···
Kent McClelland (2016.12.14.1600)–
KM: A few days ago Rick offered his definitive interpretation of my âdiscovery,â? as he called it, about collective control and conflict. Since he was referring to my work, it seems fair for me to offer a few observations of my own. Â
KM: Hmm
In theory, the speed at which two systems in conflict wouuld be expected go to their maximum output might depend on a lot of different things:Â
RM: You are so right. Indeed, systems in conflict don’t necessarily go to maximum output ever. I based my statement about the systems going “quickly” to maximum output on a little conflict simulation that I had set up. I just checked it out in preparation for answering this post and found that I had made a rather basic error; I had the output of only one system (rather than both) affecting the controlled variable. When set up properly, what I found is exactly what you found in your simulations; that a variable being controlled relative to different reference levels by different control systems will be held in a reference state (relative to a virtual reference specification with a value between the values of the reference specifications of the two systems in conflict), protected from disturbances. That is, it will be controlled as long as disturbances don’t force the systems involved to maximum output, at which point control is lost.
KM: I find Rickâs âI canât think of anyâ? argumentone he frequently makes when talking about my workkkind of amusing. His inability to think of any examples doesnât sound like a persuasive argument to me. It sounds more like an admission of the limits of his
own thought processes and observations.Â
RM: Yes, my mistake. I thought the systems involved in the conflicts I am familiar with – tug of war, my on line demo – were operating at maximum output; but this is not necessarily the case. What I should have said is that I can’t think of any examples of social variables that are being controlled (they are not just stabilized since they are protected from the effects of disturbance) because two or more control systems are trying to maintain that variable in different reference states. I’m not saying that such controlled social variables – controlled as a result of conflict –  don’t exist. Â
KM: As a sociologist, Iâve studied the empirical evidence about violent group conflicts for years. Iâve taught multiple courses on the topic. I could name dozens of international conflicts, civil wars, insurrections, guerrilla movements, wars against terrorism,
political struggles, racial struggles, ethnic conflicts, communal conflicts between religious groups, etc., that have lasted for years, decades, even centuries, before either side came to the limits of its output reserves. Just for one example, the FARC insurrection
in Colombia is finally being settled this month after some fifty years of conflict. Â Â
RM: Yes, but what I would like to know is what is the variable that is being controlled (kept at a virtual reference level) in each of these conflicts.
KM: Iâve argued that the relative stability in all kinds of social structural and organizational patterns, such as but not limited to languages, political arrangements, economic arrangements, family patterns, religious and cultural patterns, styles in the standardized
manufacture of consumer goods, etc., etc., can be understood in the context of PCT generally, and collective control specifically.
RM: Yes, but what I would like to know is exactly what variable aspects of language, political arrangements, family patterns, etc, are stabilized by conflict. And how is the control effected. What are the outputs of the actors engaged in the conflict that affect this aspect of language? What are the disturbances to this aspect of the language that are being opposed by these outputs?Â
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KM: Rick, apparently, has had difficulty getting his head around my arguments,
RM: I have read your papers and I only have difficulty going from your nice simulations of conflict to mapping how these simulations map to the “stability” of the things you talk about: languages, political arrangements, economic arrangements, family patterns, religious and cultural patterns, styles in the standardized manufacture of consumer goods, etc. It’s not that I don’t believe that your model can account for the stability of variable aspects of these phenomena, it’s just that I would like to see an explicit application of the model, showing how the variables in the model correspond to the variables observed in these social phenomena.
BestÂ
Rick
Â
assuming he has actually read my papers, so if youâre interested in my work, it might make more sense to go back to the things Iâve written, instead of settling for Rickâs Cliff-Notes
version. I would be happy to share copies of my PCT-related papers with anyone whoâs interested. Just contact me directly, rather than via CSGnet. The papers are also available on ResearchGate.Â
Best to all,
Kent
On Dec 14, 2016, at 12:33 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:
[From Rick Marken (2016.12.14.1030)]
–
Richard S. MarkenÂ
“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers
RM: What Kent showed is that under certain circumstances, a variable that is in conflict can appear to be controlled. Those “certain circumstances” exist when the systems in conflict are not producing maximum output. But in real conflicts, both
systems quickly go to maximum output. …
RM: So what Kent discovered is that there is a situation where a variable in conflict can be controlled, in the sense that it can be maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance. This happens only when the systems in conflict are
not operating a maximum output, a situation that is surely very rare (I can’t think of any but perhaps you can).
RM: I still think what’s really needed are observations – preferably quantitative – of the social phenomena that you want to explain. I think the main problem (for me, anyway) with all this discussion of “collective control” is that the theory
has driven what is observed rather than vice versa. Â
RM: What are the social phenomena that you are trying to account for with control theory?
Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.13 1155 EST)
RM: …what Kent showed in his modeling work is that, in conflict situations, the variable in conflict is controlled: the ratio of actual to expected variance is very small so stability is high meaning control is good. Â
Â
RM:Â So saying that the variable in conflict is stabilized is the same as saying that it is controlled.
 RM: No, control means stabilized in the face of disturbance that should produce instability. That’s why the stability factor is a measure of observed to expected stability. Expected stability is a measure of the variability of a variable that
would be expected on purely causal principles; observed stability is a measure of the actual variability of the variable. If the observed variability of the variable is much smaller that the expected variability it is evidence that the variable is being protected
from the effects of disturbances – ie. that it is being controlled.Â
RM: What Kent showed is that under certain circumstances, a variable that is in conflict can appear to be controlled. Those “certain circumstances” exist when the systems in conflict are not producing maximum output. But in real conflicts, both
systems quickly go to maximum output. When this happens, the variable no longer acts as though it’s controlled; the variable is no longer protected from disturbances. This is why powers said that when system are in conflict both lose control. It’s because
disturbances to the variable both are controlling (relative to different references) are completely effective. You can see (and experience) this loss of control in my “Cost of Conflict” demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Conflict.html).Â
RM: So the typical result of conflict is neither stability nor control. There will be stability, in the sense of low variability of the variable in conflict, if there are no disturbances acting on the variable. But if there are disturbances acting
on the controlled variable then there will be no stability (the variable in conflict will vary in proportion to the variable effects of the disturbance) and there will clearly be no control (the ratio of observed to expected variance of the variable in conflict
will be 1.0, indicating that the variable is not protected from disturbance at all.Â
RM: So what Kent discovered is that there is a situation where a variable in conflict can be controlled, in the sense that it can be maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance. This happens only when the systems in conflict are
not operating a maximum output, a situation that is surely very rare (I can’t think of any but perhaps you can). A variable can also be stabilized by conflict, but again only in situations where there are no disturbances acting on the variable in conflict.
This may be a more common situation and it may be what Kent was talking about when he talks about conflict resulting in stability. Again, I can’t think of any socially significant examples of such situations; the only example I can think of is a tug of war
with teams of nearly equal strength. But as the tug of war situation suggests, this stability is always on the edge of instability.Â
[EJ] With apologies, I’ll raise a recent political example. The emerging decisions of the incoming Trump administration are very far from my control (p)references, & that of 65.7 millions of others, even
though they are stabilized much closer to that of 62.9 million other voters. The argument being raised in this CSGnet discussion is whether “stabilized” is a more accurate way to talk about those “virtual reference level” compromised outcomes between conflicting
control systems. In those situations, the meaning of the Stability Factor is being confounded – it is not a good measure of individual control, because of the confound of other (conflicting) control systems.Â
RM: I don’t see what variable is being stabilized in your political example. So I’ll just say that there is no “confounding” of the stability factor that I can see. Whether a variable is being controlled by 1 or 100 people is irrelevant to the
computation of the stability factor. All you are doing is measuring the observed variability of a variable and comparing it to the expected variability. The calculation of the expected variability does require that you know how many people are acting on the
variable and what the expected effect of those actions combined with the effect of disturbances to the variable are expected to have if the variable were not under control. But I think this can be very easily done, to quote a phase (there, two Dylan lines
in one sentence!!)Â
RM: I still think what’s really needed are observations – preferably quantitative – of the social phenomena that you want to explain. I think the main problem (for me, anyway) with all this discussion of “collective control” is that the theory
has driven what is observed rather than vice versa. And the social phenomenon that has been pushed as the one explained by collective control is stability. Stability is a measure of the variability of of a variable; the lower the variability of the variable,
the more stable it is. So is collective control just trying to account for the stability of social variables? Or is it trying to account for the fact that these variables are more stable than would  be expected on causal grounds – that is, it is trying to
account for the fact hat these variables are controlled?Â
RM: What are the social phenomena that you are trying to account for with control theory?
Best
Rick
Â
[EJ]Â Kent’s key argument in his recent post [Kent McClelland (2016.12.09.1400)], with which I agree, is that "we need to develop a clear analytic vocabulary for talking about the collectively controlled stabilities in our common social environments."Â
I understand Bill Powers’ reluctance, and I share it, for not going beyond the bare minimum of conceptual categories in PCT. That is why I am always looking for how much mileage we can get out of the classic PCT concepts – e.g., associating conflict as mutual
“Disturbance”, noticing stable niches emerging in the “Environmental Feedback Function”, correlating various emotions with the rate of change in the “Error” term, etc. Â
Â
[EJ] However, there are “cultural stabilities” that develop, like well-worn pathways, which are themselves phenomena worthy of investigation (“Phenomena Phirst!”, as the rallying cry goes). Like Kent, I’m not sure what language is best for construing
them.  Various candidates have been proposed: Â
“Atenfel” (aesthetically, not getting my vote). Â
“CEV / Complex Environmental Variable” (perhaps subject to the representational misunderstanding). Â
“Stabilized niche” / “Well-worn path” / “Stable platform for controlling other perceptions”. Â
“Socially produced invariance”. Â
“Boss realities” that discipline reorganization. Â
The “Winter leaf effect” of control regions semi-protected from further disturbance. Â
Â
[EJ] To speak in these terms does not keep them from also being Categories / Principles / System Concepts controlled by individuals in their personal hierarchies of control. It just allows asking broader questions about the properties of control
systems as they interact. Â
Â
All the best,Â
ErlingÂ
Â
–Â
Richard S. MarkenÂ
“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers