signal units and units of physical units

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.12.08.17.17NZT)

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.12.08.11.34NZT)

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.07.17.06]

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.12.08.10.20NZT)

Martin

It’s dawned on me possibly why you
had such a hard time understanding the diagram I drew some weeks ago about the nested “controlled
variables”. Below

You are seeing the PCV as something you
act upon in the environment. It’s the opposite actually.

You select a PCV to control a perception of
your personal interpretation of reality and in many levels of inference and
abstraction.

A really good book to read is this it will
help you tremendously in getting to grips with words and semantics it’s a
classic. http://www.amazon.com/People-Quandaries-Semantics-Personal-Adjustment/dp/091897027X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1291782699&sr=8-1

It’s quite brilliant Johnson goes over Korzybski in great detail. I have re-read that book a dozen times and every time I get something out of
it. I have thousands of books and this is one of my cherished books. It’s
water stained and marked and a 1945 edition, from my uncle’s massive library.

If you cut out all the fluff about PCT in
a nutshell, in that diagram below the HPCT
is an assumption of Reality and
the PCVn to ****θ is its
selection of control. (Where n=1 and θ= infinity).

So if you look at this model the implication
is everything is included and nothing is excluded.

Bill is a very clever man it’s quite brilliant and so simple.

One can now even use fractal mathematics
to model this. If you want to see how Peitgen’s book on Chaos and
Fractals will show you.

It is now also possible to apply the non equilibrium
Gibbs’ Free
Energy formula to that model.

Regards

Gavin

image00128.jpg

···

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2010. 12.08, 133:35 EU ST)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.06.10.12]

MT
When you come to think of the environmental variable that corresponds to a
perceptual function, it’s sometimes hard to say what physical dimensions apply.
It’s easy enough to say that an acceleration has dimensions metres/sec^2, but

what are the dimensions of “democracy”?

bjorn

>>Maybe I slip out now. I am not sure I think that neither acceleration nor "democracy"
>>are environmental variables.

[MT now] Are they not? You control your perception of them by acting on the environment, don’t you?
How could you do that if they were not environmental variables?

What I am going to say here is some parallel with Gavin Ritz’s thoughts. I think you and I an maybe Gavin Ritz think the same way when we talk about perceptions, environment, environmental variables and more. But we express ourselves in special ways. Therefore I will reread this topic when I answer.

First of all we have to agree about the way we define the words we use.

I define environment as everything outside my sensing cells in my brain. The environment is composed of environmental variables.

Now I say something you may disagree (I don’t think you do). An example may be a car, I am seeing, that is increasing its velocity from zero to 100 metres/sec. The environmental variables passes a perceptual function where the environmental variables are changed to perceptual signals. The dimension for the car’s acceleration, metres/sec^2, is not an environmental variable that passes the perceptual function at the first level. My perception of the moving car. My awareness of this perception once made it possible for me to determine what I thought about the perception, how I explained it and how I should deal with it. These imaginations are perceptions with inner generated inputs, not sensed inputs as when I see at the car. Now they are remembered perceptions with inner generated inputs.

Let me go back to an earlier comment from you.

Martin Taylor 2010.12.06.10.12

I say your imaginings and thoughts about your perceptions are just that – imaginings
about your perceptions. We have to be careful when we deal with consciousness.
Consciousness is a bit of a mystery, to put it mildly! How you analyze where your
perceptions come from is not the same as where your perceptions come from, even if
your analysis is correct; “the map is not the territory”.

I agree with your first sentence, but I will not say “just that”. I think perceptions of environmental variables have it’s input, bit imaginations and remembered thoughts have an inner generated input. I don’t know what consciousness (I prefer the word awareness) is and where it works, but I think I am aware my writing just now, which is a perception. If not I could not continue writing. There are many perceptions I am not aware, my pulse etcetera. Here I stop the comment.

The next word I will define is control, and I think we can agree about a definition all three.

"A is said to control B if, for every disturbing influence acting on B, A generates an action that tends strongly to counteract the effect of the disturbing influence on B. "

When you say

You control your perception of them by acting on the environment, don’t you?
How could you do that if they were not environmental variables?

I agree. But I agree in a special way. I don’t plan actions, what I plan are sections of perceptions I intend to be like a purpose perception.

[MT now] So if that’s a controlled perception, how do you influence it? By acting on
something in the environment, don’t you? Maybe you physically touch the object, maybe
you turn a knob or step on a brake pedal. Whatever you do affects the environment by
applying some force, with the result that your perception changes of how rapidly the speed is increasing.

I agree and refer to my section above.

I think the disagreement between us tree is that we read your sentences as if you were planning actions. If we say that our affects on the environmental variables happens because we control our perceptions, I think we agree??.

bjorn

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.08.11.02]

        [From Bjorn Simonsen (2010.

12.08, 133:35 EU ST)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.06.10.12]

MT

      >>When you come to think of the environmental variable

that corresponds to a

      >>perceptual function, it's sometimes hard to say what

physical dimensions apply.

      >>It's easy enough to say that an acceleration has

dimensions metres/sec^2, but

what are the dimensions of “democracy”?

bjorn

          >>Maybe I slip out now.

I am not sure I think that neither acceleration nor
“democracy”

          >>are environmental variables.
    >[MT now] Are they not? You control your perception of them

by acting on the environment, don’t you?

    >How could you do that if they were not environmental

variables?

      What I am going to say here is

some parallel with Gavin Ritz’s thoughts. I think you and I an
maybe Gavin Ritz think the same way when we talk about
perceptions, environment, environmental variables and more.
But we express ourselves in special ways. Therefore I will
reread this topic when I answer.

I'm afraid I don't see any relationship between your thoughts and

Gavin’s, or between his and PCT. Your thoughts do largely agree with
mine, though.

      First of all we have to agree

about the way we define the words we use.

      I define environment as

everything outside my sensing cells in my brain. The
environment is composed of environmental variables.

Right.
      Now I say something you may

disagree (I don’t think you do). An example may be a car, I am
seeing, that is increasing its velocity from zero to 100
metres/sec. The environmental variables passes a perceptual
function where the environmental variables are changed to
perceptual signals. The dimension for the car’s acceleration,
metres/sec^2, is not an environmental variable that passes the
perceptual function at the first level.

All the signals that allow you to perceive "acceleration" do pass

the perceptual functions at the first level. The outputs of the
lower-level perceptual functions are the inputs to the higher-level
ones. Having said that, HPCT does include the concept of
“imagination”, but that has a very specific meaning: that instead of
one of the inputs to a perceptual function coming from a lower-level
perceptual function’s output, it comes from what is labelled an
“imagination loop”.

      My perception of the moving car.

My awareness of this perception once made it possible for me
to determine what I thought about the perception, how I
explained it and how I should deal with it. These imaginations
are perceptions with inner generated inputs, not sensed inputs
as when I see at the car. Now they are remembered perceptions
with inner generated inputs.

Always be careful when you talk about conscious perceptions --

perceptions of which you are aware. In this section, you are talking
about what you are thinking about the percption of the moving car,
not about the perception of the car itself, or of the car’s
acceleration. Maybe you intended to be talking about how you think
rather than about how the acceleration perception is generated, in
which case, ignore this comment.

      Let me go back to an earlier

comment from you.

Martin Taylor 2010.12.06.10.12

    >I say your imaginings and thoughts about your perceptions

are just that – imaginings

    >        about your perceptions.

We have to be careful when we deal with consciousness.

    >Consciousness is a bit of a mystery, to put it mildly! How

you analyze where your

    perceptions come from is not the same as where your perceptions

come from, even if

    >your analysis is correct; "the map is not the territory".
    I agree with your first sentence, but I will not say "just

that". I think perceptions of environmental variables have it’s
input, bit imaginations and remembered thoughts have an inner
generated input. I don’t know what consciousness (I prefer the
word awareness) is and where it works, but I think I am aware my
writing just now, which is a perception. If not I could not
continue writing. There are many perceptions I am not aware, my
pulse etcetera. Here I stop the comment.

      The next word I will define is

control, and I think we can agree about a definition all
three.

  •        "A is said to control B if, for every disturbing influence
    

acting on B, A generates an action that tends strongly to
counteract the effect of the disturbing influence on B.*
"

Yes.

When you say

      >>You control your perception of them by acting on the

environment, don’t you?
>>How could you do that if they were not environmental
variables?

      I agree. But I agree in a special way. I don't plan actions,

what I plan are sections of perceptions I intend to be like a
purpose perception.

Who mentioned planning? My point was that Gavin could not get his

message into the computer without touching the keyboard or speaking
into a voice-recognition device, or in some other way acting on the
environment. He could not eat unless he acted on the environment to
move food to his mouth. He denied that he did any of those things.
In fact he denied acting on the environment at all, so I gave up
communicating with him.

            >[MT now] So if that's a controlled perception, how do

you influence it? By acting on

    >something in the environment, don't you? Maybe you

physically touch the object, maybe

    >you turn a knob or step on a brake pedal. Whatever you do

affects the environment by

    >applying some force, with the result that your perception

changes of how rapidly the speed is increasing.

      I agree and refer to my section

above.

      I think the disagreement between

us tree is that we read your sentences as if you were planning
actions. If we say that our affects on the environmental
variables happens because we control our perceptions, I think
we agree??.

Our effects on the environment happen because we impose forces upon

objects in the environment. We are able to control our perceptions
because these forces influence what comes into our sensors, and what
comes in through our sensors is combined in all sorts of different
ways to create different kinds of perceptions.

If you say "our effects on the environmental variables happen

because we control our perceptions" you are talking about the “Why”
aspect of control, namely the reference values that are derived from
higher-level outputs, or are fixed by the state of our
reorganization (at the top level). If the perception differs from
the reference level, a control unit generates output that may change
the reference value at a lower level. Eventually that cascades into
generating muscular forces on the environment. In that sense, we
affect the environmental variables because we control our
perceptions. “How” we control our perceptions is by the effects of
the muscular forces on the environmental variables.

Planning isn't something that is much discussed on CSGnet. It

obviously happens, but I haven’t been talking about it for a long
while. Nor have I been talking about the kind of thing that concerns
you when you use words such as " what I thought about
the perception, how I explained it and how I should deal with it".
When you use such words, you are describing the process of
theory-making, not simple perceptual control.

  Martin

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.12.09.8.32NZT)

[Martin Taylor
2010.12.08.11.02]

[From Bjorn
Simonsen (2010. 12.08, 133:35 EU ST)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.06.10.12]

MT

The next word I
will define is control, and I think we can agree about a definition all three.

"A is said to control B if, for
every disturbing influence acting on B, A generates an action that tends
strongly to counteract the effect of the disturbing influence on B.

"

Martin

This is not what control means in PCT, control means selection
of “Controlled variable” to control perception. Within the Control
System (CS) model specifically and no other model.

That’s just one definition of control unrelated to PCT.
Looks like Robert Dahl’s definition in his theories on control of human behavior.
Nothing to do with PCT.

The problem here is definitely words and their meanings.

Acting, controlling, behavior words, this is a very big
problem in explaining PCT. None of these words mean vaguely the same thing as
in say a stimulus-response model.

I’m beginning to think that PCT needs a major overhaul
of terms unrelated to such deeply embedded meanings.

Yes.

Who mentioned planning? My point was that Gavin could not get his message into
the computer without touching the keyboard or speaking into a voice-recognition
device, or in some other way acting on the environment. He could not eat unless
he acted on the environment to move food to his mouth. He denied that he did
any of those things. In fact he denied acting on the environment at all, so I
gave up communicating with him.

I never denied any of these things, you
have assumed that is what I said and erroneously so.

I didn’t act on the environment I selected
a PCV (finger to keyboard) to control a perception.

Gavin

[From Rick Marken (2010.12.08.1220)]

Gavin Ritz (2010.12.09.8.32NZT)

Martin Taylor (2010.12.08.11.02)

MT: The next word I will define is control, and I think we can agree about a
definition all three.

"A is said to control B if, for every disturbing influence acting on B, A
generates an action that tends strongly to counteract the effect of the
disturbing influence on B. "

GR: This is not what control means in PCT

I was going to stay out of this useless discussion but this is too
much. Gavin, what Martin T. quotes above is precisely what control
means in PCT. If you don't know that then you really should just pick
up your htings and go home.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

(Gavin Ritz 2010.12.09.12.00NZT)

[From Rick Marken
(2010.12.08.1220)]

Gavin Ritz (2010.12.09.8.32NZT)

Martin Taylor
(2010.12.08.11.02)

MT: The next word I will define is control,
and I think we can agree about a

definition all three.

"A is said to control B if, for every
disturbing influence acting on B, A

generates an action that tends strongly to
counteract the effect of the

disturbing influence on B. "

GR: This is not what control means in PCT

I was going to stay out of this useless discussion

but this is too

much. Gavin, what Martin T. quotes above is
precisely what control

means in PCT.

That is such a poor
definition of control totally ambiguous and it sounds like something from a stimulus
response model. I have not seen a good unambiguous definition of two or more
Control Systems working together or against each other.

I looked very briefly at just
say two or more individual control systems in interaction with each other and I
cannot come up with an unambiguous definition, that is unique to PCT.

If you don’t know that then you really should just
pick

up your htings and go home.

Rick I
really don’t undertsnd what you gain but such remarks. The problem with
discussing PCT is a major concern. Because when I read that definition it’s
so ambiguous as to be almost meaningless.

Reagrds

Gavin

···

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2010. 12.09, 20:40 EU ST)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.08.11.02]

Well, I continue Martin, although Rick find the discussion useless.

Now I say something you may disagree (I don’t think you do). An example may be
a car, I am seeing, that is increasing its velocity from zero to 100 metres/sec. The
environmental variables passes a perceptual function where the environmental
variables are changed to perceptual signals. The dimension for the car’s acceleration,
metres/sec^2, is not an environmental variable that passes the perceptual function at the first level.

All the signals that allow you to perceive “acceleration” do pass the perceptual functions
at the first level.

In my first sentence I did not mention the word acceleration. Neither did I say I perceived “acceleration” pass the perceptual functions at the first level. I said that I was looking at a car increasing its velocity from zero to 100 metres/sec. I am talking only about the sensing cells in the eye. All perceptions caused by other sensing cells are zero. I think some environmental variables hit my eyes and the sensing cells continue to input functions at the first level. The perception signals continue to input functions at the next level, and so on. Different places in my brain these perceptual signals constitute matrixes of different perceptual signals in a dynamical way. I could say that I turned my head and this had an affect on sensing cells which change the external variable to nerve signals. But I did not say anything.

My question here is: “Where are the acceleration signals”? Do you find them at the levels level seven, eight and nine which pertain rational processing processes?.

The outputs of the lower-level perceptual functions are the inputs to the
higher-level ones. Having said that, HPCT does include the concept of “imagination”,
but that has a very specific meaning: that instead of one of the inputs to a perceptual
function coming from a lower-level perceptual function’s output, it comes from what is
labeled an “imagination loop”.

That is the way you say it, I think I mean the same.

bjorn

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.09.17.39]

        [From Bjorn Simonsen (2010.

12.09, 20:40 EU ST)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.08.11.02]

      Well, I continue Martin, although

Rick find the discussion useless.

I don't think Rick found your part of the discussion useless.
      My question here is: "Where are

the acceleration signals"? Do you find them at the levels
level seven, eight and nine which pertain rational processing
processes?.

No. Far below that. Perhaps even in the retina. When you are at

levels relating to the rational processing processes, the inputs are
usually categorical, yes-no, this-or-that, sort of thing. It’s hard
to “rationally” perceive a smooth acceleration! You can deduce that
a perceived object accelerated if you see only flashes of it passing
gaps in a fence, but that doesn’t feel the same as perceiving an
object accelerate that you can see clearly.

If you perceive "acceleration", it is because you have some

perceptual function that incorporates inputs that are velocities or
positions at different times. Perhaps there are only two inputs, one
being velocity as near “now” as is allowed by the sensors and signal
paths, and the other being velocity delayed from when it was
initially perceived. Perhaps there are a whole lot of inputs that
are velocities at a series of different delays. Perhaps the inputs
are positions at earlier times, and not velocities at all. In that
case, you would need three at least in order to perceive
acceleration. Whatever the velocity and/or position inputs, the
perceptual function would provide a single value as its output. In
the case where the inputs are two velocities, that value might be
the difference between the inputs, for example.

(Parenthetically, I don't treat Bill's levels with any reverence,

and neither does Bill when he builds real models. For example,
sometimes velocity comes above position, sometimes below. In the
retina, they seem to be at about the same level. Bill’s levels are
just possibilities that make sense from how he has analyzed his own
perceptions logically. There’s no reason to say they are wrong, but
few experiments to say that they are true in general, or complete.
If you perceive acceleration, but can’t find a place for it in the
levels, don’t worry about it. It probably fits under a name such as
“event”. But it could be a function right in the retina, for all I
know).

I'm sorry I misread you earlier question. I hope I got it right this

time.

Martin

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.12.10.11.52NZT)

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2010.
12.09, 20:40 EU ST)]

[Martin Taylor
2010.12.08.11.02]

Well, I continue Martin, although Rick find the
discussion useless.

Keep going Bjorn I am very interested. Your
questions are probing.

And please read my thread on the meaning
of control.

Now I say something you may
disagree (I don’t think you do). An example may be

a car, I am seeing, that is increasing its velocity from zero to 100
metres/sec. The

environmental variables passes a perceptual function where the
environmental

variables are changed to perceptual signals. The dimension for the car’s
acceleration,

metres/sec^2, is not an environmental variable that passes the perceptual
function at the first level.

All the signals that
allow you to perceive “acceleration” do pass the perceptual functions

at the first level.

In my first sentence I did not mention
the word acceleration. Neither did I say I perceived “acceleration”
pass the perceptual functions at the first level. I said that I was looking at
a car increasing its velocity from zero to 100 metres/sec. I am talking only
about the sensing cells in the eye. All perceptions caused by other sensing
cells are zero. I think some environmental variables hit my eyes and the
sensing cells continue to input functions at the first level. The perception
signals continue to input functions at the next level, and so on. Different
places in my brain these perceptual signals constitute matrixes of different
perceptual signals in a dynamical way. I could say that I turned my head and
this had an affect on sensing cells which change the external variable to nerve
signals. But I did not say anything.

My question here is: “Where are
the acceleration signals”? Do you find them at the levels level
seven, eight and nine which pertain rational processing processes?.

Good question. The HPCT levels are an
assumption of Reality only.

The outputs of the
lower-level perceptual functions are the inputs to the

higher-level ones. Having said that, HPCT does include the concept of
“imagination”,

but that has a very specific meaning: that instead of one of the inputs to
a perceptual

function coming from a lower-level perceptual function’s output, it comes
from what is

labeled an “imagination loop”.

That is the way you say it, I think
I mean the same.

bjorn

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2010. 12.10, 10:50 EU ST)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.09.17.39]

My question here is: “Where are the acceleration signals”? Do you find them at the
levels level seven, eight and nine which pertain rational processing processes?.

No. Far below that. Perhaps even in the retina. When you are at levels relating to the
rational processing processes, the inputs are usually categorical, yes-no, this-or-that,
sort of thing. It’s hard to “rationally” perceive a smooth acceleration! You can deduce
that a perceived object accelerated if you see only flashes of it passing gaps in a fence,
but that doesn’t feel the same as perceiving an object accelerate that you can see clearly.

Yes, also I think the (about) three lowest levels are in the retina or very close.

You say that we can “deduce that a perceived object accelerated if we see flashes of it passing gaps in a fence”. I read the word “deduce” as to infer from a general principle. And this “deducing” is not environmental variables that are transformed to perceptual signals at level one. I will try to explain the way I see it.

When I see a car start from velocity zero and increase the velocity, the environmental variables representing the movement of the car is experienced as neural signals in our brain. I may agree that I experience an increasing velocity, but I don’t experience what is causing the increasing velocity. I am neither experiencing the rules nor the mathematics that describe the velocity increasing.

I have learned theories of physics that describe these mathematical rules. And they exist in form of neural signals other places in my brain. As long as these theories explain what I see, when I se the car increasing it’s velocity, the theories are good enough for me. They are mental constructs that help me to explain what I see. I think Bill once told you that the real, real world does not operate by laws and principles. The laws and principles are made by our brains to explain what we perceive.

If you perceive “acceleration”, it is because you have some perceptual function that

incorporates inputs that are velocities or positions at different times. Perhaps there
are only two inputs, one being velocity as near “now” as is allowed by the sensors and
signal paths, and the other being velocity delayed from when it was initially perceived.
Perhaps there are a whole lot of inputs that are velocities at a series of different delays.
Perhaps the inputs are positions at earlier times, and not velocities at all. In that case,
you would need three at least in order to perceive acceleration. Whatever the velocity
and/or position inputs, the perceptual function would provide a single value as its output.
In the case where the inputs are two velocities, that value might be the difference between
the inputs, for example.

The way I see it is:

If I perceive “acceleration” it is because I experience something increasing it’s velocity. I describe what I perceive expressing different physical laws and principles.

I am sorry I don’t understand how you get the word “acceleration” by looking at something increasing it’s velocity.

Bjorn

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.10.09.29]

            [From Bjorn Simonsen (2010.

12.10, 10:50 EU ST)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.12.09.17.39]

                  >My question here is:

“Where are the acceleration signals”? Do you find them at
the

        >levels level seven, eight and nine which pertain

rational processing processes?.

      >No. Far below that. Perhaps even in the retina. When you

are at levels relating to the

      >rational processing processes, the inputs are usually

categorical, yes-no, this-or-that,

      >sort of thing. It's hard to "rationally" perceive a smooth

acceleration! You can deduce

      >that a perceived object accelerated if you see only

flashes of it passing gaps in a fence,

      >but that doesn't feel the same as perceiving an object

accelerate that you can see clearly.

      Yes, also I think the (about)

three lowest levels are in the retina or very close.

      You say that we can "deduce that

a perceived object accelerated if we see flashes of it passing
gaps in a fence". I read the word “deduce” as to infer from a
general principle. And this “deducing” is not environmental
variables that are transformed to perceptual signals at level
one.

Yes, that's what I meant. When you don't see the car as being in

continuous motion because of the fence, you don’t perceive the
acceleration, and you have to use a rational analysis to deduce that
it must have been accelerating.

I will try to explain the way I
see it.

      When I see a car start from

velocity zero and increase the velocity, the environmental
variables representing the movement of the car is experienced
as neural signals in our brain. I may agree that I experience
an increasing velocity, but I don’t experience what is causing
the increasing velocity.

Right. All control units have the same limitation. They don't see

the cause of a disturbance, or indeed the cause of any change in the
perceptual signal. Some other perceiving system, perhaps part of a
different control loop, may see what causes the change in perception
of the first loop, but the loop whose perceptual value is changing
sees only that perceptual value.

So "you" may actually see what is causing the increasing velocity.

Perhaps you see that someone is pushing the car to try to get it
started (it must be a very old car :-)), or perhaps the car is
running away down a steep hill with someone chasing it. But the
perception of the acceleration is very different from the perception
of the cause of the acceleration.

I am neither experiencing the
rules nor the mathematics that describe the velocity
increasing.

      I have learned theories of

physics that describe these mathematical rules. And they exist
in form of neural signals other places in my brain. As long as
these theories explain what I see, when I se the car
increasing it’s velocity, the theories are good enough for me.

Right. You don't need the theories in order to make the perception.

It took a Newton to develop a theory that works. Aristotle couldn’t
do so, so why should we expect any ordinary person to be able to?
But ordinary people can perceive that objects accelerate.

They are mental constructs that
help me to explain what I see. I think Bill once told you that
the real, real world does not operate by laws and principles.
The laws and principles are made by our brains to explain what
we perceive.

Bill doesn't know that the real real world doesn't operate by laws

and principles. Wolfram thinks it does. What Bill does know is that
we don’t know and probably can’t ever know whether it does. The laws
and principles that we use to explain the world are indeed made by
our brains to explain what we perceive. Some of those are private,
some are public and are called “Science”.

      >If you perceive "acceleration", it is because you have

some perceptual function that

      >incorporates inputs that are

velocities or positions at different times. Perhaps there

      >are only two inputs, one being velocity as near "now" as

is allowed by the sensors and

      >signal paths, and the other being velocity delayed from

when it was initially perceived.

      >Perhaps there are a whole lot of inputs that are

velocities at a series of different delays.

      >Perhaps the inputs are positions at earlier times, and not

velocities at all. In that case,

      >you would need three at least in order to perceive

acceleration. Whatever the velocity

      >and/or position inputs, the perceptual function would

provide a single value as its output.

      >In the case where the inputs are two velocities, that

value might be the difference between

      >the inputs, for example.

The way I see it is:

      If I perceive "acceleration" it

is because I experience something increasing it’s velocity.

Right. The way you do that has to be something like what I described

in the quote. Without a comparison between at least two velocities
you couldn’t tell that the velocity changes.

      I describe what I perceive

expressing different physical laws and principles.

      I am sorry I don't understand how

you get the word “acceleration” by looking at something
increasing it’s velocity.

You don't get a word by looking at something. You get a word by

agreement among people. I may start with: when I say “bejumplebug”
it looks like that-there, and you say do you mean “this-here is a
bejumplebig”, and I say “No, not this-here but that-over-there”
until you both agree what it is like to experience a bejumplebug.
But of course we can never really know if we experience the same
thing when either of us says we see a bejumplebug.

So I don't get any word, "acceleration" or "bejumplebug" by looking

at something increasing its velocity. I get a perceptual impression,
and it’s apparently the same impression that other people get,
because when I say something like “did you see that accelerating”
when I saw it accelerating, another person is likely to say “Yes, it
sure did!” or “No, it just kept moving at the same pace”, not “what
do you mean, accelerating?” That suggests that we have a similar
feeling for a perception that we label “acceleration”.

You can ask the same question about "red". Nobody can prove that we

see the same thing when we see something I would call “red”. All we
can say is that most of the time when I call something “red”, the
person I am talking to will agree that they also would call it
“red”. I can’t say the same about “puce”, because I’m never sure
what colours count as “puce” (in my group in grad school we had a
standing joke about “puce”: everything we saw was “off-blue puce” or
“off-green puce” or “off-black puce” … because none of us knew
what colour was supposed to be “puce”). But most people do know what
it looks like when something is what we call “red” or does what we
label “accelerate”. So it would seem that most people do experience
some perception that varies with the rate at which velocity changes.

Does this address your issue? I believe that we it the same way, but

that language is getting in the way of an agreement.

Martin
···

On 2010/12/10 4:50 AM, Bjorn wrote:

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2010. 12.10, 17:25 EU ST)]

Martin Taylor 2010.12.10.09.29

Ty for a nice discussion.

May I translate on or two essayes I have written for my self in Norwegian and ask you to just look through them. I am trying to make a PCT fundament to express what many other people thinks, -that psychology (not PCT) is not what I call science.

bjorn