social causation

CSGnet Archive CSG2001
1

[From Bruce Nevin (2001.08.27 22:46 EDT)]

Bill Powers (2001.08.27.1307 MDT)--

>I would suggest that if heterodox economists wish to institute significant
>reforms in their discipline, one of the most fruitful places to begin would
>be in revising the theory of human behavior that has underlain not only
>economics but all the social sciences since their beginnings. I would
>suggest that the reforms not be limited to the question of _which_ social
>or other influences cause human beings to behave as they do, but _whether_
>such factors bear any causal relationship to human behavior at all. The
>question of "whether" clearly takes precedence, because if the relationship
>of any external factors to behavior is not one of causation, there is no
>point in asking which factors cause behavior.

The illusion of causation may be in the apparent fact that people living in social relationship "normally" control variables that matter to their fellows according to reference values that are expected by their fellows, and if they do not various resistances to disturbances have the appearances of causing or attempting to cause changes in their behavior, and are typically verbalized as such.

  Bruce Nevin

···

At 15:21 08/27/2001 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:

2

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0828.0702)]

Bruce Nevin (2001.08.27 22:46 EDT)

The illusion of causation may be in the apparent fact that people living

in

social relationship "normally" control variables that matter to their
fellows according to reference values that are expected by their fellows,
and if they do not various resistances to disturbances have the

appearances

of causing or attempting to cause changes in their behavior, and are
typically verbalized as such.

To pick a nit, "cause" is a feature of a model. So to call it an illusion
might be a bit misleading. The issue is which model is better suited to
describing some phenomenon. Bill's post nicely addressed that question, I
thought.

3

[FromBill Powers(2001.08.28.1925 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2001.08.27 22:46 EDT)--

The illusion of causation may be in the apparent fact that people living in
social relationship "normally" control variables that matter to their
fellows according to reference values that are expected by their fellows,
and if they do not various resistances to disturbances have the appearances
of causing or attempting to cause changes in their behavior, and are
typically verbalized as such.

"Various resistances to disturbances have the appearances of causing or
attempting to cause changes in their behavior" ??? Whose resistances to
whose disturbances, and whose behavior are we talking about? Afraid you
lost me.

Best,

Bill P.

4

[From Bruce Nevin (2001.08.29 11:47 EDT)]

Bill Powers(2001.08.28.1925 MDT)--

Whose resistances to whose disturbances, and whose behavior are we talking about? Afraid you lost me.

Sorry, too telegraphic.

Bruce Nevin (2001.08.27 22:46 EDT)--

>The illusion of causation may be in the apparent fact that people living in
>social relationship "normally" control variables that matter to their
>fellows according to reference values that are expected by their fellows,
>and ...

One possible kind of scenario to illustrate:

>if they do not

If some given person 'G' does not control CV 'X' according to expected reference value x ...

>various resistances to disturbances

G's controlling of X at some value other than x (or G's failing to control X, and its value deviating from x for whatever reasons) disturbs control of X and of other variables by G's fellows. They resist these disturbances by communicating their displeasure to G, with or without acting themselves to control X directly.

For reasons little discussed here, this matters to G. G subsequently controls X at value x. To the superficial observer, those "various resistances to disturbances" ...

>have the appearances
>of causing or attempting to cause changes in [G's] behavior, and are
>typically verbalized as such.

G adjusted G's own reference for X to the value x, or resumed control of X (at value x), or assumed control of X (at value x). Why? We do not accept the linear-causation story. G's doing this has the function of maintaining cooperative social relations in which individuals can rely upon one another.

Whether that in fact describes a CV that G and G's fellows are controlling has not been determined. To my knowledge no other hypothesis has been suggested.

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 19:30 08/28/2001 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:

5

[From Bill Powers (2001.08.29.1256 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2001.08.29 11:47 EDT) --

OK, I think I get what you were proposing: that people adjust what they
control to avoid criticisms (or other disturbances) by others. The
appearance is that they change their behavior _because_ of the criticisms
or disturbances. The PCT view would be that they are counteracting effects
of the crits or dists to prevent disturbance of something else that matters
more to them. I can agree with that (even if it's not what you meant!).

Best,

Bill P.

6

[From Bruce Nevin (2001.08.29 16:02 EDT)]

Bill Powers (2001.08.29.1256 MDT) --

OK, I think I get what you were proposing: that people adjust what they
control to avoid criticisms (or other disturbances) by others. The
appearance is that they change their behavior _because_ of the criticisms
or disturbances.

Yes. And a commonplace description is that the criticisms etc. cause the change in behavior (which results from the adjustment of CV and/or reference level). I think this is more like an observation than a proposal.

The PCT view would be that they are counteracting effects
of the crits or dists to prevent disturbance of something else that matters
more to them. I can agree with that (even if it's not what you meant!).

Yes. The question is, what else are they controlling that matters more to them?

The proposal is that the CV might be ability to rely on others for cooperation, which is related reciprocally in the course of time to them being able to rely on you.

Bruce Nevin (2001.08.29 11:47 EDT) --

> maintaining cooperative social relations
>in which individuals can rely upon one another.

Is there another proposal?

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 13:01 08/29/2001 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:

7

[From Rick Marken (2001.08.29.1430)]

Bill Powers (2001.08.29.1256 MDT) --

The PCT view would be that they are counteracting effects
of the crits or dists to prevent disturbance of something else
that matters more to them. I can agree with that (even if it's
not what you meant!).

Bruce Nevin (2001.08.29 16:02 EDT)--

Yes. The question is, what else are they controlling that matters
more to them?

I think the question is just "what matters to them?", ie. what are they
controlling? I don't think there is a question of priorities here. I
think Bill was just referring to a controlled variable when he talked
about "something else that matters more to them". I think it would have
been better if Bill had left out the "...more..." part.

The PCT view is simply that the apparent causal relationship between
disturbances (criticisms) and actions (avoidance of criticisms) results
from the fact that the actions counteract the effects the disturbances
would have had on the controlled variable (the "something else that
matters to them") if the disturbance avoidance actions were not taken.

The proposal is that the CV might be ability to rely on others for
cooperation, which is related reciprocally in the course of time to
them being able to rely on you.
...
Is there another proposal?

I don't see how criticism is necessarily a disturbance to "relying on
others for cooperation". Indeed, absence of criticism can be just as
much of a disturbance to this variable in many cases, for example if you
have written a book and are hoping to get some criticism from others
before going to press.

I think what people are controlling for by avoiding criticism is ideas
that would point to possible flaws in a cherished belief. The CV is ,
thus, some cherished belief. The criticism is words evoking ideas that
call aspects of that belief into question, ie. disturbances that push
the belief away from its reference state. Avoidance of such criticisms
is a good approach to keeping the belief in its reference state,
protected from disturbance.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
MindReadings.com
10459 Holman Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Tel: 310-474-0313
E-mail: marken@mindreadings.com

8

[From Bill Powers (2001.08.29.1526 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2001.08.29 16:02 EDT)--

Yes. And a commonplace description is that the criticisms etc. cause the
change in behavior (which results from the adjustment of CV and/or
reference level). I think this is more like an observation than a proposal.

Depends on what you mean by "cause." The usual meaning is a direct
connection, so the criticisms would be imagined to operate on the brain in
just the way needed to change the behavior. The PCT view is that the
criticisms, if accepted as correct, would act by disturbing some variable,
and that the behavior change is what is required to nullify the effect on
that variable. The behavior change will not necessarily be to alter the
behavior that is being complained about. It might consist of delivering a
long lecture about how criticism will never get the critic what he wants
because it's antisocial and unfriendly. It might consist of a defense of
the behavior as being perfectly appropriate. It might consist of crossing
the critic off the list of people one pays attention to. It might consist
of pulling out a Colt .45 and blowing the critic away, as Indiana Jones did.

Yes. The question is, what else are they controlling that matters more to

them?

Lots of things. If you're criticized by someone you love, the loss of
control from agreeing to change the criticized behavior might be outweighed
by your desire for the other to go on loving you -- an internal conflict
decided in favor of the subsystem with the highest loop gain. When people
criticize your behavior, they don't usually know (or care) what you were
using it for; they don't know what they're asking you to give up control
of, at least by that means. It's like being criticized for scratching an
excruciating itch in public. The critic doesn't care about the itch; only
about the scratching.

The proposal is that the CV might be ability to rely on others for
cooperation, which is related reciprocally in the course of time to them
being able to rely on you.

Yes, that would be one reason for deciding to change the behavior, even
though it was serving some other purpose for you. But we don't rely on
_all_ others for cooperation, do we? Some we care about, some we don't care
about. Excessive social conformity is as much a disorder as too little.
Whether we give in to social pressure to change our behavior depends a
great deal on just what change is being demanded. An honest cop might be
ostracized by his colleagues for not being on the take, but if honesty is
that important, he will probably not change his behavior.

Best,

Bill P.

9

[From Bruce Nevin (2001.08.30 12:15 EDT)]

Bill Powers (2001.08.29.1526 MDT) --

Bruce Nevin (2001.08.29 16:02 EDT)--

>Yes. And a commonplace description is that the criticisms etc. cause the
>change in behavior (which results from the adjustment of CV and/or
>reference level). I think this is more like an observation than a proposal.

Depends on what you mean by "cause."

The observation is not of cause but of people (mistakenly) attributing cause.

>The question is, what else are they controlling that matters more to them?

Lots of things. If you're criticized by someone you love [...]

Criticism is just one of many things person B might do that an observer might (mistakenly) describe as causing a change in person A's behavior. The topic is not criticism. The topic (at least of what I have been saying) is the observer's mistaken attribution of cause, and the importance of taking that into account when communicating with e.g. economists.

>The proposal is that the CV might be ability to rely on others for
>cooperation, which is related reciprocally in the course of time to them
>being able to rely on you.

Yes, that would be one reason for deciding to change the behavior, even
though it was serving some other purpose for you. But we don't rely on
_all_ others for cooperation, do we?

Of course not. And if (at an extreme) A ranks other purposes higher than the purpose of maintaining a cooperative relationship with B, so much higher that like Indiana Jones A shoots B, an observer might (mistakenly) describe B's behavior as causing A to shoot B.

The proposal is that there are purposes that primates control with sufficiently high gain to result in their modifying their control of other variables (with considerable inconvenience and even to the point of losing control of those other variables), and that among these high-gain purposes is the maintenance of alliances with individuals they can rely upon when cooperation of others is needed. And that this maintenance of alliances and reliability is inherently a reciprocal matter.

I realize that this is so general as to be vague. One way to get more specific is with cases in which a sociologist, economist, etc. describes A's behavior as being caused by B's behavior.

I'm not proposing to do that. I'm only making clear just what I was saying in relation to Bill Williams's query about communicating with economists.

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 15:49 08/29/2001 -0600, Bill Powers wrote: