dog. When sheep control differently – run away from group, than we can see that sheep in control of their perception.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJUVULU7GDM

So we can conclude that there are many Â»survivial behaviorsÂ« or sheep can control for different perceptions. One of them and very important is : the gap between dog (predator) and sheep. With output sheep will control perception of being enough far from dog. We can say that sheep controls the distance to the dog (predator) and varying distance will in some proportion (not linear) cause Â»errorsÂ« in control. The closer dog is, more Â»errorÂ« and more distance to the dog is produced, less Â»errorÂ« no activity or perception of eating grass is controlled.

Dog’s controlled perception is : the more the sheep are together – less Â»errorÂ«, the more they are appart – €“ more Â»errorÂ«. So again varying distance, varying Â»errorÂ« of dog control. Also seen in video when one sheep ran away from group. Dogs ran after it.

So both : dog and sheep are controllig what they are supposed to control.

Now Rick you can make simulation of both LCS each controling for own perception – varying perception of distance. We have only to establish, how these diferent controls with different goals are coordinated. I would say that dog run in different directions trying to change the distance to sheep so to move sheep in wanted direction.

In this way sheep is stil controlling for distance and less Â»errorÂ« in the direction of group of other sheep mean that is more possibility for sheep to move to the group. So in this case sheep is tending to encrease the gap to the dog and dog somehow enable that. But this is not always the case.

So I concluded that dog behavior is not always implaying sheep behavior to increase distance to the dog only by running away. It can be also different. In next video you can see that sheeps choose another behavior, which has something to do with the dog, but in opposite direction. Instead of increasing the gap to the dog, with running away, they choose the control of perception of moving the dog away. So they attack dog.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY_7U56R0AM

Your term Rick about controling other living being somehow sounds to me as S-R logic. Dog behavior (stimulus, disturbance) to sheep perceptual input, and then directly to sheep behavior is somehow determined sheep behavior by it’s input (environment). It’s denying Bill’s aymetry of control : LCS can control environment, and environment can’t control LCS.

By your control of behavior of others can happen in the opposite way. So it sounds like absolutely determined behavior by environment : sheep input (dogs behavior) - sheep output (induced behavior by dog behavior). Nothing in between. No process inside Â»controlledÂ« LCS counts, no references, no reorganization, just stream from input to output (control of others).

LCS are already controlling, so nobody can overtake that control. Sheep all the time control their perception. Dogs all the time control their percpetion.

I didn’t find any example to show how sheep can attack alone sheep dog, not just ran away form the dog, but I found this video, which shows how sheep attacked wolf, when he comes to close.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F29dMtxXCkE

If we think that sheep are inocent little animals harmly eating grass, we can made a hudge mistake : here is video which show how nasty can be sheep attack.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJrlo2VuUR8

Maybe this video will help to see, how sheep control the distance to dog (predator) :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXkHDiuadTI

And maybe one more video which shows that dog is not controlling the behavior of the ram.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cluHOW_EnAQ

And maybe the last video that shows that perceptual control is choosen in the ram not in environment and can be very unpredictable and dangerous.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jgjk3DsN7c

All in all I think that there is enough proof that dogs are not controlling behavior of the sheep, but sheep control it’s own perception that it chooses and dog control it’s perception that it chooses. But neither of them can control behavior. Nor own, neither others. As far as I understand there is no such a thing in PCT.

Best,

Boris

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 2:45 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

Hope these thoughts help you to clarify the questions you were discussing.

Best,

Kent

On Sep 7, 2014, at 12:54 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.07.1100)]

boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH : I don’t think that dogs were controlling gaps by Â»controlling sheeps behaviorÂ«. Sheeps were controlling their behavior on the bases of disturbances dog produced to sheep perceptual control.

RM: Yes, the sheep were controlling a perception (I called it safety) to which the approach of the dog was a disturbance. The sheep compensated for this disturbance by moving closer to other sheep. This is the behavior that the dog wanted to see (were controlling for) because it closed the gaps that were a disturbance to the perception the dog was controlling. So the dog was able to control the behavior of the sheep, getting them to bunch closer together, because the sheep were controlling for safety by bunching together.

RM : So any model of this behavior would have to model the dogs’ “gap” control system and the sheep’s safety control system. Such a simulation would show that control systems can both control and be controlled.

BH : Well this is a good idea to make simultaneous simulation. Did you try it ?

RM: Not yet.

BH: But this is the n-th time that we are trying to solve the problem how LCS can be “controlled”. In the book : Making sense of behavior Bill talks about “attempts of control” not “control”…

BH: Maybe Kent could explain what’s wrong with your position about Â»LCS can be controlled".

RM: Yes, I think that’s a good idea, though I would be surprised if Kent thought that there is something wrong with my “position”. My position is simply that people can clearly control the behavior other people and their own behavior can be controlled as well. This is an observable fact that is explained by PCT. I leave the explanation as an exercise.

RM : It can also be easily demonstrated with humans using the rubber band demo; the E in this experiment can control the finger position of the S once S has agreed to control the position of the knot.

BH : Yes. Watch your wording in rubber band demo. “Once S has agreed” or as Kent said “S chooses”. . So it’s obviously that S agreed to be controlled.

RM: Not quite. S has agreed to control a particular perception (the location of the knot relative to the dot, in this case). S has not agreed to be controlled; indeed, S is typically unaware of being controlled after agreeing to control that perception.

HB : Aplying distrubance to a Â»controlled variableÂ« does not mean that control is established. It seems that Kent and I agree that disturbances are aplyed to perceptual control and target person chooses.

RM: I would be interested to hear what Kent has to say about that. I would be very surprised if he agreed with your analysis.

RM : Nor does control theory show that controlling organisms (particularly humans) is necessarily a bad thing to do.

BH : Now you are exaggerating Rick. You can’t control organisms. I’d really like to see how you are doing that in everyday life ?

RM: One example: When I give a cashier $10 for a $5 item I am controlling for the cashier giving me $5 change. The cashier is also controlling for me paying $5 for the item. Typically, we both get the behaviors from each other than we want: a nice example of mutual control, and no one gets hurt (or oppressed). This kind of agreed on mutual control is the basis of civilization.

RM : What control theory does show is that arbitrary control, particularly of humans by other humans, will almost certainly lead to conflict. Arbitrary control is exerting control without considering the fact that living control systems are controlling many variables at the same time and when you arbitrarily decide to have a person do something (by disturbing a controlling variable) what you have them do may conflict with other things they are controlling.

HB : It makes some sense, but I don’t understand what you meant by Â»arbitrary controlÂ« ?

RM: It means controlling without taking a persons wants and needs (the references for the many different perceptions that the person is controlling for) into account. In non-PCT terms, it is controlling another person without respecting that person’s humanity (and autonomy).

BH: If you are thinking like this one : Â»Controlle behavior match my wanted perception of behvior and thus it is Â»controlledÂ« it’s wrong.

RM: That’s exactly how I am thinking. And I think you are wrong about this being wrong.

BH: You have PCT which helps you understand what’s happening inside organisms. Human control and behavior are quite unpredictable, because the references are formed inside organism, where most of control is done.

RM: Once you have correctly identified a controlled variable behavior (the actions that protect that variable from disturbance) can be predicted with very high accuracy. See the “Basic Control demo” at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html to see what I mean.

BH: Just observable Â»factsÂ« of behavioral event are not prove that people control each other. Although it’s not excluded. The controller’s behavior is just a disturbance to controlee perceptual control. From what happens in controlee comparator (error) will probably decide whether controlee behavior will resemble to something controller wanted or not. But never behavior of controlee will be just exact Â»copyÂ« of controller’s wanted behavior, because controlee is in control.

RM: It may not be an “exact” copy of what the controller wants, but it can be very close (like within 1% of the desired value).

RM: Anyway, this behavior – managing flocks – is a very interesting demonstration of controlling a perception (of gaps between sheep) via disturbance of a perception being controlled by the control systems that are being controlled.

BH: This one makes some PCT sense. J

RM: Well, that’s progress!

Best

Rick

But as usual I’m living space for not understanding something right. And as always, sorry for my language.

Best,

Boris

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Sunday, August 31, 2014 3:23 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.08.30.1820)]

[From Bruce Abbott (2014.08.30.0820 EDT)]

Researchers have investigated how sheepdogs manage their flocks by fitting both the dogs and the sheep with highly accurate GPS devices, allowing the researchers to track their movements. The research is presented in a BBC article at http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28936251 .

RM: Great find, Bruce! There are two things that make this report particularly interesting to me. The first is the quote by Andrew King, which is a great description of the PCT approach to research. To paraphrase King: in order to understand the behavior of organisms you have to try to look at their behavior from the point of view of the organism (behaving system) Itself. I make this same point in the chapter on “Looking at Behavior through Control Theory Glasses” in “Doing Research on Purpose” (why hasn’t that become a best seller yet?). I do it in the section on trying to understand the apparent “fixed action pattern” of the greylag goose. The goose is seen to continue to make the movements that would pull an egg back into its nest even when the egg is no longer present. Looking at an organism’s behavior from the organism’s perspective helps you come up with good ideas about what perceptual variables the organism is controlling (the first step in the Test for the Controlled Variable). By looking at the goose’s egg rolling behavior from the goose’s perspective I was able to come up with the hypothesis that the goose is trying to control the pressure of the egg against the back of its bill and when the egg is removed the continued efforts to move the non-existent egg into the nest (the apparent fixed action pattern) is just the efforts of the pressure control system to restore the pressure of the egg against the back of the bill. By looking at the sheepdogs herding behavior from the dogs’ perspective King came up with the reasonable hypothesis that the dogs were controlling their perception of the gaps between patches of white (the sheep), trying to keep those gaps at zero.

RM: The other thing that’s interesting about this report is that the dogs were clearly controlling their perception of the gaps by controlling the behavior of the sheep. And they did this by becoming a disturbance to a perception that the sheep control by getting closer to other sheep: the perception of safety. So any model of this behavior would have to model the dogs’ “gap” control system and the sheep’s safety control system. Such a simulation would show that control systems can both control and be controlled. This kind of simulation would help dispel what I think is a common misconception about the control theory model of organisms – particularly humans. It is a misconception that I myself labored under until just a few years ago. It is the idea that because organisms are autonomous control systems – autonomous in the sense that they set their own references for the states of their own perception – they cannot be controlled. But autonomous control systems can be controlled, as is demonstrated by the sheepdogs controlling the sheep. It can also be easily demonstrated with humans using the rubber band demo; the E in this experiment can control the finger position of the S once S has agreed to control the position of the knot. And thanks to Bruce Abbott I demonstrated to myself that E can still exert this control even if S continuously – and autonomously – varies his or her reference for the position of the knot.

RM: Control theory doesn’t say that organisms (particularly humans) can’t be controlled; indeed, it shows that they can be controlled, mainly by disturbance to a controlled variable. Nor does control theory show that controlling organisms (particularly humans) is necessarily a bad thing to do. What control theory does show is that arbitrary control, particularly of humans by other humans, will almost certainly lead to conflict. Arbitrary control is exerting control without considering the fact that living control systems are controlling many variables at the same time and when you arbitrarily decide to have a person do something (by disturbing a controlling variable) what you have them do may conflict with other things they are controlling. So to take an example that Bill used (somewhere), if E decides to place S’s finger against a hot soldering iron while controlling Ss finger position in the rubber band game that will clearly lconflict with another goal S has (not getting burned). Non-arbitrary control is control that is done with the consent (often implicit but sometimes explicit) of the would-be controllee. Non- arbitrary control is, I think, essential when humans control other humans. To see why, think about what happens when people are arbitrarily controlled (herded) in the same way that the sheep were. Hint: They don’t like it. Why do you think not?

RM: Anyway, this behavior – managing flocks – is a very interesting demonstration of controlling a perception (of gaps between sheep) via disturbance of a perception being controlled by the control systems that are being controlled.

Best

Rick

The researchers found that the behavior could be described by two simple rules, but more interesting from a PCT perspective, they found that to understand the behavior they needed to view the action from the animalâ€™s perspectives. According to researcher Dr. Andrew King:

“At the beginning we had lots of different ideas. We started out looking from a birds eye view, but then we realised we needed to see what the dog sees. It sees white, fluffy things. If there are gaps between them or the gaps get bigger, the dogs needs to bring them together.”

According to Dr King, sheepdogs are making the most of the “selfish herd theory” to bring the animals close together and move them where they want.

“One of the things that sheep are really good at is responding to a threat by working with their neighbours. It’s the selfish herd theory: put something between the threat and you. Individuals try to minimise the chance of anything happening to them, so they move towards the centre of a group.”

The article continues as follows:

A colleague, Dr Daniel Strombom from Uppsala University in Sweden, used the GPS data from the collars to develop computer simulations. This enabled them to develop a mathematical shepherding model.

The algorithm displays the same weaving pattern exhibited by sheepdogs. It helps to solve what has been called the ‘the shepherding problem’: how one agent can control a large number of unwilling agents.

Iâ€™d be interested to know whether the computer algorithm models each individualâ€™s control systems or operates by some other method.

Bruce

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

_Boris_Hartman · September 13, 2014, 9:09am

[Martin Taylor 2014.09.12.12.46]

bob hintz - 2014.09.12

I think Boris has collected some nice video references here. He also raises another issue. When a sheep is eating (controlling for internal perceptions of nutrition by chomping clumps of grass, chewing and swallowing) its observable behavior is different than when it is controlling the distance between itself and the dog. How does the sheep switch reference signals? Is there an internal perception device that monitors the degree of error in various control units so that choices are made regarding when danger takes precedence over hunger (ordinary talk for different control units?).

MT :
You are talking about conflict between different control systems. The conflict occurs when two control systems want to set one perceptual variable (location on the field) to two different places. The “eating” set of control systems wants to be where the grass is lush, while the “safety” set of control systems wants to be away from the dog. How conflicts get resolved is a generic question in PCT with probably several different answers. Indeed, that’s what MOL is about.

HB :

I think your reasoning is very good…maybe some adds would be welcome

MT :
From the outside, conflict resolution looks like choice or decision, and maybe that’s actually what happens. Maybe one control system turns its gain down to zero and lets the other one win. Maybe some switch disconnects one and allows the other to control. Maybe they both keep providing output but there’s a system nonlinearity somewhere that allows one of them to dominate. There are several possibilities. In any particular case, I suppose that it would be possible to model the effects of different possible ways a conflict is resolved. Kent McClelland would be a good one to ask about this. But we can’t tell in the case of the sheep.

HB : Agree…J

If you were out in the jungle picking berries to stave off hunger and you thought you heard a tiger, would you imagine you would keep on picking berries? If not, what perceptions would you imagine yourself to now be controlling that you were not controlling before you thought you heard the tiger? And why?

HB : Very good question…

Boris

Martin

Hi Rick,

RM: Exactly, the dog controls the behavior of the sheep by disturbing a variable that the sheep control by grouping themselves closer together. Boris disagrees and says that the sheep are not being controlled by the dog, which is demonstrably wrong. Without the dog there, the gaps between the sheep would on average be quite wide.

HB :

First of all nobody can control any behavior. Neither dog or sheep. Both control their own perception.

So if I see right your Â»attack on meÂ« that I’m wrong, you are trying to say that dog and sheep are controlling for the same perception : the gap between sheep and so it seems to you that dog controls the behavior of sheep. And that’s by your oppinion proof that sheeps are controlled by dog. Or in other words : because sheeps behave as dog wants, sheeps are controlled. Did I missed something ?

The problem here is that sheep could control the perception of the gap between sheep, for safety as you said. But when you say safety what does it mean. If we say just control for safety we don’t know what is really controlled. I asssume that safety could be higher order perception, composed of at least two lower level controlled perceptions : distance between ship and distance between dog and sheep. Both controlled perceptions are contributing to safety, specialy the last one.

But sheep do control at least one more life-important perception : eating grass. When they control such a perception they spread on great teritory seeking for better grass, not seeking for control of gap between them. That’s what owners of sheep wants. So owner train a dog to group sheep so not to be spread arround.

Sheeps are not controlling only for the gap between sheep, they control for their life-important perception. The owner of course also control that sheep could eat best grass. Dog and people who trained dog, do control for sheep being togetheras as much as possible to eat grass, but also not to lose any of sheep.

So I think you are right that dog control for Â»the gap between sheepÂ« as that’s what owner wants. But I think you are not right that dog controls the behavior of sheep by controlling the gap among them. Sheep can control for different perception among which is also perception of grouping together for safety. But behavior of sheep is not determined with presence of the dog, but depends from sheep’s internal control by which relevant behavior (output) for the sheep’s control of perception is established.

Sheep beside very important control of eating grass, control also perception for the distance to the predator (in our case it’s dog). It’s probably some inborn survival behavior. So sheep control for the perception of distance to dog. Here is video, which show how group of sheeps are moving in accordance with distance to the dog. When dogs are at safe diastance (probably low Â»errorÂ« in sheep control) sheeps are not moving. When distance minimize sheep move (run) away from dog. But the distance is varying in accordance to control of sheep and dog. When sheep control differently – run away from group, than we can see that sheep in control of their perception.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJUVULU7GDM

So we can conclude that there are many Â»survivial behaviorsÂ« or sheep can control for different perceptions. One of them and very important is : the gap between dog (predator) and sheep. With output sheep will control perception of being enough far from dog. We can say that sheep controls the distance to the dog (predator) and varying distance will in some proportion (not linear) cause Â»errorsÂ« in control. The closer dog is, more Â»errorÂ« and more distance to the dog is produced, less Â»errorÂ« no activity or perception of eating grass is controlled.

Dog’s controlled perception is : the more the sheep are together – less Â»errorÂ«, the more they are appart – €“ more Â»errorÂ«. So again varying distance, varying Â»errorÂ« of dog control. Also seen in video when one sheep ran away from group. Dogs ran after it.

So both : dog and sheep are controllig what they are supposed to control.

Now Rick you can make simulation of both LCS each controling for own perception – varying perception of distance. We have only to establish, how these diferent controls with different goals are coordinated. I would say that dog run in different directions trying to change the distance to sheep so to move sheep in wanted direction.

In this way sheep is stil controlling for distance and less Â»errorÂ« in the direction of group of other sheep mean that is more possibility for sheep to move to the group. So in this case sheep is tending to encrease the gap to the dog and dog somehow enable that. But this is not always the case.

So I concluded that dog behavior is not always implaying sheep behavior to increase distance to the dog only by running away. It can be also different. In next video you can see that sheeps choose another behavior, which has something to do with the dog, but in opposite direction. Instead of increasing the gap to the dog, with running away, they choose the control of perception of moving the dog away. So they attack dog.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY_7U56R0AM

Your term Rick about controling other living being somehow sounds to me as S-R logic. Dog behavior (stimulus, disturbance) to sheep perceptual input, and then directly to sheep behavior is somehow determined sheep behavior by it’s input (environment). It’s denying Bill’s aymetry of control : LCS can control environment, and environment can’t control LCS.

By your control of behavior of others can happen in the opposite way. So it sounds like absolutely determined behavior by environment : sheep input (dogs behavior) - sheep output (induced behavior by dog behavior). Nothing in between. No process inside Â»controlledÂ« LCS counts, no references, no reorganization, just stream from input to output (control of others).

LCS are already controlling, so nobody can overtake that control. Sheep all the time control their perception. Dogs all the time control their percpetion.

I didn’t find any example to show how sheep can attack alone sheep dog, not just ran away form the dog, but I found this video, which shows how sheep attacked wolf, when he comes to close.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F29dMtxXCkE

If we think that sheep are inocent little animals harmly eating grass, we can made a hudge mistake : here is video which show how nasty can be sheep attack.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJrlo2VuUR8

Maybe this video will help to see, how sheep control the distance to dog (predator) :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXkHDiuadTI

And maybe one more video which shows that dog is not controlling the behavior of the ram.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cluHOW_EnAQ

And maybe the last video that shows that perceptual control is choosen in the ram not in environment and can be very unpredictable and dangerous.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jgjk3DsN7c

All in all I think that there is enough proof that dogs are not controlling behavior of the sheep, but sheep control it’s own perception that it chooses and dog control it’s perception that it chooses. But neither of them can control behavior. Nor own, neither others. As far as I understand there is no such a thing in PCT.

Best,

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Taylor
Sent: Friday, September 12, 2014 7:11 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

On 2014/09/12 12:28 PM, Bob Hintz wrote:
On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 2:45 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.08.1545)]

Kent McClelland (2014.09.07.2050)

KM: I see that my name has come up in this exchange, so I’ll see if I can say anything to help move it along. As I look at what you’ve written, I don’t see much in either person’s position to disagree with, but you seem to be at an impasse. The difficulty seems to be semantic, revolving around what it means to control another person’s behavior, which Rick says can be done and Boris says can’t. In my view, you’re both partly right.

RM: I think it’s more than semantic. I think the difficulty turns on knowing what control is, in fact, not in theory. Once you know what control is then there is no controversy at all: behavior can be controlled. That’s what we are seeing with the sheepdogs (the dogs controlling the gaps between the sheep) and with the E and S in the rubber band demo (E controlling the finger position of S). A variable (the gap, the finger position) is being kept in a pre-selected state (0 gap, finger on target dot), protected from disturbance (autonomously produced changes in the closeness of the sheep to one another, the closeness of the finger to the target dot) by varying actions appropriately (moving towards or away from the sheep, increasing or reducing the pull on the rubber band) .

KM: The problem, as I see it, is that a person’s behavior (or that of any living control system with hierarchical control of perceptions) is never just one thing. A person controls lots of different perceptions simultaneously, at different perceptual levels. And when a person observes another person’s physical actions, the observer can see “behaviors” at a lot of different perceptual levels.

RM: Yes, but this is true of all of our experience, not just our experience of other people’s behavior. We control perceptual variables of many different types (hypothetically 11 different types of perceptual variable). I don’t see what this has to do with whether or not people can control other people’s behavior.

KM: Because a person controls lots of different things at once, under the right circumstances another person can control SOME of these behaviors (as the controller perceives them), but not ALL of them, at least not all of them simultaneously. The trick in controlling a particular behavior by another person (call it behavior A) is to get the person to focus on controlling behavior B, and then to remove all the other ways for the person to keep controlling behavior B except by doing behavior A.

RM: Yes, this is all I claimed was true: people can control the behavior of other people. Of course, they can only control some of these behaviors – the one’s that correct for disturbances to the variable the controllee is controlling. This is why I gave the example of controlling the position of S’s finger in the rubber band demo. Since S must vary the position of the finger in order to compensate for E- produced disturbances to the position of the knot, the variable S is controlling, E can control S’s finger position by disturbing the position of the knot. S’s finger position is the only aspect of S’s behavior that E can control in this situation. But that aspect of S’s behavior can certainly be controlled.

KM: That’s the classic pattern for manipulation of a person’s behavior.

RM: Right! This is how you can manipulate (control) another person’s behavior.

KM: The pattern also applies to the dog and sheep example.

RM: Exactly, the dog controls the behavior of the sheep by disturbing a variable that the sheep control by grouping themselves closer together. Boris disagrees and says that the sheep are not being controlled by the dog, which is demonstrably wrong. Without the dog there, the gaps between the sheep would on average be quite wide.

KM: Thus, the control of one person’s behavior by another person can and does happen

RM: My point exactly.

RM: One example: When I give a cashier $10 for a $5 item I am controlling for the cashier giving me $5 change. The cashier is also controlling for me paying $5 for the item. Typically, we both get the behaviors from each other than we want: a nice example of mutual control, and no one gets hurt (or oppressed). This kind of agreed on mutual control is the basis of civilization.

KM: Martin Taylor, in the chapter he’s writing for the LCS IV book edited by Warren Mansell (a preliminary draft of which I’ve been lucky enough to see), calls this kind of exchange transaction a “protocol,”

RM: I looked at Martin’s reply and what he describes as a “protocol” is not the same as the mutual controlling that occurs in the customer/cashier interaction.

KM: and, if I understand his concept correctly, protocols provide a way for two people acting together to control two different perceptions. The side-effects of one person’s behavior in controlling his or her own perception allow the other person to control a different perception (and vice-versa). In your example, the cashier controls the perception of completing a sale by getting your money and giving you the item and $5 change, while you control the perception of buying the item by handing over the money and getting the item and change back.

RM: The difference between the customer/cashier interaction and the interaction between two control systems described by Martin is that there is no control of one control system by another in the situation Martin describes. In the customer/cashier situation, successful control by each control system requires successful control of each control system’s behavior by the other control system. In Martin’s “protocol”, shown below, Alan’s ability to control PA does not depend on controlling Beth’s behavior and vice versa. The actions Alan uses to control PA are a disturbance to PB which Beth will oppose along with any other disturbances to PB, and vice versa. But Alan’s ability to control PA does not depend on his controlling Beth’s behavior. INdeed, Alan can control PA just fine whether Beth is controlling PB or not.

Inline image 1

This is quite different from the customer/cashier situation. The customer is controlling for paying the exact cost for the product; the cashier is controlling for collecting the exact payment. If the product costs $5 and the customer hands $10 to the cashier, the customer will achieve the “pay the exact cost” goal only if the cashier returns the exact change. So the customer is controlling for the cashier returning $5. The cashier is also controlling for collecting the cost of the customer’s item and so will allow the customer to leave with the product only after payment has been received. If the cashier were not controlling for getting only the exact amount for the product the customer would not successfully control for getting the correct change behavior from the cashier; if the customer were not controlling for paying for the product the cashier would not successfully control for getting paid by the customer.

KM: I don’t think I would describe this exchange situation as control of another person’s behavior

RM: Apparently Bob Hintz doesn’t think so either. But, again, I think it can be easily demonstrated that both the customer and cashier are, in fact, controlling each other’s behavior by introducing disturbances to the hypothetical behavior variables that are being controlled. For example, have the cashier give the customer $4 rather $5 dollars in change – a disturbance to the customer’s perception of the cashier returning the correct change. I think you will see the customer take action – like arguing with the cashier – to bring the cashier’s behavior to the desired state: handing over the $5 change. Similarly, have the customer hand the cashier $4 rather than $5. I think you will see the cashier take action – like calling over the manager – to bring the customer’s behavior to the desired state: pay for the product. So the customer is controlling for the “returning correct change” behavior of the cashier and the cashier is controlling for the “paying for the product” behavior of the customer.

KM: unless you were buying the item from someone who had a monopoly, and the only way for you to get the item (behavior B) would be to pay the asking price (behavior A). Even then, you could refuse to buy the item or just get something else, unless the item were something you couldn’t live without.

RM: I hope my little explanation shows that this is not necessary. The customer and cashier are controlling each other’s behavior but it doesn’t look like they are controlling each other’s behavior (and they certainly don’t feel like they are controlling each other) until one or the other doesn’t behave as desired. This is the way it is with all our controlling, though, isn’t it? We don’t feel like we are controlling when we walk down the street or talk on the phone or swim in the lake – that is, we don’t notice our controlling until we start to lose it .Skillful control does’t feel like anything special; it just feels like we are doing things. And this is true of skillful controlling of our own limbs, of the physical consequences of limb movements (like walking and swimming) and interpersonal consequences of these limb movements (like getting change from a cashier).

RM: I think I understand why people don’t want to believe that they can be controlled and why they do want to believe that they never control other people. It fits with our idea that we are “free” and “good”. But I think it’s better to recognize when we are controlling, especially when we are controlling (and being controlled by) other control systems. Understanding how to recognize this is, I think, one of the most important things to learn from PCT. It’s only when you know that you are controlling (and being controlled) that you can adjust your own controlling to reduce inter (and intra) personal conflict and work to organize society in a way that allows controllers to do their controlling with the least amount of conflict and the greatest amount of cooperation with other controllers. Making believe that we can’t be controlled or that we are not controlled by and/or don’t control other controllers is not the road to a better world, I think.

Best

Rick

Hope these thoughts help you to clarify the questions you were discussing.

Best,

Kent

On Sep 7, 2014, at 12:54 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.07.1100)]

boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH : I don’t think that dogs were controlling gaps by Â»controlling sheeps behaviorÂ«. Sheeps were controlling their behavior on the bases of disturbances dog produced to sheep perceptual control.

RM: Yes, the sheep were controlling a perception (I called it safety) to which the approach of the dog was a disturbance. The sheep compensated for this disturbance by moving closer to other sheep. This is the behavior that the dog wanted to see (were controlling for) because it closed the gaps that were a disturbance to the perception the dog was controlling. So the dog was able to control the behavior of the sheep, getting them to bunch closer together, because the sheep were controlling for safety by bunching together.

RM : So any model of this behavior would have to model the dogs’ “gap” control system and the sheep’s safety control system. Such a simulation would show that control systems can both control and be controlled.

BH : Well this is a good idea to make simultaneous simulation. Did you try it ?

RM: Not yet.

BH: But this is the n-th time that we are trying to solve the problem how LCS can be “controlled”. In the book : Making sense of behavior Bill talks about “attempts of control” not “control”…

BH: Maybe Kent could explain what’s wrong with your position about Â»LCS can be controlled".

RM: Yes, I think that’s a good idea, though I would be surprised if Kent thought that there is something wrong with my “position”. My position is simply that people can clearly control the behavior other people and their own behavior can be controlled as well. This is an observable fact that is explained by PCT. I leave the explanation as an exercise.

RM : It can also be easily demonstrated with humans using the rubber band demo; the E in this experiment can control the finger position of the S once S has agreed to control the position of the knot.

BH : Yes. Watch your wording in rubber band demo. “Once S has agreed” or as Kent said “S chooses”. . So it’s obviously that S agreed to be controlled.

RM: Not quite. S has agreed to control a particular perception (the location of the knot relative to the dot, in this case). S has not agreed to be controlled; indeed, S is typically unaware of being controlled after agreeing to control that perception.

HB : Aplying distrubance to a Â»controlled variableÂ« does not mean that control is established. It seems that Kent and I agree that disturbances are aplyed to perceptual control and target person chooses.

RM: I would be interested to hear what Kent has to say about that. I would be very surprised if he agreed with your analysis.

RM : Nor does control theory show that controlling organisms (particularly humans) is necessarily a bad thing to do.

BH : Now you are exaggerating Rick. You can’t control organisms. I’d really like to see how you are doing that in everyday life ?

RM: One example: When I give a cashier $10 for a $5 item I am controlling for the cashier giving me $5 change. The cashier is also controlling for me paying $5 for the item. Typically, we both get the behaviors from each other than we want: a nice example of mutual control, and no one gets hurt (or oppressed). This kind of agreed on mutual control is the basis of civilization.

RM : What control theory does show is that arbitrary control, particularly of humans by other humans, will almost certainly lead to conflict. Arbitrary control is exerting control without considering the fact that living control systems are controlling many variables at the same time and when you arbitrarily decide to have a person do something (by disturbing a controlling variable) what you have them do may conflict with other things they are controlling.

HB : It makes some sense, but I don’t understand what you meant by Â»arbitrary controlÂ« ?

RM: It means controlling without taking a persons wants and needs (the references for the many different perceptions that the person is controlling for) into account. In non-PCT terms, it is controlling another person without respecting that person’s humanity (and autonomy).

BH: If you are thinking like this one : Â»Controlle behavior match my wanted perception of behvior and thus it is Â»controlledÂ« it’s wrong.

RM: That’s exactly how I am thinking. And I think you are wrong about this being wrong.

BH: You have PCT which helps you understand what’s happening inside organisms. Human control and behavior are quite unpredictable, because the references are formed inside organism, where most of control is done.

RM: Once you have correctly identified a controlled variable behavior (the actions that protect that variable from disturbance) can be predicted with very high accuracy. See the “Basic Control demo” at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html to see what I mean.

BH: Just observable Â»factsÂ« of behavioral event are not prove that people control each other. Although it’s not excluded. The controller’s behavior is just a disturbance to controlee perceptual control. From what happens in controlee comparator (error) will probably decide whether controlee behavior will resemble to something controller wanted or not. But never behavior of controlee will be just exact Â»copyÂ« of controller’s wanted behavior, because controlee is in control.

RM: It may not be an “exact” copy of what the controller wants, but it can be very close (like within 1% of the desired value).

RM: Anyway, this behavior – managing flocks – is a very interesting demonstration of controlling a perception (of gaps between sheep) via disturbance of a perception being controlled by the control systems that are being controlled.

BH: This one makes some PCT sense. J

RM: Well, that’s progress!

Best

Rick

But as usual I’m living space for not understanding something right. And as always, sorry for my language.

Best,

Boris

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Sunday, August 31, 2014 3:23 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.08.30.1820)]

[From Bruce Abbott (2014.08.30.0820 EDT)]

Researchers have investigated how sheepdogs manage their flocks by fitting both the dogs and the sheep with highly accurate GPS devices, allowing the researchers to track their movements. The research is presented in a BBC article at http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28936251 .

RM: Great find, Bruce! There are two things that make this report particularly interesting to me. The first is the quote by Andrew King, which is a great description of the PCT approach to research. To paraphrase King: in order to understand the behavior of organisms you have to try to look at their behavior from the point of view of the organism (behaving system) Itself. I make this same point in the chapter on “Looking at Behavior through Control Theory Glasses” in “Doing Research on Purpose” (why hasn’t that become a best seller yet?). I do it in the section on trying to understand the apparent “fixed action pattern” of the greylag goose. The goose is seen to continue to make the movements that would pull an egg back into its nest even when the egg is no longer present. Looking at an organism’s behavior from the organism’s perspective helps you come up with good ideas about what perceptual variables the organism is controlling (the first step in the Test for the Controlled Variable). By looking at the goose’s egg rolling behavior from the goose’s perspective I was able to come up with the hypothesis that the goose is trying to control the pressure of the egg against the back of its bill and when the egg is removed the continued efforts to move the non-existent egg into the nest (the apparent fixed action pattern) is just the efforts of the pressure control system to restore the pressure of the egg against the back of the bill. By looking at the sheepdogs herding behavior from the dogs’ perspective King came up with the reasonable hypothesis that the dogs were controlling their perception of the gaps between patches of white (the sheep), trying to keep those gaps at zero.

RM: The other thing that’s interesting about this report is that the dogs were clearly controlling their perception of the gaps by controlling the behavior of the sheep. And they did this by becoming a disturbance to a perception that the sheep control by getting closer to other sheep: the perception of safety. So any model of this behavior would have to model the dogs’ “gap” control system and the sheep’s safety control system. Such a simulation would show that control systems can both control and be controlled. This kind of simulation would help dispel what I think is a common misconception about the control theory model of organisms – particularly humans. It is a misconception that I myself labored under until just a few years ago. It is the idea that because organisms are autonomous control systems – autonomous in the sense that they set their own references for the states of their own perception – they cannot be controlled. But autonomous control systems can be controlled, as is demonstrated by the sheepdogs controlling the sheep. It can also be easily demonstrated with humans using the rubber band demo; the E in this experiment can control the finger position of the S once S has agreed to control the position of the knot. And thanks to Bruce Abbott I demonstrated to myself that E can still exert this control even if S continuously – and autonomously – varies his or her reference for the position of the knot.

RM: Control theory doesn’t say that organisms (particularly humans) can’t be controlled; indeed, it shows that they can be controlled, mainly by disturbance to a controlled variable. Nor does control theory show that controlling organisms (particularly humans) is necessarily a bad thing to do. What control theory does show is that arbitrary control, particularly of humans by other humans, will almost certainly lead to conflict. Arbitrary control is exerting control without considering the fact that living control systems are controlling many variables at the same time and when you arbitrarily decide to have a person do something (by disturbing a controlling variable) what you have them do may conflict with other things they are controlling. So to take an example that Bill used (somewhere), if E decides to place S’s finger against a hot soldering iron while controlling Ss finger position in the rubber band game that will clearly lconflict with another goal S has (not getting burned). Non-arbitrary control is control that is done with the consent (often implicit but sometimes explicit) of the would-be controllee. Non- arbitrary control is, I think, essential when humans control other humans. To see why, think about what happens when people are arbitrarily controlled (herded) in the same way that the sheep were. Hint: They don’t like it. Why do you think not?

RM: Anyway, this behavior – managing flocks – is a very interesting demonstration of controlling a perception (of gaps between sheep) via disturbance of a perception being controlled by the control systems that are being controlled.

Best

Rick

The researchers found that the behavior could be described by two simple rules, but more interesting from a PCT perspective, they found that to understand the behavior they needed to view the action from the animalâ€™s perspectives. According to researcher Dr. Andrew King:

“At the beginning we had lots of different ideas. We started out looking from a birds eye view, but then we realised we needed to see what the dog sees. It sees white, fluffy things. If there are gaps between them or the gaps get bigger, the dogs needs to bring them together.”

According to Dr King, sheepdogs are making the most of the “selfish herd theory” to bring the animals close together and move them where they want.

“One of the things that sheep are really good at is responding to a threat by working with their neighbours. It’s the selfish herd theory: put something between the threat and you. Individuals try to minimise the chance of anything happening to them, so they move towards the centre of a group.”

The article continues as follows:

A colleague, Dr Daniel Strombom from Uppsala University in Sweden, used the GPS data from the collars to develop computer simulations. This enabled them to develop a mathematical shepherding model.

The algorithm displays the same weaving pattern exhibited by sheepdogs. It helps to solve what has been called the ‘the shepherding problem’: how one agent can control a large number of unwilling agents.

Iâ€™d be interested to know whether the computer algorithm models each individualâ€™s control systems or operates by some other method.

Bruce

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

_Boris_Hartman · September 13, 2014, 9:30am

Bob,

please accept my apologie that I answered to Rick’s thoughts before you did… I just couldn’t resist J

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Friday, September 12, 2014 7:38 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.12.1040)]

bob hintz - 2014.09.12

BH: I think Boris has collected some nice video references here.

RM: I’ve only looked at the first one and it is, indeed, a super video. It’s as clear a demonstration of dogs controlling the position of the sheep as one could hope for.

HB : You looked only one video. Maybe it obcsured your Â»visionÂ« and you don’t see wood, because of the trees.

BH: He also raises another issue. When a sheep is eating (controlling for internal perceptions of nutrition by chomping clumps of grass, chewing and swallowing) its observable behavior is different than when it is controlling the distance between itself and the dog. How does the sheep switch reference signals?

RM: According to PCT, organisms are controlling many hierarchically related perceptions simultaneously. So what looks like “switching” from doing one thing to doing another (from controlling one perception to controlling another) is (in theory) higher level systems varying the values of the references for these controlled perceptions as the means of controlling higher level perceptions. So, for example, a sheep is presumably always controlling for both the perception of being fed and of being a safe distance from the dog.

HB : I could partialy agree. It seems to me that Rupert raised a good question about Â»what’s an internal modelÂ« ?

RM : But one possible explanation for what appears to be the “switching” from one behavior to another is that that a higher level system acts to prevent conflict by controlling for one thing being done before the other.

HB : The emphasis is on one Â»possible explanationÂ« J

RM: For example. when the distance to the dog perception is disturbed, the sheep must use output systems (move away from where it is currently munching on grass, for example) to correct for that disturbance that would interfere with eating. So a higher level system might set the eating reference temporarily to zero while the sheep is dealing with the disturbance to distance. The higher level system may be a sequence control system that is controlling for a sequence perception (flee then eat) that would preventing the sheep from being eaten before it eats.

HB : Quite good example J

BH: Is there an internal perception device that monitors the degree of error in various control units so that choices are made regarding when danger takes precedence over hunger (ordinary talk for different control units?).

RM: Yes, I just described one possibility. There are surely others. The way to figure out what is actually going on when one behavior seems to be prioritized over another (which, I think, is a very interesting question) is to do experimental tests. It can’t be done by sitting on an armchair and deciding which explanation one likes best.

HB : I agree. It’s a very interesting question ?

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

rsmarken · September 14, 2014, 4:42pm

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.14.0945)]

···

On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 1:50 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Hi Rick,

Â

BH: you are clearly defending your stand point of Â»dog controlling sheep behaviorÂ« as osbervable fact, not theoretical as PCT predicts. I’m also sorry to notice that PCT is not explaining that fact, your explanation is away from PCT. I’m sorry about that.

RM: No need to be sorry. This discussion has motivated me to revise my “Control of Behavior” demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemosJava/Coercion.html so that it shows more clearly how control of behavior works. Right now it’s a little difficult to understand unless you read the write up carefully. And the write up isn’t that clear either; I’ll have to fix that: too. But what’s not clear, perhaps, is that the behavior you are controlling is the upper cursor.(It also may be difficult for some people to run it because it’s written in Java and some browsers now won’t let you run Java without jumping through some esoteric hoops). So I will rewrite it in Javascript (so it can be run on tablets as well) and try to make what’s going on clearer.Â

Â

BH: So I decided, that I’ll try not to interfear in your beleif temporary, and I’ll wait that LCS IV come out, as Martin said. I assume that you contributed to that book. But now as I see clearly how you understand wrong some points of PCT, I’ll wait to see, what you wrote. But I can imagine what could be wrong with you contribution. So let us get surprisedâ€¦

RM: I can’t think of anything (other than the Dodgers’ route of the Giants last night)Â that would be more entertaining than to have my understanding of PCT evaluated by you, Boris.

Best regards

Rick

Â

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â

Â

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 12:10 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior

Â

[From Rick Marken (2014.09.12.1510)]

Â

On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 8:31 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Â

HB :

First of all nobody can control any behavior. Neither dog or sheep. Both control their own perception.

Â

RM: Yes, but they are controlling their perceptions of what? In the case of the dogs, it seems likely that they are controlling their perception of the position of the sheep relative to a target location in the field.Â

Â

Â HB:Â So if I see right your Â»attack on meÂ« that I’m wrong, you are trying to say that dog and sheep are controlling for the same perception : the gap between sheep and so it seems to you that dog controls the behavior of sheep. And that’s by your oppinion proof that sheeps are controlled by dog. Or in other words : because sheeps behave as dog wants, sheeps are controlled. Did I missed something ?

Â

RM: Yes, you missed the fact that my “proof” (actually, “evidence” is a better word) that the sheep are controlled by the dogs had nothing to do with guesses about what perceptions the dogs and sheep are controlling. The evidence of control is that a variable aspect of the sheep behavior – their position on the ground – Â is being maintained at a specific value – the target position in the field – and protected from disturbances – such as sheep wandering away from the target position – by the actions of the dogs. This control can be seen very clearly in the first video. What we are seeing fits the definition of control. The dogs are clearly controlling the behavior of the sheep. The dogs are the one’s keeping the sheep in the target position. Take ke away the dogs (the controllers) and you take away control. The sheep will be randomly arrayed all over the field; the variable that the dogs were controlling is no longer under control. Â

Â

RM: Again, I am not saying that the dogs are controlling the behavior of the sheep in theory; they are controlling them in fact. Control of sheep behavior by the dogs is an observable fact. PCT explains that fact; it doesn’t explain it away.

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

The problem here is that sheep could control the perception of the gap between sheep, for safety as you said. But when you say safety what does it mean. If we say just control for safety we don’t know what is really controlled. I asssume that safety could be higher order perception, composed of at least two lower level controlled perceptions : distance between ship and distance between dog and sheep. Both controlled perceptions are contributing to safety, specialy the last one.

Â

But sheep do control at least one more life-important perception : eating grass. When they control such a perception they spread on great teritory seeking for better grass, not seeking for control of gap between them. That’s what owners of sheep wants. So owner train a dog to group sheep so not to be spread arround.

Â

Sheeps are not controlling only for the gap between sheep, they control for their life-important perception. The owner of course also control that sheep could eat best grass. Dog and people who trained dog, do control for sheep being togetheras as much as possible to eat grass, but also not to lose any of sheep.

Â

So I think you are right that dog control for Â»the gap between sheepÂ« as that’s what owner wants. But I think you are not right that dog controls the behavior of sheep by controlling the gap among them. Â Sheep can control for different perception among which is also perception of grouping together for safety. But behavior of sheep is not determined with presence of the dog, but depends from sheep’s internal control by which relevant behavior (output) for the sheep’s control of perception is established. Â

Â

Sheep beside very important control of eating grass, control also perception for the distance to the predator (in our case it’s dog). Â It’s probably some inborn survival behavior. So sheep control for the perception of distance to dog. Here is video, which show how group of sheeps are moving in accordance with distance to the dog. When dogs are at safe diastance (probably low Â»errorÂ« in sheep control) sheeps are not moving. When distance minimize sheep move (run) away from dog. But the distance is varying in accordance to control of sheep and dog. When sheep control differently – run away from group, than we can see that sheeep in control of their perception. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJUVULU7GDM

Â

So we can conclude that there are many Â»survivial behaviorsÂ« or sheep can control for different perceptions. One of them and very important is : the gap between dog (predator) and sheep. With output sheep will control perception of being enough far from dog. We can say that sheep controls the distance to the dog (predator) and varying distance will in some proportion (not linear) cause Â»errorsÂ« in control. The closer dog is, more Â»errorÂ« and more distance to the dog is produced,Â less Â»errorÂ« no activity or perception of eating grass is controlled.

Dog’s controlled perception is : the more the sheep are together – less Â»errorÂ«, the more they are appart – mo more Â»errorÂ«. So again varying distance, varying Â»errorÂ« of dog control. Also seen in video when one sheep ran away from group. Dogs ran after it.

Â

So both : dog and sheep are controllig what they are supposed to control.

Â

Now Rick you can make simulation of both LCS each controling for own perception – varying perception of distance. Wee have only to establish, how these diferent controls with different goals are coordinated. I would say that dog run in different directions trying to change the distance to sheep so to move sheep in wanted direction.

Â

In this way sheep is stil controlling for distance and less Â»errorÂ« in the direction of group of other sheep mean that is more possibility for sheep to move to the group. So in this case sheep is tending to encrease the gap to the dog and dog somehow enable that.Â But this is not always the case.

Â

So I concluded that dog behavior is not always implaying sheep behavior to increase distance to the dog only by running away. It can be also different. In next video you can see that sheeps choose another behavior, which has something to do with the dog, but in opposite direction. Instead of increasing the gap to the dog, with running away, they choose the control of perception of moving the dog away. So they attack dog. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY_7U56R0AM

Â

Your term Rick about controling other living being somehow sounds to me as S-R logic. Dog behavior (stimulus, disturbance) to sheep perceptual input, and then directly to sheep behavior is somehow determined sheep behavior by it’s input (environment). It’s denying Bill’s aymetry of control : LCS can control environment, and environment can’t control LCS.

Â

By your control of behavior of others can happen in the opposite Â way. Â So it sounds like absolutely determined behavior by environment : sheep input (dogs behavior) - sheep output (induced behavior by dog behavior). Nothing in between. No process inside Â»controlledÂ« LCS counts, no references, no reorganization, just stream from input to output (control of others).

Â

LCS are already controlling, so nobody can overtake that control. Sheep all the time control their perception. Â Dogs all the time control their percpetion.

Â

I didn’t find any example to show how sheep can attack alone sheep dog, not just ran away form the dog, but I found this video, which shows how sheep attacked wolf, when he comes to close.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F29dMtxXCkE

Â

If we think that sheep are inocent little animals harmly eating grass, we can made a hudge mistake : here is video which show how nasty can be sheep attack.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJrlo2VuUR8

Â

Maybe this video will help to see, how sheep control the distance to dog (predator) :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXkHDiuadTI

Â

And maybe one more video which shows that dog is not controlling the behavior of the ram.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cluHOW_EnAQ

Â

And maybe the last video that shows that perceptual control is choosen in the ram not in environment and can be very unpredictable and dangerous.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jgjk3DsN7c

Â

All in all I think that there is enough proof that dogs are not controlling behavior of the sheep, but sheep control it’s own perception that it chooses Â and dog control it’s perception that it chooses. But neither of them can control behavior. Nor own, neither others. As far as I understand there is no such a thing in PCT. Â

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author ofÂ Â Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author ofÂ Â Doing Research on Purpose.Â
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

MartinT · September 15, 2014, 3:57am

[Martin Taylor 2014.09.14.23.44]

···

On 2014/09/12 5:35 PM, Bob Hintz wrote:

  I think we are talking past one another. To try to rectify this,

could you explain where you see the concept ofÂ “the priority of a
reference signal” in Bill’s hierarchy? And then could you suggest
what controls this priority, which you say is done by flipping a
switch.

  I imagine that these wordings mean something in the hierarchy, and

I can see vaguely where you might be thinking of them, but I can’t
be sure what you mean, other than as a description of everyday
experience, the result of something happening in the hierarchy.
Since our discussion has been on the concept of controlling
another person at a rather technical level, we need to make the
connection between this everyday experience and what happens in
the hierarchy. “Influencing the priority of another’s reference
conditions” does not map onto my own conception of what happens,
but perhaps you can put it in another way that will make sense to
me.

  At that point, maybe we can continue from your "It seems to me

that if I want to get you to do something in particular, I will
have to be able to influence what reference condition currently
has priority in your hierarchy. Â This means that I must have some
conception of your hierarchy, its contents, how they are
prioritized, and what changes in perception influence that process
prioritization." My own way of considering “getting you to do
something” includes no such knowledge of you, as I believe I said
in [Martin Taylor 2014.09.07.23.01] with the subject line
“Protocols (was Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior)”.

  Martin

    So when the sheep observes the alteration in the
distance between them caused by the dog’s movement, there will
come a point where the management of that distance takes
priority over the management of the perception of hunger or
achieving contact with some tasty looking grass. Â MOL is
appropriate when the switch keeps alternating back and forth
because priority cannot be established in any satisfactory
manner for any specified length of time or circumstance. Â There
might be such a distance (like the ass between two bales of hay
who starves to death) but the dog would have to stand still at
the distance just as the grass stands still. Â Otherwise there
does not seem to be any conflict, just a change in priority.
Â Might it be appropriate to talk about influencing the priority
of another’s reference conditions rather than talking about
influencing their behavior? Â Boris has one video which shows a
sheep head butting a dog who is clearing not harming the sheep.
Â They appear to be playing. Â The sheep turns toward the dog as
it approaches and put its head down, the dog contacts the head
and slides to one side, but does not grab anything while the
sheep spins orient its head toward the dog and then they
separate and do the whole thing over again. Â This might be an
example of co-reorganization (protocols?) of these two
particular animals and their history of interaction with each
other.

      It seems to me that if I want to get you to do something in
particular, I will have to be able to influence what reference
condition currently has priority in your hierarchy. Â This
means that I must have some conception of your hierarchy, its
contents, how they are prioritized, and what changes in
perception influence that process prioritization. Being a
member of a group and sharing a language makes this at least
possible some of the time. Â If I see my spouse going toward
the kitchen and say “can you bring me a beer?” and she says,
“sure”. Â There is no other observable change in her behavior.
Â Moments later, she sets a beer down next to me and I say,
“thanks” as she walks back to a chair in the living room.
Â Have I controlled her behavior or did I simply give her an
opportunity to change the priority of some reference condition
that she already had built into her hierarchy? Â When I share
information about myself, am I disturbing her? Â She could have
said, “No, I’m on my way to Jan’s” and I would know that she
did not change her priorities and I would know what I needed
to do if I wanted a beer. Â The fact that she told me where she
was going, might have been a change in her priorities, how
would anyone other than her know if that was the case? Â Each
of us has some awareness of the sequences of reference
conditions that we are engaged in controlling. Â

      The discussion of controlling our perception of the
behavior of others has led to some serious thinking (good old
armchair) about what kind of model a self-conscious control
system might need to have about another self-conscious control
system in order in order to succeed at intentionally
controlling some variables together. Â

      Thanks to one and all - I have also some ideas how to use
youtube as part of a research process,

Thanks, Boris

bob

      On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 12:40 PM,
Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com
wrote:
              [From Rick Marken
(2014.09.12.1041)]

On 2014/09/12 12:28 PM, Bob Hintz wrote:

bob hintz - 2014.09.12

                            I think Boris has collected some nice
video references here. Â He also raises
another issue. Â When a sheep is eating
(controlling for internal perceptions of
nutrition by chomping clumps of grass,
chewing and swallowing) its observable
behavior is different than when it is
controlling the distance between itself
and the dog. Â

                  Martin Taylor
(2014.09.12.12.46)
MT: You are talking about conflict
between different control systems.

RM: Excellent post Martin!!

BestÂ

                Rick

                      The
conflict occurs when two control systems want
to set one perceptual variable (location on
the field) to two different places. The
“eating” set of control systems wants to be
where the grass is lush, while the “safety”
set of control systems wants to be away from
the dog. How conflicts get resolved is a
generic question in PCT with probably several
different answers. Indeed, that’s what MOL is
about.
                      From the outside, conflict resolution looks
like choice or decision, and maybe that’s
actually what happens. Maybe one control
system turns its gain down to zero and lets
the other one win. Maybe some switch
disconnects one and allows the other to
control. Maybe they both keep providing output
but there’s a system nonlinearity somewhere
that allows one of them to dominate. There are
several possibilities. In any particular case,
I suppose that it would be possible to model
the effects of different possible ways a
conflict is resolved. Kent McClelland would be
a good one to ask about this. But we can’t
tell in the case of the sheep.
                      If you were out in the jungle picking berries
to stave off hunger and you thought you heard
a tiger, would you imagine you would keep on
picking berries? If not, what perceptions
would you imagine yourself to now be
controlling that you were not controlling
before you thought you heard the tiger? And
why?
                          Martin

                                On Thu, Sep
11, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Boris Hartman
boris.hartman@masicom.net
wrote:

Hi Rick,

Â

                                          RM:
Exactly, the dog controls
the behavior of the sheep
by disturbing a variable
that the sheep control by
grouping themselves closer
together. Boris disagrees
and says that the sheep
are not being controlled
by the dog, which is
demonstrably wrong.
Without the dog there, the
gaps between the sheep
would on average be quite
wide.

Â

HB

:

                                          First
of all nobody can control
any behavior. Neither dog
or sheep. Both control
their own perception.

Â

                                          So
if I see right your
Â»attack on meÂ« that I’m
wrong, you are trying to
say that dog and sheep are
controlling for the same
perception : the gap
between sheep and so it
seems to you that dog
controls the behavior of
sheep. And that’s by your
oppinion proof that sheeps
are controlled by dog. Or
in other words : because
sheeps behave as dog
wants, sheeps are
controlled. Did I missed
something ?

Â

                                          The
problem here is that sheep
could control the
perception of the gap
between sheep, for safety
as you said. But when you
say safety what does it
mean. If we say just
control for safety we
don’t know what is really
controlled. I asssume that
safety could be higher
order perception, composed
of at least two lower
level controlled
perceptions : distance
between ship and distance
between dog and sheep.
Both controlled
perceptions are
contributing to safety,
specialy the last one.

Â

                                          But
sheep do control at least
one more life-important
perception : eating grass.
When they control such a
perception they spread on
great teritory seeking for
better grass, not seeking
for control of gap between
them. That’s what owners
of sheep wants. So owner
train a dog to group sheep
so not to be spread
arround.

Â

                                          Sheeps
are not controlling only
for the gap between sheep,
they control for their
life-important perception.
The owner of course also
control that sheep could
eat best grass. Dog and
people who trained dog, do
control for sheep being
togetheras as much as
possible to eat grass, but
also not to lose any of
sheep.

Â

                                          So
I think you are right that
dog control for Â»the gap
between sheepÂ« as that’s
what owner wants. But I
think you are not right
that dog controls the
behavior of sheep by
controlling the gap among
them. Â Sheep can control
for different perception
among which is also
perception of grouping
together for safety. But
behavior of sheep is not
determined with presence
of the dog, but depends
from sheep’s internal
control by which relevant
behavior (output) for the
sheep’s control of
perception is established.
Â

Â

                                          Sheep
beside very important
control of eating grass,
control also perception
for the distance to the
predator (in our case it’s
dog). Â It’s probably some
inborn survival behavior.
So sheep control for the
perception of distance to
dog. Here is video, which
show how group of sheeps
are moving in accordance
with distance to the dog.
When dogs are at safe
diastance (probably low
Â»errorÂ« in sheep control)
sheeps are not moving.
When distance minimize
sheep move (run) away from
dog. But the distance is
varying in accordance to
control of sheep and dog.
When sheep control
differently – run aaway
from group, than we can
see that sheep in control
of their perception. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJUVULU7GDM

Â

                                          So
we can conclude that there
are many Â»survivial
behaviorsÂ« or sheep can
control for different
perceptions. One of them
and very important is :
the gap between dog
(predator) and sheep. With
output sheep will control
perception of being enough
far from dog. We can say
that sheep controls the
distance to the dog
(predator) and varying
distance will in some
proportion (not linear)
cause Â»errorsÂ« in control.
The closer dog is, more
Â»errorÂ« and more distance
to the dog is produced,Â
less Â»errorÂ« no activity
or perception of eating
grass is controlled.

                                          Dog's
controlled perception is :
the more the sheep are
together – less ÂÂ»errorÂ«,
the more they are appart â€“
more Â»errorÂ«. So again
varying distance, varying
Â»errorÂ« of dog control.
Also seen in video when
one sheep ran away from
group. Dogs ran after it.

Â

                                          So
both : dog and sheep are
controllig what they are
supposed to control.

Â

                                          Now
Rick you can make
simulation of both LCS
each controling for own
perception – varyinng
perception of distance. We
have only to establish,
how these diferent
controls with different
goals are coordinated. I
would say that dog run in
different directions
trying to change the
distance to sheep so to
move sheep in wanted
direction.

Â

                                          In
this way sheep is stil
controlling for distance
and less Â»errorÂ« in the
direction of group of
other sheep mean that is
more possibility for sheep
to move to the group. So
in this case sheep is
tending to encrease the
gap to the dog and dog
somehow enable that.Â But
this is not always the
case.

Â

                                          So
I concluded that dog
behavior is not always
implaying sheep behavior
to increase distance to
the dog only by running
away. It can be also
different. In next video
you can see that sheeps
choose another behavior,
which has something to do
with the dog, but in
opposite direction.
Instead of increasing the
gap to the dog, with
running away, they choose
the control of perception
of moving the dog away. So
they attack dog. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY_7U56R0AM

Â

                                          Your
term Rick about controling
other living being somehow
sounds to me as S-R logic.
Dog behavior (stimulus,
disturbance) to sheep
perceptual input, and then
directly to sheep behavior
is somehow determined
sheep behavior by it’s
input (environment). It’s
denying Bill’s aymetry of
control : LCS can control
environment, and
environment can’t control
LCS.

Â

                                          By
your control of behavior
of others can happen in
the opposite Â way. Â So it
sounds like absolutely
determined behavior by
environment : sheep input
(dogs behavior) - sheep
output (induced behavior
by dog behavior). Nothing
in between. No process
inside Â»controlledÂ« LCS
counts, no references, no
reorganization, just
stream from input to
output (control of
others).

Â

                                          LCS
are already controlling,
so nobody can overtake
that control. Sheep all
the time control their
perception. Â Dogs all the
time control their
percpetion.

Â

                                          I
didn’t find any example to
show how sheep can attack
alone sheep dog, not just
ran away form the dog, but
I found this video, which
shows how sheep attacked
wolf, when he comes to
close.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F29dMtxXCkE

Â

                                          If
we think that sheep are
inocent little animals
harmly eating grass, we
can made a hudge mistake :
here is video which show
how nasty can be sheep
attack.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJrlo2VuUR8

Â

                                          Maybe
this video will help to
see, how sheep control the
distance to dog (predator)
:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXkHDiuadTI

Â

                                          And
maybe one more video which
shows that dog is not
controlling the behavior
of the ram.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cluHOW_EnAQ

Â

                                          And
maybe the last video that
shows that perceptual
control is choosen in the
ram not in environment and
can be very unpredictable
and dangerous.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jgjk3DsN7c

Â

                                          All
in all I think that there
is enough proof that dogs
are not controlling
behavior of the sheep, but
sheep control it’s own
perception that it chooses
Â and dog control it’s
perception that it
chooses. But neither of
them can control behavior.
Nor own, neither others.
As far as I understand
there is no such a thing
in PCT. Â

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From:
csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu
[mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu ]
On Behalf Of Richard
Marken
Sent: Tuesday,
September 09, 2014 2:45 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re:
Sheepdog and flock
behavior

Â

                                              [From

Rick Marken
(2014.09.08.1545)]

Â

                                                Kent

McClelland
(2014.09.07.2050)

Â

                                                KM:
I see that my name
has come up in this
exchange, so I’ll
see if I can say
anything to help
move it along. As I
look at what you’ve
written, I don’t see
much in either
person’s position to
disagree with, but
you seem to be at an
impasse. The
difficulty seems to
be semantic,
revolving around
what it means to
control another
person’s behavior,
which Rick says can
be done and Boris
says can’t. In my
view, you’re both
partly right.

Â

                                                  RM:
I think it’s more
than semantic. I
think the
difficulty turns
on knowing what
control is, in
fact, not in
theory. Once you
know what control
is then there is
no controversy at
all: behavior can
be controlled.
That’s what we are
seeing with the
sheepdogs (the
dogs controlling
the gaps between
the sheep) and
with the E and S
in the rubber band
demo (E
controlling the
finger position of
S). A variable
(the gap, the
finger position)
is being kept in a
pre-selected state
(0 gap, finger on
target dot),
protected from
disturbance
(autonomously
produced changes
in the closeness
of the sheep to
one another, the
closeness of the
finger to the
target dot) by
varying actions
appropriately
(moving towards or
away from the
sheep, increasing
or reducing the
pull on the rubber
band) .

Â

                                                  KM:
The problem, as I
see it, is that a
person’s behavior
(or that of any
living control
system with
hierarchical
control of
perceptions) is
never just one
thing. A person
controls lots of
different
perceptions
simultaneously, at
different
perceptual levels.
And when a person
observes another
person’s physical
actions, the
observer can see
“behaviors” at a
lot of different
perceptual levels.

Â

                                                  RM:
Yes, but this is
true of all of our
experience, not
just our
experience of
other people’s
behavior. We
control perceptual
variables of many
different types
(hypothetically 11
different types of
perceptual
variable). I don’t
see what this has
to do with whether
or not people can
control other
people’s behavior.

Â

                                                    KM:
Because a person
controls lots of
different things
at once, under
the right
circumstances
another person
can control SOME
of these
behaviors (as
the controller
perceives them),
but not ALL of
them, at least
not all of them
simultaneously.
The trick in
controlling a
particular
behavior by
another person
(call it
behavior A) is
to get the
person to focus
on controlling
behavior B, and
then to remove
all the other
ways for the
person to keep
controlling
behavior B
except by doing
behavior A.

Â

                                                  RM:
Yes, this is all I
claimed was true:
people can control
the behavior of
other people. Of
course, they can
only control
some of these
behaviors – the
one’s that correct
for disturbances
to the variable
the controllee is
controlling. This
is why I gave the
example of
controlling the
position of S’s
finger in the
rubber band demo.
Since S must vary
the position of
the finger in
order to
compensate for E-
produced
disturbances to
the position of
the knot, Â the
variable S is
controlling, E can
control S’s finger
position by
disturbing the
position of the
knot. S’s finger
position is the
only aspect of S’s
behavior that E
can control in
this situation.
But that aspect of
S’s behavior can
certainly be
controlled.

                                                  KM: That's the

classic pattern
for manipulation
of a person’s
behavior.

Â

                                                  RM:
Right! This is how
you can manipulate
(control) another
Â person’s
behavior.Â

Â

KM:

The pattern also
applies to the dog
and sheep example.

Â

                                                  RM:
Exactly, the dog
controls the
behavior of the
sheep by
disturbing a
variable that the
sheep control by
grouping
themselves closer
together. Boris
disagrees and says
that the sheep are
not being
controlled by the
dog, which is
demonstrably
wrong. Without the
dog there, the
gaps between the
sheep would on
average be quite
wide.

Â

                                                  KM:
Thus, the control
of one person’s
behavior by
another person can
and does happen

Â

RM:

Â My point exactly.
Â

Â

                                                >
RM: One example:
When I give a
cashier $10 for a $5
item I am
controlling for the
cashier giving me $5
change. The cashier
is also controlling
for me paying $5 for
the item. Typically,
we both get the
behaviors from each
other than we want:
a nice example of
mutual control, and
no one gets hurt (or
oppressed). This
kind of agreed on
mutual control is
the basis of
civilization.
                                                  KM: Martin Taylor,
in the chapter
he’s writing for
the LCS IV book
edited by Warren
Mansell (a
preliminary draft
of which I’ve been
lucky enough to
see), calls this
kind of exchange
transaction a
“protocol,”

Â

                                                RM:
I looked at Martin’s
reply and what he
describes as a
“protocol” is not
the same as the
mutual controlling
that occurs in the
customer/cashier
interaction.Â

Â

                                                KM:
and, if I understand
his concept
correctly, protocols
provide a way for
two people acting
together to control
two different
perceptions. The
side-effects of one
person’s behavior in
controlling his or
her own perception
allow the other
person to control a
different perception
(and vice-versa). In
your example, the
cashier controls the
perception of
completing a sale by
getting your money
and giving you the
item and $5 change,
while you control
the perception of
buying the item by
handing over the
money and getting
the item and change
back.

Â

                                                  RM:
The difference
between the
customer/cashier
interaction and
the interaction
between two
control systems
described by
Martin is that
there is no
control of one
control system by
another in the
situation Martin
describes. In the
customer/cashier
situation,
successful control
by each control
system requires
successful control
of Â each control
system’s behavior
by the other
control system. In
Martin’s
“protocol”, shown
below, Alan’s
ability to control
PA does not depend
on controlling
Beth’s behavior
and vice versa.
Â The actions Alan
uses to control PA
are a disturbance
to PB which Beth
will oppose along
with any other
disturbances to
PB, and vice
versa. Â But Alan’s
ability to control
PA does not depend
on his controlling
Beth’s behavior.
INdeed, Alan can
control PA just
fine whether Beth
is controlling PB
or not.Â

Â

                                                This
is quite different
from the
customer/cashier
situation. The
customer is
controlling for
paying the exact
cost for the
product; the cashier
is controlling for
collecting the exact
payment. If the
product costs $5 and
the customer hands
$10 to the cashier,
the customer will
achieve the “pay the
exact cost” goal
only if the cashier
returns the exact
change. So the
customer is
controlling for the
cashier returning
$5. Â The cashier is
also controlling for
collecting the cost
of the customer’s
item and so will
allow the customer
to leave with the
product only after
payment has been
received. If the
cashier were not
controlling for
getting only the
exact amount for the
product the customer
would not
successfully control
for getting the
correct change
behavior from the
cashier; if the
customer were not
controlling for
paying for the
product the cashier
would not
successfully control
for getting paid by
the customer.Â

Â

                                                    KM:
I don’t think I
would describe
this exchange
situation as
control of
another person’s
behavior

Â

                                                    RM:
Apparently Bob
Hintz doesn’t
think so either.
Â But, again, I
think it can be
easily
demonstrated
that both the
customer and
cashier are,in fact ,
controlling each
other’s behavior
by introducing
disturbances to
the hypothetical
behavior
variables that
are being
controlled. For
example, have
the cashier give
the customer $4
rather $5
dollars in
change – a
disturbance to
the customer’s
perception of
the cashier
returning the
correct change.
I think you will
see the customer
take action –
like arguing
with the cashier
– to bring the
cashier’s
behavior to the
desired state:
handing over the
$5 change.
Similarly, have
the customer
hand the cashier
$4 rather than
$5. I think you
will see the
cashier take
action – like
calling over the
manager – to
bring the
customer’s
behavior to the
desired state:
pay for the
product. So the
customer is
controlling for
the “returning
correct change”
behavior of the
cashier and the
cashier is
controlling for
the “paying for
the product”
behavior of the
customer.Â

Â

                                                    KM:
unless you were
buying the item
from someone who
had a monopoly,
and the only way
for you to get
the item
(behavior B)
would be to pay
the asking price
(behavior A).
Even then, you
could refuse to
buy the item or
just get
something else,
unless the item
were something
you couldn’t
live without.

Â

                                                    RM:
I hope my little
explanation
shows that this
is not
necessary. The
customer and
cashier are
controlling each
other’s behavior
but it doesn’t
look like they
are controlling
each other’s
behavior (and
they certainly
don’t feel like
they are
controlling each
other) until one
or the other
doesn’t behave
as desired.
Â This is the way
it is with all
our controlling,
though, isn’t
it? We don’t
feel like we are
controlling when
we walk down the
street or talk
on the phone or
swim in the lake
– that is, we
don’t notice our
controlling
until we start
to lose it
.Skillful
control does’t
feel like
anything
special; it just
feels like we
are doing
things. Â And
this is true of
skillful
controlling of
our own limbs,
of the physical
consequences of
limb movements
(like walking
and swimming)
and
interpersonal
consequences of
these limb
movements (like
getting change
from a cashier).
Â

Â

                                                    RM:
I think I
understand why
people don’t
want to believe
that they can be
controlled and
why they do want
to believe that
they never
control other
people. It fits
with our idea
that we are
“free” and
“good”. But I
think it’s
better to
recognize when
we are
controlling,
especially when
we are
controlling (and
being controlled
by) other
control systems.
Understanding
how to recognize
this is, I
think, one of
the most
important things
to learn from
PCT. It’s only
when you know
that you are
controlling (and
being
controlled) that
you can adjust
your own
controlling to
reduce inter
(and intra)
personal
conflict and
work to organize
society in a way
that allows
controllers to
do their
controlling with
the least amount
of conflict and
the greatest
amount of
cooperation with
other
controllers.
Making believe
that we can’t be
controlled or
that we are not
controlled by
and/or don’t
control other
controllers is
not the road to
a better world,
I think.

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

                                                    Hope these

thoughts help
you to clarify
the questions
you were
discussing.

                                                    Best,

                                                    Kent

                                                      On Sep 7,
2014, at 12:54
PM, Richard
Marken wrote:
                                                      > [From
Rick Marken
(2014.09.07.1100)]
                                                      >

                                                      > <boris.hartman@masicom.net
                                                      >
wrote:
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH : I
don’t think
that dogs were
controlling
gaps by
Â»controlling
sheeps
behaviorÂ«.
Sheeps were
controlling
their behavior
on the bases
of
disturbances
dog produced
to sheep
perceptual
control.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Yes,
the sheep were
controlling a
perception (I
called it
safety) to
which the
approach of
the dog was a
disturbance.
The sheep
compensated
for this
disturbance by
moving closer
to other
sheep. This is
the behavior
that the dog
wanted to see
(were
controlling
for) because
it closed the
gaps that were
a disturbance
to the
perception the
dog was
controlling.
So the dog was
able to
control the
behavior of
the sheep,
getting them
to bunch
closer
together,
because the
sheep were
controlling
for safety by
bunching
together.
                                                      >

                                                      > RM : So
any model of
this behavior
would have to
model the
dogs’ “gap”
control system
and the
sheep’s safety
control
system. Such a
simulation
would show
that control
systems can
both control
andÂ be
controlled.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH : Well
this is a good
idea to make
simultaneous
simulation.
Did you try it
?
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Not
yet.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH: But
this is the
n-th time that
we are trying
to solve the
problem how
LCS can be
“controlled”.
In the book :
Making sense
of behavior
Bill talks
about
“attempts of
control” not
“control”…
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH: Maybe
Kent could
explain what’s
wrong with
your position
about Â»LCS can
be
controlled".
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Yes,
I think that’s
a good idea,
though I would
be surprised
if Kent
thought that
there is
something
wrong with my
“position”. My
position is
simply that
people can
clearly
control the
behavior other
people and
their own
behavior can
be controlled
as well. This
is an
observable
fact that is
explained by
PCT. I leave
the
explanation as
an exercise.
                                                      >

                                                      > RM : It
can also be
easily
demonstrated
with humans
using the
rubber band
demo; the E in
this
experiment can
control the
finger
position of
the S once S
has agreed to
control the
position of
the knot.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH : Yes.
Watch your
wording in
rubber band
demo. “Once S
has agreed” or
as Kent said
“S chooses”. .
So it’s
obviously that
S agreed to be
controlled.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Not
quite. S has
agreed to
control a
particular
perception
(the location
of the knot
relative to
the dot, in
this case).Â S
has not agreed
to be
controlled;
indeed, S is
typically
unaware of
being
controlled
after agreeing
to control
that
perception.
                                                      >

                                                      > HB :
Aplying
distrubance to
a Â»controlled
variableÂ« does
not mean that
control is
established.
It seems that
Kent and I
agree that
disturbances
are aplyed to
perceptual
control and
target person
chooses.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: I
would be
interested to
hear what Kent
has to say
about that. I
would be very
surprised if
he agreed with
your analysis.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM : Nor
does control
theory show
that
controlling
organisms
(particularly
humans) is
necessarily a
bad thing to
do.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH : Now
you are
exaggerating
Rick. You
can’t control
organisms. I’d
really like to
see how you
are doing that
in everyday
life ?
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                    > RM: One
example: When I
give a cashier
$10 for a $5
item I am
controlling for
the cashier
giving me $5
change. The
cashier is also
controlling for
me paying $5 for
the item.
Typically, we
both get the
behaviors from
each other than
we want: a nice
example of
mutual control,
and no one gets
hurt (or
oppressed). This
kind of agreed
on mutual
control is the
basis of
civilization.
                                                    >


                                                      >Â  RM :
What control
theory does
show is that
arbitrary
control,
particularly
of humans by
other humans,
will almost
certainly lead
to conflict.
Arbitrary
control is
exerting
control
without
considering
the fact that
living control
systems are
controlling
many variables
at the same
time and when
you
arbitrarily
decide to have
a person do
something (by
disturbing a
controlling
variable) what
you have them
do may
conflict with
other things
they are
controlling.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > HB : It
makes some
sense, but I
don’t
understand
what you meant
by Â»arbitrary
controlÂ« ?
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: It
means
controlling
without taking
a persons
wants and
needs (the
references for
the many
different
perceptions
that the
person is
controlling
for) into
account. In
non-PCT terms,
it is
controlling
another person
without
respecting
that person’s
humanity (and
autonomy).
                                                      >

                                                      > BH: If
you are
thinking like
this one :
Â»Controlle
behavior match
my wanted
perception of
behvior and
thus it is
Â»controlledÂ«
it’s wrong.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM:
That’s exactly
how I am
thinking. And
I think you
are wrong
about this
being wrong.
                                                      >

                                                      > BH: You
have PCT which
helps you
understand
what’s
happening
inside
organisms.
Human control
and behavior
are quite
unpredictable,
because the
references are
formed inside
organism,
where most of
control is
done.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Once
you have
correctly
identified a
controlled
variable
behavior (the
actions that
protect that
variable from
disturbance)
can be
predicted with
very high
accuracy. See
the “Basic
Control demo”
at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html
to see what I
mean.
                                                      >

                                                      > BH: Just
observable
Â»factsÂ« of
behavioral
event are not
prove that
people control
each other.
Although it’s
not excluded.
The
controller’s
behavior is
just a
disturbance to
controlee
perceptual
control. From
what happens
in controlee
comparator
(error) will
probably
decide whether
controlee
behavior will
resemble to
something
controller
wanted or not.
But never
behavior of
controlee will
be just exact
Â»copyÂ« of
controller’s
wanted
behavior,
because
controlee is
in control.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >Â  RM: It
may not be an
“exact” copy
of what the
controller
wants, but it
can be very
close (like
within 1% of
the desired
value).
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM:
Anyway, this
behavior –
managing
flocks – is a
very
interesting
demonstration
of controlling
a perception
(of gaps
between sheep)
via
disturbance of
a perception
being
controlled by
the control
systems that
are being
controlled.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH: This
one makes some
PCT sense. J
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Well,
that’s
progress!
                                                      >

                                                      > Best

                                                      >

                                                      > Rick

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > But as
usual I’m
living space
for not
understanding
something
right. And as
always, sorry
for my
language.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Best,

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Boris

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu
                                                      [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu                                                          ]
On Behalf Of
Richard Marken
                                                      > Sent:
Sunday, August
31, 2014 3:23
AM
                                                      > To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

                                                      > Subject:
Re: Sheepdog
and flock
behavior
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > [From
Rick Marken
(2014.08.30.1820)]
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > [From
Bruce Abbott
(2014.08.30.0820
EDT)]
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >
Researchers
have
investigated
how sheepdogs
manage their
flocks by
fitting both
the dogs and
the sheep with
highly
accurate GPS
devices,
allowing the
researchers to
track their
movements.Â
The research
is presented
in a BBC
article at http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28936251
.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Great
find, Bruce!Â
There are two
things that
make this
report
particularly
interesting to
me. The first
is the quote
by Andrew
King, which is
a great
description of
the PCT
approach to
research. To
paraphrase
King: in order
to understand
the behavior
of organisms
you have to
try to look at
their behavior
from the point
of view of the
organism
(behaving
system)
Itself. I make
this same
point in the
chapter onÂ
“Looking at
Behavior
through
Control Theory
Glasses” in
“Doing
Research on
Purpose” (why
hasn’t that
become a best
seller yet?).
I do it in the
section on
trying to
understand the
apparent
“fixed action
pattern” of
the greylag
goose. The
goose is seen
to continue to
make the
movements that
would pull an
egg back into
its nest even
when the egg
is no longer
present.
Looking at an
organism’s
behavior from
the organism’s
perspective
helps you come
up with good
ideas about
what
perceptual
variables the
organism is
controlling
(the first
step in the
Test for the
Controlled
Variable). By
looking at the
goose’s egg
rolling
behavior from
the goose’s
perspective I
was able to
come up with
the hypothesis
that the goose
is trying to
control the
pressure of
the egg
against the
back of its
bill and when
the egg is
removed the
continued
efforts to
move the
non-existent
egg into the
nest (the
apparent fixed
action
pattern) is
just the
efforts of the
pressure
control system
to restore the
pressure of
the egg
against the
back of the
bill. By
looking at the
sheepdogs
herding
behavior from
the dogs’
perspective
King came up
with the
reasonable
hypothesis
that the dogs
were
controlling
their
perception of
the gaps
between
patches of
white (the
sheep), trying
to keep those
gaps at zero.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: The
other thing
that’s
interesting
about this
report is that
the dogs were
clearly
controlling
their
perception of
the gaps by
controlling
the behavior
of the sheep.
And they did
this by
becoming a
disturbance to
a perception
that the sheep
control by
getting closer
to other
sheep: the
perception of
safety. So any
model of this
behavior would
have to model
the dogs’
“gap” control
system and the
sheep’s safety
control
system. Such a
simulation
would show
that control
systems can
both control
andÂ be
controlled.
This kind of
simulation
would help
dispel what I
think is a
common
misconception
about the
control theory
model of
organisms –
particularly
humans. It is
a
misconception
that I myself
labored under
until just a
few years ago.
It is the idea
that because
organisms are
autonomous
control
systems –
autonomous in
the sense that
they set their
own references
for the states
of their own
perception –
they cannot be
controlled.
But autonomous
control
systems can be
controlled, as
is
demonstrated
by the
sheepdogs
controlling
the sheep. It
can also be
easily
demonstrated
with humans
using the
rubber band
demo; the E in
this
experiment can
control the
finger
position of
the S once S
has agreed to
control the
position of
the knot. And
thanks to
Bruce Abbott I
demonstrated
to myself that
E can still
exert this
control even
if S
continuously
– and
autonomously
– varies his
or her
reference for
the position
of the knot.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM:
Control theory
doesn’t say
that organisms
(particularly
humans) can’t
be controlled;
indeed, it
shows that
they can be
controlled,
mainly by
disturbance to
a controlled
variable. Nor
does control
theory show
that
controlling
organisms
(particularly
humans) is
necessarily a
bad thing to
do. What
control theory
does show is
that arbitrary
control,
particularly
of humans by
other humans,
will almost
certainly lead
to conflict.
Arbitrary
control is
exerting
control
without
considering
the fact that
living control
systems are
controlling
many variables
at the same
time and when
you
arbitrarily
decide to have
a person do
something (by
disturbing a
controlling
variable) what
you have them
do may
conflict with
other things
they are
controlling.
So to take an
example that
Bill used
(somewhere),
if E decides
to place S’s
finger against
a hot
soldering iron
while
controlling Ss
finger
position in
the rubber
band game that
will clearly
lconflict with
another goal S
has (not
getting
burned).
Non-arbitrary
control is
control that
is done with
the consent
(often
implicit but
sometimes
explicit) of
the would-be
controllee.
Non- arbitrary
control is, I
think,
essential when
humans control
other humans.
To see why,
think about
what happens
when people
are
arbitrarily
controlled
(herded) in
the same way
that the sheep
were. Hint:
They don’t
like it. Why
do you think
not?
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >Â  RM:
Anyway, this
behavior –
managing
flocks – is a
very
interesting
demonstration
of controlling
a perception
(of gaps
between sheep)
via
disturbance of
a perception
being
controlled by
the control
systems that
are being
controlled.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Best

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Rick

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > The
researchers
found that the
behavior could
be described
by two simple
rules, but
more
interesting
from a PCT
perspective,
they found
that to
understand the
behavior they
needed to view
the action
from the
animalâ€™s
perspectives.Â
According to
researcher Dr.
Andrew King:
                                                      >

                                                      > "At the
beginning we
had lots of
different
ideas. We
started out
looking from a
birds eye
view, but then
we realised we
needed to see
what the dog
sees. It sees
white, fluffy
things. If
there are gaps
between them
or the gaps
get bigger,
the dogs needs
to bring them
together."
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > According
to Dr King,
sheepdogs are
making the
most of the
“selfish herd
theory” to
bring the
animals close
together and
move them
where they
want.
                                                      >

                                                      > "One of
the things
that sheep are
really good at
is responding
to a threat by
working with
their
neighbours.
It’s the
selfish herd
theory: put
something
between the
threat and
you.
Individuals
try to
minimise the
chance of
anything
happening to
them, so they
move towards
the centre of
a group."
                                                      >

                                                      > The
article
continues as
follows:
                                                      >

                                                      > A
colleague, Dr
Daniel
Strombom from
Uppsala
University in
Sweden, used
the GPS data
from the
collars to
develop
computer
simulations.
This enabled
them to
develop a
mathematical
shepherding
model.
                                                      >

                                                      > The
algorithm
displays the
same weaving
pattern
exhibited by
sheepdogs. It
helps to solve
what has been
called the
‘the
shepherding
problem’: how
one agent can
control a
large number
of unwilling
agents.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Iâ€™d be
interested to
know whether
the computer
algorithm
models each
individualâ€™s
control
systems or
operates by
some other
method.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Bruce

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

–

                                                    >

                                                    > Richard S.

Marken, Ph.D.

                                                    > Author ofÂ

Doing Research
on Purpose.

                                                    >

                                                    > Now

available from
Amazon or Barnes
& Noble

                                                    >

                                                    >

                                                    >

                                                    >

                                                    > --

                                                    > Richard S.

Marken, Ph.D.

                                                    > Author ofÂ

Doing Research
on Purpose.

                                                    > Now

available from
Amazon or Barnes
& Noble

Â

–

                                                Richard

S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author ofÂ Â Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now

available from
Amazon or Barnes
& Noble

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

                  Author ofÂ Â [Doing Research on Purpose](http://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1407342866&sr=8-1&keywords=doing+research+on+purpose).Â 
                    Now available from Amazon or Barnes &

Noble

Bob_Hintz · September 15, 2014, 9:26pm

If I think of the knot over the dot rubber band demonstration, I am recalling someone noting that if I disturb the knot in such a fashion that your hand would bump into a very iron if all you noticed was the knot/dot locations, you would probably refuse to burn your hand, i.e., change the priority of your immediate control references.Â I suppose that not only do we see more than what we are focused on at any given moment we also have reference value for those perceptions.Â If I disturb the knot slowly so that your hand moves toward the iron slowly, you are likely to feel the heat well before you touch the iron.Â As your perception of temperature increased and was compared to a reference signal (maybe intrinsic signal) regarding skin temperature, resulting in an increase in error signal to output signals resulting in hand movement would be in conflict with the output signals from the ECU sending signals to hand output function.Â This might result in paralysis and some higher level ECU would very likely have a higher gain (?) for skin safety than for compliance with instructions.Â I don’t know how you would do it in terms of the model, but I can imagine you saying something like, “nuts to you” and letting go of your end of the rubber band.Â

Now, if I am moving my end of the rubber band quickly, you might burn your hand before you notice the iron, but you would certainly notice the burn.Â You would then stop controlling for knot/dot relationship and attempt ease your pain.Â Sensing heat and avoiding a burn by shifting the priority of a reference condition may only be possible if you have failed in the past and know what getting burned feels like.

I have only one body.Â Somehow, the collective output of all the ECU’s that compose my hierarchy must fit together.Â If I am late to a meeting and hurrying, my whole body is involved in moving faster.Â If a friend sees me hustlingÂ down the hall and yells, “the meeting was cancelled”, all of the movement reference signals are changed almost simultaneously and I relax.Â

How does PCT account for my friend’s behavior?Â Should the model be required to account for such behavior (or if you prefer control).Â What if my friend is wrong and the meeting that was cancelled is not the meeting I am hurrying to attend and I do not find that out until later?Â How will we deal with that?Â

These are some of the questions that I am concerned with.Â I am starting “A transdiagnostic approach to CBT using the MOL therapy” to see if I can get some ideas of how to deal with such complexity.Â I also have “the wonder weeks” but have not started it yet.

bob

···

On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2014.09.14.23.44]
On 2014/09/12 5:35 PM, Bob Hintz wrote:
  I think we are talking past one another. To try to rectify this,
could you explain where you see the concept ofÂ “the priority of a
reference signal” in Bill’s hierarchy? And then could you suggest
what controls this priority, which you say is done by flipping a
switch.
  I imagine that these wordings mean something in the hierarchy, and
I can see vaguely where you might be thinking of them, but I can’t
be sure what you mean, other than as a description of everyday
experience, the result of something happening in the hierarchy.
Since our discussion has been on the concept of controlling
another person at a rather technical level, we need to make the
connection between this everyday experience and what happens in
the hierarchy. “Influencing the priority of another’s reference
conditions” does not map onto my own conception of what happens,
but perhaps you can put it in another way that will make sense to
me.
  At that point, maybe we can continue from your "It seems to me
that if I want to get you to do something in particular, I will
have to be able to influence what reference condition currently
has priority in your hierarchy. Â This means that I must have some
conception of your hierarchy, its contents, how they are
prioritized, and what changes in perception influence that process
prioritization." My own way of considering “getting you to do
something” includes no such knowledge of you, as I believe I said
in [Martin Taylor 2014.09.07.23.01] with the subject line
“Protocols (was Re: Sheepdog and flock behavior)”.
  Martin

    So when the sheep observes the alteration in the
distance between them caused by the dog’s movement, there will
come a point where the management of that distance takes
priority over the management of the perception of hunger or
achieving contact with some tasty looking grass. Â MOL is
appropriate when the switch keeps alternating back and forth
because priority cannot be established in any satisfactory
manner for any specified length of time or circumstance. Â There
might be such a distance (like the ass between two bales of hay
who starves to death) but the dog would have to stand still at
the distance just as the grass stands still. Â Otherwise there
does not seem to be any conflict, just a change in priority.
Â Might it be appropriate to talk about influencing the priority
of another’s reference conditions rather than talking about
influencing their behavior? Â Boris has one video which shows a
sheep head butting a dog who is clearing not harming the sheep.
Â They appear to be playing. Â The sheep turns toward the dog as
it approaches and put its head down, the dog contacts the head
and slides to one side, but does not grab anything while the
sheep spins orient its head toward the dog and then they
separate and do the whole thing over again. Â This might be an
example of co-reorganization (protocols?) of these two
particular animals and their history of interaction with each
other.

      It seems to me that if I want to get you to do something in
particular, I will have to be able to influence what reference
condition currently has priority in your hierarchy. Â This
means that I must have some conception of your hierarchy, its
contents, how they are prioritized, and what changes in
perception influence that process prioritization. Being a
member of a group and sharing a language makes this at least
possible some of the time. Â If I see my spouse going toward
the kitchen and say “can you bring me a beer?” and she says,
“sure”. Â There is no other observable change in her behavior.
Â Moments later, she sets a beer down next to me and I say,
“thanks” as she walks back to a chair in the living room.
Â Have I controlled her behavior or did I simply give her an
opportunity to change the priority of some reference condition
that she already had built into her hierarchy? Â When I share
information about myself, am I disturbing her? Â She could have
said, “No, I’m on my way to Jan’s” and I would know that she
did not change her priorities and I would know what I needed
to do if I wanted a beer. Â The fact that she told me where she
was going, might have been a change in her priorities, how
would anyone other than her know if that was the case? Â Each
of us has some awareness of the sequences of reference
conditions that we are engaged in controlling. Â

      The discussion of controlling our perception of the
behavior of others has led to some serious thinking (good old
armchair) about what kind of model a self-conscious control
system might need to have about another self-conscious control
system in order in order to succeed at intentionally
controlling some variables together. Â

      Thanks to one and all - I have also some ideas how to use
youtube as part of a research process,

Thanks, Boris

bob

      On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 12:40 PM,

Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com
wrote:

              [From Rick Marken

(2014.09.12.1041)]

On 2014/09/12 12:28 PM, Bob Hintz wrote:

bob hintz - 2014.09.12

                            I think Boris has collected some nice
video references here. Â He also raises
another issue. Â When a sheep is eating
(controlling for internal perceptions of
nutrition by chomping clumps of grass,
chewing and swallowing) its observable
behavior is different than when it is
controlling the distance between itself
and the dog. Â

                  Martin Taylor
(2014.09.12.12.46)
MT: You are talking about conflict
between different control systems.

RM: Excellent post Martin!!

BestÂ

                Rick

                      The
conflict occurs when two control systems want
to set one perceptual variable (location on
the field) to two different places. The
“eating” set of control systems wants to be
where the grass is lush, while the “safety”
set of control systems wants to be away from
the dog. How conflicts get resolved is a
generic question in PCT with probably several
different answers. Indeed, that’s what MOL is
about.
                      From the outside, conflict resolution looks
like choice or decision, and maybe that’s
actually what happens. Maybe one control
system turns its gain down to zero and lets
the other one win. Maybe some switch
disconnects one and allows the other to
control. Maybe they both keep providing output
but there’s a system nonlinearity somewhere
that allows one of them to dominate. There are
several possibilities. In any particular case,
I suppose that it would be possible to model
the effects of different possible ways a
conflict is resolved. Kent McClelland would be
a good one to ask about this. But we can’t
tell in the case of the sheep.
                      If you were out in the jungle picking berries
to stave off hunger and you thought you heard
a tiger, would you imagine you would keep on
picking berries? If not, what perceptions
would you imagine yourself to now be
controlling that you were not controlling
before you thought you heard the tiger? And
why?
                          Martin

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

                  Author ofÂ Â [Doing Research on Purpose](http://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1407342866&sr=8-1&keywords=doing+research+on+purpose).Â 
                    Now available from Amazon or Barnes &

Noble

                                On Thu, Sep

11, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Boris Hartman
boris.hartman@masicom.net
wrote:

Hi Rick,

Â

                                          RM:
Exactly, the dog controls
the behavior of the sheep
by disturbing a variable
that the sheep control by
grouping themselves closer
together. Boris disagrees
and says that the sheep
are not being controlled
by the dog, which is
demonstrably wrong.
Without the dog there, the
gaps between the sheep
would on average be quite
wide.

Â

HB

:

                                          First
of all nobody can control
any behavior. Neither dog
or sheep. Both control
their own perception.

Â

                                          So
if I see right your
Â»attack on meÂ« that I’m
wrong, you are trying to
say that dog and sheep are
controlling for the same
perception : the gap
between sheep and so it
seems to you that dog
controls the behavior of
sheep. And that’s by your
oppinion proof that sheeps
are controlled by dog. Or
in other words : because
sheeps behave as dog
wants, sheeps are
controlled. Did I missed
something ?

Â

                                          The
problem here is that sheep
could control the
perception of the gap
between sheep, for safety
as you said. But when you
say safety what does it
mean. If we say just
control for safety we
don’t know what is really
controlled. I asssume that
safety could be higher
order perception, composed
of at least two lower
level controlled
perceptions : distance
between ship and distance
between dog and sheep.
Both controlled
perceptions are
contributing to safety,
specialy the last one.

Â

                                          But
sheep do control at least
one more life-important
perception : eating grass.
When they control such a
perception they spread on
great teritory seeking for
better grass, not seeking
for control of gap between
them. That’s what owners
of sheep wants. So owner
train a dog to group sheep
so not to be spread
arround.

Â

                                          Sheeps
are not controlling only
for the gap between sheep,
they control for their
life-important perception.
The owner of course also
control that sheep could
eat best grass. Dog and
people who trained dog, do
control for sheep being
togetheras as much as
possible to eat grass, but
also not to lose any of
sheep.

Â

                                          So
I think you are right that
dog control for Â»the gap
between sheepÂ« as that’s
what owner wants. But I
think you are not right
that dog controls the
behavior of sheep by
controlling the gap among
them. Â Sheep can control
for different perception
among which is also
perception of grouping
together for safety. But
behavior of sheep is not
determined with presence
of the dog, but depends
from sheep’s internal
control by which relevant
behavior (output) for the
sheep’s control of
perception is established.
Â

Â

                                          Sheep
beside very important
control of eating grass,
control also perception
for the distance to the
predator (in our case it’s
dog). Â It’s probably some
inborn survival behavior.
So sheep control for the
perception of distance to
dog. Here is video, which
show how group of sheeps
are moving in accordance
with distance to the dog.
When dogs are at safe
diastance (probably low
Â»errorÂ« in sheep control)
sheeps are not moving.
When distance minimize
sheep move (run) away from
dog. But the distance is
varying in accordance to
control of sheep and dog.
When sheep control
differently – run awaay
from group, than we can
see that sheep in control
of their perception. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJUVULU7GDM

Â

                                          So
we can conclude that there
are many Â»survivial
behaviorsÂ« or sheep can
control for different
perceptions. One of them
and very important is :
the gap between dog
(predator) and sheep. With
output sheep will control
perception of being enough
far from dog. We can say
that sheep controls the
distance to the dog
(predator) and varying
distance will in some
proportion (not linear)
cause Â»errorsÂ« in control.
The closer dog is, more
Â»errorÂ« and more distance
to the dog is produced,Â
less Â»errorÂ« no activity
or perception of eating
grass is controlled.

                                          Dog's
controlled perception is :
the more the sheep are
together – less ÂÂ»errorÂ«,
the more they are appart â€“
more Â»errorÂ«. So again
varying distance, varying
Â»errorÂ« of dog control.
Also seen in video when
one sheep ran away from
group. Dogs ran after it.

Â

                                          So
both : dog and sheep are
controllig what they are
supposed to control.

Â

                                          Now
Rick you can make
simulation of both LCS
each controling for own
perception – varying
perception of distance. We
have only to establish,
how these diferent
controls with different
goals are coordinated. I
would say that dog run in
different directions
trying to change the
distance to sheep so to
move sheep in wanted
direction.

Â

                                          In
this way sheep is stil
controlling for distance
and less Â»errorÂ« in the
direction of group of
other sheep mean that is
more possibility for sheep
to move to the group. So
in this case sheep is
tending to encrease the
gap to the dog and dog
somehow enable that.Â But
this is not always the
case.

Â

                                          So
I concluded that dog
behavior is not always
implaying sheep behavior
to increase distance to
the dog only by running
away. It can be also
different. In next video
you can see that sheeps
choose another behavior,
which has something to do
with the dog, but in
opposite direction.
Instead of increasing the
gap to the dog, with
running away, they choose
the control of perception
of moving the dog away. So
they attack dog. Â

Â

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY_7U56R0AM

Â

                                          Your
term Rick about controling
other living being somehow
sounds to me as S-R logic.
Dog behavior (stimulus,
disturbance) to sheep
perceptual input, and then
directly to sheep behavior
is somehow determined
sheep behavior by it’s
input (environment). It’s
denying Bill’s aymetry of
control : LCS can control
environment, and
environment can’t control
LCS.

Â

                                          By
your control of behavior
of others can happen in
the opposite Â way. Â So it
sounds like absolutely
determined behavior by
environment : sheep input
(dogs behavior) - sheep
output (induced behavior
by dog behavior). Nothing
in between. No process
inside Â»controlledÂ« LCS
counts, no references, no
reorganization, just
stream from input to
output (control of
others).

Â

                                          LCS
are already controlling,
so nobody can overtake
that control. Sheep all
the time control their
perception. Â Dogs all the
time control their
percpetion.

Â

                                          I
didn’t find any example to
show how sheep can attack
alone sheep dog, not just
ran away form the dog, but
I found this video, which
shows how sheep attacked
wolf, when he comes to
close.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F29dMtxXCkE

Â

                                          If
we think that sheep are
inocent little animals
harmly eating grass, we
can made a hudge mistake :
here is video which show
how nasty can be sheep
attack.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJrlo2VuUR8

Â

                                          Maybe
this video will help to
see, how sheep control the
distance to dog (predator)
:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXkHDiuadTI

Â

                                          And
maybe one more video which
shows that dog is not
controlling the behavior
of the ram.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cluHOW_EnAQ

Â

                                          And
maybe the last video that
shows that perceptual
control is choosen in the
ram not in environment and
can be very unpredictable
and dangerous.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jgjk3DsN7c

Â

                                          All
in all I think that there
is enough proof that dogs
are not controlling
behavior of the sheep, but
sheep control it’s own
perception that it chooses
Â and dog control it’s
perception that it
chooses. But neither of
them can control behavior.
Nor own, neither others.
As far as I understand
there is no such a thing
in PCT. Â

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From:
csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu
[mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu ]
On Behalf Of Richard
Marken
Sent: Tuesday,
September 09, 2014 2:45 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re:
Sheepdog and flock
behavior

Â

                                              [From

Rick Marken
(2014.09.08.1545)]

Â

                                                Kent

McClelland
(2014.09.07.2050)

Â

                                                KM:
I see that my name
has come up in this
exchange, so I’ll
see if I can say
anything to help
move it along. As I
look at what you’ve
written, I don’t see
much in either
person’s position to
disagree with, but
you seem to be at an
impasse. The
difficulty seems to
be semantic,
revolving around
what it means to
control another
person’s behavior,
which Rick says can
be done and Boris
says can’t. In my
view, you’re both
partly right.

Â

                                                  RM:
I think it’s more
than semantic. I
think the
difficulty turns
on knowing what
control is, in
fact, not in
theory. Once you
know what control
is then there is
no controversy at
all: behavior can
be controlled.
That’s what we are
seeing with the
sheepdogs (the
dogs controlling
the gaps between
the sheep) and
with the E and S
in the rubber band
demo (E
controlling the
finger position of
S). A variable
(the gap, the
finger position)
is being kept in a
pre-selected state
(0 gap, finger on
target dot),
protected from
disturbance
(autonomously
produced changes
in the closeness
of the sheep to
one another, the
closeness of the
finger to the
target dot) by
varying actions
appropriately
(moving towards or
away from the
sheep, increasing
or reducing the
pull on the rubber
band) .

Â

                                                  KM:
The problem, as I
see it, is that a
person’s behavior
(or that of any
living control
system with
hierarchical
control of
perceptions) is
never just one
thing. A person
controls lots of
different
perceptions
simultaneously, at
different
perceptual levels.
And when a person
observes another
person’s physical
actions, the
observer can see
“behaviors” at a
lot of different
perceptual levels.

Â

                                                  RM:
Yes, but this is
true of all of our
experience, not
just our
experience of
other people’s
behavior. We
control perceptual
variables of many
different types
(hypothetically 11
different types of
perceptual
variable). I don’t
see what this has
to do with whether
or not people can
control other
people’s behavior.

Â

                                                    KM:
Because a person
controls lots of
different things
at once, under
the right
circumstances
another person
can control SOME
of these
behaviors (as
the controller
perceives them),
but not ALL of
them, at least
not all of them
simultaneously.
The trick in
controlling a
particular
behavior by
another person
(call it
behavior A) is
to get the
person to focus
on controlling
behavior B, and
then to remove
all the other
ways for the
person to keep
controlling
behavior B
except by doing
behavior A.

Â

                                                  RM:
Yes, this is all I
claimed was true:
people can control
the behavior of
other people. Of
course, they can
only control
some of these
behaviors – the
one’s that correct
for disturbances
to the variable
the controllee is
controlling. This
is why I gave the
example of
controlling the
position of S’s
finger in the
rubber band demo.
Since S must vary
the position of
the finger in
order to
compensate for E-
produced
disturbances to
the position of
the knot, Â the
variable S is
controlling, E can
control S’s finger
position by
disturbing the
position of the
knot. S’s finger
position is the
only aspect of S’s
behavior that E
can control in
this situation.
But that aspect of
S’s behavior can
certainly be
controlled.

                                                  KM: That's the

classic pattern
for manipulation
of a person’s
behavior.

Â

                                                  RM:
Right! This is how
you can manipulate
(control) another
Â person’s
behavior.Â

Â

KM:

The pattern also
applies to the dog
and sheep example.

Â

                                                  RM:
Exactly, the dog
controls the
behavior of the
sheep by
disturbing a
variable that the
sheep control by
grouping
themselves closer
together. Boris
disagrees and says
that the sheep are
not being
controlled by the
dog, which is
demonstrably
wrong. Without the
dog there, the
gaps between the
sheep would on
average be quite
wide.

Â

                                                  KM:
Thus, the control
of one person’s
behavior by
another person can
and does happen

Â

RM:

Â My point exactly.
Â

Â

                                                >
RM: One example:
When I give a
cashier $10 for a $5
item I am
controlling for the
cashier giving me $5
change. The cashier
is also controlling
for me paying $5 for
the item. Typically,
we both get the
behaviors from each
other than we want:
a nice example of
mutual control, and
no one gets hurt (or
oppressed). This
kind of agreed on
mutual control is
the basis of
civilization.
                                                  KM: Martin Taylor,
in the chapter
he’s writing for
the LCS IV book
edited by Warren
Mansell (a
preliminary draft
of which I’ve been
lucky enough to
see), calls this
kind of exchange
transaction a
“protocol,”

Â

                                                RM:
I looked at Martin’s
reply and what he
describes as a
“protocol” is not
the same as the
mutual controlling
that occurs in the
customer/cashier
interaction.Â

Â

                                                KM:
and, if I understand
his concept
correctly, protocols
provide a way for
two people acting
together to control
two different
perceptions. The
side-effects of one
person’s behavior in
controlling his or
her own perception
allow the other
person to control a
different perception
(and vice-versa). In
your example, the
cashier controls the
perception of
completing a sale by
getting your money
and giving you the
item and $5 change,
while you control
the perception of
buying the item by
handing over the
money and getting
the item and change
back.

Â

                                                  RM:
The difference
between the
customer/cashier
interaction and
the interaction
between two
control systems
described by
Martin is that
there is no
control of one
control system by
another in the
situation Martin
describes. In the
customer/cashier
situation,
successful control
by each control
system requires
successful control
of Â each control
system’s behavior
by the other
control system. In
Martin’s
“protocol”, shown
below, Alan’s
ability to control
PA does not depend
on controlling
Beth’s behavior
and vice versa.
Â The actions Alan
uses to control PA
are a disturbance
to PB which Beth
will oppose along
with any other
disturbances to
PB, and vice
versa. Â But Alan’s
ability to control
PA does not depend
on his controlling
Beth’s behavior.
INdeed, Alan can
control PA just
fine whether Beth
is controlling PB
or not.Â

Â

                                                This
is quite different
from the
customer/cashier
situation. The
customer is
controlling for
paying the exact
cost for the
product; the cashier
is controlling for
collecting the exact
payment. If the
product costs $5 and
the customer hands
$10 to the cashier,
the customer will
achieve the “pay the
exact cost” goal
only if the cashier
returns the exact
change. So the
customer is
controlling for the
cashier returning
$5. Â The cashier is
also controlling for
collecting the cost
of the customer’s
item and so will
allow the customer
to leave with the
product only after
payment has been
received. If the
cashier were not
controlling for
getting only the
exact amount for the
product the customer
would not
successfully control
for getting the
correct change
behavior from the
cashier; if the
customer were not
controlling for
paying for the
product the cashier
would not
successfully control
for getting paid by
the customer.Â

Â

                                                    KM:
I don’t think I
would describe
this exchange
situation as
control of
another person’s
behavior

Â

                                                    RM:
Apparently Bob
Hintz doesn’t
think so either.
Â But, again, I
think it can be
easily
demonstrated
that both the
customer and
cashier are,in fact ,
controlling each
other’s behavior
by introducing
disturbances to
the hypothetical
behavior
variables that
are being
controlled. For
example, have
the cashier give
the customer $4
rather $5
dollars in
change – a
disturbance to
the customer’s
perception of
the cashier
returning the
correct change.
I think you will
see the customer
take action –
like arguing
with the cashier
– to bring the
cashier’s
behavior to the
desired state:
handing over the
$5 change.
Similarly, have
the customer
hand the cashier
$4 rather than
$5. I think you
will see the
cashier take
action – like
calling over the
manager – to
bring the
customer’s
behavior to the
desired state:
pay for the
product. So the
customer is
controlling for
the “returning
correct change”
behavior of the
cashier and the
cashier is
controlling for
the “paying for
the product”
behavior of the
customer.Â

Â

                                                    KM:
unless you were
buying the item
from someone who
had a monopoly,
and the only way
for you to get
the item
(behavior B)
would be to pay
the asking price
(behavior A).
Even then, you
could refuse to
buy the item or
just get
something else,
unless the item
were something
you couldn’t
live without.

Â

                                                    RM:
I hope my little
explanation
shows that this
is not
necessary. The
customer and
cashier are
controlling each
other’s behavior
but it doesn’t
look like they
are controlling
each other’s
behavior (and
they certainly
don’t feel like
they are
controlling each
other) until one
or the other
doesn’t behave
as desired.
Â This is the way
it is with all
our controlling,
though, isn’t
it? We don’t
feel like we are
controlling when
we walk down the
street or talk
on the phone or
swim in the lake
– that is, we
don’t notice our
controlling
until we start
to lose it
.Skillful
control does’t
feel like
anything
special; it just
feels like we
are doing
things. Â And
this is true of
skillful
controlling of
our own limbs,
of the physical
consequences of
limb movements
(like walking
and swimming)
and
interpersonal
consequences of
these limb
movements (like
getting change
from a cashier).
Â

Â

                                                    RM:
I think I
understand why
people don’t
want to believe
that they can be
controlled and
why they do want
to believe that
they never
control other
people. It fits
with our idea
that we are
“free” and
“good”. But I
think it’s
better to
recognize when
we are
controlling,
especially when
we are
controlling (and
being controlled
by) other
control systems.
Understanding
how to recognize
this is, I
think, one of
the most
important things
to learn from
PCT. It’s only
when you know
that you are
controlling (and
being
controlled) that
you can adjust
your own
controlling to
reduce inter
(and intra)
personal
conflict and
work to organize
society in a way
that allows
controllers to
do their
controlling with
the least amount
of conflict and
the greatest
amount of
cooperation with
other
controllers.
Making believe
that we can’t be
controlled or
that we are not
controlled by
and/or don’t
control other
controllers is
not the road to
a better world,
I think.

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

                                                    Hope these

thoughts help
you to clarify
the questions
you were
discussing.

                                                    Best,

                                                    Kent

                                                      On Sep 7,
2014, at 12:54
PM, Richard
Marken wrote:
                                                      > [From
Rick Marken
(2014.09.07.1100)]
                                                      >

                                                      > <boris.hartman@masicom.net
                                                      >
wrote:
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH : I
don’t think
that dogs were
controlling
gaps by
Â»controlling
sheeps
behaviorÂ«.
Sheeps were
controlling
their behavior
on the bases
of
disturbances
dog produced
to sheep
perceptual
control.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Yes,
the sheep were
controlling a
perception (I
called it
safety) to
which the
approach of
the dog was a
disturbance.
The sheep
compensated
for this
disturbance by
moving closer
to other
sheep. This is
the behavior
that the dog
wanted to see
(were
controlling
for) because
it closed the
gaps that were
a disturbance
to the
perception the
dog was
controlling.
So the dog was
able to
control the
behavior of
the sheep,
getting them
to bunch
closer
together,
because the
sheep were
controlling
for safety by
bunching
together.
                                                      >

                                                      > RM : So
any model of
this behavior
would have to
model the
dogs’ “gap”
control system
and the
sheep’s safety
control
system. Such a
simulation
would show
that control
systems can
both control
andÂ be
controlled.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH : Well
this is a good
idea to make
simultaneous
simulation.
Did you try it
?
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Not
yet.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH: But
this is the
n-th time that
we are trying
to solve the
problem how
LCS can be
“controlled”.
In the book :
Making sense
of behavior
Bill talks
about
“attempts of
control” not
“control”…
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH: Maybe
Kent could
explain what’s
wrong with
your position
about Â»LCS can
be
controlled".
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Yes,
I think that’s
a good idea,
though I would
be surprised
if Kent
thought that
there is
something
wrong with my
“position”. My
position is
simply that
people can
clearly
control the
behavior other
people and
their own
behavior can
be controlled
as well. This
is an
observable
fact that is
explained by
PCT. I leave
the
explanation as
an exercise.
                                                      >

                                                      > RM : It
can also be
easily
demonstrated
with humans
using the
rubber band
demo; the E in
this
experiment can
control the
finger
position of
the S once S
has agreed to
control the
position of
the knot.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH : Yes.
Watch your
wording in
rubber band
demo. “Once S
has agreed” or
as Kent said
“S chooses”. .
So it’s
obviously that
S agreed to be
controlled.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Not
quite. S has
agreed to
control a
particular
perception
(the location
of the knot
relative to
the dot, in
this case).Â S
has not agreed
to be
controlled;
indeed, S is
typically
unaware of
being
controlled
after agreeing
to control
that
perception.
                                                      >

                                                      > HB :
Aplying
distrubance to
a Â»controlled
variableÂ« does
not mean that
control is
established.
It seems that
Kent and I
agree that
disturbances
are aplyed to
perceptual
control and
target person
chooses.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: I
would be
interested to
hear what Kent
has to say
about that. I
would be very
surprised if
he agreed with
your analysis.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM : Nor
does control
theory show
that
controlling
organisms
(particularly
humans) is
necessarily a
bad thing to
do.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH : Now
you are
exaggerating
Rick. You
can’t control
organisms. I’d
really like to
see how you
are doing that
in everyday
life ?
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                    > RM: One
example: When I
give a cashier
$10 for a $5
item I am
controlling for
the cashier
giving me $5
change. The
cashier is also
controlling for
me paying $5 for
the item.
Typically, we
both get the
behaviors from
each other than
we want: a nice
example of
mutual control,
and no one gets
hurt (or
oppressed). This
kind of agreed
on mutual
control is the
basis of
civilization.
                                                    >


                                                      >Â  RM :
What control
theory does
show is that
arbitrary
control,
particularly
of humans by
other humans,
will almost
certainly lead
to conflict.
Arbitrary
control is
exerting
control
without
considering
the fact that
living control
systems are
controlling
many variables
at the same
time and when
you
arbitrarily
decide to have
a person do
something (by
disturbing a
controlling
variable) what
you have them
do may
conflict with
other things
they are
controlling.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > HB : It
makes some
sense, but I
don’t
understand
what you meant
by Â»arbitrary
controlÂ« ?
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: It
means
controlling
without taking
a persons
wants and
needs (the
references for
the many
different
perceptions
that the
person is
controlling
for) into
account. In
non-PCT terms,
it is
controlling
another person
without
respecting
that person’s
humanity (and
autonomy).
                                                      >

                                                      > BH: If
you are
thinking like
this one :
Â»Controlle
behavior match
my wanted
perception of
behvior and
thus it is
Â»controlledÂ«
it’s wrong.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM:
That’s exactly
how I am
thinking. And
I think you
are wrong
about this
being wrong.
                                                      >

                                                      > BH: You
have PCT which
helps you
understand
what’s
happening
inside
organisms.
Human control
and behavior
are quite
unpredictable,
because the
references are
formed inside
organism,
where most of
control is
done.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Once
you have
correctly
identified a
controlled
variable
behavior (the
actions that
protect that
variable from
disturbance)
can be
predicted with
very high
accuracy. See
the “Basic
Control demo”
at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html
to see what I
mean.
                                                      >

                                                      > BH: Just
observable
Â»factsÂ« of
behavioral
event are not
prove that
people control
each other.
Although it’s
not excluded.
The
controller’s
behavior is
just a
disturbance to
controlee
perceptual
control. From
what happens
in controlee
comparator
(error) will
probably
decide whether
controlee
behavior will
resemble to
something
controller
wanted or not.
But never
behavior of
controlee will
be just exact
Â»copyÂ« of
controller’s
wanted
behavior,
because
controlee is
in control.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >Â  RM: It
may not be an
“exact” copy
of what the
controller
wants, but it
can be very
close (like
within 1% of
the desired
value).
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM:
Anyway, this
behavior –
managing
flocks – is a
very
interesting
demonstration
of controlling
a perception
(of gaps
between sheep)
via
disturbance of
a perception
being
controlled by
the control
systems that
are being
controlled.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > BH: This
one makes some
PCT sense. J
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Well,
that’s
progress!
                                                      >

                                                      > Best

                                                      >

                                                      > Rick

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > But as
usual I’m
living space
for not
understanding
something
right. And as
always, sorry
for my
language.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Best,

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Boris

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu
                                                      [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu                                                          ]
On Behalf Of
Richard Marken
                                                      > Sent:
Sunday, August
31, 2014 3:23
AM
                                                      > To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

                                                      > Subject:
Re: Sheepdog
and flock
behavior
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > [From
Rick Marken
(2014.08.30.1820)]
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > [From
Bruce Abbott
(2014.08.30.0820
EDT)]
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >
Researchers
have
investigated
how sheepdogs
manage their
flocks by
fitting both
the dogs and
the sheep with
highly
accurate GPS
devices,
allowing the
researchers to
track their
movements.Â
The research
is presented
in a BBC
article at http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28936251
.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: Great
find, Bruce!Â
There are two
things that
make this
report
particularly
interesting to
me. The first
is the quote
by Andrew
King, which is
a great
description of
the PCT
approach to
research. To
paraphrase
King: in order
to understand
the behavior
of organisms
you have to
try to look at
their behavior
from the point
of view of the
organism
(behaving
system)
Itself. I make
this same
point in the
chapter onÂ
“Looking at
Behavior
through
Control Theory
Glasses” in
“Doing
Research on
Purpose” (why
hasn’t that
become a best
seller yet?).
I do it in the
section on
trying to
understand the
apparent
“fixed action
pattern” of
the greylag
goose. The
goose is seen
to continue to
make the
movements that
would pull an
egg back into
its nest even
when the egg
is no longer
present.
Looking at an
organism’s
behavior from
the organism’s
perspective
helps you come
up with good
ideas about
what
perceptual
variables the
organism is
controlling
(the first
step in the
Test for the
Controlled
Variable). By
looking at the
goose’s egg
rolling
behavior from
the goose’s
perspective I
was able to
come up with
the hypothesis
that the goose
is trying to
control the
pressure of
the egg
against the
back of its
bill and when
the egg is
removed the
continued
efforts to
move the
non-existent
egg into the
nest (the
apparent fixed
action
pattern) is
just the
efforts of the
pressure
control system
to restore the
pressure of
the egg
against the
back of the
bill. By
looking at the
sheepdogs
herding
behavior from
the dogs’
perspective
King came up
with the
reasonable
hypothesis
that the dogs
were
controlling
their
perception of
the gaps
between
patches of
white (the
sheep), trying
to keep those
gaps at zero.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM: The
other thing
that’s
interesting
about this
report is that
the dogs were
clearly
controlling
their
perception of
the gaps by
controlling
the behavior
of the sheep.
And they did
this by
becoming a
disturbance to
a perception
that the sheep
control by
getting closer
to other
sheep: the
perception of
safety. So any
model of this
behavior would
have to model
the dogs’
“gap” control
system and the
sheep’s safety
control
system. Such a
simulation
would show
that control
systems can
both control
andÂ be
controlled.
This kind of
simulation
would help
dispel what I
think is a
common
misconception
about the
control theory
model of
organisms –
particularly
humans. It is
a
misconception
that I myself
labored under
until just a
few years ago.
It is the idea
that because
organisms are
autonomous
control
systems –
autonomous in
the sense that
they set their
own references
for the states
of their own
perception –
they cannot be
controlled.
But autonomous
control
systems can be
controlled, as
is
demonstrated
by the
sheepdogs
controlling
the sheep. It
can also be
easily
demonstrated
with humans
using the
rubber band
demo; the E in
this
experiment can
control the
finger
position of
the S once S
has agreed to
control the
position of
the knot. And
thanks to
Bruce Abbott I
demonstrated
to myself that
E can still
exert this
control even
if S
continuously
– and
autonomously
– varies his
or her
reference for
the position
of the knot.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > RM:
Control theory
doesn’t say
that organisms
(particularly
humans) can’t
be controlled;
indeed, it
shows that
they can be
controlled,
mainly by
disturbance to
a controlled
variable. Nor
does control
theory show
that
controlling
organisms
(particularly
humans) is
necessarily a
bad thing to
do. What
control theory
does show is
that arbitrary
control,
particularly
of humans by
other humans,
will almost
certainly lead
to conflict.
Arbitrary
control is
exerting
control
without
considering
the fact that
living control
systems are
controlling
many variables
at the same
time and when
you
arbitrarily
decide to have
a person do
something (by
disturbing a
controlling
variable) what
you have them
do may
conflict with
other things
they are
controlling.
So to take an
example that
Bill used
(somewhere),
if E decides
to place S’s
finger against
a hot
soldering iron
while
controlling Ss
finger
position in
the rubber
band game that
will clearly
lconflict with
another goal S
has (not
getting
burned).
Non-arbitrary
control is
control that
is done with
the consent
(often
implicit but
sometimes
explicit) of
the would-be
controllee.
Non- arbitrary
control is, I
think,
essential when
humans control
other humans.
To see why,
think about
what happens
when people
are
arbitrarily
controlled
(herded) in
the same way
that the sheep
were. Hint:
They don’t
like it. Why
do you think
not?
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >Â  RM:
Anyway, this
behavior –
managing
flocks – is a
very
interesting
demonstration
of controlling
a perception
(of gaps
between sheep)
via
disturbance of
a perception
being
controlled by
the control
systems that
are being
controlled.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Best

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Rick

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > The
researchers
found that the
behavior could
be described
by two simple
rules, but
more
interesting
from a PCT
perspective,
they found
that to
understand the
behavior they
needed to view
the action
from the
animalâ€™s
perspectives.Â
According to
researcher Dr.
Andrew King:
                                                      >

                                                      > "At the
beginning we
had lots of
different
ideas. We
started out
looking from a
birds eye
view, but then
we realised we
needed to see
what the dog
sees. It sees
white, fluffy
things. If
there are gaps
between them
or the gaps
get bigger,
the dogs needs
to bring them
together."
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > According
to Dr King,
sheepdogs are
making the
most of the
“selfish herd
theory” to
bring the
animals close
together and
move them
where they
want.
                                                      >

                                                      > "One of
the things
that sheep are
really good at
is responding
to a threat by
working with
their
neighbours.
It’s the
selfish herd
theory: put
something
between the
threat and
you.
Individuals
try to
minimise the
chance of
anything
happening to
them, so they
move towards
the centre of
a group."
                                                      >

                                                      > The
article
continues as
follows:
                                                      >

                                                      > A
colleague, Dr
Daniel
Strombom from
Uppsala
University in
Sweden, used
the GPS data
from the
collars to
develop
computer
simulations.
This enabled
them to
develop a
mathematical
shepherding
model.
                                                      >

                                                      > The
algorithm
displays the
same weaving
pattern
exhibited by
sheepdogs. It
helps to solve
what has been
called the
‘the
shepherding
problem’: how
one agent can
control a
large number
of unwilling
agents.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Iâ€™d be
interested to
know whether
the computer
algorithm
models each
individualâ€™s
control
systems or
operates by
some other
method.
                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      > Bruce

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

                                                      >

–

                                                    >

                                                    > Richard S.

Marken, Ph.D.

                                                    > Author ofÂ

Doing Research
on Purpose.

                                                    >

                                                    > Now

available from
Amazon or Barnes
& Noble

                                                    >

                                                    >

                                                    >

                                                    >

                                                    > --

                                                    > Richard S.

Marken, Ph.D.

                                                    > Author ofÂ

Doing Research
on Purpose.

                                                    > Now

available from
Amazon or Barnes
& Noble

Â

–

                                                Richard

S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author ofÂ Â Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now

available from
Amazon or Barnes
& Noble

MartinT · September 15, 2014, 9:58pm

[Martin Taylor 2014.09.15.17.32]

Bob, I wonder if I may gently change your reference priorities (whatever that means) in such a way that you begin to put the conventional name and date stamp at the head of the message. It makes for an unambiguous reference label for a message if we ever want to refer mack to an old message, which...

does not.

Here's what I don't understand:

If I think of the knot over the dot rubber band demonstration, I am recalling someone noting that if I disturb the knot in such a fashion that your hand would bump into a very iron if all you noticed was the knot/dot locations, you would probably refuse to burn your hand, i.e., change the priority of your immediate control references.

It's that "i.e." that I don't understand. How did the conflict between controlling the perception of the knot position and controlling a perception of the hand with a reference of "not too hot" get resolved. You simply say "priority" and leave it at that. I think Bill P would have called this a "dormitive principle". If you go to sleep it is because you have too much dormitivity, or if you stay awake at night it is because you have too little. So please, what is this "priority" other than a word for what we see happening? Where is "priority" perceived? What are the inputs to the "priority" perceptual function? What actions, internal or external, influence the priority perceptions so that control of knot position loses "priority" and control of hand temperature gains "priority"?

I suppose that not only do we see more than what we are focused on at any given moment we also have reference value for those perceptions.

Yes, almost all controlled perceptions are unconscious, if we are to believe HPCT.

If I disturb the knot slowly so that your hand moves toward the iron slowly, you are likely to feel the heat well before you touch the iron. As your perception of temperature increased and was compared to a reference signal (maybe intrinsic signal) regarding skin temperature, resulting in an increase in error signal to output signals resulting in hand movement would be in conflict with the output signals from the ECU sending signals to hand output function.

This, I do understand. That is the way I would describe the conflict. Kent McLelland has done a fair amount of simulation of what happens in conflicts.

This might result in paralysis and some higher level ECU would very likely have a higher gain (?) for skin safety than for compliance with instructions. I don't know how you would do it in terms of the model, but I can imagine you saying something like, "nuts to you" and letting go of your end of the rubber band.

Well, you made a start at devising a model, but would it work? What does it mean for a single ECU to have different gains for two perceptions? In HPCT an ECU has only one perceptual signal, so your higher ECU would be changing the HPCT structure. But there's nothing wrong with that if you can demonstrate that it works and offers the possibility of an experimental comparison with HPCT.

Now, if I am moving my end of the rubber band quickly, you might burn your hand before you notice the iron, but you would certainly notice the burn. You would then stop controlling for knot/dot relationship and attempt ease your pain.

Yep.

Sensing heat and avoiding a burn by shifting the priority of a reference condition may only be possible if you have failed in the past and know what getting burned feels like.

You are talking about how perceptual functions are originated. It's worth following up. But you still need to explain what is meant by "shifting the priority of a reference condition".

I have only one body. Somehow, the collective output of all the ECU's that compose my hierarchy must fit together. If I am late to a meeting and hurrying, my whole body is involved in moving faster. If a friend sees me hustling down the hall and yells, "the meeting was cancelled", all of the movement reference signals are changed almost simultaneously and I relax.

How does PCT account for my friend's behavior? Should the model be required to account for such behavior (or if you prefer control). What if my friend is wrong and the meeting that was cancelled is not the meeting I am hurrying to attend and I do not find that out until later? How will we deal with that?

These are issues in a different domain. Certainly we expect PCT to explain all of this example, but the analysis has to be done carefully, and right now I'm trying to understand why you talk about changing priority of reference conditions when you stop controlling one perception and start controlling another. As with the "dormitive principle" the result is clear, but (to me) it means nothing in the context of a scientific theory of human performance.

These are some of the questions that I am concerned with. I am starting "A transdiagnostic approach to CBT using the MOL therapy" to see if I can get some ideas of how to deal with such complexity. I also have "the wonder weeks" but have not started it yet.

bob

I hope that some of the above makes sense to you, and that it might help you in your efforts.

Martin

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On 2014/09/15 5:26 PM, Bob Hintz wrote: