[spam] Re: More on GAP-ACT

[Fred_Nickols1]

[From Fred Nickols (2006.11.07.0948 EST)] --
      
from Bill Powers (2006.11.07.0730 MST)]

Fred Nickols (2006.11.07.0649 EST)] --

Bjorn:
> >It is good enough and we need our perceptions, but we shall always
> > remember that they are our perceptions.

Fred:

>I know many people who already believe this. They also believe that there
>is enough congruence between their individual perceptions and what other
>sources say is reality that they can pretty much get away with acting as
>though their perceptions are an accurate reflection of reality. And so they
>proceed as though perception equals reality - which, if course, it doesn't
>but it's pretty close most of the time.

Can you give me an example of "pretty close," Fred? More
specifically, I'm interested in what you compare the perception to,
to determine that the perception is pretty close to it.

I think we compare our perceptions against (1) previous perceptions, (2) conceptual constructs, (3) reported perceptions/descriptions of others, and (4) alternate perceptions (e.g., tactile and visual). A friend of mine and I play pool whenever we have an opportunity to be with one another. He and I agree as to which of the 16 balls on the table is the cue ball. We also agree that it is round, white (perhaps with some speckling) and pretty darn solid. I know hundreds of other people who would agree with us. Is there a cue ball out there? I think so. So does my friend and hundreds of other people. How do we know it's round? Well, I can envision a straight line running from its core to its periphery and the length of that line would be the same no matter where on the periphery it was touching. I think that makes a sphere (however, my math is lousy so don't hold me to that). How do we know it's white? Well, we compare it with other items we perceive that we also cal!
l white
. It's a pretty good match, which is to say our perceptions in terms of color don't show that much variance - in us or between us. Why do I say it's heavy? Because my perceptions of the weight (proprioreceptive sensation?) of the object I call a cue ball is much greater than other items of similar size.

Where is all this taking place? In me of course. All I know of my world I know by way of my perceptions (which I believe I said before). However, if I adopt the position that there is no external reality, that all there is is my perception, then, frankly, I would consider myself loony - crazy as a bedbug. So, I believe there is a real world out there, filled with real objects and real people and I place some degree of confidence in my ability to cope with them, even though I am doing so on the basis of my perceptions.

As for the dictate at the core of this discussion - namely, that behavior is the control of perception - I'm not sure I buy it. PCT, as you've explained it, Bill, deals with a closed-loop view of human functioning. In loops, any choice of cause and and effect is pretty darn arbitrary. I could just as easily say that behavior is the control of discrepancies beween perceptions and reference conditions. Or perhaps that discrepancies between reference conditions and perceptions control behavior. Or, heaven forbid, I might even say that disturbances are controlling perceptions.

So, is there anything other than my perception of reality that I can use to check my perception against? Absolutely nothing; just additional perceptions, some of which are perceptions of perceptions.

Other than that, what's your question?

P.S. Do you want to speak with that statistician friend of mine?

Regards,

Fred Nickols
www.nickols.us
nickols@att.net

[Fred_Nickols1]

[From Fred Nickols (2006.11.07.1328 EST)] --

This post is triggered by Martin's comment below...

[Martin Taylor 2006.11.07.11.52]

To expand on what Bruce said: In the canonical loop there are exactly
two inputs from the outer world, the reference input and the
disturbance input.

It's the notion of the reference input as coming from the outer world that
puzzles me.

In Bill's B:CP Glossary:

"Control = achievement and maintenance of a preselected perceptual state in
the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel
the effects of disturbances.

"Control system = an organization that acts on its environment so as to keep
its inner perceptual signal matching an inner reference signal or reference
condition.

"Controlled quantity = an environmental variable corresponding to the
perceptual signal in a control system; a physical (or a function of several
physical quantities) that is affected and controlled by the outputs from a
control system's output function. (In the GAP-ACT model I called this T -
the target variable.)

"Disturbance = any variable in the environment of a control system that (a)
contributes to changes in the controlled quantity, and (b) is not controlled
by the same control system. (In the GAP-ACT model I referred to this as C -
complicating and confounding conditions.)

"Error = the discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal,
which drives a control system's output function. The discrepancy between a
controlled quantity and its present reference level, which causes observable
behavior. (The GAP-ACT model refers to error as d for discrepancy.)

"Perception = a perceptual signal (inside a system) that is a continuous
analogue of a state of affairs outside the system. (In the GAP-ACT model I
called this P for perception.)

"Reference condition = the state of a controlled quantity at which a
control-system's output ceases to tend to alter the controlled quantity.
The state toward which a control system's output tends to alter the
controlled quantity. (In the GAP-ACT model, the second statement above is
the one I referred to as G or goal state.)

The GAP-ACT model also contains A standing for actions or behavior. Neither
of these terms appears in the B:CP glossary. However, the glossary does
include output function which is "the portion of a system which converts the
magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of
effects on the immediate environment of the system." So I guess behavior
and/or action equate to output function.

In any event, in light of Bill's definitions above, I'm having a hard time
understanding "reference input" - so, can you say some more about that,
Martin?

Regards,

Fred Nickols
www.nickols.us
nickols@att.net

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2006.11.08.0745 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2006.11.07.1830 EST) --

>What I'm asking is how you compare one of your
> perceptions with something in the outside world that isn't a
> perception of your own.

Aw, c'mon, Bill; you know better than that. I know as well as you do that
"all we know of our world we know by way our perceptions" (to quote myself).

You asked me what I compare my perceptions against "to determine that the
perception is pretty close to it." Is it my fault that all I have is other
perceptions?

Nope, but it's important to make sure we agree on this. You can prove to yourself that there is consistency among different perceptions, but not consistency between perceptions and reality.

> Since all you can ever know about is a perception, it follows that
> all you can ever control is a perception.

I believe your paragraph immediately above is what the logicians call a "non
sequitur."

Given that all I can ever know about is a perception, I don't believe it
necessarily follows that all I can ever control is a perception. Might it
be the case that I can control things I don't "know about"? (Naturally, my
assertion is subject to what you mean by "know about.")

Yes, a good point. Martin Taylor has made the same point: the reorganizing system works in terms of real properties of the world and the organism, although it doesn't "understand" the real world in any cognitive sense.

Might it be the case that I am controlling "controlled quantities" - to use
your term - of which I am unaware?

If your liver controls the glucose concentration in your bloodstream, would you say "I control my glucose concentration?" If the liver does this by perceiving that concentration, would you say "I perceive the glucose concentration in my bloodstream?" I would agree readily that there are control systems in the body of which we are completely unaware. But I would also insist that these control systems operate by controlling perceptual representations of biochemical and other physical variables inside the body. Awareness and perception are not the same thing.

  If so, does it not then follow that "control" might quickly sort into "conscious" control and "unconscious" (or unaware) control?

Yes, but that follows because we are not aware of all the perceptual signals that are present in all the control systems in our bodies at all the levels of control that exist. Whether control is conscious or unconcious, it still depends on a perceptual signal that represents the current state of the controlled variable, a reference signal, and so on around the loop. The whole thesis of PCT is that ALL biological control is negative feedback control of the kind decribed in PCT, and specificaLly not the other kinds of control that other theories describe.

If not, does it follow that "control" is a conscious
process? (I think not because at the lower levels of your hierarchy,
awareness in the sense of a conscious, sentient being does not seem to be a
factor).

You are quite right about that. But consciousness pertains to awareness of perceptual signals, not to perceptual signals alone. Control systems control perceptual signals; consciousness implies being aware of perceptual signals (whether they are controlled or not).One may be conscious of a controlled perceptual signal, but shifting attention elsewhere does not automatically stop the control process. The perceptual signal is still there and is still being controlled, unless some other (higher-order) system turns off the control system.

In B:CP, a perception is defined as "a perceptual signal (inside a system) that is a continuous analog of a state of affairs outside the system." A perceptual signal is defined as "The signal emitted by the input function of a system; an internal analog of some aspect of the environment." Neither of these definitions mentions consciousness or awareness.

Awareness is defined as "a subjective phenomenon associated with reception of perceptual signals by the reorganizing system." (That one is pretty tentative -- I still don't know what awareness really is). And finally, conscious perception is defined as "the combination of awareness with one or more perceptual signals."

So awareness and perception are treated as two separate processes, with the combination of the two being called consciousness. This is actually the basis of the Method of Levels -- the idea, and the apparent fact, that awareness can be directed to different perceptual signals in the hierarchy, so that at different times, different parts of the perceptual world are in consciousness. Of course the control systems go right on working to control those perceptual signals, although another hypothesis is that reorganization follows awareness, so "conscious control systems" are subject to having their organization altered if there is significant intrinsic error.

A great deal of the above argument is a THEORY held, according to the same theory, in the part of my brain that I can bring into awareness. I can't prove that it's objectively correct; I can only show that it's internally consistent, as well as consistent with what I know about brains and physics, and with subjective experience. As I say this, I'm imagining that there are other brains reading these words, and assigning experiential meanings to them similar to the meanings I give them out of my own experiences. Once in a while I perceive words and deeds coming back from those hypothetical other brains that give me the thrilling sense of being in contact with another being like me, an intellect existing beyond the barrier of the senses who is puzzling over the same problems of existence and consciousness, who seems to be noticing the same kinds of things I notice, and who has arrived at conclusions that at least overlap in places with mine. That sense of someone else who is there behind the appearances of the senses is, to me, like making contact with a civilization on a different planet circling a distant sun, forever beyond reach yet almost certainly real.

Best,

Bill P.