[from Gary Cziko 950212. 0143 GMT]
With Rick Marken's blessing, I sent his posts about Staddon's article along
with some others in the thread to Staddon.
Below is his reply.--Gary
[from John Staddon 950211]
Gary: Thanks for the various messages. I prefer not to join the list, as I
already get more e-mail than I can handle. But I will try and clarify a couple
of points. I agree with one of the commentators who said that the notion of
"free will" is irrelevant to my main argument, which is that the purpose of
(judicial) punishment is to reduce the total amount of suffering in human
society. For this to be possible, punishment must "work" in the sense of
reducing or deterring, criminal behavior, which means that behavior must be
predictable, to some degree. In short, the legal concept of "responsibility"
requires that behavior be predictable, not the converse, which is what BFS
argues in "Beyond Freedom and Dignity."
To the objection that it seems somehow unfair to punish someone whose
(criminal) behavior is totally determined, I can say two things: (a) the
punishment is not (primarily) for him, it is pour encourager les autres; (b)
one of the determining factors in his behavior was undoubtedly the expectation
that he would get away with it. By punishing him, we make it that much less
likely that others will share that view.
I realise that all this may seem to support the current conservative political
trend, but that does not make it ipso facto wrong.
John S.
<[Bill Leach 950212.22:30 EST(EDT)]
[Gary Cziko 950212. 0143 GMT]
Gads, I just "know" I'm gonna regret this...
[John Staddon 950211]
..., which is that the purpose of (judicial) punishment is to reduce the
total amount of suffering in human society.
A nice "clear" and "precise" goal. Err, could someone please tell me the
units of measure for "suffering"? Ah... is all suffering the same? Who
determines what is and is not suffering? Is there a means of handling
"suffering" for which there is no responsibility assignment possible (or
is there just no such thing)?
For this to be possible, punishment must "work" in the sense of reducing
or deterring, criminal behavior, which means that behavior must be
predictable, to some degree. In short, the legal concept of
"responsibility" requires that behavior be predictable, not the
converse, which is what BFS argues in "Beyond Freedom and Dignity."
Do I see a red herring?
To the objection that it seems somehow unfair to punish someone whose
(criminal) behavior is totally determined, I can say two things: (a) the
punishment is not (primarily) for him, it is pour encourager les autres;
(b) one of the determining factors in his behavior was undoubtedly the
expectation that he would get away with it. By punishing him, we make
it that much less likely that others will share that view.
Gee, John REALLY should take a hard look at PCT -- then he would not have
to write this paragraph at all!
Actually, the potential for undesirable consequences (punishment)
undoubtedly DOES deter some anti-social behaviour. It is also true
though that the "price" for such methods is high and there will always be
those that either don't believe that they will ever suffer such
consequences (no matter how many examples) or don't care about the
consequences imposed.
-bill